JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. - This is an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh u/s 417(1) Code of Criminal Procedure against the appellate order of the Sessions Judge Orai dated 7-9-1968 acquitting the accused for an offence u/s 480 Code of Criminal Procedure and setting aside the sentence of a fine of Rs. 100/- imposed upon him by the trial court. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Sri Bramha Deo was both the SDM as well as the SDO Orai. On 13-8-1968 he was taking up Case No. 38 Gram Sabha v. Mori Lal and Ors. u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act. The statement of Piarey Lal son of Ram Deen, who was the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha was recorded and he was also cross-examined on behalf of the opposite party. While this case was proceeding Sri Bramha Deo asked Piarey Lal as to how many Farzi Pattas had been executed in his Gaon Sabha. Piarey Lal replied "Yeh Farzi Pattay hazoor nay hi karwayay hain." Sri Bramha Deo considered the uttering of these words to be an intentional insult amounting to contempt of his court. As such he drew up proceedings u/s 480 Code of Criminal Procedure against opposite party Piarey Lal. He examined Piarey Lal by putting the following question to him: Kya turn nay ijlas kay poochnay per ki is gaon mein kitnay Farzi pattay huway hain, yeh kaha ki yeh farzi Pattay hazoor nay hi karwayay hain. The reply of Piarey Lal to the aforesaid question was: Ji han. This answer in the opinion of Sri Bramha Dao was an admission of the deliberate insult hurled at the Presiding Officer in the earlier judicial proceedings by attributing the execution of the Farzi Pattas to the Presiding Officer. The uttering of these words in the opinion of the trial court undermined the prestige of the Court and was a contempt of a grave nature. Sri Bramha Deo was of opinion that the Contemner being a Pradhan, who fully understood the implications of his insulting utterances, convicted him u/s 480 Code of Criminal Procedure and imposed a fine of Rs. 100/-. In default of payment of fine he was to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. The aforesaid order was passed on 13-8-1968. 3. Piarey Lal tiled Cr. 100/-. In default of payment of fine he was to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. The aforesaid order was passed on 13-8-1968. 3. Piarey Lal tiled Cr. A. No. 141 of 1968 in the Court of the Sessions Judge Orai. Two main points which found favour with the lower appellate court were as follows: The first point argued was that the proceedings out of which the appeal had arisen "was taken up by the SDM Orai and that the alleged insult had been offered to the SDO Orai, who had been taking up a case u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act." It was pointed out that u/s 480 Code of Criminal Procedure any civil, criminal or revenue court before whom an offence u/s 228 IPC had been committed under which section the present case would fall could take cognizance of such offence before the rising of the court and sentence the offender to a fine not exceeding Rs. 200/-. It was urged that if the SDO Orai had been insulted he could only take action in that very capacity. He could not sic as SDM to take cognizance of this case. The other point stressed before the lower appellate court was that there was nothing to suggest that the alleged court question had actually been put to Piarey Lal during the proceedings u/s 198 of the ZA and LR Act. It was urged that it was not precisely known at which particular stage of the judicial proceeding the alleged insult was offered to him. Both the above contentions were accepted by the Sessions Judge Orai who acquitted the accused opposite party of the offence u/s 480 Code of Criminal Procedure. In appeal before us three contentions have been raised and we shall deal with each one of these submissions. 4. The first point stressed is that the SDO is not a court within the use of the expression 'revenue court' as laid down in Section 480 Code of Criminal Procedure. It is argued that according to the order of Sri Bramha Deo the contempt in question was committed while he was taking up a case Gaon Sabh v. Moti Lal u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR. Act. It is argued that according to the order of Sri Bramha Deo the contempt in question was committed while he was taking up a case Gaon Sabh v. Moti Lal u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR. Act. It was submitted that because the order u/s 198 UP ZA and LR Act was not appealable to the Collector and a person aggrieved by such an order could only file a civil suit u/s 198(4) to establish his rights, the SDO cannot be deemed to be a revenue court. Reliance for this submission is placed upon a Single Judge decision of this Court reported in 1970 AWR 516 in which Hon. H.C.P. Tripathi, J. has held as follows: Sub-section (4) of Section 198 makes the order of cancellation final subject to the suit. Therefore, if the objection filed by an aggrieved person is rejected by the SDO, he can go up in appeal before the Commissioner in accordance with serial No. 20 Schedule II read with Section 331 of the Act. But where the objection has been accepted by the SDO and the lease has been cancelled, no appeal lies against the order of the cancellation and the only remedy open to the lessee is to file a suit. We have carefully considered this submission of counsel for the Appellant but we do not find any force in it. Section 195 of the UP ZA and LR Act empowers the Land Management Committee of the Gaon Sabha to admit any person as a Sirdar of any land (other than the land falling under classes mentioned in Section 132) or where-- (a) the land is vacant land; (b) the land is vested in the Gaon Sabha u/s 117; or (c) The land has come into the possession of Land Management Committee u/s 194 or under any other provisions of this Act. Under Section 197 of the said Act the Land Management Committee is also authorised to admit any person as an Asami to any land falling in any of the classes mentioned in Section 132 where-- (a) the land is vacant land; (b) the land is vested in the Gaon Sabha; or (c) the land has come into the possession of the Land Management Committee u/s 194 or under any other provisions of the Act. It is thus clear that Sections 195 and 197 of the UP ZA and LR Act authorise the Land Management Committee to admit a person as a Sirdar or as an Asami of any land such as is mentioned therein. Section 198(1) of the Act lays down the order of preference which has to be followed by the Land Management Committee in passing the order admitting any person as a Sirdar or as an Asami Under Sections 195 and 197 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 198 lays down: The Asstt. Collector-in-charge of the sub-division may on his own motion and shall on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Gaon Sabha passed Under Sub-section (1), enquire in the manner prescribed into an allotment made Under Sub-section (1) and if he is satisfied that the Gaon Sabha has acted with substantial irregularity or otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may pass thereon such orders as he thinks fit. Sub-section (3) of Section 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act runs: Where an Asstt. Collector-in-charge of the sub-division cancels an allotment, the right, titla and interest of the allottee or any person claiming through him shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (4), cease in the land allotted thereunder which shall revert to the Gaon Sabha and any person holding or relating possession of such land shall be deemed to be a trespasser and liable to ejectment. Sub-section (4) of Section 198 states that: Any person aggrieved by the order of cancellation passed Under Sub-section (2) may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by him but subject to the results of such suit the order of cancellation shall be final. Section 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act mentions as follows: Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in col. 4 of Schedule II shall,...take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in col. 3 thereof.... Sub-section (2) of Section 331 lays down: Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or decree passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in col. 3 of the schedule aforesaid. Sub-section (3) of Section 331 reads: An appeal shall lie from...any final order or decree passed by a court mentioned in col. 3 thereof.... Sub-section (2) of Section 331 lays down: Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or decree passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in col. 3 of the schedule aforesaid. Sub-section (3) of Section 331 reads: An appeal shall lie from...any final order or decree passed by a court mentioned in col. No. 4 in the proceedings mentioned in col. No. 3 to the court or authority mentioned in col. No. 5 thereof. The relevant entries in Schedule II are as follows: Serial No. Section Description of proceedings Court of origl. jurisdiction Court of first appeal Court of Second appeal 20 198 Objection against order of Land Management Committee. Asstt. Collector Incharge of Sub-Division. Commissioner ... 20-A 198(4) Suit to establish any right claimed in the land allotted Under Sub-section (1). Asstt. Collector Incharge 3 of Sub-division. Commissioner From a perusal of the aforementioned sections and Section 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act and the relevant entries in Schedule II, it is evident that if the order cancelling the allotment is passed by the Assistant Collector incharge of sub-division on the objection filed by any person in Sub-section (2) of Section 198, or even if action is taken suo moto by the Asstt. Collector an appeal can be filed therefrom. Such an order is appealable to the Commissioner u/s 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act as mentioned at serial No. 20 Schedule II framed thereunder. Even the lessee (Allottee) who may be aggrieved by the order of the Gaon Sabha cancelling the allotment would have a right of appeal. The statute provides that right at serial No. 20 of Schedule II of the said Act and it would be erroneous to presume that that right of the lessee (Allottee) is taken away merely because an additional right had been conferred upon him to challenge a cancellation order by the institution of a suit u/s 198(4) as provided at Serial No. 21-A of Schedule II. 5. It has to be remembered that the proceedings u/s 198(3) of the Act are only summary in nature. What Section 198(4) has done is merely to permit the allottee to file a regular suit for the vindication of his rights. Such a procedure has been followed under several enactments. The "description of proceedings" as mentioned in col. 5. It has to be remembered that the proceedings u/s 198(3) of the Act are only summary in nature. What Section 198(4) has done is merely to permit the allottee to file a regular suit for the vindication of his rights. Such a procedure has been followed under several enactments. The "description of proceedings" as mentioned in col. 3 at Serial No. 20 of Schedule II against which an appeal had been provided to the Commissioner is t decision of an "objection against the order of the Land Management Committee relating to letting out of land." The section mentioned in connection 'therewith is Section 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act. There is nothing to indicate therein that this right of appeal conferred under Serial No. 20 of Schedule II is to be confined only to a decision of an objection against the objection. The objector, the lessee (allottee) or any person claiming is fully entitled to file an appeal to the Commissioner against a decision u/s 198 UP ZA and LR Act, if he is aggrieved thereby irrespective of what the decision might be. There is in our view, no justification for restricting the right of appeal provided at serial No. 20 of Schedule II of the said Act. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in 1970 AWR 516 is incorrect and is hereby overruled. 6. The argument of the learned Counsel for the opposite party that because an order u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act is not appealable and therefore the Asstt. Collector Incharge of a division i.e. the SDO is not a revenue court is to our minds wholly misconceived. No ruling has been brought to our notice in support of this submission. Even the case reported in 1970 AWR 516 does not lay down any such proposition of law. Section 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act deals with the courts that shall have cognizance of suits under the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 331 states: Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall...take cognizance of any suit, application or proceeding mentioned in col. 3 thereof.... Sub-section (1) of Section 331 states: Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall...take cognizance of any suit, application or proceeding mentioned in col. 3 thereof.... Sub-section (2) of Section 331 states: Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or decree passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in col. 3 of the Schedule aforesaid. Col. 4 of Schedule II at Serial No. 20 mentions the "Asstt. Collector Incharge of a subdivision" as the court of original jurisdiction and col. 5 of Schedule II at serial No. 20 mentions the "Commissioner" as the court of first appeal. A perusal of the provisions mentioned above to our minds leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Asstt. Collector incharge of a sub-division or a SDO is a revenue court as contemplated under the said Act. There is, therefore, no merit in the submission of the counsel for the opposite party that the SDO was not entitled to take cognizance of a contempt committed in his presence under the provisions of Sections 480 and 481 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may in passing be mentioned here that Section 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act as it stands today has been substituted by UP. Act V of 1970 which came into force on 28th December, 1970. Serial Nos. 20 and 20-A of Schedule II have now been deleted and no appeal lies against the order passed Under Sub-section (3) of Section 198. It has now been specifically provided in Section 198(4) that the order of the Collector Under Sub-section (3) of Section 193 shall be final except that a revision lies against it to the Board of Revenue u/s 333 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 7. The next point argued by the counsel for the opposite party is that as the contempt in question was committed by Pyare Lal Pradhan of the court of SDO Orai, while the record shows that proceedings Under Sections 480 and 481 Code of Criminal Procedure were being taken by the SDM Orai, as such the order (sic) question is wholly without jurisdiction We are not inclined to accept this submission. From a perusal of the record, it does appear that the words 'SDM Orai' have been written at the top of the page on which the statement of Piarey Lal has been recorded. This writing is evidently that of the Peshkar of the court. After writing down the relevant question put to the accused and his reply thereto, which we have already detailed above, Sri Bramha Deo, has appended his signatures to the statement and has written the date 13-8-1968 thereunder. In his own hand-writing he has no where designated himself as the SDM. Even in the order dated 13-8-1968 which is type written we find the signatures of Sri Bramha Deo at the bottom of the order. Even there he has not given his designation in his own hand-writing. Assuming however, that there was a mis-description in the designation of the officer concerned that does not in law effect the validity of the impugned order. It would not, therefore, be correct to say that Sri Bramha Deo was not acting as the SDO, when he recorded the statement of the accused and passed the impugned order dated 13-8-1968. Merely the use of the words 'SDM' is an innocent mis-description which cannot divest the SDO of his power to take action Under Sections 480 and 481 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may perhaps have been different matter if the SDO and the SDM had been different persons invested with different powers and the authority taking action u/s 481 Code of Criminal Procedure was different from the authority whose contempt had been committed. That is not the position here. Sri Bramha Dao had the powers of both the SDO as well as the SDM. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in Sri Bjamha Deo to take cognizance of a contempt of his Court which had been committed in his presence while he was taking up the case Gaon Sabha v. Moti Lal u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act. Section 537 Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no finding, sentence or order passed by court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity...in the order, judgment or other proceedings...during trial or inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless it has occasioned a failure of justice. Section 537 Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no finding, sentence or order passed by court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity...in the order, judgment or other proceedings...during trial or inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless it has occasioned a failure of justice. To our minds, the error in recording the designation of this Court by the Peshkar and the typist is covered by the provisions of Section 537 Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case the SDO examined the accused. He asked him as to whether in reply to the court question as to how many Farzi Pattas had been executed he had stated that the Farzi Pattas had been got executed by the court itself. The accused replied in the affirmative. Thus the accused was given an opportunity to explain the insult which he had intentionally offered to the court and the accused in reply admitted the insult. Hence it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the accused which would warrant an interference with the order convicting him of contempt. We are, therefore, of the opinion that merely an error or misdescription, as mentioned above, would not divest Sri Bramha Deo, SDO Orai, of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt committed by Piarey Lal Pradhan. It has been held in J.K. Steel v. Union of India 1970 SC 1173 that-- If the exercise of a power can be traced to legitimate source, the fact that the same was purported to have been exercised under a different power does not vitiate the exercise of the power in question. This Supreme Court case has relied upon its earlier case reported in Afzal Ullah v. State of UP 1964 SC 264. In that ease their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that: The validity of the bye-laws must be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Board has power to make those bye-laws. If the power is otherwise established, the fact that the source of the power has been incorrectly or inaccurately indicated in the preamble to the bye-laws, would not make the bye-laws invalid. If the power is otherwise established, the fact that the source of the power has been incorrectly or inaccurately indicated in the preamble to the bye-laws, would not make the bye-laws invalid. The above decision, to our minds, leaves no scope for any argument that the,, incorrect description of the SDO would have the effect of depriving him of his jurisdiction to take action Under Sections 480 and 481 Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. The next submission made by the learned Counsel for the opposite party is based upon the interpretation of Section 480 Code of Criminal Procedure. It has already been mentioned that when an offence u/s 218 IPC is committed in the view or presence of any civil, criminal or revenue court that court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence at any time before the rising of the court and to sentence the offender to a fine not exceeding Rs. 200/-. Section 481(1) refers to the maintenance of the record in such case. It runs thus: 481 (1). In every such case the Court shall record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement (if any) made by the offender as well as the finding and sentence. Sub-section (2) of Section 481 reads: If the offence is u/s 228 of the IPC (Act XLV of 1860), the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding in which the Court interrupted or insulted was sitting and the nature of the interruption or insult. 9. Two submissions have been made by the counsel for the opposite party with regard to the interpretation of the above sections. The first submission is that 'the record' mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 481 Code of Criminal Procedure is the record of the original proceeding in which the contempt had been committed. In other words, according to his submission, in the present case, the record of the case u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act, State v. Moti Lal etc. should have indicated the stage of the judicial proceeding in which the court was insulted and the nature of the insult. Counsel for the opposite party has, however, not pointed out to us any case in which such an interpretation may have been given by any court in this country. We have very carefully considered the relevant sections. should have indicated the stage of the judicial proceeding in which the court was insulted and the nature of the insult. Counsel for the opposite party has, however, not pointed out to us any case in which such an interpretation may have been given by any court in this country. We have very carefully considered the relevant sections. In our view the use of the word 'record' in Sub-section (2) of Section 481 Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the record of proceedings for contempt which may be taken by the court against the contemner. In our view it would be redundant to record the entire contempt proceedings in the original case in which totally different issues were involved. This section clearly contemplates that after taking cognizance of the offence the court shall register a separate case and record therein the facts constituting the offence, the statement of the accused, the finding of the court and the sentence. Such record shall also show the stage of the judicial proceedings in which the court was insulted and also the nature of the insult. We, therefore, do not find any force in this submission of the counsel for the opposite party. 10. The last submission that has been urged is that the record of the present contempt case, out of which the present appeal has arisen, does not fulfil the requirements of Sub-section (2) of Section 481 Code of Criminal Procedure i.e. it does not disclose the stage of the judicial proceedings in which the court was insulted, nor the nature of the insult. Learned Counsel contends that this is an illegality which goes to the root of the jurisdiction exercised by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the proceedings in question are, therefore, vitiated in law. In support of this contention counsel for the opposite party has relied upon the following cases: Krishna Chandra Bhowmik v. Emperor 24 Cri LJ 798, Ram Lal v. Emperor 32 Cri LJ 1221, Ram Nath v. State 1953 All. 59, State v. Bhabesh Chandra Das 1963 Tri. 50. 11. In support of this contention counsel for the opposite party has relied upon the following cases: Krishna Chandra Bhowmik v. Emperor 24 Cri LJ 798, Ram Lal v. Emperor 32 Cri LJ 1221, Ram Nath v. State 1953 All. 59, State v. Bhabesh Chandra Das 1963 Tri. 50. 11. Before dealing with these cases a few facts which have been established from the evidence on the record may be noted: (1) We have on the record of the present case a certified copy of the statement of Piarey Lal Pradhan which he has given in Case No. 38 u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act Gaon Sabha v. Moti Lal and Ors. This certified copy shows that the statement of Piarey Lal was recorded in the aforesaid case on 13-8-1968. After completion of his statement he was also cross-examined and his cross-examination is also recorded in this certified copy. Presumably recording of further deposition would have followed had it not been for the insult which Piarey Lal offered to the Court. To us it appears that if was at this stage of the judicial proceeding that the court questioned Piarey Lal about the execution of Farzi Pattas to which Piarey Lal gave the insulting reply to the court. (2) Thereafter the SDO took cognizance of the offence and immediately proceeded with the contempt case. He questioned the accused on the facts constituting the offence in the following words: Kya turn nay ijlas kay poochhnay per ki is gaon main kitnay farzi Pattay huway hain yeh kaha ki farzi Pattay hazoor nay hi karwayay hain. The accused admitted the facts. His statement was: Ji haan. which was taken down and duly signed by the Magistrate as well as the accused. He thereafter wrote out his order dated 13-3-1968. He recorded his finding thereon holding that by uttering the words in question the accused had undermined the prestige of the court which is a contempt of a grave nature. He considered the question of sentence and in his view as the accused was a Pradhan he fully understood the implications of his insulting utterances, he imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 100/- and in default one month's simple imprisonment. 12. He considered the question of sentence and in his view as the accused was a Pradhan he fully understood the implications of his insulting utterances, he imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 100/- and in default one month's simple imprisonment. 12. From a perusal of the above facts, which are borne out from the record, in our opinion, all the ingredients of the offence u/s 228 IPC including all the requirements of procedure laid down in Section 481 Code of Criminal Procedure have been complied with and there is, therefore, no merit in the submission made by the counsel for the opposite party on this score. 13. The cases cited by the counsel for the opposite party may now be considered. (1) In Krishna Chandra Bhowmik v. Emperor 24 Cri. LJ 798 decided by the Calcutta High Court it was held: No person can be punished for contempt of court which is a criminal offence, unless the specific offence charged against him is specifically stated and an opportunity is given to him of answering it. In that case the Petitioner was not called upon to make a statement and no statement was, as a matter of fact, recorded, as required by Section 481 Code of Criminal Procedure. In these circumstances it was held by the Court that the Petitioner had not been given an opportunity to make a statement which amounted to a defect in procedure which was fatal to the case. The facts which have been found established in the present case are entirely different from those which have been decided in the Calcutta case. This case is, therefore, clearly inapplicable. (2) The next case relied upon by the counsel for the opposite party is of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's court reported in Ram Lal v. Emperor 32 Cri LJ 1221. In that case it appears that a complaint against the Applicant was pending for trial in the court of the Magistrate. On 3rd April, 1931 which was a date fixed for hearing the Magistrate received a letter containing aspersions on his character as a Magistrate. The finding recorded by the Court in that case was as follows: I am myself special as to whether the hearing was in progress since if it had been so, it would have been clearly mentioned in the Magistrate's memo. The finding recorded by the Court in that case was as follows: I am myself special as to whether the hearing was in progress since if it had been so, it would have been clearly mentioned in the Magistrate's memo. This finding shows that the trial of the case was not actually in progress when the alleged contempt was committed. In the same case the Court doubted whether the letter which contained aspersions on the character of the Magistrate was delivered to the Magistrate during the progress of the trial by the accused. In these circumstances the Court gave benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted him. The facts and findings of the Nagpur case are also thus clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case before us. (3) The third case cited by the counsel for the opposite party is a Single Judge decision reported in Ram Nath v. State 1953 All. 59. The allegations against the accused in this case were that he was talking irrelevant. This Court found that this allegation was not sufficient and the record should have shown the words actually uttered by the accused. The Court was of the view that unless the actual words uttered by the accused were recorded it would be difficult to say that they were insulting. As regards the stage of the proceedings the learned Single Judge held that from the facts of that case it did not appear whether at the time when the alleged offence is said to have been committed the case was up for hearing before the Court. In that view of the matter the learned Judge held that the stage of judicial proceedings at which the court was insulted or interrupted had not been proved and as such the essential ingredients of Section 228 IPC were lacking. From the findings which we have recorded above it is obvious that the facts of the aforesaid ruling were different from the present one. In this case the actual words uttered by the accused were put to him and he admitted having said so. Further in this case the deposition of Piarey Lal had been recorded and the suit would have progressed further, had it not been for the insult offered to the court by the accused. In this case the actual words uttered by the accused were put to him and he admitted having said so. Further in this case the deposition of Piarey Lal had been recorded and the suit would have progressed further, had it not been for the insult offered to the court by the accused. The court has observed even in his order dated 13-8-1968: Today when I was taking up the case Gaon Sabha v. Moti Lal u/s 198 of the UP ZA and LR Act I asked Piarey Lal Pradhan as to how many Farzi Pattas had been executed in his Gaon Sabha. He replied that Yeh Farzi Pattay Hazoor nay hi karwaay hain. Hence the words actually uttered as well as the stage of the proceedings having clearly been established from the evidence on the record the case reported in 1953 All. 59 is not applicable to the facts of the present case. (4) The last case relied upon by the opposite party is reported in State v. Bhabesh Chandra Das 1963 Tri 50. This case is also clearly distinguishable. It had been held therein that: In order that Section 480 should be applicable to cases of contempt contemplated by Section 228, Penal Code, an insult or interruption should be committed in the view or presence of the court. Section 480 will not be attracted if a statement, alleged to be an insult or interruption is made within the hearing of the Court, but not within its presence. In that case it was further found that the Sessions Judge had failed to record the facts constituting the offence, nor did he state the nature of the intentional insult which constituted the offence u/s 228 IPC. The further finding recorded therein was that the accused was not given an opportunity of explaining and correcting any misapprehension as to what actually had been said or meant by him. For all these reasons the Tripura Court acquitted the accused. 14. We are of the view that the cases cited by the counsel for the opposite party are wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. For all these reasons the Tripura Court acquitted the accused. 14. We are of the view that the cases cited by the counsel for the opposite party are wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. We have, after careful consideration of the facts of the case and the evidence on the record, come to the conclusion that the entire ingredients of the offence u/s 228 IPC, as well as the procedure prescribed by law u/s 480(1) and (2) Code of Criminal Procedure had been fully complied with. We find no merit in the submissions made on behalf of the opposite party. 15. We accordingly allow this appeal by the State of U.P., set aside the appellate order of the Sessions Judge, Orai dated 7-9-1968 and restore that of the trial court dated 13-3-1968. The opposite party Piarey Lal shall pay a fine of Rs. 100/- imposed on him by the trial court within a period of one month from today. In default, he shall undergo one month's simple imprisonment.