ORDER H. Swarup, J. - Nityanand Kulshresth and Subedar, the petitioners, were working as Lekhpals. In accordance with Rule 8 of the U. P. Subordinate Revenue Ministerial (Registrar Kanoongos and Assistant Registrar Kanoongos) Service Rules, 1958, a list was prepared of the Lekhpals entitled to be promoted as Assistant Registrar Kanoongos. The petitioners' names were included in the list and on vacancy being available the petitioners were promoted and posted as officiating Assistant Registrar Kanoongos on different dates. When the original list was prepared on 21-9-66, the names of Nityanand and Subedar were not included. On representation being made by them their names were also included in the list by an order dated 28-1-68. A final list was then prepared. In this list of thirteen persons, the name of Subedar appeared at serial No. 7, that of Nityanand at serial No. 8, and those of Om Prakash and Prem Kishore, respondents, at serial Nos. 10 and 13, respectively. 2. Feeling aggrieved by these names being placed below those of the petitioners, Om Prakash and Prem Kishore filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue in accordance with Rule 9. The relevant part of Rule 9 reads as follows : "No appeal shall lie against non-selection of Lekhpal for appointment as an Assistant Registrar Kanoongo but a listed Lekhpal shall have a right to appeal to the Director against the removal of his name from the list to be maintained under Rule 8 or his reduction to a lower position in that list or when he is not appointed according to his position on the list." According to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, they ought to have been placed higher that the petitioners and instead of the petitioners being appointed Registrar Kanungos they ought to have bee appointed. The Board of Revenue passed the impugned order on this appeal and held that the inclusion of the names of the petitioners after a year and half by the District Magistrate was not proper. The Board accordingly set aside that order and directed that the names of Subedar and Nityanand were to be considered for nomination by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate when the next selection is made. The grievance of the petitioners is that this order was passed by the Board of Revenue without giving them any opportunity of hearing. It is not denied that the petitioners were not heard. The grievance of the petitioners is that this order was passed by the Board of Revenue without giving them any opportunity of hearing. It is not denied that the petitioners were not heard. Learned Standing Counsel has, however, contended that this Court should go into the merits and if it finds that the order including their names in the list was not a good order then no interference be made. I do not think it proper in these proceedings to go into the merits when the matter had gone up in appeal before the appellate authority. As the Board of Revenue was exercising its appellate jurisdiction under the Rules and the order which it ultimately passed effected the rights of the petitioners, the Board should have given the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. 3. Learned Standing Counsel also relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Tribhuwan Das v. Board of Revenue, Civil Misc. Writ No. 1376 of 1968 in which this Court had held that the order passed by the Board of Revenue could not be held to be bad only because the petitioners were not given an opportunity of hearing. This Court however had, in the same judgment, dealing with the point observed : "The objection is merely technical, be cause in the writ petition the petitioners have had the chance of establishing the merits of their claim. I have heard them on merits and for that reason I would not deem it a fit case for interference on this ground." As I am not hearing the parties on merits, the ground taken by the petitioners regarding the opportunity of hearing before the Board of Revenue cannot be taken as not a ground for interfering with the order of the Board of Revenue. 4. The names of the petitioners admittedly had been included in the list and they had also been posted as Assistant Registrar Kanoongos and were working as such. The effect of the order of the Board will be that the petitioners will not be entitled to hold these posts. The order cannot be held to be anything but affecting the rights of the petitioners. The order should therefore have been passed only after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. The effect of the order of the Board will be that the petitioners will not be entitled to hold these posts. The order cannot be held to be anything but affecting the rights of the petitioners. The order should therefore have been passed only after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. The principle appears to have been accepted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh", AIR 1971 SC 1224 . In that case it was observed: "The letter by which the appellant was reverted to the post of Panchayat Secretary, and his name was also ordered to be struck off the list of these Panchayat Secretaries maintained for promotion to the post of Panchayat Inspector, had a twofold significance - (i) it rendered some support to the plea of mala fides; (ii) it lent support to the claim of the appellant that the order involved evil consequences. The High Court apparently allowed the letter to be brought on record but thereafter declined to consider whether it prejudicially affected the appellant. The direction that the appellant's name be struck off from the list of Panchayat Secretaries eligible for promotion to the post of Panchayat Inspector involved very serious consequences to the appellant. Before such an order could be made it was obligatory upon the appropriate authority to give an opportunity to the appellant to his conduct which merited that punishment. Admittedly no such opportunity was given to the appellant." It may have been possible for the petitioners to show that the omission of their names in the original list was erroneous and that by including their names subsequently, the District Magistrate had only corrected his error. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order did not prejudicially affect the right of the petitioners. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed in part. The order of the Board of Revenue dated 8-2-1971 is quashed and the Board of Revenue is directed to decide the matter afresh after affording the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs.