Judgment 1. This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ to quash an order passed by the Additional Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, contained in Annexure 1 in the following circumstances. 2. It appears that an advertisement was made for appointment to some posts of teachers in primary schools within the district of Motihari. Trained matriculates, I. A. trained and graduates were eligible to apply for these posts. The petitioner also applied for one of them and he was interviewed, and it appears that his name also was mentioned in the list forwarded for such appointment. Before the appointments could be made, the impugned order is said to have been issued on the 25th May, 1971. This order passed by the Additional Director of Public Instruction, forwarded to all the District Education Superintendents contained instructions that while preparing the list of candidates recommended for appointment, the first place should be given to the trained matriculates and next to such intermediate trained candidates as were willing to serve on the pay given to the matric trained candidates. It was further directed that trained graduates and other batter qualified candidates should not be recommended for appointment to the posts meant for trained matriculates. It further said that even while making appointments out of the lists already prepared, this direction should be followed. 3. In view of this direction, the petitioner being a trained graduate could not be appointed to the post and, accordingly, he filed a representation on the 18th July, 1972, to the Additional Director of Public Instructions. It appears that an association of trained graduates also filed a representation to the Chief Minister and others on the 25th of July, 1972. Being affected by the aforesaid order of the Additional Director of Public Instructions, the petitioner has come up to this Court. 4. The point raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the aforesaid order of the Additional Director of Public Instructions violates Arts, 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable and arbitrary classification and, therefore, offends the right of equality both under Art. 14 and also in respect of right of employment under Art. 16 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel has supported this contention by referring to the fact that even though the trained graduates are better qualified than the matriculates and the intermediate trained candidates, they have been treated as inferior to them for the purpose of appointment as teachers in primary schools, and there can be absolutely no justification for the State laying down that people with better qualifications would not be appointed to posts considered inferior for them. It has also been pointed out in this connection that prior to this impugned order appointments of trained graduates who got their degrees till 1967 were made to posts of teachers in primary schools, and, there was no good reason for the State Government to make a departure and thereby discriminate against the graduates who got their degrees after the year 1967. I am afraid I am unable to accept the contentions raised by learned Counsel. 5. The State has sworn a counter-affidavit wherein the reasons behind the classification have been mentioned. Even if there were no such counter-affidavit, I am inclined to think that merely because the State Government have decided on principle not to appoint "over-qualified persons" to quote the language employed by learned Counsel it would not result in its becoming arbitrary or discriminatory. Put in other words, it means that an over qualified person is not properly qualified or suitably qualified for appointment to a particular post. Over qualification itself may be a disqualification in some cases as will appear when I state the reasons given by the State Government in this behalf. In the counter-affidavit, it has been stated, and there is no rejoinder to the counter-affidavit, that graduate teachers receive their training in teachers training colleges where they get experience of practical teaching of secondary classes VIII to XI, Matriculates and intermediate trained teachers, however, receive their training in primary Teachers Education Colleges where they get practical teaching experience for elementary classes from I to VII. In other words, matriculate and intermediate trained teachers are better qualified to teach the primary school children than the graduate trained teachers. Therefore, even though prima facie it may appear that a graduate trained teacher is more qualified than the matriculate and intermediate trained teachers, in essence the graduate trained teacher is not really qualified to teach the primary school children. Therefore, even though prima facie it may appear that a graduate trained teacher is more qualified than the matriculate and intermediate trained teachers, in essence the graduate trained teacher is not really qualified to teach the primary school children. Besides this reason, the State Government have stated about the administrative difficulties inasmuch as matriculate and intermediate trained teachers are to be appointed Headmasters in primary schools; and, if the graudate teachers are appointed, they will have to serve under the former. It is also said that such trained graduate teachers would naturally be dissatisfied, because they deserve better prospect and they would be in search for other employment. These considerations, do not really weigh greatly with me. There is, however, another reason given by them and that is a substantial one. It has been said that the State Exchequer subsidises the training of matriculate and I. A. trained teachers, and naturally, therefore, as employers they would give preference to such teachers and not keep them unemployed, because that would mean a waste of public money which they have spent over such matriculate and Intermediate trained teachers. 6. Whether the policy of the State Government is really good or bad, it is not for this Court to judge. It is undoubtedly for the State to formulate their policies and a Court exercising writ jurisdiction will not substitute its judgment so far as the policies of he State Government are concerned. It is quite obvious that the reasons assigned by them are not irrational, nor can they be said to be unjustified reasons for making a classification. In the result, it cannot be said that the classification is unreasonable and that the order is arbitrary. 7. The next point with regard to the discrimination alleged as between the members of the same class, namely, the graduates who got their degrees up to the year 1967 and those who got them thereafter is also not tenable. In fact, the State Government seemed to have had one policy prior to the issue of these instructions and they seem to have changed their policy subsequently, with the result that the impugned order has been passed. It cannot be said that a change of policy is not within the jurisdiction of the State Government. In fact, the State Government seemed to have had one policy prior to the issue of these instructions and they seem to have changed their policy subsequently, with the result that the impugned order has been passed. It cannot be said that a change of policy is not within the jurisdiction of the State Government. It cannot, therefore, be said that it amounts to a discrimination between those who got their degrees until 1967 and those who got them subsequently. It has neither been alleged nor shown that there was any discrimination practised by the State Government between the members of the same class which would be the graduates who got their degrees from the year 1968, and thereafter. It is this class as a whole which has been affected by the impugned order. No discrimination in between the members of this class has been alleged. It has not been said either that the decision of the State Government not to make appointments of graduate teachers for teaching in primary schools is tainted with any mala fide. In that view of the matter there does not appear to me to be any substance for calling the order discriminatory. 8. There is, thus, no substance in any of the points raised before me. This application is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order for costs.