JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - Kirori Mal, the Respondent in this appeal, was tried by the learned City Magistrate, Meerut, u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of U.P. Food-grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, the Imported Foodgrains (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sale) Order, 1958-hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Order and Interzonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, 1964. The trial Magistrate found Kirori Mal guilty of having committed breach of the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964 and the 1958 Order. He was found not to have committed a contravention of the Interzonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, 1964. For contravention of the two Orders of which he was found to have committed a breach, Kirori Mal was convicted u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The learned City Magistrate ordered that in default of payment of fine, Kirori Mal shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Kirori Mal preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence. The learned Sessions Judge, Meerut, who heard the appeal, held that it had not been proved that the convict-Appellant before him had committed a breach either of paragraph 3 of the U.P. Foodgrains Licensing Order, 1964 or of paragraph 3 of the 1958 Order. The court below consequently allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of Kirori Mal by its judgment and Order dated 24th May, 1968. Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State Government has appealed. 2. The last day of limitation for filing the appeal was the 24th August, 1968, which was a Saturday when the Court did not sit. The appeal was presented after Court hours at the residence of the Registrar of the Court on the 23rd August, 1968. A preliminary objection has been raised by Sri D.P. Mittal, learned Counsel for Kirori Mai, that the appeal preferred by the State against the judgment of acquittal not having been presented within the period of limitation in accordance with Rule 1 of Ch. XVIII Part III of the Rules of Court, its admission after the expiry of the period of limitation was illegal and the appeal was not maintainable. He placed reliance on the judgment of S. Malik, J. dated 6th December, 1971 in State v. Amrik Singh G.A. No. 2025 of 1968 connected with G.As. Nos. XVIII Part III of the Rules of Court, its admission after the expiry of the period of limitation was illegal and the appeal was not maintainable. He placed reliance on the judgment of S. Malik, J. dated 6th December, 1971 in State v. Amrik Singh G.A. No. 2025 of 1968 connected with G.As. Nos. 2026 to 2029 and 2033 of 1968. In G.A. No. 370 of 1969, Jag Mohan Lal Sinha, J. was inclined to differ from the view of Section Malik, J. in the cases relied on by Sri Mittal and consequently referred to a larger Bench the following two questions: 1. Whether in view of the provisions contained in Rule 38 of Ch. VIII and Rule 11 of Ch. XI, a criminal appeal can be validly presented before the Registrar during court hours on any working day on which the Judges do not site. (2) Whether in view of the aforesaid provisions a criminal appeal can be validly presented before the Registrar on the last date of limitation beyond court hours if the Appellant or his counsel was unable to present it in court? This Bench has answered both the questions in the affirmative. In view of the opinion expressed by us in that appeal, the preliminary objection raised regarding the maintainability of this appeal must fail. 3. Sri D.P. Mittal, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, however, urged that limitation for filing the appeal expired on the 24th August, 1968, which was a Saturday when the Court vas not sitting. He submitted that in the view taken by us in the judgment mentioned above regarding the applicability of Rule 11 of Ch. XI Part II and Rule 38 of Ch. 8 Part I of the Rules of Court to criminal appeals, the State would have been justified in presenting before the Registrar the memorandum of appeal on the 24th August, 1968. The appeal, however, it was submitted, was presented before the Registrar at his residence at 7.45 P.M. on 23rd August, 1968, which was a working day on which the court did sit. He invited our attention to the fact that the memorandum of appeal contained an endorsement by the office to the effect that the papers of the appeal were complete and that it was within limitation till the 24th August, 1968. He invited our attention to the fact that the memorandum of appeal contained an endorsement by the office to the effect that the papers of the appeal were complete and that it was within limitation till the 24th August, 1968. He urged that the office endorsement showed that the appeal was ready for presentation during Court hours on the 23rd August, 1968 which was a day on which the Court did sit. If the appeal had to be presented on 23-8-1968, it was submitted, the State was bound to have presented it before the Court in accordance with Rule 1 of Ch. XVIII Part III of the Rules. The presentation of the appeal after Court hours on 23-8-1968, which was not the last date of limitation was, it was submitted, sanctioned neither by Rule 1 of Ch. XVIII Part III nor by Rule 11 of Ch. XI Part II read with Rule 38 Ch. VIII Part I. Sri Mittal went on to urge that the appeal consequently must be deemed to have been presented on 10-9-1968, when it was put up before K. N. Srivastava, J. and was ordered to be admitted by him. We find no merit in this submission either. 4. According to Sri Mittal if the State counsel had retained the memorandum of appeal with him for a few hours more and had presented it before the Registrar a few seconds after the midnight hour had struck between the 23rd and 24th August, 1968, the presentation of the appeal would have been in order but merely because it was presented a few hours earlier its presentation before the Registrar is incompetent and illegal. Rules of procedure are meant to advance justice and a too technical approach which might tend to defeat that purpose must, in our opinion, be avoided. It was open to the Registrar to refuse to accept the memorandum of appeal when it was presented before him and to inform the State-Appellant that it should be presented to him after 1200 P.M. on the night intervening the 23rd and 24th August, 1968. He, however, did not do so. It was open to the Registrar to refuse to accept the memorandum of appeal when it was presented before him and to inform the State-Appellant that it should be presented to him after 1200 P.M. on the night intervening the 23rd and 24th August, 1968. He, however, did not do so. In our opinion, the Registrar, retained with him the memorandum of appeal till 12 P.M. of the night of the 23rd August, 1968, as an agent of the Appellant-State and immediately after midnight the appeal came to be in his possession in his capacity as the Registrar of the Court. In this view of the matter, we unhesitatingly reject the submission made by the learned Counsel for the Respondent. 5. Having disposed of the preliminary objection raised by Sri Mittal, we now propose to consider the appeal on merits. 6. The trial Magistrate himself had found that the Respondent had committed no breach of the Interzonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, 1964. No appeal was preferred by the State against the acquittal of the Respondent under the said order. The lower appellate court found that the Respondent had not been proved to have committed a breach of the other two Orders for the contravention of which he had been prosecuted. During the hearing of the appeal before us, learned Counsel for the State did not challenge the acquittal of the Respondent for breach of the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. He, however, strenuously contended that the learned Sessions Judge was legally unjustified in having found that the Respondent was not guilty of having committed a breach of the 1958 Order. 7. Clause (3) of the 1958 Order of which according to the Appellant-State the Respondent had committed a breach runs as follows: No person other than authorised dealer shall sell, or store or offer for sale, imported foodgrains in any quantity, either split or unsplit or mixed with other grains. Explanation. The storage of imported foodgrains in quantities exceeding (one quintal) shall unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be storage for the purpose of sale. Clause 2 of the Order, so far as it is relevant for our purposes, is in the following terms: In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "authorized dealer" means a dealer authorized by the Central Govt. or a State Govt. Clause 2 of the Order, so far as it is relevant for our purposes, is in the following terms: In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "authorized dealer" means a dealer authorized by the Central Govt. or a State Govt. or by a duly authorized officer of the Central Govt. or the State Govt. to run a fair price shop or ration shop at which imported foodgrains are sold or may be sold; (b) "imported foodgrains" means foodgrains imported from outside India by the Central Govt. and supplied by that Govt., either directly or through a State Govt., to authorised dealers for sale to the public; (c)... ... ... It has been found as a fact by both the courts below that when the Respondent's house was searched on 27-3-1967, wheat flour weighing 10 quintals and 65 Kilograms was recovered therefrom. The courts below have held on an assessment of the evidence led that the Respondent was in possession of the flour recovered from his house. Both the courts below relied on the testimony of PW 5 A.S. Yadav who was examined as an expert for coming to the conclusion that the wheat flour recovered from the possession of the Respondent was of "imported foodgrains". The lower appellate court, however, held that selling, storing or offering for sale flour made of "imported food-grains" by an "unauthorized dealer" was not prohibited by Clause 3 of the Order because flour was not "split" "imported food-grain" within the meaning of that provision. 8. In the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, the word "food-grains" is defined as under: 2(a)... ... ... (b) "Foodgrains" means any one or more of the foodgrains specified in Schedule I to this Order including products of such foodgrains other than husk and bran. The definition of "foodgrains" in the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, is wide enough to include flour made out of foodgrains. One of the reasons that led the "learned Sessions Judge to come to the conclusion that the expression "split" imported foodgrain did not include flour made of "imported foodgrain" was that if the Central Government had intended to include Att. or flour within the purview of Clause 3 o the 1958 Order, there was no reason why that order was not framed in the same fashion as the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. or flour within the purview of Clause 3 o the 1958 Order, there was no reason why that order was not framed in the same fashion as the U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. In out opinion, it is not permissible to take into account the practice followed by one legislative authority for the purposes of construing a statutory instrument framed by an entirely different authority. 9. Learned Counsel for the State drew our attention to the Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary according to which the word "split" means "to break in pieces, to wreck, to rend, to cleave lengthwise, to divide, to disunite, to smash to pieces". It was urged that if the process of splitting foodgrains is continued, a stage is bound to be reached when the foodgrains will be completely pulverized and assume the form of flour. It was thus submitted that "split" "imported foodgrains" within the meaning of Clause 3 of the 1953 Order embraces within its purview "atta" or flour also. It must be conceded that the word "split" as used in the 1958 Order is not entirely incapable of being assigned that meaning. There are, however, circumstances which justify the conclusion arrived at by the court below. 10. The 1958 Order was passed by the Central Govt. in exercise of powers u/s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Ace. The dominant objective and intendment of that section of the Act is to arm the Central Govt. with powers to pass orders considered necessary for securing equitable distribution and availability at fair price of any "essential commodity" in the interest of the general public. To secure this purpose the Central Govt. has, apart from passing the 1958 Order under consideration, passed a number of other Orders. According to Sutherland: Statutes are considered to be in pari materia-to pertain to the same subject matter when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or thing, or have the same purpose or object. ("Statutes and Statutory Construction" Vol. 2 p. 535 Third Ed.) 11. Since the various Orders issued by the Central Govt. in exercise of powers u/s 3 of the 1955 Act have the same purpose and object, they may well be characterized as statutory instruments which are in pari materia. 12. According to Sutherland... ("Statutes and Statutory Construction" Vol. 2 p. 535 Third Ed.) 11. Since the various Orders issued by the Central Govt. in exercise of powers u/s 3 of the 1955 Act have the same purpose and object, they may well be characterized as statutory instruments which are in pari materia. 12. According to Sutherland... in construing an ambiguous enactment t is held proper to consider not only acts passed at the same session of the legislature or to which the act refers, but also acts passed at prior and subsequent sessions to which the act does not refer p. 539 Vol. 2 Third Ed. 13. In Rex v. Loxdale 1758 Burr. 145: 97 ER (K.B) 394) Lord Mansfield C.J. stated the rule as to the exposition of one Act by the aid of another in the following words: Where there are different statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system and as explanatory of each other. Though this was a case in which a later legislation was interpreted with the aid of an earlier enactment, the principle enunciated by Lord Mansfield has on numerous occasions been applied for construing a statute earlier in point of time with the assistance of a subsequent statute. 14. In The Kings v. Holland Palmer (1785) 1 Leach 352: 168 ER (CC) 279 the rule of construction was pressed in aid for the purpose of interpreting an earlier statute with reference to a subsequent one. The relevant observations in that judgment which are as follows may be profitably quoted: There are two rules by which the expressions of the legislature are to be interpreted. First, if any part of an Act of Parliament is penned obscurely and other passages in the same Act will elucidate that obscurity, recourse ought to be had to such context for that purpose. Secondly, if there are several Acts upon the same subject, they are to be taken together as forming one system and as interpreting and enforcing each other. 15. In Ormand Investment Co. Ltd. and Betts (1928 AC 143), Lord Buckmaster quoted with approval of passage from the judgment of Lord Sterndale in the case of Gape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commrs. 15. In Ormand Investment Co. Ltd. and Betts (1928 AC 143), Lord Buckmaster quoted with approval of passage from the judgment of Lord Sterndale in the case of Gape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commrs. (1921) 2 KB 403 which is as follows: I think it is clearly established in Attorney-General v. Clarkson (1900) 1 Q.B. 1561 that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked to in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. Lord Atkinson in the same decision at p. 164 of the Reports has stated that: Where the interpretation of a statute is obscure or ambiguous, or readily capable of more than one interpretation, light may be thrown on the true view to be taken of it by the aim and provisions of a subsequent statute. 16. The observations of Lord Atkinson in Ormand Investment Co. Ltd. and Betts (supra) were cited with approval by Lord Denning in Payne and Bradley (1962) AC 343. 17. The principle enunciated in Ormand Investment Co. Ltd. and Betts (supra) has been approved by the Supreme Court also in State of Bihar Vs. S.K. Roy, AIR 1966 SC 1995 wherein speaking on behalf of the Court, Ramaswami, J. stated the law in the following words: It is a well-recognised principle in dealing with matters of construction that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier Act where the earlier Act is obscure or ambiguous or readily capable of more than one interpretation. 18. In Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel and Others, AIR 1964 SC 1099 Subba Rao, J. cited with approval the following observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Kandaswami Pillai Vs. Kannappa Chetty alias Arunachala Chetty, AIR 1952 Mad 186 : It is well established that the Limitation Act and the Code are to be read together, because both are statutes relating to procedure and they are in pari materia and therefore, to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other. 19. There seems to be no reason why this rule of construction which applies to statutes be not applied to instruments of a statutory character such as the one with which we are concerned in the present appeal. 19. There seems to be no reason why this rule of construction which applies to statutes be not applied to instruments of a statutory character such as the one with which we are concerned in the present appeal. It is thus legitimate to examine the other Orders passed by the Central Govt. u/s 3 of the 1955 Act for the purpose of ascertaining the true scope and meaning of the expression "split" within the contemplation of Clause 3 of the 1958 Order. 20. It remains to be seen as to whether the various orders issued by the Central Govt. u/s 3 of the 1955 Act throw any light on the question we are called upon to decide. 21. In the Gram Zone (Movement Control) Order, 1966 issued by the Central Govt. u/s 3 of the 1955 Act Clause 2(e) is as follows: "Gram" includes Bengal Gram, Kabli gram, Gramdal (husked or unhusked), gram churi, gram flour and gram besan but does not include gram chhilka. As a result of this definition Clauses 3 and 4 of this Order will apply not only to gramdal which is nothing but "split" gram but also to gram flour. In this Order a distinction exists in the definition clause between "split" gram and "gram flour". 22. The words "gram" is defined in identical terms in Northern Inter-Zonal Gram (Movement Control) Order, 1967, also. 23. In the Maize Zone (Movement Control) Order, 1966, Clause 2(e) is as under: "Maize" includes products made out of maize. In view of this definition clause, flour made out of maize will clearly fall within the prohibition of Clause 4 of the Order. 24. The Inter-Zonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, 1969, throws a good deal of illumination on the question that is engaging our attention. Clause 2(e) of the said Order defines "wheat" as including "split wheat" and any mixture of wheat and gram or barley in which the proportion of wheat exceeds four per cent, or other foodgrains in which the proportion of wheat exceeds two per cent. The expression "wheat product" is defined as meaning "wholemeal atta, maida, resultant atta, maida, sooji or rawa". The definition clause in this Order draws a clear distinction between "split wheat" and flour made out of wheat. 25. An examination of these various Orders indicates that whenever the Central Govt. The expression "wheat product" is defined as meaning "wholemeal atta, maida, resultant atta, maida, sooji or rawa". The definition clause in this Order draws a clear distinction between "split wheat" and flour made out of wheat. 25. An examination of these various Orders indicates that whenever the Central Govt. intended to include within the mischief of an Order atta or flour, it has been so indicated in an unambiguous way. In the Inter-Zonal Wheat and Wheat Products (Movement Control) Order, the word "split" has been used, on the other hand, as non-inclusive of flour or atta of the foodgrains concerned. In our judgment the word "split" ha been used in the 1958 Order with the same signification as in the Inter-Zona Wheat and Wheat Products (Movemen Control) Order, 1969 and Clause 3 of the Order under consideration has no application to flour made of "imported food-grains". In this view of the matter, we agree with the conclusion arrived at be the learned Sessions Judge regarding the scope and applicability of Clause 3 of the 1958 Order, though for different reasons. 26. We accordingly, dismiss this appeal and the order of acquittal of Kirori Mal is sustained.