JUDGMENT 1. IN these two Rules the petitioners have challenged an order bearing reference No. D. O. D. 215 dated the 21st march 1972 passed by the Superintendent of Police Midnapore placing the petitioners under suspension with effect from the 18th March, 1972. It is alleged that some incidents took place at about 01. 30 hours in the night of February 2/3, 1972 at Puratan Bazar brothel area, kharagpur, in which the two petitioners were involved in acts of indiscipline. It further appears that there was a local enquiry made by the Inspector-in-charge of the Kharagpur Police Station in respect of the above incidents on the basis of an order passed in the matter and the said officer submitted a report on february 20, 1972. On this report the suspension order mentioned above was passed by the Superintendent of Police and there was a further order directing the Additional Superintendent to draw up proceedings against the petitioners. The petitioners were served with the said suspension order on the 24th march, 1972, and on 29th March 1972 the two petitioners moved two petitions under Article 226 (1) of the constitution challenging the order of suspension referred to above. It was contended that the said order of suspension was issued without any charge-sheet and there was no pending enquiry when the impugned order was issued. The petitioners contended that 0the impugned order of suspension was an order of substantive punishment without complying with the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and was therefore illegal and void. The said order was also bad as retrospective effect was sought to be given to the said order in that though the order was. signed on March 21, 1972 it was expressly stated to have taken effect from the march 18, 1972. There was a further ground that no charge-sheet was issued nor any proceeding initiated prior to the issue of the impugned order and accordingly, the order was bad in law. On these two applications two Rules were issued on the March 29, 1972 calling upon the respondents to show cause why a Writ in the nature of mandamus should not issue directing the respondents to forbear them from giving effect to the said orders and also why a Writ in the nature of Certiorari should not issue for the purpose of quashing the same. 2. 2. THE above Rules were opposed by the respondents who filed affidavits-in-opposition to the same and it was stated that the order of suspension was not bad as the same was effective on and from the date of its service on the petitioners. It was further stated that the departmental proceeding No. 9 of 1972 arising there from was also valid being in accordance with the provisions of the Police Regulations, Bengal. It was also stated that the order of suspension was pending enquiry and was not a substantive punishment as contended. For all these reasons it was submitted that the petitions should be rejected. There were affidavits-in-reply by the petitioners reiterating the allegations made in the petitions. Supplementary in-affidavits-in-opposition affirmed on the september 1, 1972 were filed on the september 4, 1972 and it was stated therein that as the order could not be served before March 21, 1972, the order of suspension was to be deemed to have taken effect from the said elate of service. 3. AFFIDAVITS-IN-REPLY were filed to the supplementary-affidavits in which the allegations made in the petitions again were reiterated. It appears there from that the order of suspension was intimated to the petitioners by a radio message on March 21, 1972 and the petitioners were served with the order on March 24, 1972. 4. MR. Sitikantha Lahiri, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners in the two Rules, made several contentions in support of the Rules which are considered in seriatum. His first Contention is that the impugned order of suspension is by way of substantive punishment and accordingly as the order has been passed without following the procedure laid down under Article 311 (2) of the constitution, the order was void. Mr. Basak, learned Advocate, appearing for the respondents has contended that the order is to be understood as one pending enquiry and not as one of substantives punishment and such an order pending enquiry could always be passed by the authorities. 5. THE relevant rule is Rule No. 880 (a) of the Police Regulations Bengal, 1943, which is to the following effect: 880 (a) "suspension is not be considered a specific punishment, and is only authorised in cases where the continuance in an office of an officer pending enquiry into his conduct is prejudicial to public interests. When the enquiry is completed, some definite order of acquittal or punishment shall be recorded. When the enquiry is completed, some definite order of acquittal or punishment shall be recorded. " 6. IN the Regulations Chapter XVII provides for punishments and appeals. Article 857 provides for punishments which are divided into major and minor. In this article we do not find suspension being mentioned as a substantive punishment whether major or minor. It would thus appear that under the Police regulations there could be no substantive punishment by way of suspension. Accordingly, the impugned order may be deemed and understood as of one pending enquiry. It has further been stated in the supplementary affidavits-in-opposition and also conceded by Mr. B. C. Basak that the impugned order of suspension is not an order of substantive punishment but merely an order pending enquiry under the proceeding referred to above. Accordingly, in this state of affairs this contention of Mr. Lahiri is not acceptable. The second point argued by Mr. Lahiri is that the impugned order of suspension dated March 21, 1972 was given retrospective effect in that it was directed in the order itself that it should take effect from March 18, 1972. Mr. Lahiri referred to a bench decision of this Court in the case of (1) Hemanta v. S. N. Mukherjee, 58 c. W. N. 1, in which Chakravarti C. J. observed that suspension with retrospective effect is a contradiction in terms. Suspension is an act by the employer debarring the employee from performing his duties. Such action, it is obvious, can not take effect retrospectively as till the actual prevention is made, the employee must have already performed his duties. 7. IT would, therefore, appear that the order of suspension can take effect only from the date of service and this position also has riot been disputed by the respondents. It further appears that from the supplementary affidavits-in-reply that the petitioners were informed by radiogram about the order of their suspension on March 21, 1972, though the actual order was served on 24th following. There is, therefore, no escape from the position that time suspension order took effect from 21st March, 1972 the date on which the petitioners were communicated and informed of the suspension order. 8. MR. Lahiri's third point is that in view of the above infirmity in the suspension order it must be held to be wholly illegal and unenforceable. In the decision cited by Mr. 8. MR. Lahiri's third point is that in view of the above infirmity in the suspension order it must be held to be wholly illegal and unenforceable. In the decision cited by Mr. Lahiri it would appear that the such order was held severable so that even though the order was an invalid or ineffective prior to its date of service, the order was held to be a valid order after service. It must be held accordingly that the suspension order was valid and effective from march 21, 1972 which was the dale of communication of the order to the petitioners. Mr. Lahiri's fourth point is that prior to the issue of suspension order, no charge-sheet was issued nor any disciplinary proceedings commenced against the petitioners and accordingly the suspension order is not legal and valid. Reliance was placed on the decision in (2) P. R. Naik v. Union of India A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 554 in which it was held that there could be no valid suspension order prior to the initiation or commencement of disciplinary proceeding. That decision, however, was on an interpretation of Rule 3 (1) of the All India services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1969, in which there is a specific provision for suspension pending enquiry and final order after initiation of disciplinary proceeding. 9. IN the case of (3) Government of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 823, it was observed as follows : "in substance disciplinary proceeding can be said to be started against an officer when complaints about his integrity and honesty are entertained and followed by preliminary enquiry into them culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case has been made against him for framing charges. " This decision was considered in (2) Naik's case and the law enunciated as above in its application to the said rules was not accepted by the majority view, which was obviously the decision of the Court, in view of the express provisions of Rule 3 (1. There is no similar provision in Article 880 (a) of the bengal Police Regulations and it is only provided therein that when there is an enquiry, there may be an order of suspension in appropriate cases. There is no similar provision in Article 880 (a) of the bengal Police Regulations and it is only provided therein that when there is an enquiry, there may be an order of suspension in appropriate cases. The principle in (3) Tarak Nath Ghosh's case referred to above, which has not been disapproved as a general proposition of law in absence of any express provision in the relevant rules, appears to me to be applicable in respect of the police Regulations, Bengal. Even in plain and literal interpretation, an enquiry in contemplation of disciplinary proceeding is an enquiry under this rule in absence of any express or implied provisions to the contrary. 10. WE have noticed in the facts of the case that there has been an enquiry into the incidents and a report of local enquiry was submitted on February 20, 1972 culminating in the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioners. The impugned order of suspension was passed on a consideration of this report on March 21, 1972. There is thus no doubt that an enquiry against the petitioners was pending on the date the suspension order was passed. Accordingly there is no illegality in the order of suspension. There is a suggestion by Mr. Lahiri that the endorsement for drawing up of the charge on the said report by the Superintendent of Police was a subsequent interpolation as the fact of charge as having been drawn up was not been mentioned in the affidavits filed by the respondents, except in the supplementary affidavits-in-opposition. 11. IT would however appear that in the main affidavit-in-opposition that there is mention of the charge-sheet which, it was further stated, was received by the petitioner on the 2nd April, 1972 which also is not denied by the petitioner. In the absence of any other materials it cannot be said that there was any interpolation and even without such endorsement, in the enquiry had already commenced and was pending on the date of issue of suspension order as stated above. 12. MR. In the absence of any other materials it cannot be said that there was any interpolation and even without such endorsement, in the enquiry had already commenced and was pending on the date of issue of suspension order as stated above. 12. MR. Lahiri has lastly contended that the order requiring the petitioner to reside in the Police lines even pending enquiry as contemplated in Article 881 of the Police Regulations is substantive punishment and thus bad in law as the said rule in the context of similar facts was held to be ultra vires in the case of (4) Bhabesh, Kumar Pal v. The State, A. I. R. 1965 Cal. 347. In this case, it was held that the requirement under Article 881 on a Police officer making him obligatory to reside within the police lines for indefinite period amounts to confinement within meaning of 7 (b) of the Police Act and is nothing but punishment during the enquiry. In view of the above decision, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot be kept within the police lines indefinitely during the Enquiry. The relevant rule is rule 881 of the Regulation is to the following effect: - "police officers while under suspension shall reside in the lines unless specifically permitted in writing to reside elsewhere". As the petitioners cannot be confined to the police line indefinitely even pending enquiry, they are given liberty to apply to the appropriate authority for residing elsewhere pending the disciplinary proceeding. If such applications are made by them the authority will deal with the same expeditiously and grant them the necessary permission to reside elsewhere as provided in Article 881. 13. IN the premises the Rules fail and they are discharged. Subject to the above observations, interim orders are vacated. It appears that 7 months have already passed away and the disciplinary proceeding has not moved at all possibly in view of the pendency of the rules. Let expeditious steps be taken by the authorities for completion of the proceedings. There will be no order for costs in these two rules.