JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution asking for a writ of certiorari to quash the leavy of penalty made by the opposite Party No. 2 under the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and upheld in appeal by the opposite party No. 1. 2. The facts giving rise to the dispute are these. The Petitioner is the owner of a motor truck bearing registration No. O.R.C. 4635. Tax for the fourth quarter of 1970 under the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (2 of 1930) was payable on 1-10-1970. The Petitioner, however, paid the same on 17-10-1970. Accordingly penalty was levied by the opposite party No. 2 u/s 12-A of the Act and the Petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 1200/- by way of penalty by order dated 3-12-1970. An appeal carried by the Petitioner under Sub-section (2) of that section before the opposite party No. 1 was dismissed. 3. The Petitioner contends: (1) He had shown cause to the notice proposing levy of penalty and had stated that Government Offices including the Treasury were closed for the Puja holidays and opened only on 16.10.1970. There was heavy rush and as such the deposit could not be made on 16.10.1970 inspite of keenness of the Petitioner to deposit the amount. Under those circumstances the Petitioner deposited the money on the following day. As such there was no default on his part. (2) The cause shown by the Petitioner was not at all taken into account by the opposite party No. 2. The order ill posing penalty (Annexure-3) does not show that there was any application of mind to the cause shown. The Appellate authority also did not apply his mind independently to the circumstances of the case. (3) The Petitioner was indeed not liable to levy of any penalty as the vehicle had not started being used without tax having been paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Each of these contentions may now be examined. 4. From reference to a Government calendar of 1970 we find that public offices were closed from 7-10-1970 till 15-10-1970 for the Puja holidays. The offices, therefore, opened only on 16.10.1970. Each of these contentions may now be examined. 4. From reference to a Government calendar of 1970 we find that public offices were closed from 7-10-1970 till 15-10-1970 for the Puja holidays. The offices, therefore, opened only on 16.10.1970. According to the learned Standing Counsel of the Transport Department if payment had been made on 16-10-1970 It would have been in time and the Petitioner would not have incurred the liability of being penalised. The Petitioner came forward with an explanation, that there was a lot of rush on 16.10.1970 and therefore, the deposit could not be made. The order by which penalty was imposed is Annexure-3. It may be quoted in entirety: Sri Mahadeo Ram, Dhenkanal, owner of vehicle No. 4635 was asked by the undersigned by registered notice vide this office letter no 2989 dated 3-11-1970 which was received by him on 4-11-1970. (a) No representation has been received from him against the imposition of penalty. (b) The representation received from him against imposition of penalty has been after due consideration rejected due to the following reasons. (i) The explanation is not satisfactory. (ii) x x x (iii) x x x Therefore the following amount of penalty on him Rs. 1,300/- (Rupees one thousand three hundred only) for 4th quarter, 1970. In the present case a representation had admittedly been made, but Clause (a) has not been scored through. A certified copy of this order has been produced before us in this case where Clause (a) is in tact. The learned Standing Counsel produced the record to show that it has been scored through. As in the certified copy it had not been cancelled, it is difficult for us to hold that it was indeed cancelled at the time when the order was made. Under Clause (b) in item (i) it has been stated that the explanation is not satisfactory. A bald statement of this type does not indeed indicate application of mind of the authority in whom discretion has been vested either to impose or not to impose penalty. In the circumstances by a look at Annexure 3 we are not in a position to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that mind had really been applied to the explanation offered by the Petitioner before the public officer proceeded to levy penalty. In the circumstances by a look at Annexure 3 we are not in a position to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that mind had really been applied to the explanation offered by the Petitioner before the public officer proceeded to levy penalty. The Appellate authority dealt with the matter by saying, I will dispose of this point as well as the merits of the explanation of the Appellant for the delay. Since Section 6 of B. & O. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 makes it clear that the tax was due on 1-10-1970 and it is well settled point of law, the question as to what is the due date cannot be challenged by the stand taken by the Advocate u/s 12-A of the B. & O. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 1930. As regards delay, the Appellant had the entire 15 days of grace period to pay the tax and he has not availed of it. We have already indicated that the public offices were closed from 7-10-1970 to 15-10-1970. The Appellate authority does not seem to have been aware of that position; otherwise he would not have stated that "the Appellant had the entire 15 days of grace period." It is true, the entire grace period was available, but one could wait until the last point. The explanation for the delinquency has to be considered by finding out whether what is offered by way of explanation is appropriate and sufficient to cover up the delinquency. The Appellate authority has not looked at the matter from that point of view. In view of this discussion we would hold that the first two contentions of the Petitioner are correct. 5. The last contention of the Petitioner is that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Petitioner had no liability to be penalised even if the Petitioner had defaulted to pay the tax within 15 days from 1-10-1970. There is no dispute that tax has to be paid by every person who keeps a motor vehicle for use as is provided u/s 6(2) of the Act. That tax can be paid for one or more quarterly period or on annual basis. Under Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 it can also be paid for a month the tax being 1/12th of the annual rate. That tax can be paid for one or more quarterly period or on annual basis. Under Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 it can also be paid for a month the tax being 1/12th of the annual rate. Since liability is cast on every keeper of the motor vehicle for use for payment of tax we shall assume that no vehicle can be kept for use without payment of tax. On this basis for one who pays tax on quarterly basis tax for the last quarter of 1970 became due on 1-10-1970. One who keeps motor vehicle for use without paying the tax incurs the liability u/s 12 of the Act and if prosecuted is punishable with fine as provided for in that Section 12-A, of the Act which was added by Orissa Act 23 of 1962 makes an additional provision. It provides: (1) Without prejudice to any other liability that may be incurred under any of the provisions of this Act of the rules made there under the licensing officer may, on default in payment of the tax within fifteen days from the due date of payment, impose a penalty, on the person liable to pay the tax, of an amount equal to in the case of a default for the first time, twice the amount of tax remaining unpaid and in the case of any subsequent default, four times such tax I provided that no such penalty shall be imposed without giving the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Explanation: For the purposes of this Sub-section (1) the expression due date of payment' shall be the date on which the vehicle had started being used without the tax having been paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act; (ii)... (2)... While Section 12 makes it an offence to keep a motor vehicle for use without having paid the tax, Section 12-A appears to bring in liability of penalty for using the vehicle without payment of tax. The field covered by Sections 12 and 12-A of the Act cannot be the same, because in Sub-section (2) of Section 12 it has been provided- In cases where a penalty has been imposed u/s 12-A the Magistrate passing a sentence of fine under Sub-section (1) shall have due regard to the amount of penalty imposed. Again it might lead to double jeopardy. Again it might lead to double jeopardy. The first explanation u/s 12-A defines "due date of payment" to be the date on which the vehicle started being used without the tax having been paid under Sub-section (1) a grace period of 15 days is provided from such doe date where after only the liability for penalty accrues. The scope of an explanation in the field of construction of statutes is well known. An explanation of a section is intended to make the meaning plain or intelligible. It is intended to clear from obscurity something which may arise from the section. A construction of the explanation must depend upon its terms and where the meaning is clear that has to be followed. The learned standing Counsel has asked us to confine the meaning of the first explanation to cases where the vehicle has been kept off the road as provided for u/s 9-A of the Act of where tax has been paid for a period less than a quarter as provided in Section 6(2)(ii) of the Act. We find no room for such contention. The explanation does not intend to limit the meaning to such cases. Section 12-A of the Act has general application and the explanation is appended to clarify the position with reference to the general provision in Section 12-A of the Act. In such a case we are not prepared to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the meaning given to the "due date of payment" must be confined to those two cases. 6. Section 12-A of the Act is a penal section. Therefore, its provisions have to be strictly construed and given reasonable strict construction. The position is clear that penalty is impossible when default of payment of tax continues after 15 days from the date when the vehicle started being used without the tax having been paid. We find support for such a proposition in the Bench decision of this Court in Padma charan Mohapatra v. S.P. of Police, Phulbani 30 C.L.T. 271. The vehicle had been found in that case to be running on 10.10.1962 and, therefore, the due date was calculated as 15 days from such date the later oases of this Court in Bijoy Kumar Modi v. R.T.O. Dhenkanal 36 C.L.T. 1301, and Nisamani Dei v. R.T.O. Dhenkanal 37 C.L.T 167, also support the same view. The vehicle had been found in that case to be running on 10.10.1962 and, therefore, the due date was calculated as 15 days from such date the later oases of this Court in Bijoy Kumar Modi v. R.T.O. Dhenkanal 36 C.L.T. 1301, and Nisamani Dei v. R.T.O. Dhenkanal 37 C.L.T 167, also support the same view. The learned Standing Counsel attempted to distinguish these two later cases by saying that they were cases with reference to the provisions of section 9-A of the Act. As we have said above, no such distinction is available to be made. 7. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa dealing with the provisions of penalty under the Orissa Sales Tax Act have stated: An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious of dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Whether penalty should be imposed for failure to perform a statutory obligation is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical of venial breach of the provisions of the Act. The facts of the case certainly come within the rule indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and even if all other contentions fail, in our view this was not a case where any penalty was leviable. We agree that it was discretionary on the part of the taxing officer and in the matter of exercise of discretion our extra ordinary jurisdiction is not to be invoked. We agree that it was discretionary on the part of the taxing officer and in the matter of exercise of discretion our extra ordinary jurisdiction is not to be invoked. But where we find that the statutory authority is not aware of the fact that it is discretionary for him to impose or not to impose penalty, a fit case is made out for exercising such jurisdiction because an order made in ignorance of one's own power is not manifestation of sound exercise of discretion and, therefore, results in an error requiring rectification by issue of a writ of certiorari. 8. We are satisfied that the levy of penalty in this case from any point of view is not sustainable and has accordingly to be quashed. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the demand. The writ application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100/- (one hundred). K.B. Panda, J. 9. I agree.