JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The petitioner and opposite party No. 2 were two contending applicants under section 19 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 2 of 1952 (here in after called the 'Act') for grant of lease of 52 decimals of land belonging to the Dakhinaparawa Math whose executive Officer is Opposite party. No. 3 to this writ petition. The Trust Board of the Math by its resolution dated 29-9-1962, recommended the we of the petitioner. The Commissioner of Endowments by order dated 31-1-1964, was not in favour of sanctioning the lease and accordingly the petitioner's application was rejected. The Commissioner did not also entertain the petition of opposite party No. 2. The Executive Officer of the Math again recommended the case of the petitioner by his letter dated 20th of March, 1969, and the Commissioner of Endowments by his order dated 17th of May, 1969, in opposite party No. 14 of 1959-1960, accorded sanction to the permanent lease fixing Rs. 4,000/- as premium and Rs. 30/- as annual rent. Thereupon an appeal was carried to the State Government under sub-section (4) of section 19 of the Act. The Minister of law, who heard the appeal on 23-12-1969, allowed it, set aside the order of sanction and gave the following direction :- "......The case is remitted back to the Commissioner for disposal after fresh hearing. He will treat the petitioner filed by the respondent (Petitioner) on 25-5-1964 and the other petition filed by the appellant (Opposite Party no. 2) as fresh petitions for sanction. He will hear the Math and allow the respondent and appellant opportunity to substantiate their case and will dispose of the two petitions by analogous hearing......................" This writ application asks for the quashing of the Minister's order purported to have been passed under section 19(4) of the Act by issuing a writ of certiorari mainly on the footing that no appeal lay before the Minister at the instance of the opposite party No. 2, and the Minister had, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of sanction passed by the Commissioner. 2. The opposite parties 1 and 2 have entered appearance. But during hearing learned Advocate General does not appear in the case. The opposite party no. 2 contends that the appeal was competent and he was a person having interest and was, therefore, entitled to maintain the appeal. 2. The opposite parties 1 and 2 have entered appearance. But during hearing learned Advocate General does not appear in the case. The opposite party no. 2 contends that the appeal was competent and he was a person having interest and was, therefore, entitled to maintain the appeal. The order made by the Minister is in the interest of the Math and as such we should not exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with the appellate order. 3. The order of the Commissioner was made under section 19(1) of the Act. That sub-section provides:- "Not-with-standing anything contained in any law for the time being in force no transfer by exchange, sale or mortgage and no lease for a term exceeding five years of any immovable property belonging to, or given or endowed for the purpose of, any religious institution, shall be made unless it is sanctioned by the Commissioner as being necessary or beneficial to the institution and no such transfer shall be valid or operative unless it is so sanctioned." The Commissioner was moved to accord sanction by the Trust Board and after due investigation, the Commissioner did make an order sanctioning the permanent lease. Under sub-section (5) of section 19, the order of the Commissioner made under section 19(1) is final subject to the provisions of sub-section (4). Sub-section (4) provides:- "The trustee within three months from the date of his receipt of a copy of the order and any person having interest may, within three months from the date of the publication of the order, appeal to the State Government to modify the order or set it aside." It is well settled that right of appeal has to be statutorily provided and there cannot be an appeal in the absence of that right being conferred by statute. Sub-section (4) which confers jurisdiction for appeal authorises the trustee or any person having interest to prefer an appeal. The opposite party no. 2 who preferred the appeal before the Minister was admittedly not the trustee. There is no dispute that he was a contemner for the grant of lease. The memorandum of appeal is not before us, nor is there any positive material from which it can be clearly ascertained as to whether the opposite party No. 2 had described himself as a person having interest. A 'person having interest' has been defined by the Act. The memorandum of appeal is not before us, nor is there any positive material from which it can be clearly ascertained as to whether the opposite party No. 2 had described himself as a person having interest. A 'person having interest' has been defined by the Act. Section 3(x) defines the term to mean - "(a) in the case of a Math, a disciple of the Math or a t person professing the Hindu religion or the Sikh faith to which the Math belongs : (b) ** ** (not necessary to extract as it deals with a temple)." A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mahant Jagannath Ramanuja Das v. B.K. Patra, Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments and others 1959 C.L.T. 98, had occasion to deal with this term "person having interest". Chief Justice Narasimham delivering the judgment for the Court said "The language of this definition is somewhat unhappy. It is not clear whether the words 'Hindu religion to which the Math belongs' means the Hindu religious in general or that sect of the Hindu religion to which the Math belongs. It is well-known that Maths are purely sectarian institutions and are established with a view to propagate the tenants of a particular sect amongst Hindus. In the old Act, however, the corresponding definition clause, namely section 6(10) was better drafted and that clause made it clear that a person of the religious persuasion to which the Math belongs would alone be a 'person having interest'. Though the drafting of the expression in the new act is not satisfactory, I think both the definitions convey the same idea i.e., only those persons who belong to the religious denomination to which the Math belongs can be said to have an interest in the institution. If wider interpretation be given to the definition in clause 3(x) of the new Act, it may offend Article 26(d) of the Constitution by allowing an institution belonging to a particular denomination to be administered by persons of another denomination even though both the denominations may be spots within the Hindu Religion......................." Mr. If wider interpretation be given to the definition in clause 3(x) of the new Act, it may offend Article 26(d) of the Constitution by allowing an institution belonging to a particular denomination to be administered by persons of another denomination even though both the denominations may be spots within the Hindu Religion......................." Mr. Misra for the opposite party No. 2 contended that the view expressed by Narasimbam C.J. should be accepted by us and should hold that a person having interest can be: (a) a disciple of the Math ; (b) a person professing the Hindu Religion ; and (c) a person professing the Sikh faith to which the Math belongs. We are not prepared to accept this analysis of Mr. Misra. A proper analysis of the definition would be that a disciple of the Math, or a Hindu or a Sikh to whom the Math belongs would be a person having interest. The reasoning given by his Lordship the Chief Justice, therefore, rightly indicated the true meaning. Admittedly the opposite party no. 2 is not a disciple of the Math and Mr. Misra states that he does not belong to the religious denomination to which the Math belongs. We would accordingly conclude that the opposite party No. 2 is not a person who can come within the definition of 'person having interest'. Therefore, he was not a person at whose instance the appeal before the State Government under section 19(4) of the Act could be maintained. 4. Mr. Misra contends that objection to the maintainability of the appeal had pot been specifically raised before the Minister and, therefore, we should not permit the contention to be agitated for the first time, before us. We do not think such a ground should be entertained in the facts of this case, where on the admitted facts, the appeal turns out to have been incompetent. 5. Mr. Misra's next contention is that certiorari proceedings are discretionary and even if we find that a wrong order has been passed, we need not interfere as ultimately it is in the interest of the Math. We have given anxious consideration to this contention. As we find, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Commissioner. By sub-section (5) of section 19 of the Act, the Commissioner's order is final. We have given anxious consideration to this contention. As we find, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Commissioner. By sub-section (5) of section 19 of the Act, the Commissioner's order is final. Finality of that order can only be taken away by an appropriate order made under sub-section (4). The impugned order of the Minister having incompetent in law, cannot interfere with the original order of the Commissioner. Again, the lease deed appears to have already been executed and registered. Mutation has taken place and an implied right had accrued in favour of the petitioner. It is possible that if the remand order of the Minister is give effect to, the Math might get some more money. But it is a dispute of about of about 10 years. The Trust Board had sent a recommendation for settlement in favour of the petitioner at less than Rs. 4,000/- and the Commissioner ultimately directed the premium to be fixed at Rs. 4,000/-. By reopening the matter the Trust may benefit, but an over-all picture of the matter leads us to hold that the finality given to the matter by the Commissioner's order should be allowed to stand, on our finding that the appeal was incompetent. There is some allegation made by the petitioner upon affidavit that the opposite party No. 2 has been set up by a rich neighbour who has an eye on the land. It is not for us to decide the correctness of that matter here. But we are satisfied that no man has a right to unlimited draughts on time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes and in the circumstances, once we come to the conclusion that the appeal was incompetent, the original order of sanction must be respected as the final position in law as provided for in sub-section (5) of section 19 of the Act. 6. The writ application is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of the Minister of Law is quashed as being without jurisdiction by issue of a writ of certiorari. Parties shall bear their own costs B.K. Ray, J. - I agree. Final Result : Allowed