JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. This appeal is by the defendants in a suit for recovery of Rs. 11,226.36 and the interest thereon claimed by the plaintiff as due under a pattuvaravu account which the defendants are said to have had with the plaintiffs from 1135 onwards. It is said that the defendants are jointly running a business in the name 'Maveli Lazar Ouseph and Sons' and for the purpose of their business, they were, from time to time, purchasing goods from the business of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff amount was due under this account and inspite of demand that was not discharged and hence the suit had to be filed. The defence set up by the defendants in the suit was that the purchases were being made from time to time and payments were also being made as against particular bills so much so it could not be said that there was such dealing as mentioned by the plaintiff in the plaint but only separate purchases of goods from time to time. On the basis of this a plea of limitation was also set up. According to the defendants, at any rate, at least a part of the suit claim was barred. 2. The only question with which we are concerned in this appeal is the plea of limitation urged by the defendant, but found against by the court below. According to the defendants, the rule of limitation which would apply is article 52 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (which is the Act applicable to the suit) and therefore the plaintiff will have only a period of three years to sue from the dates of delivery of the goods sold to the defendants from time to time. Such of those sales which were beyond the period of three years would therefore be barred. The suit is filed on 11th January 1963. The last of the purchases by the defendants from the plaintiff firm was on 12th Makaram 1135. Of course, that purchase would be within three years of the suit. But the claim for price of purchases prior to 11th January 1960 would be barred by limitation if there be no ground to hold that article 52 may not apply. 3. To save the suit from the bar of limitation the plaintiff relies on a plea of acknowledgment. Of course, that purchase would be within three years of the suit. But the claim for price of purchases prior to 11th January 1960 would be barred by limitation if there be no ground to hold that article 52 may not apply. 3. To save the suit from the bar of limitation the plaintiff relies on a plea of acknowledgment. According to him defendants had made payments towards the amounts due to the plaintiff from time to time and in particular, such payment by cheques dated 23rd October 1959, 7th December 1959, 25th December 1959 and 5th January 1960 are mentioned. These cheques were accompanied by covering letters which are relied on to show that the defendants acknowledged the liability under the accounts. It is further said that in 1135 Mithunam and in 1136 Vrischigom the defendants had made part payments, the latter being by way of a draft for Rs. 100. It is therefore contended that limitation would be saved both by reason of the acknowledgment contained in the letters and also part payments evidenced by the draft and cheques. There is yet another fact stated in the amended plaint intended to save limitation. According to the plaintiff, for amounts due to them, the defendants assigned rights under two chitties which they had with the Trichur Assyrian Charities Banking Company Limited and in the said assignments executed on 5th January, 1961 the defendants had acknowledged the liability to the plaintiffs. 4. The court below has found that Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) which are the endorsements on the kuri pass-book operate to save limitation as there is an acknowledgment of the liability of the defendants under the transactions to the plaintiffs in these endorsements and these endorsements are well within three years of the suit. It has further been found that a forwarding letter Ext. P-17 which was said to have accompanied a draft sent to the plaintiffs in 1136 Vrischigom would also operate as an acknowledgment. 5. In this appeal the defendants challenge the finding of the court below that the endorsements in Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) operate as an acknowledgment. They also contend that Ext. P-17 letter is not written by the defendants and the court below ought not to have acted on that letter as if it was genuine. 6. The relevant part of the endorsement in Ext. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) operate as an acknowledgment. They also contend that Ext. P-17 letter is not written by the defendants and the court below ought not to have acted on that letter as if it was genuine. 6. The relevant part of the endorsement in Ext. P-11 (a) is in the following terms: Malayalam Just after this writing and in between it and the signature of the 4th defendant it is seen written in another ink the following words: Malayalam and the date 20th January 1963 is also seen written. The endorsement in Ext. P-12 (a) is also in similar terms. There is no dispute that the endorsement was made by the 4th defendant excepting the words” (Malayalam) It is said that this is an interpolation made by the plaintiff with a view to serve his case both by way of acknowledgement that the defendants were having pattuvaravu dealings as contended by the plaintiffs and also as an acknowledgement of a subsisting liability. The question is whether this is an interpolation, as contended, by the plaintiff. If it be not, necessarily there is an acknowledgment and the suit would be in time. But the court below has proceeded on the basis that even if this be considered as an interpolation the rest of the endorsement would be sufficient to be read as an acknowledgment of the liability in terms of section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Before us, learned counsel for the plaintiff did not seek to rely on the words which are said to be interpolation in support of the plea of acknowledgement and rightly so, because much has to be said against it in the face of the circumstances. The disputed portion of the endorsements appears to be written in a different ink from the rest of the endorsement, though according to the plaintiff it was written at the same time. Whatever that be, in view of the stand taken by counsel, we need not go into that question further. It is sufficient if we consider whether the mere mention of the transaction in Exts. P-11(a) and P-12 (a) without any reference to any accounts between plaintiff and defendants and without any reference to any existing liability would be sufficient to treat these as valid acknowledgments saving the bar of limitation. It is sufficient if we consider whether the mere mention of the transaction in Exts. P-11(a) and P-12 (a) without any reference to any accounts between plaintiff and defendants and without any reference to any existing liability would be sufficient to treat these as valid acknowledgments saving the bar of limitation. It is now well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court that in order to constitute acknowledgment the writing must indicate either expressly or by implication that there was intention on the part of the person who is responsible for such writing to admit the jural relationship of debtor and creditor. If the intention could be read from the circumstances the writing may amount to an acknowledgment. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision in Shapur Fredoom Mazda v. Durga Prasad A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1236 and in Tilak Ram v. Nathu A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 935. In the case before us the writing evidences only the fact of a transfer of the rights under the chitty from the defendants to the plaintiff. There is mention that the defendants have received consideration for such transfer. There is nothing more. To read this as indicating intention on the part of the defendants to admit the existence of a liability under a pattuvaravu transaction with the plaintiff would be quite unwarranted and we find that there is no justification for such a course. The court below seems to think that if, as a matter of fact, the transfer could have been only in satisfaction of some claim on account of some transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants that would be sufficient to read an admission of the existence of a liability of the defendants. As we have indicated earlier, on the wording of Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) endorsements, we see no reason to assume so. The question is not whether actually there was a liability, but whether in the writing which is the subject-matter of the alleged acknowledgment, there is anything which would indicate an admission of a relationship of creditor and debtor. We find none. Hence Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) cannot be of any assistance to the plaintiff. 7. Next we come to the letter, Ext. P-17. This is said to have been written by the defendants to the plaintiff when forwarding a demand draft for Rs. 100. We find none. Hence Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) cannot be of any assistance to the plaintiff. 7. Next we come to the letter, Ext. P-17. This is said to have been written by the defendants to the plaintiff when forwarding a demand draft for Rs. 100. That such a draft was given to the plaintiff by the defendants is admitted. But according to the defendants no letter was forwarded along with it, but it was personally given to the plaintiff. The court below would disbelieve the story for the reason that it is hot likely that a man would have paid an amount by draft when he himself has gone to the creditor's place. That, of course, would depend upon various circumstances. When the reliance by the plaintiff is on a letter, the genuineness of which is denied by the defendants, the question should necessarily be whether such a letter has been written by the defendants. In considering the genuineness of such a letter, circumstance in which the demand draft is said to have been taken directly by one of the defendants is certainly not one of weighty consideration. On the evidence we do not think that the court below was justified in finding that Ext. P-17 was genuine. We compared the signature in Ext. P-17 with the signature of the 4th defendant in his, deposition as D.W. 1. We also compared it with his signature in the Vakalath. Without any difficulty we could say that the signature in Ext. P-17 cannot be that of the person who has signed the deposition as D.W. 1. The court below seems to think that the answer given by the 4th defendant in the witness box that he is not bold enough to say whether he has signed the written statement is of relevance. We have looked into the written statement and the signature of the defendants in the written statement and we are afraid that there is justification for the defendant to be cautious in his reply when he was asked whether the signature in the written statement is that of his. It appears to us that the signature in the written statement was apparently marked for the defendants by someone else, a practice, which, no doubt, has to be condemned in very strong terms, but a practice, which, from our experience at the bar, is still prevalent. It appears to us that the signature in the written statement was apparently marked for the defendants by someone else, a practice, which, no doubt, has to be condemned in very strong terms, but a practice, which, from our experience at the bar, is still prevalent. It is apparent that the signatures of the 4th defendant or second defendant or for that matter the other defendants in the written statement bear absolutely no comparison with their admitted signatures and no attempt has been made to explain this. No wonder that the defendant said that he is not bold enough to say whether the signature in the written statement is his or not. The court below refers to the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 3. P.W. 1 is the accountant of the plaintiff. He would say that Ext. P-17 has been signed by the 4th defendant. When cross-examined he would say that he does not know in whose handwriting the number of the draft is written in Ext. P-17 letter. Of course, he could not have seen 4th defendant signing that letter and if at all he speaks of the signature it could only be from the resemblance about which we have already expressed our views. P.W. 3 swears that the signature in Ext. P-17 is that of the "defendant" and in cross-examination he would say that the number of the draft mentioned in Ext. P-17 is in the handwriting of the 4th defendant. The court below relies on this without anything more and finds that Ext. P-17 must have been written by the 4th defendant, notwithstanding the fact that he categorically denied that neither the writing nor the signature in Ext. P-17 is his. An explanation is given as to how a letter head of his firm was used for writing Ext. P-17. That again is not very material. When the circumstances do not substantiate the case of the plaintiff that Ext. P-17 is written by the 4th defendant or signed by him, we do not think that the question as to how such a letter head could have got into the possession of the plaintiff is in any way material. Hence we hold that Ext. P-17 is not genuine and therefore it cannot constitute any acknowledgment. It is not contended for the plaintiff that the draft said to have been forwarded along with Ext. Hence we hold that Ext. P-17 is not genuine and therefore it cannot constitute any acknowledgment. It is not contended for the plaintiff that the draft said to have been forwarded along with Ext. P-17 would itself constitute an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 8. Though on these findings plaintiff will have to be non-suited, he seeks to sustain his case by reference to Ext. P-13. Ext. P-13 is a cheque, dated 23rd January 1960 signed by one M.O. Varghese who is the second defendant and drawn in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 150. It is agreed that this cheque was sent by the defendants to the plaintiff, that plaintiff cashed the cheque and credited it in his accounts. The accounts of the defendants produced as Ext. D-8 also shows that the said payment has been made. Therefore a payment was made on 23rd January 1960 under Ext. P-13 is not in dispute now. If that be the case, according to the plaintiff, there cannot be limitation because Ext. P-13 will operate as an acknowledgment in writing of a payment made on account of the debt and that is payment within three years of the date of suit. It is therefore said that whatever may be the view that we take on the question of acknowledgment, the plea that there has been a part payment evidenced by an acknowledgment in writing would be sufficient to save the suit from limitation. 9. Section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads thus: "20. Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made: Provided that, save in the case of a payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. " That the sum claimed in the plaint is the value of goods purchased within the three years preceding the date of Ext. P-13 is not disputed. " That the sum claimed in the plaint is the value of goods purchased within the three years preceding the date of Ext. P-13 is not disputed. The proviso to section 20 (1) applies where the payment is made on account of a debt or of interest and an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. The payment is said to have been made by the second defendant on behalf of the defendants and it is the plaintiff's case that it is made on account of the liability arising out of a series of transactions. That contention, we will refer in due course. But the question is whether it could be said that an acknowledgment is made when the fact is that payment is made by drawing a cheque in favour of the creditor. A cheque is an order to pay the banker and that order is sent to the creditor who can get paid only when that is honoured as and when presented to the banker. Whether that writing so sent to the creditor and of course signed by the debtor could be said to be an acknowledgment of payment within the meaning of proviso to section 20 (1) was one of the questions urged before us. On that, we do not think that there is any difficulty in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Jiwanlal v. Rameshwarlal A.I.R. 1967 s.c. 1118. A payment by cheque has been considered by the Supreme Court as operating as evidence of part payment within the meaning of section 20 (1) of the India Limitation Act, 1908 and if that be the case, we do not think that any further discussion is called for on this question. 10. The most important question urged by Sri C. M. Devan with considerable force before us was that from the nature of the transactions between the parties, it should not be taken or assumed that payment was made on account of all debts due to the plaintiff from the defendants. 10. The most important question urged by Sri C. M. Devan with considerable force before us was that from the nature of the transactions between the parties, it should not be taken or assumed that payment was made on account of all debts due to the plaintiff from the defendants. He referred to his specific case in the written statement, pursued in the evidence but found against by the court below, that the defendants were only purchasing goods from time to time from the business of the plaintiff and that payments were being made in regard to particular purchases from time to time and interest was also being calculated on the individual bills. In other words, his case appears to be that the several debts were independent and therefore it was always open to him to require appropriation of any payment towards a particular debt. He would further urge that Ext. P-13 must be taken to have been earmarked towards a particular debt and not the debts in general and if that be the case the saving of the bar of limitation by reason of section 20(1) can be only in regard to that debt. That would mean that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree only for part of the plaint claim. We will assume that the debts have been incurred independently and these have been brought into account from time to time. We make this assumption because, according to us, it makes no difference for the purpose of this case. The proviso to section 20(1) requires that the acknowledgment must be in writing and that must be by the person making the payment or must be in a writing signed by such person. That of course is the case here in regard to Ext. P-13. Then the only other question is whether payment is on account of the subsisting liability arising from the purchases made by the defendants from time to time or whether it is only on account of a particular debt representing a particular purchase. That, of course, is not a matter which need be indicated in the document itself. Under section 60 of the Indian Contract Act the creditor has a right to appropriate repayments towards any one of the debts due to him if the debtor who makes the payment does not earmark the payment towards one or other of the debts due. That, of course, is not a matter which need be indicated in the document itself. Under section 60 of the Indian Contract Act the creditor has a right to appropriate repayments towards any one of the debts due to him if the debtor who makes the payment does not earmark the payment towards one or other of the debts due. But the right of appropriation has no relevence in considering a question arising under section 20 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act. That is because in considering a question under section 20 (1) the payment on account of the debt has to be determined with reference to the intention of the person who makes the payment and the right of the creditor to appropriate, as he likes in the absence of intimation by the debtor will have bearing in the matter of section 20(1) of the Indian Limitation Act. What the court will have to decide in a case where this section is called into application is to see what the intention of the debtor was. That intention may be gathered from the writing or from all surrounding circumstances. In fact this is only a question of fact. If it could be read from the previous conduct of the debtor and the creditor or the circumstances attending the payment or from such other materials as are available to the court that the debtor made the payment on account of a particular debt irrespective of any right of the creditor to appropriate towards any other debt for want of an intimation of the mode of appropriation by the debtor, the debtor's intention would prevail. Then the debt towards which payment was made alone would be saved. If, on the other hand, the intention of the debtor was not that any particular debt was to be satisfied by the payment and if he had treated all the debts together as his liability and made payment towards such liability the entire liability would be saved from the bar of limitation by reason of section 20 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 11. We think, we are supported in this view by the decisions of some of the High Courts in India. In Panna Lal v. Ram Singh A.I.R. 1929 Lahore 288 the plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 2,200 on the basis of a bond. 11. We think, we are supported in this view by the decisions of some of the High Courts in India. In Panna Lal v. Ram Singh A.I.R. 1929 Lahore 288 the plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 2,200 on the basis of a bond. The suit which was instituted after the normal period of limitation was sought to be saved on the basis of a payment of Rs. 200 made by the defendants. That the amount was so paid within the period of limitation for the suit was not disputed. But it was alleged by the defendants that the payment was made towards the discharge of another decretal debt. The payment was accompanied by a letter which, however, did not specify the debt towards which the payment was made. The fact that there was another decretal debt was also found. The plaintiff appropriated the sum of Rs. 200 towards the debt due on the bond, as, according to him, he was entitled to do so under section 60 of the Contract Act in the absence of a specification by the debtor as to the particular mode of appropriation. The question was whether such an appropriation by a creditor in the absence of an intention indicated by the debtor to appropriate towards the bond would be sufficient to save the suit from the bar of limitation. The court said thus : "The object of the section evidently is to give a fresh starting point for limitation when there is an acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor either by payment of interest or of a portion of the principal. The payment is viewed from the standpoint of the debtor and hence the determining factor seems to be the intention of the debtor in making the payment and not that of the creditor in appropriating it." In the case before the Nagpur High Court in Sukhdeo Prasad v. J. Michael A.I.R. 1938 Nagpur 266 the question of limitation arose in a suit for recovery of money. The plaintiff relied on part payment to save limitation. Whether the payment should be appropriated towards all the debts due or whether it should be appropriated to one of the debts was the question that arose. The decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Munna Lal A.I.R. 1921 All. 325 and Puttu Lal v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1935 All. Whether the payment should be appropriated towards all the debts due or whether it should be appropriated to one of the debts was the question that arose. The decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Munna Lal A.I.R. 1921 All. 325 and Puttu Lal v. Jagannath A.I.R. 1935 All. 53 wherein it was held that the creditor was not entitled to credit the payment made by the debtor towards the entire balance found due on the date of payment so as to save limitation for each item, was considered by the Nagpur High Court. The learned Judge expressed his view that the principle was too broadly stated without qualification in the decisions of the Allahabad High Court referred to. The learned Judge further said thus: "If more debts than one are due and a payment is made which is not specifically appropriated, it is a question of fact in respect of which debt the payment was made." Reliance was also made in this connection to the relevant passage in Halsbury's Law of England. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court. 12. That the court is called upon to infer from circumstances and probabilities the intention of the debtor has been noticed by the Madras High Court in M/s Wazir Sultan & Sons v. P. S. Rao A.I.R. 1959 Madras 195. 13. Applying the principles to the facts of this case, what has to be found here is whether, on the evidence before us, it is possible to say that the payment under Ext. P-13 was earmarked for the debts due under the accounts of the plaintiff or whether it was earmarked only as against a particular debt. Naturally, counsel for the defendants is not in a position to say which of the several debts is the one against which Ext. P-13 was intended to be made. Necessarily if he has got a case that it is limited to one debt, he must be in a position to say which debt it was. The course of conduct between the parties amply justify this court holding that the payments from time to time were made by cheques not against any particular purchase but towards the amounts due to the plaintiffs. The course of conduct between the parties amply justify this court holding that the payments from time to time were made by cheques not against any particular purchase but towards the amounts due to the plaintiffs. The accounts, it is apparent, are running accounts and balance due under the account at any point of time is that due to the plaintiff under the purchases. The letters which the defendants have sent to the plaintiff from time to time along with the cheques forwarded by them would be sufficient to support this view. In Ext. P-14(1) letter defendants mention: Malayalam In Ext. P-14(2) letter also the cheque is asked to be cashed and entered in the accounts. Similar is the statement in Ext. P-14(3) letter also. These indicate that when cheques are said to have been issued, there never has been any mention of appropriation towards any particular bill or particular purchase, but there has been mention from time to time to credit the payments towards amounts due. That is indicative of the intention of the debtor of making payments as against the liability arising out of the transactions. There is nothing to show that Ext. P-13 payment was in any way different from the earlier payments nor was any different course of conduct attempted to be proved in regard to that payment. Therefore we must assume that in issuing Ext. P-13 cheque also the intention was the same as that when the earlier cheques were issued. That would mean that payments were made for the purpose of discharging the amount due under the accounts. That would again mean that the payments were made against the liability arising out of the purchases. If that be the case, section 20 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 will operate to save limitation in regard to all the debts and not in regard to any particular debt. What we have said here about Ext. P-13 could equally be said of Exts. P-13 (1) and P-13 (2) cheques. We do not want to discuss about them independently for the reasons which have mentioned above. 14. As a result of the findings, it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the plaint amount. Counsel for the defendants raised a contention that interest ought not to have been awarded as no agreement was entered into nor was there any mercantile usage. 14. As a result of the findings, it follows that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the plaint amount. Counsel for the defendants raised a contention that interest ought not to have been awarded as no agreement was entered into nor was there any mercantile usage. Even according to the defendants, from time to time interest had been paid. Account books of the plaintiff show that such interest has been claimed and debited in the accounts. If that be the case, it would be sufficient to show mercantile usage of paying interest. The interest awarded to the plaintiff at 6 per cent is only reasonable and therefore does not call for interference. 15. Before leaving the case, we must certainly notice the conduct of the plaintiff. When faced with the plea of limitation, the plaintiff did not hesitate to fabricate records for production before court. We have noticed the interpolation in Exts. P-11 (a) and P-12 (a) and also the fabrication of Ext. P-17. In these circumstances, it is only fair to direct both parties to suffer costs throughout. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.