JUDGMENT (Re : An application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by Balbhadra Singh and others) During the pendency of this application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court from the appellate decree of the High Court passed in an appeal arising out of a decree in a suit, Jainath Singh, appellant 4, died. An affidavit to this effect was filed on behalf of the respondents on 16-2-72" stating therein that Jainath Singh died more than three years ago. A copy of this affidavit was served on the learned, Advocate for the appellants. Yet no step was taken for substitution of the heirs of deceased Jainath Singh until 1-11-72, when an application for substitution of his heirs mentioned in paragraph 1 was filed. It is stated in paragraph 2 of this application that earlier an affidavit had been filed on behalf of the respondents stating therein that Jainath Singh died more than three years ago but this statement was altogether false. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating therein that the certified copy of the sale deed dated 6-12-68, which was being annexed with the counter-affidavit as annexure I, would show that Balbhadra Singh and Kamdeo singh, two sons of Jainath Singh, who are mentioned in paragraph I of the substitution application also, had executed a sale deed describing Jainath Singh, their father, as deceased. When this application was taken up for orders on 13.11.72 by this Bench, Mr. Kaushal Kishore Singh, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that he wanted to argue this substitution matter on the footing that Jainath Singh died before 6.12.63, as alleged by the respondents. He did not want an enquiry to be held in the matter. His submission was that the provisions of order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, are not applicable in case a person who is a party to the application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court, dies during its pendency before grant of the certificate; after grant of certificate provisions of order XV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, are attracted. Learned Counsel further submitted on the basis of a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, The Union of India V. Seth Shanti Sarup AIR 1966 All 530 that there will be no period of limitation for filing an application for substitution of heirs of a deceased person in leave application before grant of leave. 2. As the matter was not free from difficulty, it was adjourned for further consideration. The matter has been fully agrued today and we record our views and order as below. 3. This application for certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court is an application under order 45 Rule 2 of the Code in accordance with section 109 and 110. This is not an application under Article 133 of the Constitution, as was argued on behalf of the appellants. But in our opinion, that is of no significance for the purpose of deciding the point at issue. In either event the provisions of order 22 of the Code will not apply. Rule II of that order cannot take within its ambit an application for grant of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court, even though the application may be one under order 45 Rule 2. In such a situation, it is plain that this court possesses inherent power to bring on record the heirs of a deceased person. It is also plain that such an inherent power cannot be exercised suomoto in accordance with section 151 of the Code, as was argued on behalf of the appellants. There must be an application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased person made on behalf of the opposite party. It is also firmly established by now that the inherent power which the Court possesses is not a power which is conferred on the court by section 151 of the, Code vide Manohar Lal Chopra V. kai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth HiraIal. AIR 1962 SO 527. In this connection reference may also be made to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Annada Prasad Mitra V. SushiI Kumar MandaI. AIR. 1942 Cal. 390 But' the Court does possess the inherent power. Section 151 of the Code merely recognises, it. AIR 1962 SO 527. In this connection reference may also be made to a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Annada Prasad Mitra V. SushiI Kumar MandaI. AIR. 1942 Cal. 390 But' the Court does possess the inherent power. Section 151 of the Code merely recognises, it. The application, therefore, filed for substitution cannot be said to be an application made under section 151 C. P. C. but it is an application to invoke the inherent power of the court for substituting the heirs of the deceased person. The question is whether there is a period of limitation provided in the Limitation Act, 1963, for the filing of such an application. In the Calcutta case referred to above with reference to Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it has been held t hat the said Article is applicable only to an application filed under the Code and not in accordance with any other provision or principle of law. This view is firmly established by now (vide Sah Mulchand & Co. V. Jawaher Mills Ltd AIR 1963 SC 98 and Bombay Gas Co. V. Gopal Bira AIR 1964 SC 752 . But there is a vital distinction between the language and setting up of Article 181 of the old Limitation Act corresponding to which the provision is to be found in Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. One of the main reasons which led many courts to take the view that Article I8l applies to an application filed under the Code was that the applications in the Third Division of the First Schedule and especially in Articles just above and below Article 181 were application contemplated under the Code. It would be noticed that Article 137 has now been put in part II of the Third Division of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, and this is the only Article in part II. Therefore, the main reason given in all those decisions for taking the view that the residuary article applies to an application only under the Code has vanished. Moreover, it is to be pointed out that there is a vital distinction between the wordings of section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act and t he corresponding provision of section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act. Moreover, it is to be pointed out that there is a vital distinction between the wordings of section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act and t he corresponding provision of section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act. The latter is wider and embraces the filing of the applications under the special provisions also, unless they are expressly excluded. It is for this reason also that the latter phrase of article 181 saying "or by section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908" has been omitted from Article 137. We have, therefore, no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which will govern the present application, is applicable to it although it is an application for substitution of the heirs of deceased appellant 4 in exercise of the inherent power. 4. A contrary view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Union of India vs. Seth Santi Sarup does not appear to us, and we say with very great respect, correct. Article 137 in the present context of the Limitation Act is very much different from Article 181 of the old Limitation Act. 5. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chandradeo Pandey V. Sukhdeo Rail has taken the view that an application for substitution filed in a civil revision application is under section 151 of the Cod e and since Article 137 applies to an application under the Code, such an application for substitution will be governed by the rule of limitation provided therein. We respectfully agree with the final view taken in this decision but for different reasons. We have already indicated that an application invoking the exercise of inherent power for substitution is not under section 151 of the Code and yet, although Article 181 of the old Limitation Act would not have governed such an application, the new Article 137 does govern it. 6. Now coming to the facts of this case it is clear that the present application for substitution of the heirs of deceased appellant 4 was filed more than three years after his death; the application is, therefore, barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963. It is accordingly dismissed on that ground. There will be no order as to cost.