ORDER K.N. Srivastava, J. - This is an appeal arising out of the following facts: Kewal Ram was the landlord of the disputed portion of the house which was let out to Visheshwar Rao on a monthly rent of Rs. 14/-. Kewal Ram served a notice on the tenant u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 20-7-1961. He then applied for a permission from the DM as provided u/s 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. This permission was granted to the landlord by the RC and EO whom the powers had been delegated by the DM. The permission is dated 22-2-1965. The house originally belonged to an evacuee. It was purchased by the landlord and a sale certificate was issued in his favour with effect from 1-1-1958. The certificate is dated 25-4-1961. The Defendant was the tenant of this premises from before this auction sale. After permission u/s 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act was obtained, a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was filed by Kewal Ram against the Defendant on 27-2-1965. 2. The suit was contested by the Defendant on various grounds and inter alia it was pleaded that as provided u/s 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1954, the Defendant was not liable to ejectment for a period of two years. The there ground was that the notice u/s 05 of the Transfer of Property Act was waived by the landlord per his letter (sic) A-4 which is dated 29th October, 1964. The third ground was that the notice was bad in law and that under the Transfer of Property Act, which was Central Act, only 15 days notice was required and therefore, the period of 10 days notice as amended by the provincial law was not applicable. Other rounds were also taken but we are not concerned with them in this appeal as they were not pressed here. 3. The learned trial court came to the conclusion that the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was waived by the landlord and therefore, the Defendant was not liable to eiectment. As a result of this finding, the suit was decreed for arrears of rent alone. Being dissatisfied, the Plaintiff filed an appeal. 4. 3. The learned trial court came to the conclusion that the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was waived by the landlord and therefore, the Defendant was not liable to eiectment. As a result of this finding, the suit was decreed for arrears of rent alone. Being dissatisfied, the Plaintiff filed an appeal. 4. The lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment as well is against this decree that the Defendant has filed this appeal. 5. During the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court, Visheawar Rao Defendant died. His heirs were substituted in his place. The landed died during the pendency of the second appeal. His heirs too have been brought on the record. The appeal was dismissed against some of the heirs of the deceased tenant by this Court. An application to vacate that order was also subsequently dismissed. However, the question of remand was not argued and the parties entered into the merits of the (sic) thinking that the State was fully represented by the Appellant who is the on of the deceased tenant. 6. The first point which has to be decided in this appeal is as to whether the landlord waived his notice which he ad served on the tenant. In Ext. A-4 here is a demand from the tenant that 3 should pay the rent upto date and in this recital, an argument was built tat it amounted to waiver. In my opinion, there cannot be a waiver only the above ground, firstly because from the perusal of Ext. A-4, it is not made it that any rent of the period mentioned in the notice Ext. 2 was demanded. The use of the word 'upto date' cannot be stretched to mean that the sent was demanded of a period subsequent to the date of the termination of the tenancy. Secondly, mere demand would not amount to waiver unless there is acceptance of rent or there is some agreement between the parties to the effect whereby waiver could be presumed. In the instant case, even if a demand was made, there is evidence that the landlord did not accept the rent. Therefore, this demand did not result in acceptance of the rent. In the instant case, even if a demand was made, there is evidence that the landlord did not accept the rent. Therefore, this demand did not result in acceptance of the rent. There is nothing on the record to show that after the demand or along with it, there was some act, omission or commission by the Plaintiff which, coupled with the demand, could lead to the inference that there was a waiver of the notice by the landlord. 7. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on a number of decisions. One of them is a Single Judge decision of this Court Ram Dayal v. Jwala Prasad AIR 1966 All. 623 . In this case, there was acceptance of rent. It was held that if rent subsequent to or prior to the institution of the suit is accepted by the tenant of a period subsequent to the date of the termination of tenancy, the same would amount to waiver. The facts of Ram Dayal's case were altogether different from the facts of the present case, there was no acceptance of rent by the landlord and all that was argued was that the landlord made a demand. That demand is also not coupled with any act, omission or commission by the landlord or by any agreement between the parties undoing the effect of the notice. Therefore, the above decision will not affect to the facts of this case. 8. The other case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is Behari Lal Vs. Radhye Shyam, AIR 1953 All 745 . In this case also, the question was as to whether acceptance of rent of a subsequent period amounted to waiver. In that case, not only that the rent was accepted, but acting on that agreement, the tenant had made certain repairs. In the instant case, there is nothing on the record to show that the expenses which the tenant incurred in repairs was on the basis of any agreement. 9. The third case relied upon on behalf of the Appellant is a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court- Puran Mal Jaiswal Vs. Onkar Nath Choudhary and Others, AIR 1959 Patna 128 . 9. The third case relied upon on behalf of the Appellant is a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court- Puran Mal Jaiswal Vs. Onkar Nath Choudhary and Others, AIR 1959 Patna 128 . In this case, an observation was made that even a demand could amount to a waiver under certain circumstances and the following observation in this judgment was relied upon: Further as will appear from the above, the question whether or not there was waiver of notice to quit is purely a question of intention of the parties. It is quite manifest from the provisions of Section 113 that in order to constitute waiver there must be an intention not only on the part of the lessor but also on the lessee to treat the lease as subsisting. In order, therefore, to determine whether or not in a particular case there was waiver of notice to quit one has to see whether from the conduct of the landlord and tenant, by demand or acceptance of rent or by demand followed by express promise to pay, or otherwise an intention to treat the lease as subsisting can be inferred and this would certainly depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. The observation in the Patna case was that the mere demand would not amount to waiver of notice but it should be accompanied with an express promise to pay or an agreement between the parties to treat the lease as subsisting. Therefore, the mere demand would not amount to waiver of notice to quit. 11. So far as the intention is concerned, there is not the least doubt that by reading the letter Ex. A-4, the only inference which can be drawn is that the lessor never intended to waive the notice to quit or to treat the lease as a subsisting one. In this view of the matter, this decision of the Patna High Court too does not apply to the facts of the present case. 12. After giving my best consideration to the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the lower appellate court rightly held that there was no waiver by the landlord of the notice to quit. 13. 12. After giving my best consideration to the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the lower appellate court rightly held that there was no waiver by the landlord of the notice to quit. 13. The next point which was argued in this appeal was that the suit was premature because the two years' period mentioned under the proviso of Section 29(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had not expired This argument was raised on the ground that the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent on 20-7-1961 when the aforesaid period of two years had not expired. This argument too has no force in it. u/s 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the suit could not be filed unless permission had been obtained from the DM. As it was not a case under the other clauses of this section, therefore, the suit could not be filed unless the aforesaid permission have been obtained. The statutory tenancy had continued till the permission was obtained and therefore, by serving the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be said that the tenancy had been terminated. In the instant case, the Plaintiff had to pass two hurdles. The first hurdle was the compliance of the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The second hurdle was the obtaining of the permission u/s 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and unless both these hurdles were surmounted, the suit for ejectment could not be filed. In the instant case, the suit was actually filed on 27-2-1965. There is no doubt that when the suit was filed, the period mentioned u/s 29(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had expired. 14. The next argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that the words used in the section were 'liable to be ejected' and not the words 'shall be ejected' and therefore, 'liable to be ejected' would only mean a future possibility of a happening which may or may not occur. This question came up for decision in Kirpal Singh v. Ramesh Chandra 1966 AWR 860. This question came up for decision in Kirpal Singh v. Ramesh Chandra 1966 AWR 860. In this case, it was observed as below: The word used in the proviso are 'No such person shall be liable to be ejected.' These words indicate that the liability to ejectment itself is non-existent. If the words used had been 'No person shall be ejected', the view taken by the lower appellate court would have been correct. In my opinion, if the liability to ejectment did not exist, then a suit for enforcement of such non-existent liability could not be competent. The suit was filed for the enforcement of the liability for the ejectment. If the liability had not arisen, there was no cause of action for the suit and consequently the suit would be a premature suit. 15. In this reported case, what had happened was that the suit itself had been filed before the period of two years had expired and therefore, the above observation was made. In the instant case, as observed above, the suit was filed much after the expiry of the above period and then the cause of action had arisen. It cannot be said that the cause of action was non-existent at the time when the suit was filed. 16. In a Supreme Court case-Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das AIR 1951 SC 1067, it was observed as below: It is however well settled that where a contractual tenancy to which the Rent Control legislation applies has expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy. 17. A guarantee is afforded to the tenant under the Rent Control and Eviction Act. A statutory tenant was, therefore, not liable to eviction except under the condition laid down under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In this view of the matter, the suit was not premature on the ground that the notice to quit was served on the tenant before two years' time, as mentioned in the proviso of Section 29(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had expired. 18. In this view of the matter, the suit was not premature on the ground that the notice to quit was served on the tenant before two years' time, as mentioned in the proviso of Section 29(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act had expired. 18. In Babu Lal v. Hanuman Prasad 1964 ALJ 1143 it was held that the use of the word 'Kiraya' alone was not sufficient to hold that there was a determination of tenancy because 'Kiraya' is a loose word and is indiscriminately used. 19. The first point argued in this appeal was that u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, only 15 days time for notice was given and by amendment the extension of period to 30 days was invalid and illegal. This point was concluded by authorities and needs no further discussion and in my opinion, this argument has absolutely no force in it. 20. In the result, the appeal fails. It is hereby dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.