P. N. Khanna ( 1 ) THIS judgment will dispose of three second appeals : S. A. OS 228,229 and 230 of 1971, filed by the landlord. Raj inder Pershad and directed against the order dated June 1, 1971 of the Rent Control Tribunal, by which, accepting the three appeals of the tenants, it set aside three separate orders passed by the Additional Controller, one under Section 15 (1) of the Rent Control Act, 1958, herein called the Act , directing payment of rent, the order under Section 15 (7) striking out the tenant s defence, and the third under Section 14 (1) (a) of the Act, ordering eviction of the tenants. ( 2 ) THE appellant landlord, filed an application under Section 14 of the Act for the eviction of the respondent-tenants from the premises in dispute on the ground that they had neither paid nor tendered the arrears of rent due at the rate of Rs. 75. 00 per month for the period from July 14, 1965 witnin two months of the service of notice of demand. The respondents pleaded that in the year 1961, a portion of the premises had been surrendered to the landlord, tor which the rent was reduced to Rs. 60. 00 per month. The present landlord, Rajinder Pershad, had purchased the property in 1965, when the respondents are alleged to have been deprived of certain other portions of the demised premises. This according to the respondents, entitled them to invoke the doctrine of suspension of rent. No rent, according to them, was payable. ( 3 ) THE Additional Controller passed an order under section 15 (1) of the Act, directing the respondents to deposit the arrears of rent at she rate of Rs. 60. 00 per month with effect from January 6, 1968, up to date, within one month of the order and also to deposit future rent month by month byl5tb day of each succeeding month. As there were disputes about the respondent tenants having been deprived of a portion of the premises, the amount deposited was not to be paid to the landlord till the final decision of the application. The order further stated, that there was no sufficient material for holding that the respondents were entitled to suspension of rent, nor was there any prima facie evidence to show that the agreed rent was more than Rs. 60. The order further stated, that there was no sufficient material for holding that the respondents were entitled to suspension of rent, nor was there any prima facie evidence to show that the agreed rent was more than Rs. 60. 00 per month. ( 4 ) THE inital deposit of the arrears of rent was required to be made on or before May 21, 1970 ; but it was actually made on May 22, 1970. The rent due on July 20. 1970 was deposited on July 22, 1970. On the application of the appellant, the tenants were held guilty of these defaults. Their defence was accordingly struck out by order dt. Oct. 3, 1970. On the ex parte evidence led on behalf of the landlord, the Additional Controller ordered eviction of the respondents on October 6, 1970. ( 5 ) WHEN the matter came up before the Rent Control Tribunal in three separate appeals, a copy of the judgment dated June 1, 1970 passed my Mr. V. S. Aggarwal Sub Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, in a suit between the parties was produced. The learned Sub Judge had held in that judgment that the tenants had been deprived of a portion of the demised premises and were entilted to a reduction in rent, allowing which their liability to pay the rent was fixed at the rate of Rs. 55 per month. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the respondents were liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 55. 00 per month only and not Rs. 60. 00 per month as directed by the Additional Controller. The order of the Additional Controller under section 15 (1) of the Act, was set aside and a fresh order was passed under that sec ion allowing time to the tenants to deposit rent. In view of this, the other two orders of the Additional Controller were also set aside. All the three a appeals of tho tenants were accepted. Feeling aggrieved, the landlord has filed three separate second appeals in this Court, arising out of the said three orders originally passed by the Additional Controller. ( 6 ) THE landlord s second appeal, SAO 221 of 1971 is in respect of the order passed by the Tribunal under section 15 (1) of the Act. [after reproducing portion of section 15, the judgment proceeds. ( 6 ) THE landlord s second appeal, SAO 221 of 1971 is in respect of the order passed by the Tribunal under section 15 (1) of the Act. [after reproducing portion of section 15, the judgment proceeds. ] Order under Sub-Section (1) has to be made as soon as the eviction application comes up before the Controller. If the rate of rent at which it was last paid as claimed by the landlord is not disputed by the tenant, then there is no difficulty in passing orders directing payment at that rate for the period for which the arrears of rent are legally recoverable. If, however, the tenant raises a dispute regarding the amount which was legally recoverable from him, then the Controller has to decide the same, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, before he nukes an order giving directions under sub-section (1 ). This dispute may be with respect to the period for which the rent is due or the rate at which it was last paid or any other matter without resolving which the Controller is unable to fix the amount which the tenant can be directed to pay or deposit. If the tenant seeks to invoke the doctrine of suspension of rent, the Controller has to decide the dispute so raised after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard He has to conduct some sort of inquiry however brief it may be. His decision may be based, as natuarally it would be at that stage, on prima-facie evidence. But he has to be satisfied that the arrears of rent are due ; and for this, the tenant s plea, if any, for a total or partial abatment of lent has to be considered. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order under section 15 (1) is not a final order but is merely preliminary to the trial of the case. For the purpose of an interim order, it is not necessary, contended the counsel, that there should be a full trial. He cited V. N. Vasudeva v. Kirori Mal Luhariwala, AIR 1965 S. C 440, to support his contention. But the Supreme Court in that case found that the Rent Controller from the affidavits before him, could judge whether in the circumstances of the case "any interim order ought or not to be made". He cited V. N. Vasudeva v. Kirori Mal Luhariwala, AIR 1965 S. C 440, to support his contention. But the Supreme Court in that case found that the Rent Controller from the affidavits before him, could judge whether in the circumstances of the case "any interim order ought or not to be made". The Controller was found to have come to the conclusion that the rent had not been paid and the plea that it was withheld under an agreement was an after-thought and not true. This conclusion had appeared to the Tribunal, as it appeared to the High Court and the Supreme Court, to be sound. It was under these circumstances that the Supreme Court observed : "once such a conclusion is reached, it is quite manifest that the order was made after affording an opportunity to the appellant to be heard. No doubt the appellant is entitled to lead oral evidence in regard to the agreement he alleges, but for that he will have an opportunity hereafter. At the moment he is being asked to deposit the arrears in Court, which admittedly are outstanding. " The Supreme Court noticed a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Ramesh Chandra v. Sm. Subodhbala Dasi, AIR 1953 Cal, 198, in which Harries C. J. had observed that\before making an order for the deposit of rent, a full enquiry should be made In that Calcutta case, the tenant had pleaded an agreement for setting off the amount spent on repairs against the rent. Harries C. J. had held that without ascertaining the truth of the plea that a large sum had been spent on repairs, an order to deposit the entire arrears of rent ought not to have been made. The Supreme Court did not express disapproval of this view. Rather it observed that "facts in that case were entirely different as payment by the landlord for repairs was a part of the tenancy agreement and the rentunder the tenancy could not be calculated without advertence 10 every term of the agreement of tenancy. " Supreme Court, thus, did not rule out cases, which may require some sort of full trial, even at this stage. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, the tenant had put up a plea for abatment of rent on the ground that a part of the premises had been taken away from him. " Supreme Court, thus, did not rule out cases, which may require some sort of full trial, even at this stage. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, the tenant had put up a plea for abatment of rent on the ground that a part of the premises had been taken away from him. If the accommodation with the tenant had really been reduced, the eviction was being claimed from premises different from those for which Rs. 60. 00 per month was the last paid rate of rent. The Controller had,. then to find out the rate of rent at which it was. last paid for the reduced accommodation. And unless this was done, order under section 15 (1) could not be passed. It had to be determined, whether the portion of the premises taken away from the tenant, was such as had rendered the remaining portion with the tenant, quite useless for the purpose for which the premises had been taken on rent and whether it was a case of total abatement of rent. 0r again whether it was a case of partial abatement. If it was the latter case, then what was a the last paid proportionate rent for the reduced accommodation, from which the eviction is now claimed. For, it was only the proportionetely reduced rent for the reduced accommodation from which eviction is now sought, which can be said to be the rate of rent-last paid for that accommodation. The Additional Controller having not attempted to find out the rate of rent at which it was last paid and which could be attributed to the reduced accommodation for which eviction was claimed, was not acting within his jurisdiction to order payment at the rate of Rs. 60. 00per month. The law requires the Controller to direct the tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent at the rate at which it was last paid; and if this rate is disputed, then order under section 15 (1) cannot be passed without first determining the same. (See-judgments reported as M. L. Ahuja v. Lachhman Das. 1970 0 RCR 347, Mohan C. Vanjani v. Shant Das, 1971 RCP, 914 and Smt. Bhonri Devi v. Gopi Ram 1971 0 RCJ 248 ). (See-judgments reported as M. L. Ahuja v. Lachhman Das. 1970 0 RCR 347, Mohan C. Vanjani v. Shant Das, 1971 RCP, 914 and Smt. Bhonri Devi v. Gopi Ram 1971 0 RCJ 248 ). The Additional Controller had to consider the tenant s plea for abatment of rent on account of a portion of the premises alleged to have been taken away from his possession and also to determine wether such an abatement was total or partial and if partial to what extent. This not having been done, the order of the Additional Controller passed under section 15 (1) cannot be sustained and the Tribunal was right in setting it aside. ( 9 ) THE Tribunal found from the judgement of Shri V. S. Aggarwal, Sub judge, 1st Class, Delhi, that the tenants plea of abatement of rent had been upheld by the civil Court and the rent had been reduced to Rs. 55. 00 per month. This, therefore, was the rate of rent at which it was last paid, for the accommodation from which eviction was clamed and this evidence was sufficient for this conclusion at this stage. The Tribunal, therefore, was right in passing an order under Section 15 (1) of the Act directing the respondent tenants to deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 55. 00 per month with effect from January 6,1968 up to date within one month of the date of the order and also to deposit future rent by the 15th day of each succeeding month and to allow the respondents to adjust the amount already deposited in accordance with these directions. The landlord s appeal, SAO 228 of 1971 against this portion of the judgment is without any merit and is dismissed. ( 10 ) AS a result of the setting aside of the order under section 15 (1) of the Act, the order passed under section 15 (1) of the Act could not be sustained. Nor could the ex-parte order of eviction be justified. The Tribunal, therefore, was right in setting both these orders aside. Appeals Dismissed.