Research › Browse › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

1972 DIGILAW 208 (PAT)

Kameshwar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar

1972-11-13

S.ANWAR AHMAD

body1972
S. ANWAR AHMED, J. The six appellants along with 19 others were put on trial for offence under section 147, 307/149 and 395, Indian Penal The learned Additional Sessions acquitted the nineteen others Code. Judge of all charges and the appellants under section 395, Indian Penal Code, but convicted the appellants under section 147 and 323/149, Indian Penal Code. They have been sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment under section 147 and to one years' rigorous imprisonment under section 323/149, the sentences were to run consecutively. 2. In this court a compromise petition has been, filed on behalf of the appellants and the complainant, Raghunandan Sahu. It is stated in the petition that since large number of cases were pending between the appellants, on one side, and the complainant, on the other, including a proceeding under section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, the feeling between the parties had, therefore, become highly strained but due to intervention of common friends and co-villagers the parties have compounded their differences and all the pending cases between them have been compromised. 3. Mr. Satyanand Kumar, counsel for the appellants, submits that if the parties are allowed to compound the offences, it will strengthen their bond of friendship and also put an end to the long drawn animosity between them. Lala Kailash Bihari Prasad, for the state; contends that as the conviction of the appellants is also under sections 147 and 149, and those sections are not compoundable, the prayer of the appellants cannot be allowed. 4. On the findings of the court below, the substantive offence for which the appellants have been convicted is under section 323, Indian Penal Code, which is compoundable without the permission of the court. As section 323 is compoundable without the permission of the court, and the parties in the present case have actually compounded it, the result is that they would be deemed to have been acquitted of the offence, vide subsection (6) of section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure. The common object of the charge under section 147 and 149, Indian Penal Code, in the present case is to assault complainant Raghunandan Sahu. As the appellants stand acquitted under section 323, the common object completely disappears and therefore, the conviction of the appellants under section 147 or reached with the help of section 149 cannot be maintained. The common object of the charge under section 147 and 149, Indian Penal Code, in the present case is to assault complainant Raghunandan Sahu. As the appellants stand acquitted under section 323, the common object completely disappears and therefore, the conviction of the appellants under section 147 or reached with the help of section 149 cannot be maintained. The common object of assault being eliminated, the assembly does not remain an unlawful assembly and as such it cannot be said that force or violence was used by it in prosecution of its common object. No offence is, therefore, made out for rioting as contemplated by section 146, Indian Penal Code. If so there cannot be conviction of the appellants under section 147, Indian Penal Code. Similar is the position in regard to section 149. The common object of the assembly having disappeared in view of the compromise entered into between the appellants and the complainant there is no unlawful assembly with common object of assault as contemplated by section 149. Indian Penal Code. Although the persons who, on the findings of the court below, were members of an unlawful assembly remain on the records of the case, they cannot remain on the records of the case they cannot be convicted for their unlawful act as members of an unlawful assembly. This view of mine gets support from the decision in Sitaram Mahton v. State of Bihar 1969 P.L.J.R. 107 A. In that case their Lordships were pleased to hold that as the common object of the unlawful assembly had not been established, the offence of rioting was not made out. The members of the unlawful assembly could only be made liable for their individual acts. Accordingly, convictions under section 147, 148 and those reached with the assistance of section 149, and the sentences awarded thereunder, were set aside. 5. It seems to me that there is no difference in principle where the court finds on a consideration of evidence that the common object is not proved and the present case, where, by a valid compromise the common object disappears. 6. In the result, the appellants are acquitted of the charge levelled against them. Appeal allowed.