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1972 DIGILAW 229 (KAR)

DEVAYYA GOWDA v. M. GANAPATHI SRINIVAS KAMATH

1972-09-27

NARAYANA RAI KUDOOR, VENKATACHALAIAH

body1972
VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are filed against the decree passed in OS. No. 38 of 1866 on the file of the Civil Judge At Mangalore. The plaintiff who is the respondent before us and who is the son ol one Srimvasa Kamath, filed the above suit for recovery of Rs. 21,032-50 jointly and severally from defendants 1 to 7 on the basis of the following allegations. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff has been carrying on business in areca and other agricultural produce in Puttur from the year 1942 at his shop premises bearing door Nos. 13/95 and 13/96 and the said business exclusively belongs to him, that at or about 9 a. m. on 26-4-65, defendants 1 to 7 came to his shop; and defendant 3 who was the Amm attached to the Court of the Munsiff at Puttur had with him at that time a warrant for attachment of moveables issued in REP No. 145 of 1965 against Srinivasa Kamath, the father ot the plaintiff m execution of a decree passed m OS. No. 288 of 1953 on the file of the said Court. One Athri Rama Prabhu had obtained a money decree m OS. No. 288 of 1953 against Srinivasa Kamath and that the decree had remained unsatisfied. Athri Rama Prabhu had assigned the decree in favour of one Kamalaksha Pai, who in his turn had transferred it in favour of defendant 1 iji this suit. When defendant 3 -proceeded to attach the goods lying in his shop, the plaintiff protected saying that his goods could not be attached in execution of the decree obtained against his father. He also sent for an Advocate, Sri K. N. Mallya, practising at pattur in order to explain the true legal poosition to defendant 3. Defendam 3 who was assisted by defendantss 4 and 5, who were also the Amins attached to the Munsiffs Court at Futtur, did not pay any heed to the protests of the plaintiff. After Mallya arrived, he also persuaded defendants 3 to 5 not to proceed with the attachment of the goods belonging to the plaintiff. Defendam 3 who was assisted by defendantss 4 and 5, who were also the Amins attached to the Munsiffs Court at Futtur, did not pay any heed to the protests of the plaintiff. After Mallya arrived, he also persuaded defendants 3 to 5 not to proceed with the attachment of the goods belonging to the plaintiff. All the defendants who were present were informed that srinivasa Kamath, judgment-debtor in REP No. 145 of 1965 had no sort of interest in that shop and the business which was being carried on there, and that Srinivasa Kamath was not present at that time in the shop. In the meanwhile, two other respectable persons of Puttur, namely, hanumantha Bhat and Manjunatha Kini offered to stand as sureties. The plaintiff also suggested that he was willng to offer cash security in order to avert the attachment of the goods. The appeals made by the plaintiff, Sriyuths Mallya, hanumantha Bhat and Manjunatha Krni were all in vain. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS 3 to 5 refused to accept the sureties and the cash security offered by and on behalf of the plaintiff and attached thirty bags of biligotu areca weighing 1893 Kgs. of the value of about Bs. 13,000. No attachment proceedings were drawn up at the premises of the shop. The goods which were seized were loaded into a lorry bearing No. MYA 4938 which had been brought by the defendants and they were taken away by all the defendants. It was alleged that the conduct of the defendants amounted to trespass and that the plaintiff had been wrongfully deprived of his goods by defendants 1 to 7 who acted in concert with a view to causing loss to the plaintiff. Since on 26-4-1965 the Munsiff's Court at Puttur had been dosed on account of summer vacation, the plaintiff went to mangalore and moved a petition before the Vacation Judge to release the goods that had been illegally attached, After depositing a sum of Rs. 5,000. On the same day, the Vacation Judge ordered the release of the goods and directed the Bailiff of the Munsiffs Court at Puttur to release the goods, from the papers that were later on lodged with the Court of the Munsiff by defendant 3, it was known that the goods had been entrusted to defendants 1 and 2 as sureties by defendant 3. All the attempts made to serve defendants 1 and 2 with the order for release of the goods failed since they were not traceable. It was further alleged that defendants 6 and 7 Apart from otherwise assisting defendants 1 to 5 in illegally aeizing the goods, certified on the attachment warrant regarding the solvency of defendants 1 and 2 even though they were persons of no means at all and that the goods were taken from the place of attachment to the residence of defendant 6 at Kanakamajalu situate about 14 miles away from Puttur Town. When it was not possible to recover the goods which had been illegally attached or their value even after a claim petition filed by the plaintiff under Or. 21, R. 58 CPC had been allowed, the plaintiff caused registered notices issued to all the defendants on 10-9-1966 calling upon them to make good the loss which the plaintiff had sustained. The defendants sent replies containing false find frivolous allegations. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the above suit against all the defendants on the basis that they were joint tort-feasors who were Jointly and severally liable to pay damages for the wrongful attachment made on 26-4-1965. The plaintiff estimated the value of the goods attached at Rs. 13,000 and estimated the profits which he would have made but for the seizure at Rs. 2,000. He claimed Rs. 6,000 as damages for mental agony. On the total sum of rs. 20,000 so claimed, the plaintiff claimed interest at 6 per cent per annum from 26-4-1965 upto the date of institution of the suit amounting to rs. 982-50; Rs. 50 towards notice charges, and future interest at six percent per annum. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 6 contested the suit and defendant 7 remained eacparte. Defendant 1 who was the assignee decree-holder pleaded that the shop in question belonged to Srinivasa Kamath and that the plaintiff had no interest in the goods that had been attached He denied that he had acted in collusion with the other defendants in order to cause loss to the plaintiff. Defendant 1 who was the assignee decree-holder pleaded that the shop in question belonged to Srinivasa Kamath and that the plaintiff had no interest in the goods that had been attached He denied that he had acted in collusion with the other defendants in order to cause loss to the plaintiff. He further pleaded that pursuant to the warrant that had been issued by the Munsiff's Court in execution of the decree an attempt was made by defendant 3 to attach the goods on 23-4-1965 and that since the judgment debtor obstructed, the Court was requested to allow the warrant to be executed with the help of the police and by breaking open the locks, if any. After the Court passed necessary orders on the request so made, the warrant was executed on 26-4-1965. On that day Srinivasa kamath who was present at the shop stated that the goods belonged to him and that the goods were, therefore, lawfully attached He further pleaded that Sri K. R. Mallya, Advocate, who came to the spot tried to influence defendant 3 in several ways in order to prevent attachment and having failed in his attempts to do so, began to threaten defendant 3. It was not true that either the plaintiff or anybody on his behalf told either defendant 1 or defendant 3 that the shop belonged to the plaintiff and that the goods should not be attached on that account. It was further alleged that neither Hanumantha Bhat nor Manjunatha Kini offered themselves as sureties. The case of the plaintiff that he offered cash security was also denied. The allegations in the plaint that the attachment proceedings were not drawn up at the place of attachment was also denied defendant 1 further denied that the lorry, MYX 4938, had been brought and that the attached goods were taken away in that. The attached goods were entrusted to the custody of defendants 1 and 2 After the goods were directed to be released, the attached goods were brought to Puttur for being delivered to the Amin at the Grama Chavadi on 19-6-1965, but the goods had to be taken back by defendant 2 to his house at Dalampadi since the Amin did not turn up. In a suit instituted against defendant 2 in OS. In a suit instituted against defendant 2 in OS. No. 262 of 1p65 on the file of the Munsiff at kasargod, the said goods were attached from the custody of defendant 2 and hence they could not be produced. It was pleaded that the goods that were attached were worth only about Rs. 5,000. The allegation that defendant 1 to 7 had colluded with each other in order to effect wrongful attachment and to cause consequent loss to the plaintiff, was denied It was urged that the suit was liable to be dismissed. Defendant 2 pleaded more or less on the same lines as defendant 1. He admitted that the goods had been entrusted to his custody at the time of the attachment and that he had brought the goods to Puttur on 19-6-1965 to Grama Chavadi after coming to know of the orders of the Court to produce the attached goods, but they could not be delivered because the Amin who bod been deputed to receive the goods from him did not come to the Grama Chavadi on that day Thereafter the goods were taken back by him, but subsequently the very same goods were attached by the Munsiff's Court, Kasargod in a suit instituted against him Therefore, he had been prevented from circumstances beyond his control from producing the attached goods He denied that all the defendants acted in concert He, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 5 ) DEFENDANT 3 in his written stament pleaded that the shop in question belonged to Srinivasan Kamath and that there was no collusion or conspiracy among defendants 1 to 7 in order to cause loss to the plaintiff He alleged that pursuant to the warrant which was entrusted to him for execution, he effected the attachment in good faith and in accordance with law. He had sought police aid in order to do so and it had been ordered. He denied that the goods attached belonged to the plaintiff and that they were worth more than Rs. 13,000. According to him, the estimated value of the goods was in the order of Rs. 5,000. It was pleaded that at the time of the attachment, Srinivasa Kamath judgment-debtor was present and that defendants 4. and 5 were not present and that Sri K. N. Mallya, Advocate, was sent for by Srinlvasa Kamath and not by the plaintiff. 13,000. According to him, the estimated value of the goods was in the order of Rs. 5,000. It was pleaded that at the time of the attachment, Srinivasa Kamath judgment-debtor was present and that defendants 4. and 5 were not present and that Sri K. N. Mallya, Advocate, was sent for by Srinlvasa Kamath and not by the plaintiff. On his arrival, Sri Mallya sent away the judgment-debtor from that place. The allegation in the plaint that Sri Mallya requested defendant 3 not to proceed with the attachment because the goods belonged to the plaintiff, was denied. Similarly, the allegation that Hanumantha Bhat and Manjunnatha kini offered to stand as sureties and that the plaintiff offered to give cash security and that defendant 3 refused to accept the same, was also denied by defendant 3. After the attachment was complete, proceedings were drawn up in proper form and the goods were entrusted to the custody of defendants 1 and 2 who agreed to act as sureties. The allegation in the plaint that lorry MYX 4938 was brought to carry the attached goods and that the goods were loaded into it and taken awav in accordance with the direction given by defendants 3 to 6, was denied. He pleaded that he was not concerned with the manner in which the sureties dealt with the goods after they were entrusted to them. It was further pleaded that even though there was any error of judgment on his part in the execution of the warrant, since he had acted with diligence he was entitled to the protection under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. Defendant 4 plealied that he had nothing to do with the execution of the warrant in question and that he was in no way concerned with the recovery of the decretal amount. He denied that he had participated in the attachment and that he was assisting defendant 3. It was no doubt admitted by him that he was at the spot where the attachment was effected only as a spectator, but that there was no occasion for nim to discuss the matter either with the plaintiff or Sri K. N. Mallya. He denied that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiff. Defendant 5 similarly pleaded that he was not concerned with the attachment proceedings and that he had not acted in concert with the other defendants. He denied that the attached goods belonged to the plaintiff. Defendant 5 similarly pleaded that he was not concerned with the attachment proceedings and that he had not acted in concert with the other defendants. The allegations in the written statements of defendants 4 and 5 are in many respects common. The case of defendant 6 was that on 26-4-1965 he went to the shop which belonged to Srinivasa kamath with two bags of areca early in the morning and that he had sold them to Srinivasa Kamath and that when he was still there, defendant 3 came in order to effect the attachment. After the attachment was effected, he attested the proceedings as a witness. He denied that he had certified regarding the solvency or fitness of defendants 1 and 2 to act as sureties. He also denied that he had anything to do with the goods that were attached and that there was any collusion amongst the defendants as pleaded in the plaint. The allegation that defendant 4 and he took defendants 1, 3 and 5 into confidence and that all of them were jointly responsible' for illegally removing the goods belonging to the plaintiff was also denied by him. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings the Court below framed nineteen, issues. The plaintiff examined on his behalf seven witnesses including himself and on behalf of the defendants, fifteen, witnesses including defendants 3 to 6 were examined. A large number of documents were marked as exhibits in the case by the parties At the conclusion of the trial, the court below held, (i) that the goods that had been attached belonged to the plaintiff; (ii) that the attachment was not legal and proper; (iii) that the attachment had been effected illegaly in collusion by the defendants and that the acts of the defendants amounted to trespass; (iv) that defendants 3 to 5 acted mala fide and in excess of their authority; (v) that defendants 3 to 5 were not entitled to the protection of Judicial Officers' protection Act; (vi) that all the defendants had conspired and acted in collusion m depriving the plaintiff of the goods illegally, and (vii) that the defendants were jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 11400 towards the value of the goods attached, Rs 2,000 as damage for the loss of reputation and mental agony and Rs 1,000 towards loss of profit which the plaintiff would have made by the sale of areca. The Court below, therefore, made a decree for Rs 14400 against the defendants. Aggreived by the decree of the Court below, defendants 3, 4, 5 and 7 have filed RFA No. 26 of 1969 and defendant 6 has filed RFA No 27 of 1969 Defendants 1 and 2 have not filed any appeal. ( 7 ) THE points that arise for consideration in these appeals are : (1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the shop from which the goods were attached and whether the attached goods belonged to the plaintiff ? (2) Whether the execution of the attachment warrant against the plaintiff was wrongful ? (3) Whether all or any of the defendants are responsible for the loss or damage suffered by the plantiff ? and (4) What is the extent of damages the plaintiff is entitled to ? ( 8 ) IT is not disputed that 30 bags of areca were attached on 26-4-1965 pursuant to a warrant of attachment issued in REP No 145 of 1965 in execution of a decree passed in OS. No 288 of 1953 at shop premises bearing door Nos. 13 95 and 13 96 of Puttur Town. Ext. P82 is the warrant of attachment. It is seen from the said warrant that defendant 1 had got it issued m order to recover a sum of Rs 5,612-14 from Snnivasa Kamath, the father of the plaintiff. The decree in 09. No 288 of 1953 was passed on 20-10-1953. Even before the said decree was passed, the plaintiff had issued a notice as per Ext. P79 to Athri Rama Prabhu (DW 15) who was the plaintiff in the said suit informing him that the plaintiff was not liable for the decree that was likely to be passed in the said suit DW 15 admitted in the course of his deposition that he had received the original of Ext. P79. In Ext. P79 it was stated that the business which was being carried on by the plaintiff in the name of Ganapathi Srinivasa Kamath' and the house in which he was residing belonged exclusively to the plaintiff and that Srinivasa Kamath had no interest in them. P79. In Ext. P79 it was stated that the business which was being carried on by the plaintiff in the name of Ganapathi Srinivasa Kamath' and the house in which he was residing belonged exclusively to the plaintiff and that Srinivasa Kamath had no interest in them. It was also mentioned that the records maintained by the several offices and the accounts of the dealers with whom he had businpss transactions, would etablish the said fact. The plaintiff, therefore, warned DW. 15 that m the event of the properties belonging to the plaintiff being proceeded against for recovery of the monies due under the decree, DW. 15 would be liable for damages to the plaintiff. Until 1965 no action had been taken to attach the goods or properties in the shop in question in order to realise the decretal amount. The plaintiff in addition to the oral evidence has produced before Court a large number of documents in support of his case that he was the exclusive owner of the shop bearing Nos. l3/95 and 13/96 of Puttur. ( 9 ) WE, therefore, hold that the goods that were seized on 26-4-1965 pursuant to the warrant of attachment Ext. P82 that had been issued, belong exclusively to the plaintiff and that Srinivasa Kamath, judgment-debtor in the execution proeedings had no right, title or interest in them. The lower Court has found that the value of 30 bags of areca nut which were attached on 28-4-1965 and removed from the possession of the plaintiff was Rs. 11,400 only. The correctness of the above finding has not been questioned before us. The said finding is also supported by the evidence placed on record by the plaintiff. We, thereore, confirm the above finding, the next question for consideration is whether the attachment of the goods belonging to the plaintiff in execution of a decree under which he was not liable to be proceeded against is wrongful and whether it is actionable. The law in India on the above question is fairly well settled. In Kissorimohun Roy v. Horsukh Das, ILR 17 Cal. The law in India on the above question is fairly well settled. In Kissorimohun Roy v. Horsukh Das, ILR 17 Cal. 436 PC, the Privy Council had occasion to deal with the question regarding the lability of a decree-holder to compensate the actual owner of the goods attached in execution of a decree obtained by the decree holder when it turned out that the owner of the goods was not liable to be proceeded against under the decree. The appellants in that appeal had obtained a money decree against two persons. In execution of the said decree, they requested the Court to attach 1500 bales of jute which were lying in the premises of the respondent alleging that the said goods belonged to the judgment-debtors. Accordingly the executing Court issued a parwana directing its Nazir to proceed to the spot and to make an inventory of the bales of jute. The Nazir in execution of the warrant proceeded to the respondent's premises and attached a quantity of jute which was pointed out to him by the appellants as the property of one of the judgment-debtors. The respondeent thereupon preferred a claim to the goods under S. 278 of the CPC which was then in force. The said claim having been disallowed, the respondent instituted a suit in order to establish his rights over the attached goods and for damageg for wrongful attachment. The said suit having been decreed by the Calcutta High Court, the appellants appealed to the Privy Council. ( 10 ) IN that appeal Lord Watson speaking for the Judicial Committee observed as follows :" The appellants mainly relied upon the English case of walker v. Olding (1 H and C 621) which was cited as an authority for the proposition that a judgment-creditor is not responsible for the consequences of a sale, under a judicial order, of goods illegally taken in execution in satisfaction of his debt. Walker v. Olding would have been an authority of importance had the law of execution been the same in india as in England, but there is in that respect no analogy between the two systems. In England the execution of a decree for money is entrusted to the Sheriff, an officer who is bound to use his own discretion, and to directly responsible to those interested for the illegal seizure of goods which do not belong to the judgment-debtor. In England the execution of a decree for money is entrusted to the Sheriff, an officer who is bound to use his own discretion, and to directly responsible to those interested for the illegal seizure of goods which do not belong to the judgment-debtor. In India warrants for attachment in security are issued on the ex parte application of the creditor, who is bound to specify the property which hedesires to attach, and Its estimated value. In the present case, by the terms of the perwana, no discretion was allowed to the officer of Court in regard to the selection of the goods which he attached; his only function was to secure under legal fence all bales of jute in the respendent's premisees which were pointed out by the appellants. " ( 11 ) THE illegal attachment of the respondent's jute on the 28th November, 1883 was thus the direct act of the appellants, for which they became immediately responsible in law; and the litigation and delay, and consequent deprecation of the jute, being the natural and necessary consequences of their unlawful act, their Lordships are of opinion that the liability which they incurred has been rightly estimated at the value of the goods upon the day of the attachment. In Ramanathan Chetty v. Mira Saibo Marikar, AIR. 1931 PC. 28. the Privy Council held that a distinction must be drawn between acts done without judicial sanction and acts done under judicial sanction improperly obtained:" If goods are seized under a writ or warrant which authorised the seizure, the seizure is lawful, and no action will lie in respect of the seizure, unless the person complaining can establish- a remedy by some such action as lor malicious prosecution. . . . . In the case before. the Board, once it was shown as it has been to their Lordships' satisfaction, that the respondent was the cause of the appellant's goods having been seized by the Fiscal under a warrant which only directetd him to seize property of the firm, the case against the respondent was complete, and he became liable to the appellant in damages without proof of malice. " ( 12 ) WE have held that the warrant which had been issued as per Ext. P82 did not authorise the seizure of the goods belonging to the plaintiff who was not at all liable under the decree in execution. " ( 12 ) WE have held that the warrant which had been issued as per Ext. P82 did not authorise the seizure of the goods belonging to the plaintiff who was not at all liable under the decree in execution. The warrant also did not specifically authorise seizure of goods lying in premises bearing Nos. 13/95 and 13/96 or the godown where the plaintiff was carrying on business. In those crcumstances, the attachment of the goods belonging to the plaintiff was not warranted. ( 13 ) FOLLOWING the decisions in Kiss Primohun Roy's case (1) and rumanathan Chetty's case (2), p. B. Mukharji, J. observed in bajranglal Podda,t v. Sitaram Kedia, AIR 1949 Cal 457. that:" where the warrant of attachment authorises the Sheriff to levy attachment of moveable property belonging to judgment-debtor he was not entitled to levy it on the goods not belonging to the judgment- debtor but to somebody else, and if he dees, the owner of the goods can sue the judgment-debtor for wrongful attachment without any allegation and prcof of malice or want of reasonable or probable cause. " ( 14 ) IT was further held by him that even if the goods were seized under a bona fide mistake, such bona fide mistake was no defence for an action. It was enough for the owner of the goods to prove that they had been taken away without any lawful justification i. e. wrongfully. Similarly, in Qaim Husain v. Pirbhu Lal, AIR 1938 All. 508, it was held that for a suit for damages it was not necessary, to prove that the attachment was malicious and with out reasonable and probable cause. In view of the finding recorded already by us that the goods in question belonged to the plaintiff and he was not in any way liable under the decree in execution, defendant 1 at whose instance the warrant of attachment had been issued is liable to pay damages to the plaintiff for wrongful attachment resulting in unauthorised deprivation of the plaintiff's possession of the goods and subsequent conversion of the same. A conversion is an act of wilful interference without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of it. A conversion is an act of wilful interference without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of it. Under those circumstances, the person responsible for the commission of the said tort and all those who either aided or abetted him in doing so or who acted as accessories in its commission or who acted in concert in its commission, would also be liable for damages, as joint tort-feasors. When there is concerted action among several people with a common design with a view to causing damage to another, all of them are liable for the entire result. "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of the same party being present " (vide Heydon's case (11 C. Rep. 5a) ). The same principle was followed in smithson v. Garth (5) in which it was held that where the plaintiff was attacked by three persons, all would be liable for the entire damage although only one committed battery, another imprisoned him and the third stole buttons. ( 15 ) IN Salmond on Torts, 15th Edn/ at page 582 under the caption "who are joint tort-feasors", we find the following passage :"where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers those wrongdoers may be either joint or independent tort-feasors. Persons are to be deemed joint tort-feasors within the meaning of this rule whenever they are responsible for the same tort- that is to say, whenever the law for any reason imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at once. "this happens in three cases,-agency, vicarious liability and common action i. e. where a tort is committed in the course of a common action or a joint act is done in pursuance of a common purpose. Dealing with the nature of liability of joint tort-feasors, the learned author proceeds to state at page 593 as follows :"if a number of persons jointly participate in the commission of a tort, each is responsible, jointly with each and all of the others, and also severally,, for the whole amount of the damage caused by the tort, irrespective of the extent of his participation. That is to say, the person injured may sue any one of them separately for the full amount of the loss; or he may sue all of them jointly in the same action, and even in this latter case the judgment so obtained against all of them may be executed in full against any one of them. " ( 16 ) HIS above view expressed by the learned author regarding the liabiity of joint tort-feasors has been approved by the Supreme Court in khushro S. Gandhi v. N. A, Guzder, AIR. 1970 SC. 1438 in which it was held that the liability of joint tort-feasors was joint and several and that being BO, a release of one of the tort-feasors, would not result in the discharge of the liability of the other tort-feasors. But Sri V, Krishnamurthy, learned Counsel for defendant 6, contended that on the facts and circumstances of the present case it was not possible at all to extend the liability for damages for wrongful attachment to the defendants other than defendant 1, for according to him, in the case of wrongful attachment, the only person who would be responsible for the loss suffered by the person whose goods had been wrongfully attached would be the decree-holder. In support of the above contention he relied upon the observations of the Privy council in Kissorimohun Roy's case (1) that in all cases of illegal attachments, the decree-holders become immediately responsible in law'. He wanted us to understand the expression 'immediately' as 'exclusively' and hold that no person other than the decree-holder could be answerable in an action for damages for wrongful attachment. We find it difficult to agree with the submission of Sri Krishnamurthy. If the action of the decree-holder in bringing about a wrongful attachment amounts to a tort which is actionable in law, then all persons who acted in concert in the commission of the said tort would be liable as joint tort-feasors as already explained above. Another contention urged by Sri Krishnamurthy may conveniently be dealt with at this stage. He argued that the attachment having been effected by defendant 3, who was an officer of a Court, pursuant to a judicial warrant it could not be said that defendant 3 and the other defendants had acted in collusion or collectively with the object of committing a tort. He argued that the attachment having been effected by defendant 3, who was an officer of a Court, pursuant to a judicial warrant it could not be said that defendant 3 and the other defendants had acted in collusion or collectively with the object of committing a tort. It was contended that the execution of a process of a Court was in its very nature an innocent act and that, therefore, neither defendant 3 nor defendants 4 to 7, could be considered as joint tort-feasors along with defendant 1 the decree-holder who alone was responsible to law for the consequence of unauthorised seizure of the goods of the plaintiff. We cannot accept the above proposition without any qualification. If in the course of the execution of the warrant issued by the Court defendant 3 is shown to have acted within his lawful authority and if there is no evidence to show that there is no collusion amongst defendaent 3 on the one hand and the other defendants on the other, then probably the submission made by Sri Krishnamurthy would be acceptable . But if the Court comes to the conclusion that defendant 3, the Amin, had acted outside his lawful authority and in a capricious way and that the other defendants either abetted or aided him in doing so, then all the defendants would be responsible for the loss sustained by the plaintiff as a consequence of wrongful attachment. We shall now proceed to consider the question whether defendants 1 to 7 had acted in concert with the object of causing loss to the plaintiff as alleged by him. ( 17 ) IN so far as defendants 1 and 2 are concerned, it has to be observed that their liability is beyond dispute. Defendant 1 was the decree-holder at whose instance the warrant of attachment had been issued pursuant to which the property belonging to the plaintiff who was not a judgment- debtor, was seized. In those circumstances, it has to be held on the basis of the decision in Kissorimohun Roy's cose (1) and other cases referred to above, that he would be liable for damages. Defendants 1 and 2 are also liable on the ground that the goods that had been attached were entrusted to their custody as sureties with the condition that the goods must be produceed before the Court whenever they were required to do so. Defendants 1 and 2 are also liable on the ground that the goods that had been attached were entrusted to their custody as sureties with the condition that the goods must be produceed before the Court whenever they were required to do so. Admitedly in this case, defendants 1 and 2 did not produce the goods before the Court and no information is available regarding the manner in which they were disposed of apart from the statement that the said goods had been attached pursuant to a warrant issued by the Court at Kasargod in kerala State and removed to that Court. Defendants 1 and 2 have also not preferred any appeal against the decree passed against them in the suit. In order to determine the liability of defendants 3 to 7, it would be necessary to refer to certain events which had taken place prior to the date of attachment. ( 18 ) WE are of the opinion that defendant 3 had, inspite of honest efforts on the part of the plaintiff, seized the goods in excess of his authority and contrary to the provisions of Or. 21, R. 43 CPC and the relevant Civil ruleg of Practice which are extracted below, which provide for entrustment of attached goods to the custody of decree-holder or judgment-debtor or any other person interested in the goods who is prepared to stand as surety or offer cash security with an undertaking to produce the goods whenever required by the Court. Or. Or. 21, R. 43 CPC reads as follows :" Where the property to be attached is moveable property, other than agricultural produce, in the possession of the judgment-debtor the attachment shall be made by actual seizure, and the attaching officer shall keep the property in his own custody or in the custody of one of his subordinates and shall be responsible for the custody thereof; provided that when the property seized is subject to speedy and natural decav or when expenses of keeping it in custody are likely to exceed its value the attaching officer may sell it at once, and provided also that, when the property attached consists of livestock, or other articles which cannot conveniently be removed and the attaching officer does not act under the first proviso to this rule, he may at the -instance of the judgment-debtor or of the decree-holder or anv person claiming to be interested in such property leave it in the village or place where it has been attached- (a) in the charge of the person at whose instance the property is retained in such village or place, if such person enters into a bond in the prescribed form with one or more sure-ties for its production when called for, or. " ( 19 ) RULES 7 and 8 of the Rules for the custody of attached moveable property and for the maintenance of attached livestock made under Or. 21, R. 43, cpc framed by the Madras High Court and which were in force then at puttur read as follows :"when the property attached consists of livestock, agricultural implements or other articles which cannot conveniently be moved, the officer making the attachment may, at the instance of the judgment-debtor or of the decree-holder or of any person claiming to be interested in such property, leave it in the village or place where it has been attached- (a) in the charge of the person at whose instance the property is retained in such village or place, provided such person enters into a bond in the form prescribed (vide Form No. 15a of Appx. E of the first Schedule to the Code) with one or more sufficient sureties for its production when called for; or (b) in the charge of a peon, if a suitable place for its safe custody be provided and the wages of the, peon, at the rate of 8 annas per diem, for 15 days, be paid in advance, 8. Whenever attached property is kept in the village or place where it is attached, the officer shall forthwith report the fact to the court, and shall, with his report, forward an accurate list of the property seized, so that the Court may thereupon issue the order for sale if such order has not been already issued. " ( 20 ) THERE was no valid excuse for not entrustng the goods to the custody of pws. 4 and 7 who offered themelves as sureties or to the plaintiff who offered cash security. Defendant 3 instead of. doing so, entrusted the goods to the custody of defendants 1 and 2 who are stated to be impecunious. At this stage we shall deal with the evidence regarding the conduct of defendant 3. Defendant 3 elated both in his written statement and in his deposition that the shop belonged to Srinivasa Kamath. In para 1 of his deposition he stated that he had sold bis own areca in that shop but later on he stated that the said sreca belonged to his father with whom he was living. But in para 8 of the deposition, he stated that he did not know who the owner of the shop was, In para 11 he has stated that he had not bothered himself to know what the plaint contained Regarding his own duties he has stated in para 12 that even though he knows that the decree-holder and surety offered by the decree-holder are not solvent, it was his practice to hand-over the goods to the decree-holder and the surety. It is not his rase that the goods that were attached were pointed out bv the decree-holder. He has not stated so in Ext. P94 his reply notice but his case has been that the foods were delivered by the judgment- debtor himself which cannot be believed. The report regarding attachment was filed by defendant 3 only on the next day. He has not stated so in Ext. P94 his reply notice but his case has been that the foods were delivered by the judgment- debtor himself which cannot be believed. The report regarding attachment was filed by defendant 3 only on the next day. The evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses is that no prorceedings were written at the place of attachment, which appears to be probable having regard to the circumstances of this case. A reading of the written statement and deposition leaves one sad for the arm of law has been used in this case to carry out an illegal object. ( 21 ) WE may at this stage dispose of the contention of defendant 3 based on the provisions of Judicial Officers Protection Act. It is no doubt true that if, as. already observed by us, the warrant had been executed in accordance with law, defendant 3 could have claimed the protection of the Act. In the instant case, the warrant itself did not mention the goods that had to be attached or their situation. There is no believable evidence that defendant 1 pointed out the goods that were attached. Defendant 1 has not been examined. It is found by us that the shop and the goods belonged to the plaintiff who was not liable under the decree. We have also held that the report of defendant 3 regarding the proceedings dt. 23-1-1965 was not true. Defendant 3 has in violation of Or. 21, R. 43 of the Code and the relevant Civil Rules of Practice seized the goods even though the plaintiff offered sureties and also cash security. The specific rase put forward by defendant 3 that the goods belonged to Srinivasa Kamath is disbelieved by us. All these circumstances established that defendant 3 had deliberately misused his office and the warrant issued to him to cause loss to the plaintiff in collusion with others with a mala fide intention and that ho had done so in excess of his authority. Defendant 3 is not therefore, entitled to the protection of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. ( 22 ) IN so far as defendant 4 is concerned we have the evidence of the plaintiff and PW. 6 regarding the interest he had in recovering the money. Defendant 4 was admittedly present at the shop. PW. Defendant 3 is not therefore, entitled to the protection of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. ( 22 ) IN so far as defendant 4 is concerned we have the evidence of the plaintiff and PW. 6 regarding the interest he had in recovering the money. Defendant 4 was admittedly present at the shop. PW. 5 has stated that he had brought him in his lorry with defendant 6 and defendant 4 went in the lorry loaded with the attached goods. PW. 6 has stated that defendant 4 was assisting defendant 3 in carrying out attachment. We do not believe the case of defendant 4 that he came there after attachment was all over. The case of the plaintiff is that defendant 4 had caused the assignment of the decree in favour of defendant 1 nominally with the object of causing loss to the plaintiff. We feel that the evidence is sufficient to hold that defendant 4 acted in concert with defendants 1, 2, 3 and 6 in causing loss to the plaintiff. ( 23 ) THE case against defendant 6 is equally well founded. The plaintiff has stated about defendant 6 approaching him regarding the settlement of decretal amount in 1960-61. PW. 5 R. D'souza has stated that defendant 6 came in the lorry to the place of attachment and went back in it with the attached goods. He also stated that the said goods were deposited in the house of defendant 6. Defendant 6 has certified that defendants 1 and 2 were solvent even though they were not so. From Ext. P111 it is seen that defendant 2 also comes from Kanakamajalu where defendant 6 is residing. The presence of defendant 2 at the place of attachment is not explained by any body. The plaintiff has deposed in para 18 of his deposition that defendant 2 was always seen with defendant 6 at Puttux. Defendant 6 has not denied the said fact. We have held that the alternative case set up by him explaining his presence at the shop is not true. Hence, we hold that he is also one of the joint tort-feaeors answerable to the plaintiff's claim. ( 24 ) WITH regard to defendants 5 and 7, however, we do not feel that the evidence is sufficient to make them liable as joint tort-feasors. Hence, we hold that he is also one of the joint tort-feaeors answerable to the plaintiff's claim. ( 24 ) WITH regard to defendants 5 and 7, however, we do not feel that the evidence is sufficient to make them liable as joint tort-feasors. The only evidence against defendants 5 and 7 is that they were present at the time of attachment. Defendant 7 has no doubt also certified regarding the solvency of defendants 1 and 2, PW. 5 does not say that defendants 5 and 7 travelled in the lorry. In the circumstances of this case, they cannot be considered as having acted in concert with others in committing the tort with a common object. Hence, we hold that the claim against them is not sustainable. But the cumulative effect of the evidence in this case makes us believe that defendants 1 to 4 and 6 have with a common design and purpose carried out illegal seizure of goods from the plaintiff. The fact that the goods were later on seized and taken away pursuant to a warrant of the Court at Kasargod in Kerala State in a case with which the plaintiff was unconcerned is no defence. Defendant 2 as a surety could not have removed the attached goods out side the jurisdiction of the Court at Puttur. The case of defendants 1 and 2 that they brought the goods on 19-6- 1965 to the Grama Chavadi at Puttur for delivering the goods to the Amin is not proved. All attempts made to get defendants 1 and 2 through the process of the Court were unsuccessful. We feel that defendants 1 to 4 and 6 are all jointly and severally liable as joint tort-feasors to compensate the plaintiff. ( 25 ) THE Court below has made a decree for Rs. 14,400 made up of Rs. 11,400 being the value of the goods; Rs. 2,000 being damages for loss of reputation and mental agony, and Rs. 1,000 towards loss of profit. It is contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to get Rs. 2,000 as damages for mental agony and loss of reputation. On behalf cf the plaintiff it is urged that the said sum could be awarded as general damages In view of the aggravated nature of tort committed in this case. 1,000 towards loss of profit. It is contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to get Rs. 2,000 as damages for mental agony and loss of reputation. On behalf cf the plaintiff it is urged that the said sum could be awarded as general damages In view of the aggravated nature of tort committed in this case. We do not express any opinion oh the legal position whether in such a case damages could be awarded for mentsl apony or loss of reputation, for we feel that damages of Rs. 1,000 which is awarded by the Court below in addition to the value of the goods 'and which is not questioned before us. is sufficient in the circumstances of the case to meet the ends of justice. We extend the benefit of the above finding also to defendants 1 and 2 who have not appealed under Or. 41, rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 26 ) IN the result, in substitution of the decree of the Court below we pass a decree for Rs. 12. 400 only jointly and severally against defendants 1 to 4 and 6. with current interest theronn at 6 per cent per annum fmm the date of suit till the date of payment and proportionate costs of the trial court. We dismiss the suit aganinst defendants 5 and 7 and direct them to bear their own costs in both the Courts. ( 27 ) WITH the above modification, both these appeals are dismissed. Plaintiff shall pet proportionate Costs from defendants 3 and 4 in RFA. No. 26 of 1969 and from defendant 6 in RFA. No. 27 of 1969. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. --- *** --- .