JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows : Being aggrieved by a decision of the Appeal Committee of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education in Appeal No. 68 of 1967 dated September 7, 1970 the petitioners who are some of the present members of the Managing Committee of Gohaldanga High School (hereinafter referred to as the said School) have obtained the present Rule on an application under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution for quashing the said decision. By the impugned decision the Appeal Committee had set aside an earlier order of the Managing Committee discharging a teacher from the school dated April 8, 1967 and had directed his reinstatement. The teacher, the appellant before the Appeal Committee is respondent No.3, Harisadhan Roy. 2. The facts are shortly as follows : In the year 1966 the members of the Managing Committee of the said -school fell out amongst themselves. The then Secretary and the President of the Managing Committee appointed a new Headmaster though it is claimed that such appointment was made without the sanction of the Managing Committee and without removing the permanent headmaster, Paresh Nath Roy, petitioner No.3, before this Court. Such disputes led to a civil suit in which the newly appointed Headmaster was injuncted from interfering with the administration of the school on November 30, 1966. The suit however, ended in a compromise in this year 1968. The old President the Secretary and the newly appointed Headmaster parted making over charge of the administration to the present petitioners and respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 8. 3. It appears that during the aforesaid dispute one Amar Nath Roy a teacher and the present respondent No.3, the other teacher' were abiding by the direction of the then Secretary and the newly appointed Headmaster. After the injunction was obtained against the newly appointed Headmaster two charge sheets were issued some time in March, 1967 one against Amar Nath Roy and the other against the present respondent No.3, Harisadhan Roy. There were four charges against Amar Nath Roy, but eight charges against the present respondent No.3. Harisadhan Roy though the four charges against Amar Nath Roy are also common with four of the charges against present respondent No.3. Both of them in answer to the said charge sheet submitted explanations denying broadly the allegations made and claiming that the charges are not bona fide. Harisadhan Roy though the four charges against Amar Nath Roy are also common with four of the charges against present respondent No.3. Both of them in answer to the said charge sheet submitted explanations denying broadly the allegations made and claiming that the charges are not bona fide. Both of them, however, took the defence that as the suit was still pending the disciplinary proceedings could not proceed. The petitioners in the Managing Committee, however, adopted a resolution on April 8, 1967 and discharged the said two teachers from service. Both of them preferred appeals under section 22(3) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) to the Appeal Committee of the Board. The appeal of Amar Nath Roy, being Appeal No. 69 of 1967 was heard and disposed of on September 17, 1968 and was dismissed. The Committee held, the materials on record show that the dismissal was justified on the charges as brought by the Managing Committee. There was no satisfactory explanation to the charges levelled against the appellant. The order of dismissal should stand." 4. On the appeal preferred by the present respondent No.3, the Board called for the explanation of the Managing Committee on July 10, 1967 and the Committee filed its explanation on March 11, 1968. This appeal being Appeal No. 68 of 1967, was however, heard on September 7, 1970. The appellant in this appeal succeeded and the Appeal Committee after hearing both the appellant and the Managing Committee found on evidence each of the charges levelled against respondent No. 3 to be unsustainable. Therefore, the Committee came to the conclusion that the discharge of the teacher was not justified and directed his reinstatement. Though the Committee directed reinstatement it did not allow any arrears of salary for the period from the date of his discharge till the receipt of the order of the Appeal Committee by the school and this period was directed to be treated as extraordinary leave without pay but without any break in service. Obviously the Committee gave the above direction to avoid any prejudice to the school due to the delay on the part of the Committee to dispose of the appeal so that the prejudice for the delay was really borne by the teacher respondent No.3. 5. Obviously the Committee gave the above direction to avoid any prejudice to the school due to the delay on the part of the Committee to dispose of the appeal so that the prejudice for the delay was really borne by the teacher respondent No.3. 5. This is the decision which is the subject-matter of challenge by the eight members of the Managing Committee who have moved this Court with the above application. The other three members of the Managing Committee respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are not supporting this application on the other hand, and affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 indicates that they are of the view that discharge of the respondent No.3 was an act of victimisation and was not bona fide. The Rule is being contested by the Board and the Appeal Committee on whose behalf an affidavit has been filed. The Rule is also being contested by the teacher respondent No.3 who has filed an affidavit. 6. Mr. Bhuniya appearing in support of this Rule has first contended that when the appeal by the appellant Amar Nath Roy was dismissed by the Appeal Committee on a finding that the discharge is justified on the charge and when such charges are also common has against the present respondent No.3 a contrary decision by the Committee only betrays in application of mind. It is, however, difficult to accept this contention on the materials now before this Court. The pleadings in the appeal of Amar Nath Roy who are not before this Court. What has been disclosed is only the communication of the decision of the Appeal Committee by the Secretary of the Board. The material part of the communication has been set out hereinbefore which indicates that the appellant there could not file satisfactory explanation to the charges levelled against him and as such the Appeal Committee upheld his discharge. On the other hand, in the present case I find the respondent No.3 who was the appellant could not only effectively assail the charges before the Board but prove them baseless on evidence produced at the hearing. Merely because of the fact that the charges are common it is not impossible to think that same set of charges though substantiated against one may not be substantiated against the other. Merely because of the fact that the charges are common it is not impossible to think that same set of charges though substantiated against one may not be substantiated against the other. Therefore, I find no inherent inconsistency in the decisions of the Appeal Committee in the two appeals. Further I have reasons to think that Amar Nath Roy in his appeal to the Appeal Committee could not substantiate any defence to the charges by adducing proper materials which the present respondent No. 3 could do so. That is what is apparent on the decisions of the Committee and this explains the divergence between the two decisions. In this view I find no substance in the first contention of Mr. Bhuniya. 7. Mr. Bhuniya has next contended that on September 7, 1970 when the appeal of the present respondent No.3 was being heard by the Appeal Committee the school could not produce the necessary documents as such documents were lying in a Civil Court and as such time was prayed for. It is further alleged in paragraph 17 of the petition that the Appeal Committee wrongly refused the prayer for time and disposed on the matter. On these allegations Mr. Bhuniya has contended that the petitioners had been seriously prejudiced in their defence before the Appeal Committee and as such the decision of the Appeal Committee should be set aside. On the pleadings of the parties it is however, difficult to accept the suggestion that the school prayed for time and such prayer was wrongly refused. The statements made in paragraph 17 have been denied both by the respondent No. 3 and by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The Assistant Secretary of the Board in his affidavit in paragraph 6 has clearly stated that at no point of time there was any prayer by the school for any adjournment for production of any other documents. On the other hand, according to the deponent of the said affidavit in answer to the notice of hearing Paresh Nath Roy one of the petitioners before this Court appeared before the Appeal Committee on that date with a letter of authority from the Secretary of the Managing Committee and the matter was heard in his presence on the evidence produced by him on behalf of the school. The authority letter is annexed to the affidavit which in no way discloses any difficulty on the part of the Managing Committee to produce any evidence or documents to support their case. There is no affidavit by the petitioners counter to this affidavit of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. I have no reason to disbelieve this statement made of behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 which is also well-supported by the documents disclosed by them. In my opinion, if the school had felt any difficulty in the matter of production of documents at the hearing normally it would be expected to file an application for an adjournment or at least indicate the difficulty in the letter of authority handed over to its representative and produced at the hearing. But that was not done. Representative or the Managing Committee also did not lodge any protest to the alleged wrongful refusal of the adjournment until the decision was communicated. In this view I am unable to accept the case of the petitioners that they had asked for any opportunity to produce any document or that such prayer was wrongly refused. 8. Mr. Bhuniya has next gone on to assail the findings of the Appeal Committee on each of the charges treating this Court to be a Court of Appeal form the decisions of the Appeal Committee. He has not substantiated any case that any of the findings so made is based on no evidence. On the other hand, he has sought to assail the propriety of the findings on the materials now disclosed before this Court. It should be noted that the entire evidence is not before this Court nor has this Court any jurisdiction to constitute itself as a Court of Appeal and sit in judgment over the propriety of the decision of the Appeal Committee. Further none of these points had been taken no opportunity to meet such points argued by Mr. Bhuniya. In this view I have not entertained this contention of Mr. Bhuniya disputing the propriety of the findings of the Appeal Committee on each of the charges. 9. Lastly, Mr. Bhuniya has raised a question of law. The recall the facts set out have in before the Appeal Committee set aside the decision of the Managing Committee by its order dated September 7, 1970. Bhuniya disputing the propriety of the findings of the Appeal Committee on each of the charges. 9. Lastly, Mr. Bhuniya has raised a question of law. The recall the facts set out have in before the Appeal Committee set aside the decision of the Managing Committee by its order dated September 7, 1970. When this order was communicated to the Managing Committee, on November 6, 1970 an application for review was filed on behalf of the Managing Committee. This is Annexure 'E' to the writ petition. This petition has two aspects. In the first place, it was pointed out in this petition that the Committee could not produce certain papers at the hearing as they were lying in the Civil Court and as such it was claimed that there should be fresh hearing giving the school an opportunity to produce these documents. But the other part of this petition which is the major part was really one direct to the assailing of the findings made by the Appeal Committee. This part is clearly not a matter of review. But in any event, the Board refused to entertain this application and by an order dated January 12, 1971 rejected it with the observation "according to appeal regulation there is no scope for review." Mr. Bhuniya contends that this view of the Appeal Committee is not correct in law as the Committee possesses the power to review its own decision. Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of Board and Appeal Committee, how over, supports the view taken by the Appeal Committee and contends that no power to review having been conferred either by the statute or statutory regulation the committed was right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to review its own decision. 10. In my view a right to a review does not flow from any inherent right and unless conferred expressly or by necessary implication no quasi judicial tribunal can exercise any such right. Reference may be made to (1) Lala Prag Lal v. Jai Narayan, ILR 22 Cal 419; (2) Chunibhai v. Narayan Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1457 (Para 23) ; (3) Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 and (4) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Haji Hasan, AIR 1966 SC 905 (Para 7). Mr. Bhuniya himself has not very seriously disputed this position in law. Mr. Bhuniya himself has not very seriously disputed this position in law. He has, however, relied on three decisions of this Court in the cases of (5) B. K. Paria v. Gosta Dolui, 64 CWN 1062 ; (6) A. Mullick v. Sumsher Ali, 66 CWN 1068 and (7) Smt. Durga Devi v. B. Jaiswal, 67 CWN 935 which, however, in my view, have got no direct bearing on the point On the other hand; a Bench decision of this Court in the Case of (8) Indira Devi v. State, AIR 1967 Cat 459 has gone on to hold that no quasi-judicial tribunal can even exercise any inherent power of review unless such power is specifically or by necessary implication conferred upon the tribunal. In my view, however, on the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore this point beyond any controversy now. Alternatively Mr. Bhuniya has drawn my attention to section 40 and section 42 of the said Act in contending that these two sections make out clear implication that the Appeal Committee could exercise the power of a Civil Court which includes the power to review or the inherent power. In my reading section 40 has no bearing whatsoever. Section 42, on the other hand, confers power of a Civil Court on a tribunal appointed under the Act. But the Act in my reading makes a clear distinction between a tribunal and the different committees provided for therein. Tribunal in section 42 obviously refers to tribunals contemplated by sections like section 12 and not to committees constituted under Chapter 3 therein. In law, the position may be that the Appeal Committee is a quasi-judicial tribunal but it is not a tribunal within the meaning of section 42. Therefore, I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Bhuniya that section 42 of the Act either explicitly or by necessary implication confers any power of review on the Appeal Committee. On the other hand, I find ample substance in the contention of Mr. Sarkar that on the provisions of the said Act and the regulations made thereunder the clear implication of the statute is that once a decision is arrived at by the Appeal Committee the decision becomes final and there is no authority even for the Committee itself to review the same Mr. Sarkar that on the provisions of the said Act and the regulations made thereunder the clear implication of the statute is that once a decision is arrived at by the Appeal Committee the decision becomes final and there is no authority even for the Committee itself to review the same Mr. Sarkar rightly relies on the provisions of section 22(4) of the Act and Regulation 11 of the Appeal Regulations. In this view, I must uphold the view taken by Appeal Committee that it having no authority to review, the application filed by the Managing Committee on November 6, 1970 was not maintainable. 11. Incidentally, Mr. Bhuniya sought to raise a point not raised in the writ petition to the effect that the Appeal Committee had no jurisdiction to decide an appeal after the expiry of the period contemplated by Regulation 10 of the Appeal Regulations. There is no dispute that the appeal had not been disposed on within the time contemplated by Regulation 10. But there is nothing either in the Act or in the Regulation to show that on the expiry of the period referred to in Regulation 10 the appeal shall abate. On the other hand, the terms of Regulation 10 indicate that the provisions for the time is not mandatory but directory. It is desirable that the time schedule should behonoured but any and every breach thereof would not render the Committee without jurisdiction to dispose of the appear. In any event the prejudice arising out of the delay had been suffered not by the school but by the respondent No.3 on my findings made hereinbefore. There, I find no merit in this incidental point raised by Mr. Bhuniya. On the conclusion as above this application fails and the Rule is discharged with costs, hearing fee being assessed at ten gold mohours to be shared equally by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and respondent No.3.