S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is a firm and petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 are its partners with two others. The petitioner No. 1, according to its case, is a manufacturer of paints, enamel and varnishes with wide reputation in business and sales upto the year ending 1970-71 amounted to over Rs. 37 lakhs. The petitioner firm has a factory at Alambazar which is a lease-hold property end the lease-hold interest of the firm in the aforesaid property is facing expiry. As there is no scope for further extension, the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 purchased about ten bighas of land in mouza Kusaigachi, P. S. Chanditola for a consideration of about Rs. 46,000 on the basis of a registered conveyance dated February 10, 1967. The names of the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5, who own 80% share in the said firm petitioner No. 1, were duly mutated in respect of the said lands and rent was being duly paid. The lands are situate near the National High way by-pass No. 2 known as Delhi Road. The petitioner No. 1 was to set up its factory on the said lands and the petitioner have been trying for access to the said road from the said lands which is being sanctioned. The petitioner No. 1 also has been trying to have some loan arrangement with the State Bank of India for construction of a new factory in the said premises and the proposal is under consideration. Such factory will also provide employment to a large number of people. The petitioners came to know from their vendors about the requisition of lands under the West Bengal Requisition and Acquisition Act, 1948 in or about April 22, 1071. No notice of the said requisition was given to the petitioners and they were deprived of all opportunities, far less reasonable opportunity, of representation to the State Government against the said requisition. In that state of affairs the petitioners moved this Court under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution and Rule, being C. R. No. 2069 (W) of 1971 was issued. This Rule was disposal of by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. on February 7, 1972 on concession that the order of requisition was illegal and invalid. The Rule was made absolute accordingly. In that state of affairs the petitioners moved this Court under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution and Rule, being C. R. No. 2069 (W) of 1971 was issued. This Rule was disposal of by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. on February 7, 1972 on concession that the order of requisition was illegal and invalid. The Rule was made absolute accordingly. ( 2 ) IMMEDIATELY thereafter on February 19, 1972 the petitioner No. 1 was served with an order of requisition dated February 10, 1972 of the said lands along with others lands. The petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 were not served with any copy of this order. It was contended that the requisitioning authority was bound to serve the order on the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 who are the admitted owners of the lands for giving them reasonable opportunity of making representation against the requisition. It was further contended that the Act, in so far as it does not provide for a hearing before the order of requisition is passed, was ultra vires and the order of requisition was also bad. It was also contended that the order of requisition was a colourable exercise of power for depriving the petitioners of the benefits to which the petitioner would be entitled under the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners also contended that the requisitioning authority was bound to afford reasonable opportunity to the petitioners for a hearing of their case against the proposed requisition. The ground of requisition as alleged was for establishment of a dairy by taking the disputed lands which, the petitioners contended, could be done at any other suitable place, the purpose of the present requisition being one to deprive the petitioners from carrying on their business on their acquired lands. ( 3 ) ON the above allegations the petitioners moved this Court for a Writ in the nature of Mandamus calling upon the respondents to cancel, withdraw or recall the order of requisition dated February 10, 1972 and to forbear from giving effect to the same. The Rule was issued on February 21, 1972 with an interim order forbearing the respondents from proceeding with the order of requisition and from utilizing the land for other purposes for a period of four weeks. On interim order was continued and the application was directed to be heard along with the main Rule. The Rule was issued on February 21, 1972 with an interim order forbearing the respondents from proceeding with the order of requisition and from utilizing the land for other purposes for a period of four weeks. On interim order was continued and the application was directed to be heard along with the main Rule. ( 4 ) THE State of West Bengal and its other officers have entered appearance and have opposed the Rule by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. All the material allegations made in the petition were denied and it was said that the lands had been lying vacant while possession thereof was taken on February 21, 1972. It was further stated that as the earlier requisition order dated April 6, 1972 contained certain mistakes in respect of the lands in question, the Rule was made absolute and the earlier requisition order was quashed with liberty to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law. The present requisition order was for requisition and speedy acquisition of the lands for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for establishment of dairy factory in connection with the distribution of milk in Calcutta and its environs. The impugned order of requisition was duly served on the petitioner No. 1 and also the other petitioners. The Order of requisition was served on the other petitioners of by affixing a copy of the order on the gate of their Bondel Road residence on refusal by the petitioners to receive the same. In the Act there is no provisions for representation against requisition as contended. It was contended that the provisions of the said Act (Act II of 1948), are intra vires. In all 25. 52 acres of lands including the suit lands have been requisitioned and taken possession of. It was also stated that the impugned order was passed bona fide and in accordance with law after full consideration of all relevant facts by the appropriate authorities forming the opinion. This requisition is for establishing milk factory as an essential project needing speedy execution on emergency basis for supply of 4 lakhs litres of milk and providing employment of about five thousand people. It was stated that any delay in execution of the project would cause hardship to the people at large. This requisition is for establishing milk factory as an essential project needing speedy execution on emergency basis for supply of 4 lakhs litres of milk and providing employment of about five thousand people. It was stated that any delay in execution of the project would cause hardship to the people at large. The petitioners filed Affidavit-in-reply reiterating the allegations made in the petition and disputing those made in the said affidavit-in-opposition. It was stated that the lands are still being owned and possessed by the petitioners. The allegations of service on the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 were denied. It was further contended that the right of making representation against deprivation of property is inherent in the right of ownership of property and any statute which does not give reasonable opportunity to make representation against such deprivation is illegal and ultra vires the Constitution. ( 5 ) MR. Noni coomar Chakraborty, learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred me to decision in (1) S. M. Nandy and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , reported in A. I. R. 1971 SC 961 in which the Supreme Court has answered the reference made to its Constitution Bench under proviso to Article 145 (3) of the Constitution. Reference was as to whether the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act (Act II of 1948), is ultra vires the Constitution under Article 19 (1) (f) read with Article 19 (5 ). The answer given was in the negative. It was held that fair compensation was provided in the Act for requisitioning determine by the Court, ultimately by the Supreme Court, in case of dispute. It was further observed that the necessity for requisition was to be left necessarily to the State and though no right of representation has been provided, there is no bar to make representation after service of the order and the Court had no doubt that such representation if it did override the public purpose would be favourably considered by the authority. ( 6 ) IN view of the above authority a Mr. Chakraborty has confined his attack to the question of service of notice on the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5. It was contended that no notice was served on the petitioners and accordingly the requisition order was bad in law. ( 6 ) IN view of the above authority a Mr. Chakraborty has confined his attack to the question of service of notice on the petitioners Nos. 2 to 5. It was contended that no notice was served on the petitioners and accordingly the requisition order was bad in law. The power of requisition is provided in section 3 (1) of the Act and it will appear therefrom that the requisition takes effect immediately after the order in writing under the said section is passed. Such order does not depend on the service of the order on interested persons for its validity. For that reason merely on the ground of non-service of the order on interested parties it cannot be said that the order is bad in law or ultra vires. The order is to be served, as it appears from the relevant sections, for facilitating possession as in the event of failure to comply with the order for delivery of possession as may be made under section 3 (1), the machinery for enforcing delivery of possession is provided through the Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police against persons served with the order. Accordingly it must be held that the order of requisition is not bad or void for reason of its alleged non-service on the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5. ( 7 ) ABOUT the right of representation it appears that even if it is held that the petitioners were not served with notice personally, they were fully aware of the same as it was duly served on the petitioner No. 1 of which they were partners. We have seen that the requisition order takes effect from the date the order in writing is passed and continues to be a valid and effective order till it is withdrawn by the appropriate authority or merges in the order of acquisition. It could not accordingly be said that the requisition order is bad merely because no opportunity was given for making representation. Even if the order of requisition is in force there was no bar in the petitioners' making representation against the order since it came to their knowledge. It cannot therefore be said that the requisition order is bad merely because no service of the order was made on the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 or no opportunity was available to the petitioner for representation against such requisition. It cannot therefore be said that the requisition order is bad merely because no service of the order was made on the petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 or no opportunity was available to the petitioner for representation against such requisition. For this reason it must be held that the order of requisition is valid and in accordance with law and the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this Rule. ( 8 ) THE Rule is accordingly discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order for costs. ( 9 ) THE application filed by the petitioners on March 24, 1972 for extension of the interim order is also rejected for the same reason without any order as to costs. Let the operation of this order be stayed for three weeks, as prayed for by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Rule discharged.