JUDGMENT Mitra, C.J. This Rule is directed against an order dated the 12th January, 1971 of the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta arising out of an application against an order dated the 3rd May, 1968 passed by the Third Bench of the Court of Small Causes in Suit No. 116 of 1966. On the 24th February, 1963, 167 bags of Arhar were tendered at Chanda Fort Rly. Station on the Central Railway for being carried to Ramkristopur, a station in South Eastern Railway. The consignor and the consignee were the same. The railway receipt issued by the Railways was endorsed and delivered to the petitioner against payment of the Punjab National Bank Limited, Brabourne Road Branch, Calcutta. There was a short delivery of the goods and the petitioner, on January 13, 1966 instituted a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta for Rs. 1,349.56. 2. The first question that arose for determination before the Court of Small Causes, was with regard to the jurisdiction of the court to try the suit. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that by reason of the endorsement of the railway receipt against payment in Calcutta, the Court of Small Causes bad jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Third Bench of that court held that endorsement of the railway receipt against payment did not constitute part of the cause of action and therefore, the Court of Small Cause had no jurisdiction to try the suit the plaint was directed to be returned for presentation to the proper Court this judgment of the Third Bench was delivered on the 3rd May, 1968. Then an application was made by the plaintiff on the 10th May, 1968 under section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for the matter being heard by the Full Bench. On the 11th January 1971 the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes rejected the application on the ground that the application under section 38 was not maintainable as there had been no adjudication of disputes but the plaint had merely been returned for presentation to the proper court. It is against this order of the Full Bench that the present Rule has been obtained. 3. The application for revision was made on the 17th June, 1971. The Rule was issued on the 7th July, 1971. It is against this order of the Full Bench that the present Rule has been obtained. 3. The application for revision was made on the 17th June, 1971. The Rule was issued on the 7th July, 1971. On the 10th May, 1972 an application was made under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay, On the 11th May, 1972 the matter came up for hearing before Mr. Justice A.K. Sinha but His Lordship referred it to a Division Bench. The reason stated by His Lordship is that there are two decisions of two learned Judges of this Court reported in (1) 57 CWN 167 (Harimohan v. Dominion of India) and (2) AIR 1959 Calcutta 563 (Alliance Assurance Co. v. Union of India) which have taken the view that endorsement of the railway receipt in favour of the plaintiff for valuable consideration furnishes cause of action and the plaintiff is entitled to sue within the jurisdiction of that court in which such an endorsement was effected. But, Mr. Justice Sinha points out, there is another Single Bench decision reported in (3) AIR 1960 Calcutta. 458 (Fushraj Thanmell v. Union of India) in which a different view was taken. The latter case was followed in a decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (4) AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 282 (Singamsetti Ramarao v. Union of India). In the Andhra Pradesh case it was laid down that endorsement of a railway receipt by the consignor in favour of a third party would not constitute a part of the cause of action. 4. Owing to these differences of opinion, Mr. Justice A.K. Sinha has referred the matter to the Division Bench. 5. We are of opinion that the cases referred to above, dealt with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act prior to their amendment in 1961. 4. Owing to these differences of opinion, Mr. Justice A.K. Sinha has referred the matter to the Division Bench. 5. We are of opinion that the cases referred to above, dealt with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act prior to their amendment in 1961. Section 80 of the Railways Act before its amendment in 1961 ran thus: "Suits for compensation for injury to through-booked traffic: Notwithstanding anything in any agreement purporting to limit the liability of a railway administration with respect to traffic while on the railway of another administration a suit for compensation for loss of the life of, or personal injury to, a passenger, or for loss, destruction deterioration of animals or goods where the passenger was or the animals or goods were booked through over the railways of two or more railway administrations, may be brought either against the railway administration from which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket, or to which the animals or goods were delivered by the consignor thereof, as the case may be, or against the railway administration on whose railway the toss, injury, destruction or deterioration occurred." 6. This section was amended by section 14 of Act XXXIX of 1961. The amended provisions are as follows : "80. Suits for Compensation-A suit for compensation for loss of life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods may be instituted. This section was amended by section 14 of Act XXXIX of 1961. The amended provisions are as follows : "80. Suits for Compensation-A suit for compensation for loss of life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods may be instituted. (a) if the passenger, was or the animals or goods were booked from one station to another on the railway of the same railway administration, against that railway administration; (b) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods were booked through over the railway of two or more railway administrations against the railway administration from which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or to which the animals or goods were delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or against the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred, and, in either case the suit may be instituted in a court having jurisdiction over the place at which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or the animals or goods were delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or over the place in which the destination section lies, or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or determination occurred.” 7. A noticeable feature of the amended provision in that “a suit may be instituted in a court having jurisdiction over the place at which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or the animals or goods were delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or over the place in which the destination station lies, or the loss, injury, destruction, damage, or deterioration occurred.” These provisions it is to be noted, appear in a statute specially meant for the railway administration. 8. In this connection it is also interesting to observe the provisions of section 139 of the Railways Act as amended by ACT XXXIX of 1961. These provisions are: "139. 8. In this connection it is also interesting to observe the provisions of section 139 of the Railways Act as amended by ACT XXXIX of 1961. These provisions are: "139. Proof of entries in records and documents-Entries in the records or other documents of a railway administration shall be admitted in evidence in all proceedings by or against the railway administration, and all such entries may be proved either by the production of the records or other documents of the railway administration containing such entries or by the production of the copy of the entries certified by the officer having custody of the records or other documents under his signature and stating that it is a true copy of the original entries and that such original entries are contained in the records or other documents of the railway administration in his possession. 9. Section 139 gives an indication that the Railways Act intended to introduce certain special provisions applicable to railway administrations. 10. We find, therefore, that in case of a loss or short delivery of goods, a suit for compensation can be instituted either in the court having jurisdiction Over the place where the goods were booked or in the court having jurisdiction over the place of destination of the goods or in a court having jurisdiction over the place at which the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred. 11. These special provisions have to be read in the light of section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant provisions are: "In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force." 12. Now, under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure a suit can be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. In the instant case it is argued before us that endorsement of a railway receipt against payment is a part of the cause of action. And since this part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta, the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to try the suit. 13. In the instant case it is argued before us that endorsement of a railway receipt against payment is a part of the cause of action. And since this part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta, the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to try the suit. 13. It is unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether endorsement and payment of a railway receipt is a part of the cause of action. For our purpose it is enough to state that section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables a court to entertain a suit if a part of the cause of action arises within its jurisdiction, affects the special jurisdiction conferred by the amended provisions of section 80 of the Railways Act. 14. Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression "otherwise affect". The dictionary meaning of the word "affect" in the context in which it is used under section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is "to produce an effect or change upon" There is no doubt that section 20(c) of the Code produces an effect or change upon the special jurisdiction conferred by section 80 of the Railways Act. And from this point of view section 20(c) would not apply to a suit covered by section 80 of the Railways Act. 15. On the facts of this case, therefore, the Court of Small Causes in Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In these premises, we do not propose to discuss the scope of section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act on which some arguments were advanced before us. We discharge this Rule but make no order as to costs. Janah, J.: I agree.