Judgment of the Court - The only point urged by learned counsel for the appellant, a limited company, is that the suit of the plaintiff respondent was barred by limitation and has wrongly been decreed by the Courts below. 2. In the suit, the plaintiff-respondent, which is also a limited company, sought declaration that it was not bound to supply any electricity from its New Laikdih Colliery Substation to the defendant's Pumps at the Buro Khad in plot No. 707 of Mouza Laikdih and that the appellant had no right to take water from the plaintiffs reservoir in the said plot. A permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking any water from the reservoir and from interfering with the respondent's dewatering the quarry for the purpose of reopening the mine was also claimed. Another relief claimed was that the order dated the 30th of March 1957 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dhanbad, in a proceeding under section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the "Code", was void for absence of jurisdiction. It is not necessary to state the facts of the case as averred in the plaint and the written statement for the purposes of the decision of this appeal. 3. It was urged on behalf of the appellant in the Courts below that the suit which was instituted on the 4th of September 1962 was barred by article 47 of the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, hereinafter referred to as the "Act". In this Court also, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the suit is barred by that article. In the alternative, he has also submitted that the suit is barred by article 14 of the said schedule to the said Act. Article 47 reads as follows: "By any person bound by Three The date an order respecting the poss years of the ession of immoveable pro- final or perty made under the Code der in of Criminal Procedure,1898, the case. or the Mamlatdars' Courts Act, 1906, or by anyone claiming under such person, to recover the property comprised in such order." This article, on a plain reading of it, cannot apply to suits which are not for recovery of the property. It also cannot apply unless the order is in respect of possession of immoveable property made under the Code. or the Mamlatdars' Courts Act, 1906, or by anyone claiming under such person, to recover the property comprised in such order." This article, on a plain reading of it, cannot apply to suits which are not for recovery of the property. It also cannot apply unless the order is in respect of possession of immoveable property made under the Code. An order under section 147 of the Code is passed respecting rights of use of immoveable property etc. and not respecting the possession of immoveable property. The order dated the 30th of March 1957, which has been quoted in the judgment of the trial Court, on the face of it does not show that it was respecting the possession of immoveable property. In our opinion, therefore, article 47 of the Act is not applicable to the facts of the case. 4. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the decision of a learned single Judge in Ballappa Bhimappa and others. v. Tippangowda Basangowda and others A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 256. It was held in that case that a suit denying a right of way as affirmed by an order of a mamlatdar under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, was governed by article 47. Really the learned Judge did not definitely held that the suit with which he was concerned, was governed by article 47. The suit was instituted within three years of the date of the order of the Mamlatdar and was within time if article 47 were to apply to it. It was urged before the Bombay High Court that the suit was barred under article 14. While considering the argument the learned Judge observed. "Therefore, whether as regards Art. 14 or Art. 47, there is a certain amount of difficulty in applying each of these articles, but to my mind the difficulty in the application of Art. 14 is greater, and it would appear that the legislature really meant Art. 47, rather than Art. 14, to apply to orders by mamlatdars respecting immovable property." It was neither contended before the learned Judge nor the learned Judge applied himself to the question that if there was difficulty in the application of either of the aforesaid two articles of the Act, the appropriate article to apply was Article 120 of the said Schedule of the Act. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the decision in Goswami Ranchor Lalji v. Shri Girdhariji I.L.R. 20 All 120. In that case their Lordships held that Article 47 did not apply to an order passed under section 146 of the Code. They casually observed that it may be that an order under section 147 of the Code was intended to be governed by Article 47, but added at once that they were not deciding the point. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has placed before us the decision in Eshan Chandra Samanta v. Nil Moni Singh I.L.R. 35 Cal. 851. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court held in the case that Article 47 had no application to a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to put up dams in a river to irrigate his lands, it not being one to recover possession of property. As it appears from the facts of that case, an order much before three years of the institution of the suit had been passed by a Magistrate under section 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) and the District Judge had held that the suit was barred under Article 47. Section 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 corresponded to section 147 of the present Code. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court did not agree with that finding of the District Judge. 7. In Partab Bahadur Singh v. Jagajit Singh A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 387 a Bench of Oudh Chief Court has held that Article 47 applies only to those cases in which the Magistrate has declared one of the parties to be entitled to possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law or has restored possession to a party found to have been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months of his initial order. In that case, Article 47 was not applied though there had been order by a Magistrate under section 145 of the Code for demarcation of the boundary without deciding the question of possession. Their Lordships held that Article 120 of the First Schedule of the said Act governed such a suit. Though in that case their Lordships were not concerned with an order under section 147 of the Code, the ratio decidendie of great assistance to the respondent. 8. Their Lordships held that Article 120 of the First Schedule of the said Act governed such a suit. Though in that case their Lordships were not concerned with an order under section 147 of the Code, the ratio decidendie of great assistance to the respondent. 8. In our opinion, Article 14 of the First Schedule to the Act is also not applicable to the present suit. This Article reads as follows. "To set aside One year The date of any act or order of the act or an officer of Gove- order. rnment in his offi- cial capacity, not herein otherwise expressly provided for. An order passed under section 147 of the Code need not be set aside, because the section itself says that an order under that section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. It has been held in 'Babaji v. Anna 10 Bom H.C.R. 479 and in Shivaji Yesji Chawan v. The Collector of Ratnagiri and others I.L.R. 11 Bom. 429 that if a summary order does not prevent a suit, it need not be set aside, and Article 14 does not apply to suits in which such summary orders are challenged. There cannot be any doubt that an order passed under section 147 of the Code is a summary order. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred us to the decision in Parbati Nath Dull v. Rajmohan Dull I.L.R. 29 Cal. 367 in support of his contention that Article 14 is applicable to this case. In that decision it has been held that a suit challenging an order passed under section 116 of the Estates Partition Act was governed by Article 14. Section 149 of the Estates Partition Act provides that no order of a Revenue officer passed under part VIII of that Act (which is the part in which section 116 occurs) shall be set aside, except as provided in section 150, and section 150 expressly provides that any person aggrieved by an order under section 116 may bring a suit to modify it or set it aside. There can be no doubt that to such a suit provision of Article 14 were attracted, and that decision is of no help to the appellant. 10. There can be no doubt that to such a suit provision of Article 14 were attracted, and that decision is of no help to the appellant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any other article of the Act under which the present suit can be held as barred. The suit having been brought within six years of the order dated the 30th of March 1957 under section 147 of the Code, wag not barred under the residuary Article 120 of the First Schedule of the Act. The Courts below, therefore, have rightly held that the suit was not barred. 11. In the result we find no merit in the appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.