R. N. AGGARWAL, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, H. C. Sharma has challenged the vires of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as "the Act") on the ground that it is violative of Articles 14, 19 (l) (f) and 31 of the Constitution of India. The relevant facts are that the petitioner is the owner of the premises described as Flat No. 28-E, Connaught Place, New Delhi. The petitioner had leased out the said flat to the National Insurance Company Limited for non-residential use. The National Insurance Company was nationalised and on its nationalisation, the Life Insurance Corporation of India became the tenant of the said premises under the petitioner. The petitioner requested respondent no. 1 for vacating the premises as he required the premises for his bona fide use and occupation. The demised premises are in possession of an officer of respondent no. 1 who is using it for his residence. Respondent No. 1 did not vacate the premises. The petitioner filed an application against respondent no. 1 for his eviction on the ground that respondent no. 1 had sub-let the premises. The petitioner was unsuccessful in those proceedings right up to the High Court. It was held by the High Court that respondent no. 1 had permitted its officer to occupy the premises for residential purposes asa licencee and it would not in law amount to sub-letting. In this Writ Petition the petitioner pleaded that he could not seek eviction of respondent no. 1 from the demised premises on the ground of his personal requirement as Section 14 of the Act does not provide for the recovery of possession of a non-residential building on the ground of personal need. The petitioner pleaded that the restriction placed by Section 14 on the right of the landlord to recover the premises let out for non- relidential purposes for his bona fide use and occupation is unreasonable and that such a restriction is not in the interest of general public. The petitioner further pleaded that the classification of the premises into two classes, namely, "non-residential" and "residential" is arbitrary and there is no rational basis for distinguishing the two and consequently the provisions of Section 14 the reviolative of. Article 14 and deserve to be struck down. The petitioner further pleaded that the classification of the premises into two classes, namely, "non-residential" and "residential" is arbitrary and there is no rational basis for distinguishing the two and consequently the provisions of Section 14 the reviolative of. Article 14 and deserve to be struck down. The petitioner pleaded that a landlord who has let out the premises for non-residential purposes is precluded from recovering possession of non-residential premises on the ground of his bona fide requirem ents whereas a landlord who has let out the pre. nises for residential purposes can recover such premises for his bona fide requirement s and that the differential treatment meted out to the two categories of the landlords mentioned above is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner further pleaded that the impugned provision is a permanent measure and has the effect of depriving a landlord of his right to possess and enjoy the property permanently and is, therefore, vioiative of the fundamental rights of a citizen guaranteed under Articles 19 (l) (f) and 31 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner prayed that Section 14 and clause 14 (l) (e) of the Act be declared ultra vires and unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE petition was resisted by the respondents. Respondents 1 and 2 pleaded that the provisions of Section 14 of the Act are reasonable and in the interest of general public and are, therefore, not violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. The respondents further pleaded that the classification of the properties into residential and non-residential and the absence of a provision in Section 14 (l) (e) enabling a landlord to recover possession of a non-residential building for his persona) use is rational and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Respondent no. The respondents further pleaded that the classification of the properties into residential and non-residential and the absence of a provision in Section 14 (l) (e) enabling a landlord to recover possession of a non-residential building for his persona) use is rational and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Respondent no. 2 pleaded that the restriction imposed by Section 14 of the Act on the right of the landlords from recovering possession of non-residential premises even when the landlord required the premises for his personal use is in public interest and the object being that the tenants in possession of non-residentia I premises should not be compelled to shift their professional, commercial or business premises from time to time merely to meet the private and personal requirements of the landlords; that in other words the requirement of the landlord has been made subservient to the needs of that class of persons CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER who require and avail of the services rendered y persons engaged in such commercial, professional or business activities; and such a restriction cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction. Respondent no. 1 pleaded that the restrictions imposed by Section 14 of the Act against eviction of tenants by the landlords are reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution of India. Respondent no. 1 submitted that on account of World War II and partition of the country and consequent influx of refugees into India from West Pakistan, a great housing shortage was caused, that in order to remove the hardship, discontentment and grievance of a particular class of citizens, viz. , the tenants, it became necessary to regulate the relations between the landlords and tenants by controlling the rents and the right to evict the tenants, by legislation. Respondent no. 1 submitted that unless proper restrictions were imposed on the rights of the landlords to eject their tenants, the economic and social fabric of the society would have been shaken and public order would have been seriously jeopardised. Respondent no. 1 further contended that the classification of the premises into (a) residential and (b) non-residential is intelligible and has obvious relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Respondent no. Respondent no. 1 further contended that the classification of the premises into (a) residential and (b) non-residential is intelligible and has obvious relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Respondent no. 1 submitted that the object of Section 14 of the Act is to restrict the right of the landlords to eject tenants and thereby prevent the landlords from exploiting the situation arising from housing shortage; that at the same time the object of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act was to enable the landlord to obtain possession of the residential premises bona fide required by him for use as his residence. Respondent no. 1 submitted that premises which were let for non-re sidential purposes were classed separately as normally they could not be put to the use of residence. The Respondent submitted that nonresidential premises were taken out of the ambit, of Section 14 (l) (e) in view of the shortage of commercial premises, and that the legislature being the best judge of the need of a particular class of premises, the classification of the premises into "residential" and "non-residential" cannot be said to be arbitrary. Before discussing the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, we shall briefly refer to the history of rent control legislation that was applied to Delhi from time to time. At first, the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 was issued under rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules. The object of enacting the said Rent Control Order was to control the rents and eviction of tenants. The Rent Control Order was made applicable only to residential premises. Section 11a of the said Rent Control order provided that a tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except on the grounds mentioned therein. The Rent Control Order was made applicable only to residential premises. Section 11a of the said Rent Control order provided that a tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except on the grounds mentioned therein. Clause (iv) of sub-section 2 of Section 11a is important and it provides : "that the landlord was at no time during the twelve months immediately preceding the date of his application residing within the limits of the Delhi or New Delhi Municipality or the Notified Areas of the Civil Station, Delhi, or Delhi Fort, that it is essential in the public interest that he should take up residence in that area and that he is unable to secure other suitable accommodation, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, and if thejcontroller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application. " ( 3 ) ON 15th October, 1942, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941, was made applicable to the Province of Delhi, except to areas where the New Delhi House Rent Control Order was applicable. The definition of the expression "premises" in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act made no distinction between "residential" and "non-residential" premises. Section 10 (1) of the said Act provided that no order for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay rent to the full extent allowable by this Act and perform other conditions of the tenancy. The proviso to sub-section I of Section 10 provided that the court shall make an order for the recovery of possession if the landlord satisfies the court that six months notice to quit or notice of such period as may be required under the contract of tenancy whichever be longer has been served on the tenant. The proviso to sub-section I of Section 10 provided that the court shall make an order for the recovery of possession if the landlord satisfies the court that six months notice to quit or notice of such period as may be required under the contract of tenancy whichever be longer has been served on the tenant. Sub-section 2 of Section 10 provided that where any order mentioned in sub-section I has been made on or after the First day of January, 1939 but not executed before the cornmencement of the said Act the court by which the order was made may if it is of opinion that the order would not have been made if the Act had been in operation on the date the order was made, rescind or vary the order in such manner as the court may think fit. The proviso to [ Section 10 (2) provides the grounds when the provisions of Section 10 will not be applicable and one of the grounds provided is when the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his own occupation. In 1944, the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, No. XXV of 1944, was enacted. The expression "premises" was defined to CORPORATION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER meaa any building which is let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose. Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 9 of the Ordinance provide the grounds on which the landlord could recover possession of the premises and one of the grounds stated was A when the landlord required the premises for his use as residence. landlord, under the Ordinance, could not recover possession of the premises for his commercial use. In 1947, the Delhi and Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act was passed for all parts of Delhi. This Act was initially to remain in force for two years but later its life was extended to six years. Section 2 (b) of the said Act defined "premises" and the relevant portion of it reads as : "premises" means any building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 4 ) SECTION 9 of the said Act provided the grounds on which a tenant could be evicted. The relevant clause (e) reads as : "that purely residential premises are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family, that he neither has nor is able to secure other suitable accommodation, and that he has acquired his interest in the premises at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever is later, or if the interest has devolved on him by inheritance or succession, his predecessor had acquired the interest at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever is later;. . . . . . . . " ( 5 ) THIS Act was replaced on 9th June, 1952, by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, No. XXXVIII of 1952. There was no material change in the definition of the expression "premises" in this Act. Section 13 of the Act of 1952 provided the grounds on which a tenant could be evicted. The relevant clause 13 (l) (c) reads as :- "that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation; Explanation :-For the purposes of this clause, "residential premises" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes:. . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) THE act of 1952 was further replaced by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. There was no change in the definition of the expression "premises" in the Act of 1958. The relevant portion of Section 14 reads as: "14. . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) THE act of 1952 was further replaced by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. There was no change in the definition of the expression "premises" in the Act of 1958. The relevant portion of Section 14 reads as: "14. Protection of Tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant : Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); (b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtain- ing the consent in writing of the landlord; (c); that the tenant has used the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let- (i) if the premises have been let on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; or (ii) if the premises have been let before the said date without obtaining his consent; (d) that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof; (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; Explanation :-For the purpose of thisclause, "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes; (f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are hona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; (g) that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purposes of building or re-building or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and (hat such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; (h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence; (i) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and that the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment; (j) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises; (k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in amanner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate; (l) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in pursuance of any improvement scheme or development scheme and that such building work cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated. " ( 7 ) MRS. Shyamla Pappu, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that Article 19 (l) (f) of the Constitution of India guarantees to every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and the right to hold property includes the right to possess the property and enjoy it. Mrs. Pappu contended that Sec. 14 read with clause 14 (l) (e) of the Act deprives the landlord of a non-residential building of his right to evict the tenant when he needs the premises for his own occupation, and this restriction, according to the counsel, is unreasonable and not in public interest and, therefore, violative of Article 19 (1) (f ). Article 19 (l) (f) of the Constitution of India provides:- "all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. " Clause (5) of Article 19 provides that- "nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. " ( 8 ) THE question that arises for determination is whether the restriction imposed by Section 14 of the Act on the right of a landlord of nonresidential premises to evict a tenant on the ground of his personal requirement is a reasonable restriction and in the interest of the general public. There appears to be no difficulty in accepting the contention of Mrs. Pappu that the right to hold property guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (f) includes the right to possess the property-see Jyoti Pershad and ors. vs. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi and Ors. , A. I. R. 1961s. C. 1602. (1 ). Any other meaning given to the expression "the right to hold" would be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 (l) (f ). ( 9 ) WE regret we are unable to accept the contention that the restriction imposed by the impugned provisions on the right of landlord of non-residential premises to evict the tenant on the ground of his personal requirement is not reasonable and in the interest of general public. ( 9 ) WE regret we are unable to accept the contention that the restriction imposed by the impugned provisions on the right of landlord of non-residential premises to evict the tenant on the ground of his personal requirement is not reasonable and in the interest of general public. Looking in the background of the history of rent control legislation made applicable to Delhi from time to time, it is evident that the rent control legislation had its origin because of shortage in housing accommodation and demand of exhorbitant rents. To check the rise in rents and control the eviction of tenants, in 1929 the Rent Control Order was issued. It embraced only residential accommodation. Under the Rent Control Ordinance, 1944 a landlord could evict a tenant if he required the premises for his use as residence. The Rent Control Act of 1947 for the first time drew a distinction between the premises let out for residence and for commercial use and imposed a restriction on the eviction of tenants in possession of commercial premises. A landlord could evict a tenant only from residential premises in case he required the premises for his personal occupation but he could not recover possession of non-residential premises for his own use. This restriction also found place in the subsequent two enactments. ( 10 ) IN judging whether the restriction imposed by the impugned provisions is reasonable, the court can look into the circumstances under which the restriction came to be imposed. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in 1947 there was a large influx of refugees into Delhi. A large number of people who were uprooted from their hearths and homes in West Pakistan settled in Delhi. This resulted in acute shortage of house accommodation and business premises with the result that rents soared to a high level which necessitated the regulation of realtions between landlords and tenants. ( 11 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of Section 14 of the Act places a blanket restriction on the landlords to evict tenants both from residential and nonresidential premises. Clauses (a) to (c), (f), (g) and (j) to (1) enumerate F the grounds on which a landlord could evict tenants both from the residential and non-residential premises while clauses (d), (e), (h) and (i) provide the grounds on which a landlord could evict tenants from residential premises. Clauses (a) to (c), (f), (g) and (j) to (1) enumerate F the grounds on which a landlord could evict tenants both from the residential and non-residential premises while clauses (d), (e), (h) and (i) provide the grounds on which a landlord could evict tenants from residential premises. Clause (e) gives a right to the landlord of premises let for residential purposes to evict a tenant in case he required the residential premises bona fide for occupation as his residence. This advantage was not allowed to the landlords of non-residential premises. The object in not providing for the eviction of a tenant from a non- residential premises on the ground specified in sub-clause (e) was to give security of tenure to a tenant of such premises. If a tenant of a non-residential premises was allowed to be evicted on the ground of personal requirement by the landlord, it would have had the effect of completely dislocating the business of the tenant and this in turn could have grave consequences on the social and economic fabric of the country, besides causing untold misery to the tenant. Mrs. Pappu contended that the effect of the impugned provision is to deprive the landlord of his right to possess the premises for an indefinite period although he may be requiring the premises bonafide for his commercial or residential use and such a restriction cannot be said to be reasonable. ( 12 ) THE Rent Control Act does not impose any obligation on a landlord to let the premises. There is no restriction in the Act on the right of a landlord to put the premises owned by him to any use that he liked. The restriction is that once a landlord chooses to let out the premises for non-residential use then he is debarred from evicting the tenant on the ground of his personal requirement. This restriction, keeping in mind the background which resulted in the rent control legislation, cannot be said to bs unreasonable and not in the interest of general public. In Sardar Inder Singh and others, vs. The State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1957 S. C. 510, (2) Mr. This restriction, keeping in mind the background which resulted in the rent control legislation, cannot be said to bs unreasonable and not in the interest of general public. In Sardar Inder Singh and others, vs. The State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1957 S. C. 510, (2) Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the court held- "it cannot be said that the provisions of the Ordinance 9 of 1949 are repugnant to Art. 19 (l) (f) in that they oblige the landowners to keep tenants on their lands, thereby preventing them from themselves cultivating the same. The object of theOrdinance, as set out in the preamble, is clearly not to put a restriction on the right of an owner to himself cultivate the lands, but to prevent him when he had inducted a tenant on the land from getting rid of him without sufficient cause A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone be said to be unreasonable. The impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character, and, that is a factor to be taken into account in judging of its reasonableness. " ( 13 ) MRS. Pappu contended that the impugned provisions have the effect of totally depriving the landlord of his right to possess and enjoy the property and such a restriction cannot be termed as reasonable. The impugned provisions only take away the right of the landlord in nonresidential premises to a limited extent. If a tenant of non-residential premises sub-lets the premises or fails to pay the rent or uses the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was let out, or causes substantial damage to the premises, or the landlord requires it for reconstruction, the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant. The restriction is only that once he inducts a tenant to the non-residential premises then he cannot evict him on the ground of his personal need. Mrs. Pappu in support of her contention placed reliance on Ramcharan Ramdin Ahir vs. Resident Deputy Collector, with Rent Control Appellate Powers,yeotmal and others,a. I. R. 1971 Bombay 203, (3 ). The restriction is only that once he inducts a tenant to the non-residential premises then he cannot evict him on the ground of his personal need. Mrs. Pappu in support of her contention placed reliance on Ramcharan Ramdin Ahir vs. Resident Deputy Collector, with Rent Control Appellate Powers,yeotmal and others,a. I. R. 1971 Bombay 203, (3 ). In the cited case the validity of clause 13 (3) (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order (1949) was challenged on the ground that it puts unreasonable restriction on the right of a landlord to get back the demised premises even if his need is bona fide and that the restriction imposed is violative of Article 19 (1) (f ). The provision which was under challenge in the cited case reads- "if after hearing the parties the Controller is satisfied- that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation, provided he is not occupying any other house of his own in the city or town concerned. He shall grant the landlord permission to give notice to determine the lease as required by sub-clause (1 ). ( 14 ) THE said clause came up for interpretation before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and the Bench interpreted the clause to mean that the landlord cannot get back the possession of the house or a portion of it even if the landlord genuinely needs it because his own house or a portion thereof in which he is living is either unsuitable or inadequate or insufficient for his needs. In Ramcharan Ramdin Ahir (Supra)/ Mr. Justice Padhye while considering the validity of the clause reproduced above, held- "thus, such a kind of restriction would in fact jeopardise the interests of the tenants class instead of promoting their interests. It is not understood as to how such restrictions can be said to be reasonable restrictions. On a consideration of all these matters, I am of opinion that the restriction which is put on the right of the landlord to occupy his own house or a portion of his house who seek additional accommodation from the tenant is highly unreasonable and is in excess of what is really necessary. On a consideration of all these matters, I am of opinion that the restriction which is put on the right of the landlord to occupy his own house or a portion of his house who seek additional accommodation from the tenant is highly unreasonable and is in excess of what is really necessary. "the Judge further held- "i am of opinion that the proviso to clause 13 (3) (vi) of the Rent Control Order in so far as it denies to the landlord the right to get a house or a portion of the house in the occupation of the tenant if the landlord genuinely needs it, because his own house or a portion thereof in which he is living is either unsuitable or inadequate or insufficient for his needs, which is a construction put upon that proviso by the Full Bench, is ultra vires as it violates the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (l) (f) of the Constitution, the restriction put thereon under Article 19 (5) being unreasonable and is, therefore, unconstitutional and invalid. " ( 15 ) THE Full Bench interpreted clause 13 (3) (vi) and held that prohibition would apply whether the house is sufficient or insufficient. On that interpretation of the provision, Padhye J. took the view that it was an unreasonable provision. Such a position does not obtain in the present case. We are concerned in the present case with the question as to whether the absence of a provision in clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act enabling a landlord to recover the premises let out by him for commercial purposes on the ground of his personal need for commercial and residential purpose makes the provision clause (e) unreasonable. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel is not of any assistance in determining the validity of the impugned provisions. ( 16 ) MRS. Pappu contended that in no other State in India a restriction similar to the one in question has been imposed on a landlord and this demonstrates that the restriction imposed by the impugned provisions is unreasonable. This argument has not impressed us. In each State, rent control legislation was brought on the statute keeping in view its needs and peculiar circumstances. This argument has not impressed us. In each State, rent control legislation was brought on the statute keeping in view its needs and peculiar circumstances. After partition of India in 1947, there was a large influx of refugees to the Union Territory of Delhi and the State of Punjab and the authorities were faced with a gigantic problem of resettlement of those refugees. This problem was not faced by the other States in India in such magnitude. In judging the validity of the impugned provisions, the conditions prevailing at the time of legislation have to be kept in view. It must be presumed that the legislature in enacting measures understands and correctly appreciates the needs of the people. The mere fact that other States in India did not impose restrictions similar to the one in question in their rent control legislation cannot lead to the conclusion that the impugned provisions are unreasonable. ( 17 ) EVEN otherwise Mrs. Pappu is not correct in contending that in no other State restrictions similar to the impugned restrictions have been imposed. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949 categorised the buildings in three categories, (a) non-residential, (b) residential and (c) scheduled buildings. A landlord, under the 1949 Act could recover possession of a non-residential buildings if he required it for his own use. Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act wassubsequently amended and at present the right of a landlord to recover possession of a non-residential purpose on the ground of his personal need has been taken away. Tn Punjab, a landlord cannot recover possession of a non-residental building on the ground of personal need. ( 18 ) ON an examination of the circumstances under which restrictions were imposed by the impugned legislation on the right of the landlord to hold property, we find that the said restrictions are not unreasonable. The class of tenants in possession of non-residential premises form a section of the public. The expression "general public" would include a section of the public. This statement of law has not been challenged by the counsel for the petitioner. The class of tenants in possession of non-residential premises form a section of the public. The expression "general public" would include a section of the public. This statement of law has not been challenged by the counsel for the petitioner. For the reasons recorded above, in our view, the provisions of Section 14 (1) and clause 14 (1) (e) of the Act cannot be attacked as violative of the fundamental right of the landlord to hold property under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution as the restrictions imposed by it are reasonable and in the interest of the general public within the meaning of Article 19 (5 ). ( 19 ) MRS. Pappu next contended that Section 14 (1) read with clause 14 (1) (e) is discriminatory and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that this argument has no force. Under the Act, the "premises" have been mainly put in two categories, i. e. residential and non-residential. Landlords as a body can be classified as landlords owning residential premises and those owning non-residential premises. Section 14 (1), as observed earlier, puts a blanket restriction on all the landlords in the matter of evicting tenants. Clauses (a) to (1) provide the grounds on which the landlords can evict their tenants. Except grounds (d), (e), (h) and (i) which relate to residential premises, all other grounds are common to both the categories of landlords. It is clause (e) which draws a distinction between the two types of premises, i. e. residential and non-residential. Clause (e) enables a landlord to evict a tenant from residential premises provided the landlord needs the premises bonafide for his own use. The benefit of clause (e) has not been extended to the landlords of the second category, viz. non-residential premises. ( 20 ) THE grievance of the petitioner is that the discrimination between the two classes of landlords is without any rational basis. World War II broke out in 1939 and an acute shortage of housing accommodation developed. To control the rents and eviction of tenants, the Rent Control Order of 1939 was issued. A study of the relevant provisions of the rent control legislation discussed in the earlier part of the judgment would show that the restrictions imposed on the landlords to recover possession of residential premises were very stringent upto 1952. To control the rents and eviction of tenants, the Rent Control Order of 1939 was issued. A study of the relevant provisions of the rent control legislation discussed in the earlier part of the judgment would show that the restrictions imposed on the landlords to recover possession of residential premises were very stringent upto 1952. Under the Rent Control Order of 1939 and the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944. a landlord could recover possession of residential premises only when he had not resided within the limits of Delhi or New Delhi during the twelve months immediately preceding the date of the application and further satisfied the conditions that it was essential in the public interest that he should take up residence in that area and that he was unable to secure other suitable accommodation. Under the Rent Control Act of 1947, a landlord could recover possession of residential premises only if he did not possess other suitable accommodation nor was he able to secure other suitable accommodation and further, that he had acquired his interest in the premises at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever was later. The rigour of the restrictions qua residential premises was relaxed in the Act of 1952 and a landlord could recover possession of residential premises if he required it bonafide for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and he had no other suitable accommodation. In comparison to this the Rent Control Order, 1939 was not applied to non-residential premises. The Delhi Rent Control Ordinance did not place any bar on the right of the landlord to recover possession of non-residential premises. The only restriction placed was that the landlord could recover possession of the premises for his residential use. The bar against the eviction of tenants from non-residential premises was introduced in the Rent Control Act, 1947 and it has continued since then. A landlord cannot recover possession of non-residential premises on the ground of his personal need. There is a clear object behind classification of the premises into "residential" and "non-residential". We have earlier observed that in 1947, on partition of the country, there was a large influx of refugees into Delhi. The Government was faced with the problem of resettling the refugees. There is a clear object behind classification of the premises into "residential" and "non-residential". We have earlier observed that in 1947, on partition of the country, there was a large influx of refugees into Delhi. The Government was faced with the problem of resettling the refugees. This necessitated the imposition of restrictions on the right to evict tenants both from residential and non-residential premises. The legislature keeping in view the needs of the people and other circumstances allowed the landlord to evict tenants from residential premises for his personal use in case he did not have any other suitable accommodation, but restricted the right of the landlord to recover possession of nonresidential premises on the ground of personal need. The necessity behind this discrimination is to assure the security of tenure to the tenants of non-residential premises so that they can settle in their business without the fear of being ejected. The above discussion of the relevant provisions of the rent control legislation applicable to Delhi would bring out that the legislature was from time to time making amendments keeping in view the needs of the time. ( 21 ) OWNERS of residential buildings and non-residential buildings each stand out a? a class by themselves. The impugned provisions make no distinction inter se between the two classes of properties or their landlords. The impugned provisions take within their fold all the persons similarly situate. So long as there is equality under similar conditions and among persons similarly situated, there is no infringement of Article 14. In Ram Krishna Dalmia and others vs. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others, AIR 1958 S. C. 538, (4) Chief Justice S. R. Das laid down certain principles to be borne in mind by court in determining the validity of a statute on ground of violation of Article 14 and they are :- "it is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The decisions further establish- CD/72-8. (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstancesor reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. " ( 22 ) LOOKING to the history of the rent control legislation and other attending circumstances and keeping in view the principles laid down in the cited case, we are of the view that the discrimination in the impugned provisions is based on adequate grounds and cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as there is a nexus between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by it. ( 23 ) MRS. Pappu did not press the third ground of attack, namely, that the impugned provisions are violative of Article 31 of the Constitution. There is no merit in the third ground of attack on the validity of the impugned provisions. There is a clear distinction between the imposition of restrictions on the use of property and the deprivation of a person of his property. Section 14 of the Act cannot be read as a legislative provision depriving the owner of his property. The impugned provisions only restrict the right of the owner to recover possession of the property let out for non-residential purposes on the ground of personal requirement but otherwise his rights in the property remain intact and he can deal with the property the way he likes. In Kishan Singh and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others. A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 795, 5 it was held - "a law which regulates the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within Art. 31 (2), even though it has the effect of reducing his rights. To regulate the relations of landlord and tenant and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised by the landlord in connection with his land, is different from compulsory acquisition of the land. Hence, S. 86, Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 is not repugnant to Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. " ( 24 ) FOR the foregoing reasons the challenge to the vires of the impugned provisions on the ground that they are violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution of India fails and the petititon is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee is assessed at Rs. 500. 00. There will be only one set of fees.