B. B. MONDAL v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1972 DIGILAW 212 (CAL)

PRADYOT KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE Rule is directed against an order of suspension passed on the petitioner Sri B. B. Mondal, Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Government of West Bengal, dated 7th June, 1972. The petitioner joined IAS service in 1949. Between the period 12th March, 1968 to 7th July, 1971 the petitioner was the Commissioner of Refugee Rehabilitation and Ex. Officio Secretary of R. R. R. Department, Government of West Bengal. Between 8th July, 1971 and 7th August 1971 the petitioner was Director General of Evacuees of Bangladesh. On 8th November, 1971 the petitioner's house was searched by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C. B. I. and others on 9th November, 1971 the petitioner's wife's Locker at Central Bank was also opened. On 16th November 1971 the Chief Secretary to the State of West Bengal asked the petitioner to fill up certain proforma. On 22nd November, 1971 the petitioner asked for papers seized by the Police. On 21st December, 1971 the Chief Secretary forwarded a letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police to the petitioner calling for the tour programme from 1969 to October, 1971. The petitioner wanted to know about the alleged charge against him and wanted to know the particulars thereof but no such charge was given on 27th May, 1972 a paper of the Ruling Party 'janabani' published a news regarding the petitioner's suspension. The petitioner moved the High Court on 1st June, 1972 and rule was issued on the respondent by the Court which was returnable on 8th June, 1972. On 8th June, 1972 the petitioner went to the Office and received the impugned order dated 7th June, 1972 by which the petitioner was suspended. The petitioner moved the High Court on 8th June, 1972 for a rule and obtained the rule on the same date. The copy of the impugned order is annexure 'm' to the main rule which is as follows: ?dated Calcutta the 7th June, 1972. Whereas an investigation relating to a criminal charge is pending against you Shri B. B. Mondal, IAS Additional Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal in respect of your conduct while you were employed as Refugee Rehabilitation Commissioner and Ex Officio Secretary Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department and whereas it is considered necessary that you should be placed under suspension. Whereas an investigation relating to a criminal charge is pending against you Shri B. B. Mondal, IAS Additional Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal in respect of your conduct while you were employed as Refugee Rehabilitation Commissioner and Ex Officio Secretary Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department and whereas it is considered necessary that you should be placed under suspension. Now therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969 the Governor is pleased hereby to place you Shri B. B. Mondal, IAS Additional Member, Board of Revenue, West Bengal, under suspension with effect from the date of service of this order upon you and until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charges under investigation. By order of the Governor, sd/- N. C. Sen Gupta chief Secretary to the Govt. of west Bengal? ( 2 ) ON behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 affidavit has been sworn in by the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has been sworn in by Sri Samit Kumar Dutt, Superintendent of Police, Delhi Special Police Establishment Central Bureau of Investigation in Calcutta. On behalf of the State Government it was stated in the affidavit that upon receiving a complaint in writing on 27th September, 1971 made to the Governor of West Bengal relating to malpractice committed by proprietors of some firms and some officers of the Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department and the Irrigation and Waterways Department of Government of West Bengal in connection with the purchases of tarpaulin for incoming refugees of Bangladesh during 1971 it was suspended that offences under section 120b/420 of Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 were committed. The petitioner was during that period the Commissioner of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Department of the Government of West Bengal. It is stated that the Governor of West Bengal directed that an investigation into the said matter be made by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Calcutta Branch. A first information report was lodged with the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Calcutta Branch which was recorded under section 154 of the Cr. P. C. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the said Delhi Special Police Establishment. A first information report was lodged with the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Calcutta Branch which was recorded under section 154 of the Cr. P. C. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the said Delhi Special Police Establishment. An investigation by the said authorities under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code with regard to the said charges is in progress. The said Police authorities submitted two progress reports to the Government of West Bengal. The examination of the second report submitted by the said Police authorities revealed certain facts against the petitioner Sri B. B. Mondal. The Government of West Bengal had carefully considered the said matter and was of the opinion that the charge against the petitioner was in connection with his position as a Government servant and that it would not be proper to allow him to carry on his normal duties until the termination of all proceedings relating to the charges under investigation. On consideration of the said matter the Chief Minister, West Bengal on 3rd June, 1972 took a decision that the petitioner should be suspended and the order of suspension was made on 7th June, 1972 in the bonafide exercise of powers conferred under sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In course of the investigation, the S. P. E. conducted the search of the petitioner's house as well as Locker of the Petitioner's wife. It is stated that the State Government considered it necessary that the petitioner should be suspended pending the investigation relating to the criminal charge. ( 3 ) IN the affidavit filed by the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 it has been stated that the police investigation was started on the basis of a complaint made by a respectable citizen to the Government of West Bengal. The said complaint was forwarded by the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Bengal to the Delhi Special Police Establishment at Calcutta and thereupon the said Police Establishment at Calcutta initiated a police investigation after recording a first information report according to law and registering an investigation case. It is stated therein that at present no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is pending in any Court or before any authority against the petitioner. The police authorities are still making investigation into cognizable offences. It is submitted that the investigation cannot be interfered with by this Court. It is stated therein that at present no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is pending in any Court or before any authority against the petitioner. The police authorities are still making investigation into cognizable offences. It is submitted that the investigation cannot be interfered with by this Court. It is further stated that the investigation is not malafide but is in due process of law. On these pleadings the petitioner came to trial. Before I refer to the argument advanced by the parties it is convenient for me to set out rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969: ?3. Suspension during disciplinary proceedings: - (1) If, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Government which initiates and disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started, that Government may - (a) if the member of the Service is serving under it, pass an order placing him under suspension, or (b) if the member of the Service is serving under another Government, request that Government to place him under suspension, pending the conclusion of the inquiry and the passing of the final order in the case: provided that in cases where there is a difference of opinion between two State Governments, the matter shall be referred to the Central Government for its decision. (2) A member of the service, who is detained in official custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period longer than forty-eight hours, shall be deemed to have been suspended by the Government concerned under this rule. (3) A member of the service in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the Government under which he is serving, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. (4) A member of the Service shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension with effect from the date of conviction of, in the event of conviction for a criminal offence, he is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent on such conviction provided that the conviction carries a sentence of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours. (5) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a member of the service under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for/further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (6) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a member of the service is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law, and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the member of the Service shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Central Government from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. (7) (a) an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (7) (a) an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (b) Where a member of the Service is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended, whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise, and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the member of the service shall continue to be under suspension with the termination of all or any of such proceedings; (c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order?. ( 4 ) MR. Noni Coomar Chakravarti appearing for the petitioner contended that no order of suspension of a member of the all Indian Administrative services can be made except during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding and there cannot be any order of suspension in contemplation of any disciplinary proceeding. Before an order of suspension is made the Government must be satisfied that there is a prima facie charge against the petitioner for suspension. Unless a prima facie case is made out, no order of suspension can be made in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Chakravarti argued that without initiation of a disciplinary proceeding under section 3 (1) that is, without issuance of a charge-sheet, there cannot be any disciplinary proceeding and no suspension order can be made unless disciplinary proceeding is initiated by issuance of a charge-sheets. The second branch of argument of Mr. Chakravarti is that the power exercised is a power under section 3 (1) read with section 3 (3) of the Act as the order states that the order of suspension is being made ?whereas it is considered necessary? which is an exact word as it to be found in rule 3 (1) of the Rules and under rule 3 (3) the word ?necessary? is not to be found at all. It is argued by Mr. which is an exact word as it to be found in rule 3 (1) of the Rules and under rule 3 (3) the word ?necessary? is not to be found at all. It is argued by Mr. Chakravarti that from the affidavit of S. P. E. it will be found that no case is pending against the petitioner and as such the order of suspension cannot be made. Mr. Chakravarti further argued that the meaning of the word 'charge' must be read as in the criminal charge as is the Criminal Procedure Code that if a complaint is made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the very earliest stage so that the accused may defend himself. Reading the charge in that way unless a criminal proceeding is pending no suspension order can be made. Mr. Chakravarti contended that the investigation is malafide. Mr. Chakravarti further contended that rules 3 (1) and 3 (3) must be read together and reading together it is contended that unless a judicial proceeding is pending and a charge is framed under the Cr. P. C. no order of suspension can be made. The order of suspension under rule 3 is also a matter for disciplinary proceeding and unless there is a specific charge against the petitioner, no suspension order can be passed. ( 5 ) MR. Advocate-General on behalf of the respondent contended that an investigation is pending before the Superintendent of Police, Delhi Special Police Establishment and as such the matter was considered by the Chief Minister and who was of the opinion that the petitioner should be suspended till the termination of all proceeding relating to the charges pending investigation. It is argued that under rule 3 (3) of the Rules the State Government has a right to do the same. Mr. Advocate-General contended that the criminal charge in rule 3 (3) means accusation or allegation having committed an offence. It has not the same meaning as ?charge? is known to have under the Criminal Procedure Code. It is argued that the State Government has not initiated any departmental proceeding under rule 3 (i) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. A complaint was made by the 'respectable citizen' which was forwarded to the Special Police Establishment Unit for investigation. The compliant was recorded under section 154 of the Cr. It is argued that the State Government has not initiated any departmental proceeding under rule 3 (i) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. A complaint was made by the 'respectable citizen' which was forwarded to the Special Police Establishment Unit for investigation. The compliant was recorded under section 154 of the Cr. P. C. and reports about the progress of investigation were sent to the respondent and on perusal thereof, the petitioner was suspended pending investigation. It is argued that the criminal charge under 3 (3) does not mean charge framed by the Court. It is argued by Mr. Advocate-General that no departmental proceeding has been initiated by the State Government at all and the question of issuing a charge-sheet does not therefore arise. ( 6 ) THE first contention of Mr. Chakravarti is that, in respect of an Indian Administrative Services Officer, no order of suspension can be made except during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding and there can be no order of suspension in contemplation of any disciplinary proceeding and that before the suspension order is made there must be an initiation of departmental proceeding. In support of his contention Mr. Chakravarti strongly relied upon the case reported in (1) P. R. Nayak v. Union of India A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 554. The fact of the case was that the appellant joined the Indian Civil Service after being selected pursuant to his success at the competitive examination held in London in 1934. The appellant was appointed as Managing Director of the Indian Refineries Ltd. There was allegation against Mr. Nayak and Government contemplated the disciplinary proceeding against him and Mr. Nayak was placed under suspension in contemplation of the disciplinary proceeding. The appellant Mr. Nayak challenged the order of suspension in contemplation of the disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court held in favour of Mr. Nayak. Number of points were argued but the second contention of Mr. Nayak succeeded before the Supreme Court. the contention which succeeded is in paragraph 13 of the judgment which is as follows: - ?13. The appellant Mr. Nayak challenged the order of suspension in contemplation of the disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court held in favour of Mr. Nayak. Number of points were argued but the second contention of Mr. Nayak succeeded before the Supreme Court. the contention which succeeded is in paragraph 13 of the judgment which is as follows: - ?13. The next argument pressed before us on behalf of the appellant was that under R. 3 of the All India Services (D and A) Rules, 1969 the appellant could be placed under suspension only after disciplinary proceedings with respect to a definite charge or charges against him were actually initiated or started and not merely when they were in contemplation, as the impugned order of the President dated March 23, 1971 expressly purports to do. Reference to Takru Commission, according to this argument, could by no means be considered to be the initiation or commencement of disciplinary proceedings. The language of R. 3, according to the learned counsel, is clear and unambiguous and it is not permissible on plain reading of sub-r. (1) to order the appellant's suspension merely because there are some accusations or imputations against him which call for an enquiry in the guise of interpretation Courts cannot rewrite a rule to accord with their view of what it should e. The order of suspension dated March 23, 1971, argued the Counsel, must, therefore, be held to be illegal and liable to be quashed?. The decision on the said contention is to be found in paragraph 15 of the Supreme Court judgment which is as follows: - 15. In our view, the second contention possesses merit and deserves to be upheld. In case we uphold this contention it would be unnecessary for us to express any considered opinion either way on the other contentions. Rule 3 of the All India Services (D. and A.) Rules, 1969, which has already been set out in extensor, provides for suspension during disciplinary proceedings. In case we uphold this contention it would be unnecessary for us to express any considered opinion either way on the other contentions. Rule 3 of the All India Services (D. and A.) Rules, 1969, which has already been set out in extensor, provides for suspension during disciplinary proceedings. Sub-rule (1) of this rule on its plain reading empowers the Government, which initiates and disciplinary proceedings, on being satisfied, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances, of the necessity or desirability of placing under suspension, the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started, to pass an order placing him under suspension or if he is serving under another Government to request that Government to suspend him. (Emphasis supplied ). It does not suggest that suspension can be ordered merely when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated. The language used in sub-rr. (4) to (7) also suggests that these rules do not authorize order of suspension of the delinquent member of Service merely because disciplinary proceedings against him are contemplated. Suspension under those sub-rules may be ordered only either after conviction (deeming provision under sub-r. 4) or when criminal proceedings are actually in progress (sub-r. 5) or when after the penalty imposed on him having been set aside. The disciplinary authority decides to hold further enquiry (deeming provision under sub-r. 6 ). Clause (b) of sub-r. (7) similarly provides for continuation of order suspension, if any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against the delinquent member of the service, during the continuance of the earlier suspension-actual or deemed. The legislative scheme underlying r. 3 is thus clearly indicative of the intention of the rule making authority to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government concerned is possessed of sufficient material whether after preliminary investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated. An order of suspension before the actual initiation or commencement of disciplinary proceedings appears to us, therefore, to be clearly outside the ambit of r. 3 and we find no cogent ground for straining the plain language of r. 3 (1) so as to extend it to cases in which disciplinary proceedings are merely contemplated and not actually initiated or commenced. It is no doubt true that this Court (G. K. Mitter and A. N. Ray, JJ.) has in Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tarak Nath Ghose, A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 823 expressed the view that under r. 7 (1) of the All India Services (D. and A.) Rules, 1955 (replaced in 1969 by R. 3 (1) with which we are concerned) the Government is entitled to place an officer under suspension even before definite charges are communicated to him when preliminary investigation has been made into his conduct following allegations of corrupt or malpractice leveled against him. In support of this view, reliance in that decision was placed on S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India, (1967) 2. S. C. R. 566. (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1274), an earlier decision by a bench of two judges. After referring to the facts and the decision in S. Govinda Menon's case (supra) it was observed in the case of Tarak Nath Ghosh's case (supra) as follows: ?it was urged before us that the order of suspension there different from the one before us. While there is no doubt that the order against the appellant in the above case was far more detailed both with regard to the nature of the charges and to the necessity of placing him under suspension, in substance there is little difference for the purpose of R. 7 of the Service Rules. The order in this case dated 31st July, 1964 shows that serious allegations of corruption and malpractices had been made against the respondent and he was also reported to have contravened the provisions of the All India Service Conduct Rules and enquiries made by the Government of Bihar into the allegations had revealed that there was a prima facie case made out against him. Merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent, as compared to Rule 7 which contains phrases like 'the initiation of disciplinary proceedings' and the 'starting of such proceedings' we cannot hold that the situation in the present case had not reached a stage which called for an order of suspension. Merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent, as compared to Rule 7 which contains phrases like 'the initiation of disciplinary proceedings' and the 'starting of such proceedings' we cannot hold that the situation in the present case had not reached a stage which called for an order of suspension. In substance disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started against an officer when complaints about his integrity or honesty are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case has been made out against him for the framing of charges. When the order of suspension itself shows that Government was of the view that such a prima facie case for departmental proceedings has been made out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceedings were contemplated makes no difference. Again the fact that in other rules of service an order of suspension may be made when 'disciplinary proceedings were contemplated' should not lead us to take the view that a member of an All India Service should be dealt with differently. The reputation of an officer is equally valuable no matter whether he belongs to the All India Services or to one of the humble cadre. It is the exigency of the conditions of service which requires or calls for an order of suspension and there can be no difference in regard to this matter as between a member of an All India Service and a member of a State Service or a Railway Service?. ( 7 ) READING the said argument and the decision of the Supreme Court it is clear that the Supreme Court held that an order of suspension before the actual initiation of disciplinary proceeding is clearly outside the ambit of rule 3 and Their Lordships do not find any cogent ground for sustaining the plain language of rule 3 (1) so as to extend it to cases in which disciplinary proceedings are merely contemplated and not actually initiated or commenced. The Supreme Court held that the case reported in (2) Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tarak Nath Ghosh A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 823 is wrongly decided. Be that as it may, the result of Mr. The Supreme Court held that the case reported in (2) Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tarak Nath Ghosh A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 823 is wrongly decided. Be that as it may, the result of Mr. Nayak's case is that no order of suspension of the member of Indian Administrative Service can be made unless disciplinary proceeding is actually commenced or started and not otherwise. There cannot be any order of suspension in contemplation of starting a disciplinary proceeding. On the basis of this judgment Mr. Chakravarti contended that in rule 3 (3) also, unless a disciplinary proceeding is started and unless the petitioner is made known of the charges against the petitioner, the order of suspension cannot be made. Mr. Chakravarti relied upon the case reported in (3) R. P. Kapur v. Union of India A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 787 and argued that the suspension pending investigation of criminal charges related to the disciplinary matters and on that basis Mr. Chakravarti argued that under rule 3 (3) the order of suspension relates to the disciplinary matters and therefore unless disciplinary matters and therefore unless disciplinary proceedings is initiated under rule 3 (1), no order of suspension can be made. In the said case it appears that the Supreme Court was considering the scope of the words ?disciplinary matters? contained in Art. 314 of the Constitution and held that the words ?disciplinary matters?. Under Art. 314 must be given their widest meaning consistent with what disciplinary matters may reasonably include suspension. The suspension is of two kinds, namely, as a punishment, or as an interim measure pending a departmental enquiry or pending a criminal proceeding. Both these kinds of suspensions must be comprised within the words ?disciplinary matters? as used in Art. 314. The Supreme Court set aside the order of suspension because the same was passed by the Governor and not by the Secretary of the State or the Governor-General in Council in absence of the Secretary of State. The judgment only says who is an authority and the meaning to be given to the words ?disciplinary matters? as contained in the said article. It has been held that the ?disciplinary matters? includes the order of suspension pending disciplinary enquiry or pending criminal charges. The judgment only says who is an authority and the meaning to be given to the words ?disciplinary matters? as contained in the said article. It has been held that the ?disciplinary matters? includes the order of suspension pending disciplinary enquiry or pending criminal charges. The Supreme Court decided who is competent to pass an order of suspension on an Indian Civil Services Personnel and held that under Art. 314 of the Constitution this power is only given to the Governor-General in Council. This power is given to the Government of India or otherwise it is the President who can pass the order of suspension and not the Governor and the power of suspension exercised by the Governor was struck down. In my opinion, this case does not support the broad contention put forward by Mr. Chakravarti. The case of P. R. Nayak as I have already said makes it clear that in contemplation of a departmental proceeding no order of suspension can be made. Mr. Chakravarti relied upon the case reported in (4) S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1274, in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said judgment. The said paragraphs are as follows: ?12. The next question to be considered is whether the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant were validly instituted as required by R. 4 (i) (b) of the Rules. It was submitted by the appellant that there was no formal order of the Government for instituting these proceedings. For the respondents it was contended that the question is barred by res judicata by reason of the decision of the Kerala High Court in S. Govinda Menon v. State of Kerala, 1963 Ker. LT 1162. In that case, the order of suspension was challenged by the appellant by a writ petition in O. P. No. 485 of 1963 which was dismissed by Vaidialingam, J. Against that decision the appellant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Division Bench. It was contended by the appellant that the only issue considered in that case was whether the appellant could be suspended before the charges were framed and the rule of res judicata was not applicable. We shall assume in favour of the appellant that the question is not barred by res judicata. It was contended by the appellant that the only issue considered in that case was whether the appellant could be suspended before the charges were framed and the rule of res judicata was not applicable. We shall assume in favour of the appellant that the question is not barred by res judicata. Even so, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that there was no valid institution of the disciplinary proceedings under R. 4 (i ). A perusal of the order of the Government, Exhibit P-1 would itself indicate that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the appellant. Exhibit P-1 reads as follows: - ?the Government have received several petitioners containing serious allegations of official misconduct against Shri S. Govinda Menon, I. A. S. , First Member, Board of Revenue, and formerly Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration ). Preliminary enquires caused to be conducted into the allegations have shown prima facie, that the officer is guilty of corruption, nepotism and other irregularities of a grave nature. The Kerala High Court had also occasion to comment on the conduct of the Officer in thier judgment in O. P. No. 2306/62 delivered on 12th February, 1963. The judgment begins with the observation that 'this case, if it has served little lese, has served to expose a disquieting state of affairs regarding the disposal of valuable forest lands belonging to a religious institution known as the Sree Pulpally Devaswom of which I trust due notice will be taken by the competent authority in the interests of the public administration and preservation of our forest wealth no less than in the interests of this particular institution. The judgment in the above case and preliminary report of the x-Branch Police have disclosed the following grave charges of the serious irregularity and official misconduct on the part of the accused officer. The detailed enquiry into the charges by the X-Branch is in progress. The evidence in the case has to be collected from a large number of officers who are subordinate to the accused officer in his capacity as First Member of the Board of Revenue. In the interest of the proper conduct of the enquiry it is necessary that the officer should not be allowed to continue in that post. The evidence in the case has to be collected from a large number of officers who are subordinate to the accused officer in his capacity as First Member of the Board of Revenue. In the interest of the proper conduct of the enquiry it is necessary that the officer should not be allowed to continue in that post. Having regard to the nature of the charges against the officer and the circumstances the proper course would be to place him under suspension. Shri S. Govinda Menon, I. A. S. First Member, Board of Revenue is, therefore, placed under suspension under R. 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are completed. ? a perusal of this document shows that the Government had accepted the proceedings taken in the matter until that date and had decided to go forward with the disciplinary proceedings. In our opinion, there is no formal order necessary to initiate disciplinary proceedings under R. 4 (1) of the Rules and the order of the State Government under Ex. P-1 must be deemed to be an order under R. 4 (1) of the Rules initiating disciplinary proceedings. 13. It was lastly submitted that the order of suspension of the appellant dated March 8, 1963 is not in compliance with R. 7 of the Rules which states: - ?7. Suspension during disciplinary proceedings - (i) If having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the Service against whom such proceedings are started that Government may - (a) if the member of the service is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension, or. . . ? It was pointed out that definite charges were framed on June 6, 1963 and the Government had no authority to suspend the appellant before the date of framing charges. Reference was made to R. 5 (2) which states: ?5 (2 ). . . ? It was pointed out that definite charges were framed on June 6, 1963 and the Government had no authority to suspend the appellant before the date of framing charges. Reference was made to R. 5 (2) which states: ?5 (2 ). The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the member of the Service charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. ? It was argued by the appellant that the word ?charge? which occurs in R. 5 (2) and R. 7 should be given the same meaning and no order of suspension could be passed under R. 7 before the charges are framed under R. 5 (2) against the appellant. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. Rule 5 (2) prescribes that the grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges. Under R. 5 (3) a member of the service is required to submit a written statement of his defence to the charge or charges. The framing of the charge under R. 5 (2) is necessary to enable the member of Service to meet the case against him. The language of R. 7 (1) is, however, different and that rule provides that the Government may place a member of the Service under suspension ?having regard to the nature of the charge/charges and the circumstances in any case? if the Government is satisfied that it is necessary to place him under suspension. In view of the difference of language in R. 5 (2) and R. 7 we are of the opinion that the word ?charges? in R. 7 (1) should be given a wider meaning as denoting the accusations or imputations against the member of the Service. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case. ? mr. Chakravarti contended that it would be clear from the said judgment that suspension order cannot be made in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case. ? mr. Chakravarti contended that it would be clear from the said judgment that suspension order cannot be made in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court held in that case that in the facts of the case there was no formal order necessary to initiate disciplinary proceeding under rule 4 (1) of the rules and the order of the State Government under Ex. P-1 must be deemed to be an order under rule 4 (1) of the rules initiating disciplinary proceedings. If the order of suspension in the present case is an order of suspension pending initiation of disciplinary proceeding, the order cannot be sustained; and if the order of suspension is in ?contemplation? of a criminal investigation then the order cannot be sustained. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court upto-date is that ?in contemplation? of any disciplinary proceeding, no order of suspension can be made. While discussing the proposition of rule 3 the Supreme Court considered from that angle and when the Supreme Court referred to sub-rule (5), (6) and (7) of rule 3 they are only considering whether an order of suspension can be made in ?contemplation? of any disciplinary proceeding or criminal investigation or proceeding. The Supreme Court has laid down in paragraph 14 of the judgment of P. R. Nayak's case recording in the contention and with reference to other provision of rule 3 that order of suspension can be made pending disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court further held that no order of suspension can be made in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding and the emphasis is that the disciplinary proceeding has to be commenced or criminal investigation or proceedings are actually in progress when the suspension order pending Disciplinary proceeding or criminal investigation can be passed. The Supreme Court held that the legislative scheme underlying rule 3 is thus clearly indicative of the intention of the rule making authority to restrict its operation only to those cases in which the Government concerned is possessed of sufficient material whether after preliminary investigation or otherwise and the disciplinary proceedings have in fact commenced and not merely when they are contemplated. Applying the said principle in the facts of the case it will be clear that under rule 3 (3) the Government the disciplinary authority has no power to direct a suspension ?in contemplation? of an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge or in the other words unless an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a Criminal charges is pending no order of suspension can be made. In my opinion, if it is found that an investigation is pending the order of suspension under rule 3 (3) can be made on the satisfaction of the competent authority. In the facts of the present case, there is no doubt that investigation is pending on the basis of a complaint made by a citizen to the S. P. of the S. P. E. and that from the affidavit of the S. P. a case has been recorded under section 154 of the Cr. P. C. and the investigation is in progress. ( 8 ) MR. Chakravarti contended that rule 3 (3) must be read together, inasmuch as, the order of suspension, it is stated that the Government considered it necessary. The words ?considered necessary? is to be found in rule 3 (1) of the rules. Therefore the order was passed under rule 3 (1) and rule 3 (3) read together. In my opinion, that is not proper interpretation of the said words. It is clear from the order that investigation relating to a criminal charges is pending against the petitioner and that the Government considered it necessary to place the petitioner under suspension; and that he was placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge under investigation. In that circumstances, therefore, in my opinion, the identical words as ?considered necessary? cannot be construed as the order was made under rule 3 (1), more so when the order states that the investigation relating to the criminal charges is pending and the suspension will continue till the termination of the said charges under investigation. The identical words have been used in the impugned order as contained in rules 3 (1) and 3 (3) but it does not make the order as if under rule 3 (1) while in the owner itself rules quoted clearly shows that the order is made under rule 3 (3) of the rules. The next point argued by Mr. The identical words have been used in the impugned order as contained in rules 3 (1) and 3 (3) but it does not make the order as if under rule 3 (1) while in the owner itself rules quoted clearly shows that the order is made under rule 3 (3) of the rules. The next point argued by Mr. Chakravarti is that the word ?charge? in rule 3 (3) means a criminal charge as used in Criminal Procedure Code. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciate the arguments advanced, it is necessary for me to refer to the definition of 'investigation', 'inquiry', 'trial' and the meaning of 'charge' under the Criminal Procedure Code. The said definitions are as follows: - 'investigation'. 'investigation' ?includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police-officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. ? 'inquiry'. 'inquiry' ?includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. ? 'trial'. 'trial' was defined as ?the proceedings taken in Court after a charge has been drawn up, and includes the punishment of the offender?. 'charge'. 'charge' includes any head of charge when the charge contains more heads than one. In so far as the power of investigation is concerned, it is contained in Chapter XIV of the Cr. P. C. If any information is received relating to the commission of a cognizable offence the Officer-in-charge of a police-station may investigate into the said information. The 'investigation' as defined 'investigation' includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police-officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. The investigation ends with the collection of evidence by he police-officer or any other person so authorized and after the report is given under section 157 of the Cr. P. C. I am not referring to any other provisions of the statute regarding the investigation as those are not necessary for the purpose of our case. ( 10 ) MR. Chakravarti contended that the 'charge' has been defined in section 4 (1) (c) of the Cr. P. C. I am not referring to any other provisions of the statute regarding the investigation as those are not necessary for the purpose of our case. ( 10 ) MR. Chakravarti contended that the 'charge' has been defined in section 4 (1) (c) of the Cr. P. C. The 'charge' has not been defined but the judicial decision has given a definition to the word 'charge' as used in the Criminal Procedure Code in A. I. R. 1928 Cal. 434 that the word 'charge' is said to be a precise formulation of a specific accusation made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the very earliest stage. Mr. Chakravarti further relied on 1888 (21) Q. B. D. 109 at page 119 where His Lordship held that the 'charge' is a solemn act of calling before Magistrate and stating the accusation so that they may be defended. Mr. Chakravarti relied upon section 221 of the Cr. P. C. wherein it is stated that every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. He further referred to sections 207 (A), 251a (3) and 254 Cr. P. C. which deal with the charge in warrant cases and section 242 deals with the summon cases. Mr. Chakravarti contended that the offence and the charge are not synonymous and in the present case to charge has yet been given and as such the order of suspension is without jurisdiction. Mr. Chakravarti further contended that there cannot be any investigation into the charges but only investigation for cognizable offence. Mr. Chakravarti contended on this branch that the word 'charge' as appears in rule 3 (3) means and imposition or imputation of accusation or allegation of having committed an offence. Charge has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code but there cannot be any trial or inquiry before the investigation is completed and after the inquiry and trial commenced, there cannot be any investigation into any charges. ( 11 ) MR. Advocate-General contended that there cannot be any charge-sheet in the matter of any summons cases but still in summons cases charges are made. It is argued that the charges in the case means accusation. ( 11 ) MR. Advocate-General contended that there cannot be any charge-sheet in the matter of any summons cases but still in summons cases charges are made. It is argued that the charges in the case means accusation. ( 12 ) IT appears that under rule 3 (3) a member of the service in respect of, or against, whom a investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending, may be suspended until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge. In so far as rule 3 (3) is concerned, it does not mean of the same nature as 'charge' is used in the Cr. P. C. 'charge' here, in my opinion, means accusation or imputation which is a nature of crime. Giving that meaning, in my opinion, there is no difficulty in reading the words 'investigation', 'inquiry' or 'trial'. At the trial of a criminal case 'charge' has a definite meaning. In the present case there is no doubt that there was a first information report and on that basis of the first information report investigation is pending. Investigation as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, includes all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence. At the investigation stage there cannot be any inquiry or trial. The 'inquiry' has been defined as that 'inquiry' includes every inquiry other than a trial. The 'inquiry' or 'trial' is to be found in part VI of Cr. P. C. which is proceeding in prosecution. The 'inquiry' is not a trial. Therefore, 'inquiry' and 'trial' in the criminal case cannot go hand in hand at the same time. Investigation is a stage before either enquiry or trial has commenced. ( 13 ) IF Mr. Chakravarti's contention is correct, then no meaning can be given to the word 'investigation' appearing in rule 3 (3) of the rules. In my opinion, the word 'charge' in rule 3 (3) means to impute blame or guilt (Webster Dictionary) or accusation and accuse him of (Oxford Dictionary ). The criminal charge in rule 3 (3) means accusation of criminal nature. The criminal charge, in my opinion, in the context of rule 3 (3) of the Service Rules, does not mean 'charge' as framed by the Criminal Proceeding Code. In the facts of this case it is admitted that there was no judicial proceeding pending at the present moment. The criminal charge in rule 3 (3) means accusation of criminal nature. The criminal charge, in my opinion, in the context of rule 3 (3) of the Service Rules, does not mean 'charge' as framed by the Criminal Proceeding Code. In the facts of this case it is admitted that there was no judicial proceeding pending at the present moment. In the Criminal Code a complaint was made to the S. P. E. by a citizen which was recorded under section 154 of the Cr. P. C. and investigation is proceeding of the 'charges' relating to the criminal offences. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that unless a charge-sheet is issued no suspension order can be made. In my opinion, therefore, Mr. Chakravarti is not correct in his submission that unless a criminal proceeding is pending, that is, enquiry or trial is pending, no suspension order can be made. Mr. Chakravarti argued that the word 'investigation' is not at all redundant if rule 3 (3) is read along with rule 3 (1) of the rules, that is, if suspension order is made with regard to the nature of charge, that is, investigation into the nature of charge is made which may be of a criminal nature. In that case suspension can only be directed when the order with disciplinary proceeding is drawn up against the petitioner and there cannot be any suspension order before the pendency of such disciplinary proceeding. In my opinion, that is not the correct way of reading rule 3 (3) of the rules. ( 14 ) MR. Chakravarti next argued that the investigation is malafide. The allegation of malafide is to be found in paragraphs 19, 19a and 24 of the petition. The respondent has denied the allegation of malafide and the Police Officer has definitely stated in the affidavit that the complaint was made to the Police and the case has been recorded under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and investigation is continuing. It is further stated that the complaint contained very serious allegation of corrupt practices including the petitioner and that in the said complaint it appears that the petitioner is mainly responsible or liable for the corrupt practices. In my opinion, the facts as it stand to day it cannot be said that the respondents acted malafide. Mr. It is further stated that the complaint contained very serious allegation of corrupt practices including the petitioner and that in the said complaint it appears that the petitioner is mainly responsible or liable for the corrupt practices. In my opinion, the facts as it stand to day it cannot be said that the respondents acted malafide. Mr. Chakravarti further contended in course of argument, that the S. P. E. forwarded the reports of the investigation to the State Government which is unknown to law. This point is not taken in this petition and therefore the petitioner cannot argue the point at all. As regards malafide, it appears that there is nothing wrong in giving the report to the State Government because in order to prosecute, if at all a Government servant, on the allegation of corruption, it is necessary to have sanction of the authorities concerned under the Prevention of Corruption Act unless however such report is sent to the State Government for approval, no such sanction can be given. The complaint was made to the State Government which was sent to the Delhi Special Police Establishment for investigation and I do not find any difficulty or illegality in asking for an information regarding the investigation by the person who has forwarded the complaint against an Officer of the State Government. In the circumstances, all the points argued by Mr. Chakravarti must fail. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.