JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated august 10, 1970, by which the Rule nisi obtained by the appellant was discharged. 2. THE appellant purchased two plots of land C. S. Plots Nos. 646 and 647 in Khatian No. 202 and 203, Mouza joka, P. S. Behala, District 24-Pargana:. Before this purchase, the plots were affected by a notification under S. 4 and a declaration under S. 6 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter referred to as the Act. After the declaration, the first respondent took recourse to the procedure prescribed by s. 17 (1) and (2) of the Act and under s. 17 (4) of the Act, an order was made by the first respondent that S. 5a of the Act would not apply. Thereafter, a notice under S. 9 of the Act was issued and thereupon the appellant obtained a rule Nisi in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the said notification and declaration. This Rule was discharged by the judgment and order under appeal. The first contention of Mr. A. K. Dutt for the appellant was that the acquisition was for setting up a permanent campus of the Indian Institute of management and as this was a purpose of the Union, the acquisition of the plots by the State of West Bengal was ultra vires its powers under the Act. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on paragraph 9 and 10 of the petition, in which it was alleged that the purpose of acquisition namely, a permanent campus of the Institute of management was a purpose of the Union and was being carried out at the expenses of the Union. It is also alleged that the State Government is not competent to acquire lands for the said purpose, and therefore the notification, and the declaration are illegal, invalid and ultra vires. Paragraph 9 of the petition, however, has been verified as a submission and paragraph 10, though verified as based on information received from Jatindra Nath Mondal, is in itself a submission to Court. Leave was granted by the trial court for filing supplementary affidavits and the appellant filed such an affidavit which was affirmed on July 20, 1964. Paragraph 9 of the petition, however, has been verified as a submission and paragraph 10, though verified as based on information received from Jatindra Nath Mondal, is in itself a submission to Court. Leave was granted by the trial court for filing supplementary affidavits and the appellant filed such an affidavit which was affirmed on July 20, 1964. In paragraph 3 of this supplementary affidavit, it is stated that the Indian Institute of management has been set up by the government of India and was an organisation of the Central Government, and that the Institute was a national Institute for undertaking management, education and research relating to various aspects of business. To this affidavit is annexed an appeal by the Late Mr. Humayan Kabir, Minister of Scientific research and Cultural Affairs. There is no affidavit in support of this appeal, nor is there any statement in the supplementary affidavit of the appellant that the statements in the appeal are true. 3. A supplementary affidavit was also filed on behalf of the first respondent, by the Additional Land acquisition Collector which was affirmed on september 11, 1969. In paragraph 3 of this supplementary affidavit, it is stated that acquisition of land for a campus in the Indian Institute of Management is a purpose of the Government of West bengal, and not of the Union of India. In paragraph 4 of this affidavit, it is denied that the Institute has been stat up by the Government of India, and is an organisation of the Central Government. In paragraph 5, it is stated that it is the Education Department, Development Branch, Government of West bengal, which is the requiring authority and the cost of acquisition has been paid by the Education Department of the West Bengal Government. It appears from Annexure 'x' to this supplementary affidavit which is a letter dated May 5, 1964, from the Assistant Secretary, government of West Bengal, Land and land Revenue Department, to the Commissioner Presidency division, authorising the latter under S. 7 of the Act to direct the Collector of 24-Parganas to make an order for acquisition of the land, which when acquired should be made over to the requiring department. The Collector of 24-Parganas was also authorised under S. 17 (1) of the Act to take possession of the land which was described as waste and arable. The Collector of 24-Parganas was also authorised under S. 17 (1) of the Act to take possession of the land which was described as waste and arable. The second annexure to the affidavit is a letter dated April 7, 1964, from the deputy Secretary, Education. Department, Government of West Bengal, to the Land Acquisition Collector, 24-Parganas. In this letter, it is stated that the Governor has been pleased to decide that 400 Bighas of Land at joka, Hanspukuria and Kalua, District 24-Parganas, be acquired as Government cost for educational purposes. The third annexure is a letter dated March 30, 1966, from the Deputy Secretary to the state Government to the Presidency commissioner informing the latter that a sum of Rs. 8,86,687/- was sanctioned towards the cost of acquisition of 134,77 acres of land for a permanent campus of the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta. 4. IT appears to us on these materials that the initiative in the matter of acquisition of land was taken by the education Department of the Government of West Bengal. It also appears that the cost of acquisition is being met by the Government of Went Bengal out of its own funds. There is no material at all to show that any part of the costs and expenses of acquisition was paid by the Central Government. It is also clear that the requiring authority is the education Department of the Government of West Bengal and possession of the land is to be made over to that department. It may be that the Institute will serve a national purpose in the sense that students and trainees from other States in the Union of India would receive education and training at the Institute, but that by itself would not make the Institute a Central Institute, and the purpose of acquisition of land for the Institute, a Union purpose. On the materials, such as they are, we cannot but hold that the purpose of acquisition of the land was a State purpose, although incidentally, it may serve other purposes, in so far as it may give, training to trainees from other states of the Union of India. It was next argued by Mr. On the materials, such as they are, we cannot but hold that the purpose of acquisition of the land was a State purpose, although incidentally, it may serve other purposes, in so far as it may give, training to trainees from other states of the Union of India. It was next argued by Mr. Dutt that Section 4 of the act prescribed a notification by the appropriate Government, and appropriate government has been defined in S. 3 (ee) of the Act to mean in relation to acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union, the Union government and in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes the State Government He argued that since the Institute was to be set up by the Central Government and an appeal for funds and cooperation had been made by a Minister of the Union of India, the notification under S. 4 of the act could not be issued by the State government. We are unable to accept this contention. I have referred to the materials on record and to my mind, there is nothing in these materials to hold that the Institute was to be established and run by the Central government On the other hand, the materials, such as they are, conclusively show that the proposal for acquisition was initiated by the Education Department of the State Government, the funds to meet the costs were being provided by the State Government and upon acquisition, possession was to be made over to the requiring authority, which also is the Education Department of the state Government. The copy of the appeal, to which I have referred earlier, even assuming that it can be looked into although not verified or supported by an affidavit, shows that the Institute is being set up by the Government of India in cooperation with the Government of West Bengal, as a national institute for management, education and research. It also appears from this appeal that the administration of the institute will be vested in a Board of governors representing the Central and state Governments as well as Industry, labour and national bodies connected with management education. It is true that there is a statement in the appeal that the Institute has been set up by the Government of India. It is true that there is a statement in the appeal that the Institute has been set up by the Government of India. But it is also true that the management of the institute is to be vested in the Board of governors representing both the Central and the State Governments. It is difficult to understand why the State government should be represented in the board of Governors, if the Institute is a Central Institute run by the Central government. All in all, it is clear to us that it is the State Government which required the land for establishment of the Institute and the costs for acquisition of the land were to be paid out of the funds of the State Government. 5. ON the question discussed above, mr. Dutt relied on a decision of the supreme Court (1) State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan A. I. R. (1955) S. C. 810. In that case, it was held that an undertaking might have three different facts and might serve the purpose of a State, a purpose of the Union and a general public purpose, and that even if, the requisition of a room for accommodation of a member of the Consulate was regarded as appertaining to a Union purpose, it did not necessarily cause to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. We do not see how this decision, in which the State Government had requisitioned certain premises for housing a member of the staff of a foreign consulate, is of any assistance to the appellant in this case. But even then, it was held that the requisition of the premises, which was made under the Bombay Land Acquisition Act, 1948, was valid. 6. THE conclusion, to which I have reached on this question, would have been enough to dispose of the first point urged by Mr. Dutt. But he went on to argue that the land was acquired for a Union purpose, and the notification and the declaration under the Act could be valid, only if, the President had delegated the powers of acquisition. Dutt. But he went on to argue that the land was acquired for a Union purpose, and the notification and the declaration under the Act could be valid, only if, the President had delegated the powers of acquisition. under the Act to the State Government; under Art. 258 (1) of the Constitution on this point, he argued firstly, that there must be a specific delegation in each case of acquisition, and secondly, that the notification under S. 4 of the act must contain clear indication that in exercise of the powers under Art 258 (1) of the Constitution, the President had entrusted the functions of the Central Government under the land Acquisition Act to the State government. There is no dispute that by a notification No. I. S. R. O. 1074 dated May 14, 1955 the President in exercise of the powers under Art 258 (1) of the constitution, had entrusted the Government of West Bengal, with the functions of the Central Government, under the land Acquisition Act, 1894. Mr. Dutt drew our attention to this notification, but contended that it was not enough. He argued that a general delegation or entrustment by the President would not validate acquisition under the Act by the State Government for a Union purpose. We are unable to accept this contention. There is nothing in the constitution itself or in. any other statute, by which it can be said that a general entrustment under Art. 258 (1)by the President to the State Government would not be enough to enable the latter to validly acquires land under the Act for a Union purpose. On this point, reliance was placed by Mr. Dutt on a decision of the Supreme Court (2) Jayantilal Amratlal Sodhan v. F. M. Rana and ors, A. I. R. (1964) S. C. 648. In this case dealing with the effect of Art 258 (1) of the Constitution, it was held that the effect was to make a blanket provision enabling the President by notification to exercise the powers of the legislature by entrustment of functions to the Officers to be specified by the President, and that by the entrustment of powers the notification authorised the State or an Officer of the State to exercise specified functions within the limits prescribed. It was further held that the effect of a Presidential notification was that wherever the expression "appropriate Government occurred in the Act, in relation to provisions for acquisition of land for the purpose of the Union the words "appropriate government or the Commissioner of the Division having territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situate" were deemed to be substituted and by the issue of such a notification the Land Acquisition Act must be deemed to be Pro tent amended. As we read this decision, it seems to us that it is entirely against the contention of Mr. Dutt. Even assuming that the purpose, of the acquisition is a Union purpose, and not a State purpose, the presidential notification of May 14, 1955 in our view, is enough to entrust power to the State Government to acquire the land for the purpose of the Institute. 7. TURNING now to the second branch of Mr. Dutt's contention namely. that the Presidential notification should have been quoted in the notification under Section 4 of the Act, and that the latter notification was invalid because there was nothing to indicate that the President had entrusted the functions under the Act to the State government, it seems to me that there is no merit in this contention either. If the Presidential notification mentioned above, had validly entrusted the functions under the Act to the State government, as I have held it had, mere failure or omission to specify in the notification under Section 4 of the Act, the Presidential notification by which the entrustment was made, would not make the notification under Section 4 invalid. As the State Government had acquired jurisdiction to issue a notification under section 4 of the Act in a case where land was acquired for a Union purpose, the notification does not become invalid or illegal merely because of failure on the part of the State Government to mention the source of its jurisdiction, namely, the Presidential notification of may 14, 1955. It is now well-settled that the exercise of a power would be referable to a jurisdiction which conferred validity upon it, and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be invalid. (See (3) L. Hazri Mai Kuthiala v. Income Tax Officer Special Circle, ambala 41 I. T. R. 12. For the reasons, both the contentions of Mr. It is now well-settled that the exercise of a power would be referable to a jurisdiction which conferred validity upon it, and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be invalid. (See (3) L. Hazri Mai Kuthiala v. Income Tax Officer Special Circle, ambala 41 I. T. R. 12. For the reasons, both the contentions of Mr. Dutt relating to ertrustment by the President to the State Government under Article 258 (1) of the Constitution fail. As i have said earlier, in view of our conclusion that the purpose of acquisition of the land in this case is a purpose of the state of West Bengal, it would not have been necessary for us to deal with these contentions of Mr. Dutt. But since, these points were canvassed before us, it is appropriate that the argument advanced in support of these points should be dealt with. 8. I now proceed to deal with the next contention on behalf of the appellant that the land is not waste or arable land, and therefore the notification under Section 17 (1) of the Act is invalid and that all the previous proceedings including the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act are also equally invalid. According to the appellant, he purchased the land by a conveyance dated May 5, 1964, his case is that the lend is within the municipal limits of Behala and is a building site for building structures for residential and factory purposes. According to him again, he purchased the land for construction of factory sheds and structures for carrying on a manufacturing business. On the other hand, it appears from the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Debabrata Basu Roy, assistant Secretary, Department of land and Land Revenue, Government of West Bengal, on January 13, 1965, that a local survey was made and upon inspection, it was found that the land in question was waste and/or arable. It seems to us that the question as to whether the land is waste and arable is a serious disputed question of fact. While the appellant contends that the land is not waste and arable, and therefore Section 17 (1) and (4) of the act could not be invoked, the respondents, on the other hand, contend that the land is in fact waste and arable land. While the appellant contends that the land is not waste and arable, and therefore Section 17 (1) and (4) of the act could not be invoked, the respondents, on the other hand, contend that the land is in fact waste and arable land. Ordinarily the writ Court ought not to go into such disputed questions of fact, if the grant or refusal of relief, depends upon a decision on such disputed questions of fact. But in this case, since the question of jurisdiction of the state Government to acquire the lands depends upon a decision of this question and the parties relied upon some materials on record in support of their rival contentions and the trial Court also went into this question, I shall therefore proceed to deal with this question on the materials on record. 9. IT was argued by the learned advocate for the appellant that his client had purchased the land for building a factory and that the land was within the limits of a Municipality and could not be held to be waste and arable land. No materials have been produced by the appellant in support of his contention that the land is not waste and arable land. On the other hand, it appears from the affidavit-in-opposition mentioned above, that upon enquiry and investigation, the land was in fact found to be waste and arable land. The argument on behalf of the appellant was that since the land was not waste and arable land, S. 17 (1) and (4) of the act could not be invoked and enforced. In support of this contention, reliance was placed by learned Advocate for the appellant on a decision of the Supreme court (4) Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (1967)1 S. C. R. 373. In that case also the question whether the land was waste or arable, was raised. It was found, however, that there were one Lac of trees of various types and varieties and it was contended that the land was forest land and could not be treated as waste or arable land within S. 17 (1) or (4) of the Act. This contention was accepted and it was held that the land sought to be acquired was not waste or arable land. This contention was accepted and it was held that the land sought to be acquired was not waste or arable land. This decision, to our mind, is of no assistance to the appellant in this case, because he has produced no materials to show that land is not waste or arable land. On the other hand, the materials on record, such as they are, show that an enquiry and survey was made and the land was found to be waste and arable land. Reliance was also placed on behalf of the appellant on a Bench decision of the Bombay high Court reported in (5) Shri Navantilal Ranchodlal v. State of Bombay and ors. A. I. R. (1961) Bom 89 In that case also the land was not only within the Municipal Corporation of ahmedabad, but it was situated at a place commanding the meeting of four public reads and there was an 80 ft. road by its side, and further it was just opposite the Income Tax Office and All India Radio house. It was further stated by the petitioner in that case that he was desirous of building a bungalow on the site, and had for that purpose already submitted a plan for sanction and approval to the appropriate authorities. It is on these facts that it was held that the land was not waste and arable. In the case now before us, there are no materials to show that the land is a building site, beyond a bare statement by the appellant that he purchased the land for the purpose of erecting a factory at the site. In our view, therefore, the Bombay decision which again turned on the facts in that case, is of no assistance to the appellant, in this case. But even then, it is to be noticed that the land was purchased by the appellant after the proceedings for acquisition had already commenced. The declaration under S. 6 of the Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary on May 1, 1964, and the appellant purchased the land on May 5, 1964. with full knowledge that the State government proposed to acquire the land for a public purpose. 10. BEFORE concluding I would briefly refer to the contentions of the respondents. Mr. The declaration under S. 6 of the Act was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary on May 1, 1964, and the appellant purchased the land on May 5, 1964. with full knowledge that the State government proposed to acquire the land for a public purpose. 10. BEFORE concluding I would briefly refer to the contentions of the respondents. Mr. H. N. Mukherjee appearing for the respondents contended that the purpose of acquisition was a state purpose and not a purpose of the union. He submitted that the initiative in the matter of establishing the Institute in Calcutta was taken by the education Department of the State government, although funds to meet the expenses were to come from various sources including the Ford Foundation. He also argued that the appeal by the central Cabinet Minister showed that the Institute was to be established in cooperation with the Government of west Bengal, who is also to be represented in the Board of Governors. He also relied on the definition of the expression "appropriate Government" in S. 3 (ee) and submitted that in order to hold that the purpose of acquisition was a union purpose, the land must be needed exclusively for the purpose of the union, and if the land was needed for any other purposes, the appropriate government to issue the notification under S. 4 and the declaration under s. 6 of the Act would be the State government In this case there were no materials, he argued, to hold that the land was needed exclusively for the purposes of the Union. On the other hand, on the materials, it should be held, he argued, that the land was needed for the purposes of the State government, though the Central Government was associated with the project in certain aspects of the same. It was also submitted that the decision to invoke S. 17 of the Act on the ground that the land was waste and arable was taken after survey and inspection of the land and was not lightly taken, to exclude the operation of S. 5a of the act. It seems to us that there is good deal of force in the contentions of the learned Advocate for the respondents. As we have already indicated our views, while dealing with the contentions of the appellant, we need say nothing more on the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents. It seems to us that there is good deal of force in the contentions of the learned Advocate for the respondents. As we have already indicated our views, while dealing with the contentions of the appellant, we need say nothing more on the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents. In our view, no grounds have been made out by the appellant to interfere with the judgment and order of the trial Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Let status quo, as on today, be maintained till four weeks from this date.