JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, A.C.J. - This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order of the Additional District Magistrate, Puri, dated 1-12-1969 and the order of the Additional Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar, dated 9-9-1969. and to direct the latter to proceed with the O.L.R. Case No. 136 of 1966-67. 2. The facts, which are not in dispute, may now be stated, as related by the petitioner:- A 0.98? decimals of land appertaining to northern part of plot nos. 43 and 40 of Khata No. 68 of Mouza Atala originally belonged to opposite party no. 2. He was in khas possession of the same. On 15-1-1963 he executed and registered a deed of mortgage by conditional sale in favour of the petitioner for a consideration of Rs. 1000/-. The southern portion of the aforesaid plots, 43 and 46, had been purchased by and was in possession of opposite party No. 1. Opposite party no. 1 instituted O.T.R. Case No. 3 of 1965-66 on 14-4-1965 in respect of this 98? decimals of land, claiming that he was the Bhag-tenant in respect of the same. He impleaded the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 in that O.T.R. Case where he alleged that he and his father were the Bhag chasis in respect of that land. While this case was being tried by the O.T.R. Collector, Bhubaneswar, on 1-10-1965 the Orissa Land Reforms Act came into force, except Chapters III and IV. On 9-12-1965 Chapter III of the Act came into force. Opposite party no. 1 filed an application under sub-section 1(i) of section 4 of the O.L.R Act for a declaration, that he is a raiyat under opposite party no. 2 in respect of the disputed land, before the Additional Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar, which was numbered as O.L.R. No. 136 of 1966-67. The petitioner and opposite party no. 2 were impleaded in this O.L.R. Case No. 136 of 1966-67. The O.T.R. Collector continued the proceeding, initiated in the O.T.R. Case No. 3 of 1965-66, not-with-standing the aforesaid repeal, and disposed of the case on 10-11-1967 in favour of opposite party no. 1 in the following terms : "I conclude that Dwijabar (O.P. No. 1) was a Bhag-chassi and Chaitan Sahu has prevented him from cultivation of such land as a tenant. 1 in the following terms : "I conclude that Dwijabar (O.P. No. 1) was a Bhag-chassi and Chaitan Sahu has prevented him from cultivation of such land as a tenant. Hence notice the landlords Chaitan Sahu and Balaram Sahu in the prescribed manner to allow the tenant Dwijabar Padhan to enter the land forthwith and to cultivate it as a tenant. The landlords Balaram Sahu and Chaitan Sahu are to pay to Dwijabar Padhan cost of the case amounting to Rs. 100/- at the rate of Rs. 50/- such. Besides, a penalty of Rs. 200/- is imposed on Balaram Sahu and Chaitan Sahu to be deposited in this office @ Rs. 100/- each for contravention of provisions contained in section 3 the O.T.R. Act. The above order will be complied by the parties within one month from the date of passing of this order." The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal under section 15 of the O.T.R. Act to the S.D.O., Bhubaneswar (O.T.R. Appeal No. 1/67). Pending this appeal the petitioner purchased the disputed property from opposite party no. 2 on 27-12-1967. This appeal was dismissed on 30-1-1968, and the order of the O.T.R. Collector was confirmed. Thereafter O.L.R. Case No. 136 of 1966-67 was dropped on 9-9-1969. The petitioner went up in revision to the A.D.M. Puri, in O.T.R. Revision case No. 2 of 1968. This revision was dismissed on 1-12-1969 and the order of the O.T.R. Collector was again confirmed. The net result of the proceedings initiated in O.T.R. Case No. 3 of 1965-66 was that opposite party who was a Bhag tenant in respect of the disputed land was held to be entitled to recover possession and the landlord and the petitioner were directed to allow him to enter the land and a penalty of Rs. 200/- was imposed on them. Thereafter the present application has been filed for the reliefs aforesaid. 3. The petitioner's stand, as presented in this application, is that the O.T.R. Collector had no jurisdiction to continue the O.T.R. proceeding after repeal of the O.T.R. Act on 1-10-1965 and to grant reliefs in accordance with that O.T.R. Act. He should have transferred the proceedings to the revenue Court appointed under the O.L.R. Act. 3. The petitioner's stand, as presented in this application, is that the O.T.R. Collector had no jurisdiction to continue the O.T.R. proceeding after repeal of the O.T.R. Act on 1-10-1965 and to grant reliefs in accordance with that O.T.R. Act. He should have transferred the proceedings to the revenue Court appointed under the O.L.R. Act. This contention involves two questions : viz., (a) whether the rights acquired and the privileges conferred, under the O.T.R. Act in favour of the petitioner, are saved after the passing of the O.L.R. Act ; and (b) whether the forum under the O.L.R. Act, for determination of the rights and liabilities under the said Act, continued after passing of the O.L.R. Act, so that the proceedings initiated before its repeal would continue unaffected by such repeal. 4. The O.T.R. Act (here in after to be referred to as the Act) was a temporary Act which had undergone a number of extensions and the last extension was to expire on 31-12-1965 but before that it was repealed on 1-10-1965 by section 74(1) of O.L.R. Act. The rights created, or privileges conferred, were also temporary in nature. The preamble of the Act lays down : "Whereas subsequent to the passing of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951, and pending further legislation relating to land reforms large-scale eviction of tenants from actual cultivation of agricultural lands is being resorted to by owners of such lands ; And whereas pending such further legislation it is expedient to afford relief to such persons by providing for their temporary protection from such eviction and for conferring on them certain other privileges in the manner hereinafter appearing :" Sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act provides : "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to confer any additional right in land on any tenant and on expiry of this Act such tenants shall possess the same right which he would have possessed if this Act had not been passed." Reading this provision, along with the preamble, it is clear that the Legislature intended to protect the temporary tenants, until further legislation relating to land reforms was made. The obvious intention was to confer permanent rights on such precarious tenants in the contemplated legislation relating to land reforms. That "further legislation relating to land reforms" came in the shape of Orissa Land Reforms Act. The obvious intention was to confer permanent rights on such precarious tenants in the contemplated legislation relating to land reforms. That "further legislation relating to land reforms" came in the shape of Orissa Land Reforms Act. Sub-section (31) of section 2 of the O.L.R. Act defines 'tenant'. This definition comprises within its sweep the 'tenant' as defined in the O.T.R. Act. Section 7 which occurs in Chapter II of the Act provides : "7 (1) No rights of a tenant in any land held by him as such shall be transferable. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the rights, benefits, protection, privileges, obligations or liabilities of any such tenant immediately before the commencement of this Act shall not be liable to be modified or extinguished in any manner whatsoever." This sub-section (2) to section 7 extended protection to the tenants under the Act, unless that protection was otherwise affected by any other provision of the O.L.R. Act. The expression "save as otherwise provided in this Act" would mean "except as otherwise expressly provided in the O.L.R. Act modifying or extinguishing in any manner the rights, benefits etc." which a tenant was enjoying immediately before the commencement of the O.L.R. Act. There is, in fact, no express provision in O.L.R. Act affecting pre-judicially the rights, benefits, privileges of a tenant acquired and accrued under the Act. Since on account of the temporary nature of this Act, the rights and privileges acquired and the proceedings initiated thereunder would not survive after the efflux of time, and since the legislative intent was to prevent these consequences of a normal expiry of a temporary Act by efflux of time from happening, it enacted a provision of sub-section (4) of section 1, in the following manner : "S. 1(4). It shall cease to have effect on the 31st day of December, 1965, and section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937, shall apply on the expiry of this Act, as if it had been repealed by an Orissa Act." 5. It is clear that sub-section (4) of section 1 would operate only on the normal expiry of the Act by efflux of time. Before this happened, it was repealed by section 74(1) of the O.L.R. Act which laid down that on the coming into force of Chapter I of this Act, the Orissa Tenant's Relief Act, 1955, shall, be repealed. It is clear that sub-section (4) of section 1 would operate only on the normal expiry of the Act by efflux of time. Before this happened, it was repealed by section 74(1) of the O.L.R. Act which laid down that on the coming into force of Chapter I of this Act, the Orissa Tenant's Relief Act, 1955, shall, be repealed. Chapter I, as already stated, came into force on 1-10-1965, and accordingly, the O.T.R. Act stood repealed before its normal life time, on that date. Sub-section (2) of section 74 of the O.L.R. Act provided the consequences of such repeal. 6. Section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act runs as follows: "(2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect:- (a) the previous operation of the said enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said enactment ; or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the said enactment ; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed." This is a clearly worded saving clause. There is nothing in O.L.R. Act which detracts from full effect being given to this provision. The O.L.R. Act is prospective in operation, and contains no express provision for transfer of proceedings pending before any hierarchy of authorities, endowed with jurisdiction to decide dispute and controversies arising under the Act, to a revenue officer as defined in the O.L.R. Act. Wherever the O.L.R. Act provides for decision by a revenue officer, similar to those contemplated under the Act, the Legislature has taken care to use the language having prospective effect. This would be dear from a perusal of sections 15 and 18 of the O.L.R. Act. This makes it abundantly clear that full prospective effect must be given to section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act, Section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act is a re-enactment of the provisions of section 5 of the Orissa General clauses Act with the omission of the words "unless a contrary intention appears" which occur in the latter section. This makes it abundantly clear that full prospective effect must be given to section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act, Section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act is a re-enactment of the provisions of section 5 of the Orissa General clauses Act with the omission of the words "unless a contrary intention appears" which occur in the latter section. Thus, it is manifest that if there be any provision in the O.L.R. Act, which appears to delimit the operation of section 74(2) thereof by indicating a contrary intention, the said intention is to be disregarded ; in other words section 74(2) is to be given overriding effect. Clauses (a), (b) and (d) of section 74(2) are relevant for the present purpose. At the commencement of the present dispute, which arose on account of the landlord preventing the opposite party from cultivating his land as a tenant and evicting him while the Act was in operation, the landlord's Acts were performed in breach of the provisions of sections 3(1)(a), 9(6) and 14(1) of the Act. Section 3(1)(a) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything in any law, contrast or usage or in any decree or order of any Court, but subject to the provisions of this Act, no tenant in lawful cultivation of any land on the 1st day of July, 1954, or at any time thereafter, shall be liable to be evicted from such land by the landlord. Section 9(6) of the O.T.R. Act empowered the Collector to hold an enquiry to determine the dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards the tenant's possession of the land on the 1st day of July, 1954, or at any time thereafter, and his rights to the benefits under the Act and if he, as a result of his enquiry, is satisfied that the tenant's rights or privileges under the Act are being infringed by, or at the instance of the landlord, to impose on the landlord, under section 14, a penalty, besides directing the landlord to allow the tenant to enter upon the land forthwith and cultivate it as a tenant. The liability under section 14(1) had been incurred by the landlord in terms of section 14 of the Act at the date of commencement of the dispute. The liability under section 14(1) had been incurred by the landlord in terms of section 14 of the Act at the date of commencement of the dispute. When the opposite party was dispossessed by the landlord, which gave rise to the dispute, the 'right' to get back possession 'accrued' to him, and the landlord 'incurred' the correlative legal 'obligation' of restoring possession. The happening of the events of this position resulted in an 'accrual of the right to get back possession' and 'incurring of an obligation to restore possession'. It is dear that the previous operation of the Act gave rise to the aforesaid accrued rights and privileges and the correlative obligations and incurring of liabilities. These have been saved under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 74 of the O.L.R. Act. 7. The right, which is sought to be saved is not a primary or abstract right, but a sanctioning right. A sanctioning right is one which arises out of the violation of another right. All others are primary, that is to say, they are rights which have some other source than wrongs. Under the O.T.R. Act, non-evictability conferred under section 3(1)(a) may be a primary or abstract right, but the rights to have an enquiry made, and possession restored under section 9(6), or to have the landlord penalised under section 14(1), are sanctioning rights, because they arise out of violation of the primary right under section 3(1)(a) of the Act. Similarly, liabilities are incurred before the Act was repealed on account of violation of a primay right or privilege conferred thereunder. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 74 of the O.L.R. Act speaks of rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities which are acquired accrued, or incurred out of violation of some primary rights. It is only this latter category of rights, privileges etc. that are saved. Dealing with clause (c) of section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which is almost identical with section 74(2)(b) of the O.L.R. Act, Atkin L.J. in the case of Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K.B. 422, said that:- "That provision was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act.................. that are saved. Dealing with clause (c) of section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which is almost identical with section 74(2)(b) of the O.L.R. Act, Atkin L.J. in the case of Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K.B. 422, said that:- "That provision was not intended to preserve the abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act.................. It only applies to the specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of the events specified in the statute." In the case of G. Ogdem Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Lucas (1969) 1 All. Eng. Law Reports 121, the Judicial Committee held that the mere right existing at the date of the repealing statute take advantage of the provisions of the Act repealed was not a 'right accrued' within the meaning of the saving clause. In the case of Director of Public Works v. Ho Po Sang (1961) A.C. 901, dealing with a repealed clause, similar to the one in hand, it was said that there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should or should not be given. Upon a repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act and the latter is not. In the case of Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ransinghe (1964) A.C. 541 a direct claim given by the Ceylon Motor Car Ordinance, 1938, to an injured person against the insurers of the other party involved in an accident, was held to survive the repeal of the Ordinance. Lord Evershed, who delivered the judgment in that case, said, that : "The distinction between what was, and what was not, a right must often be one of great fineness; but the injured person here had 'something more than a mere hope or expectation'. Lord Evershed, who delivered the judgment in that case, said, that : "The distinction between what was, and what was not, a right must often be one of great fineness; but the injured person here had 'something more than a mere hope or expectation'. He had in truth a right, although that right might fairly be called inchoate or contingent." Dealing with paragraph (c) of the Interpretation Act, which corresponds to clause (d) of section 74 (2) of the O.L.R. Act, it was said in the case of Benett v. Tatton (1918) 88 L.J. K.B. 313, and Postle the waite v. Katz 1943 (59) T.L.R. 248, that the effect of paragraph (e) of section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act, with its reference to the preservation of proceedings in respect of a 'penalty' is that a person can now be prosecuted under a repealed enactment. 8. Thus, by reason of section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act, the opposite party no. 1 could initiate and continue the proceeding under the Act in O.T.R. Case No. 3 of 1965-1966, through all the hierarchy of forums provided by that Act for restoration of possession and have the landlord penalised under section 14(1) of that Act, unaffected by its repeal on 1-10-1965, as if the O.L.R Act had not been passed. 9. The O.T.R. Act is a temporary Act which, was originally enacted on 20-4-1955, and was intended to remain in force till 31st December, 1956. By subsequent enactments, its life was extended from time to time, and the last extension was up to 31st of December, 1665, and is, therefore, to be deemed, even as to such extensions, as passed when it was first enacted. This Act was repealed legislatively before it was due to expire on account of efflux of time. The effect of the saving clause, contained in section 74, is only to keep surviving the repealed Act (O.T.R. Act) in respect of the matters mentioned in the saving clause, and thereby making it possible for the repealed Act to take effect, in regard to them, as if it had not been repealed. The effect of the saving clause, contained in section 74, is only to keep surviving the repealed Act (O.T.R. Act) in respect of the matters mentioned in the saving clause, and thereby making it possible for the repealed Act to take effect, in regard to them, as if it had not been repealed. The saving clause does not extend the repealed O.T.R. Act as regards its scope, but only preserves the accrued rights and liabilities, as they were, under the repealed Act, and the proceedings, so far as they might be commented or continued under it, by excluding from them, the operation of the repeal under section 74 of the O.L.R. Act. It is true that there would be no absolute saving in the sense that the rights, liabilities and remedies and the proceedings saved by the saving clause, are saved altogether, free from the limitation which was attached to them under the repealed Act. Those limitations in the repealed Act would remain, that is to say, the accrued rights and incurred liabilities and proceedings for their enforcement or remedies instituted or continued in so far as that Act (O.T.R.) Act would have warranted them, if not repealed, would normally be subject to its expiry by efflux of time. There can be no other effect of deeming the repealing Act as not passed : See Tarak Chandra Muhherjee and others v. Ratan Lal Ghosal and others AIR 1957 Cal. 257 (F.B.). The date of expiry of the O.T.R. Act was 31-12-1965. On the footing of the aforesaid doctrine, therefore, do proceeding initiated under the O.T.R. Act before its repeal, could continue after 31-12-1965. To avoid such a consequence, the Legislature has enacted section 1(4) of the Act, already extracted above, which brings into operation section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act, 1937, as if it had been repealed by an Orissa Act and not expired by efflux of time. Therefore, on the expiry of the Act, it would be deemed to have been repealed, and section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act would then be applicable. Therefore, on the expiry of the Act, it would be deemed to have been repealed, and section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act would then be applicable. Section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act runs as follows: "Where any Orissa Act repeals any enactment hitherto made, or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not: (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or, (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed, or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." For the reasons stated above, while considering the effect of the repealed provision of section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act, the O.T.R Case No. 3/65-66 being in respect of rights accrued or liabilities or penalties incurred, can validly be continued through all forums provided in the Act. Of course, section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act says that the aforesaid effects shall ensue, unless a different intention appears. The intension has to be judged with reference to the preamble of the Act, already extracted, and by looking into the provisions of the O.L.R. Act which is a fresh legislation on the same subject matter as is comprised in the Act. According to the preamble, the intention was to protect the precarious tenants till their rights were crystalized pending further legislation relating to land reforms which were in the offing and which ultimately materialised in the O.L.R. Act. The intention, therefore, was that the full effect, as envisaged in section 5 of the General Clauses Act, shall be given. In the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, referred to above, their Lordships were dealing with a temporary Act which did not contain a provision similar to section 1(4) of the O.T.R. Act. The intention, therefore, was that the full effect, as envisaged in section 5 of the General Clauses Act, shall be given. In the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, referred to above, their Lordships were dealing with a temporary Act which did not contain a provision similar to section 1(4) of the O.T.R. Act. Accordingly they said that the operation of 1950 Act cannot ensure beyond its temporary life, even after its repeal. Here, by reason of section 1 (4) of the O.T.R. Act, section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act is attracted, and the Act would operate beyond its temporary life for the purpose of giving effect to the matters contained in clause (a) to (c) of section 5 of the Orissa General clauses Act. 10. I would now proceed to notice some judicial decisions where the operation of section 6 of the Central General Clauses Act has been considered. Section 6 of that Act is almost similar to section 5 of the Orissa General Clauses Act and also to section 74(2) of the O.L.R. Act, as they deal with the effect of repeal. The first case is the case of Briban Maharastra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni and others AIR 1960 S.C. 794 . There, the companies Act, 1913, was repealed by the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The 1913 Act gave certain rights to the share-holders of a company to take legal proceedings for winding up. Some share-holders filed an application under section 153-C of the 1913 Act before that was repealed. The question was whether further proceedings under that Act could be continued after its repeal. The Supreme Court said:- "There is no dispute that section 153-C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the share-holders of a company, and put the company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities. The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities. The Supreme Court said:- "There is no dispute that section 153-C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the share-holders of a company, and put the company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities. The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would, therefore, preserve the rights and liabilities created by section 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect there for would be competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913, unless of course a different intention could be gathered." In that case though section 10 of the repealing Act, 1956 indicated that the District could no longer be empowered to deal with an application made to the District Judge, Poona, it was nevertheless held that that section did not indicate that the rights created under the repealed Act were intended to be destroyed and as such, their Lordships held:- "It seems to us that since under section 6 of the General Clauses Act the proceeding in respect of the application under section 153-C of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that Act, it follows that the District Judge of Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it. If it were not so, then section 6 would become in-fructuous." This decision supports the view that the O.T.R. Act forums are also saved along with the rights and liabilities, accrued or incurred or investigations and proceedings in respect of them or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment in respect of any offence committed against the Act. The next case is the case of T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, Income Tax Officer Central Circle (1969) 1 I.T.J. 732 , Construing section 6 of the General Clauses Act in regard to legal proceedings for an offence committed under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, after that Act, had been repealed by 1961 Act, their Lordships held that a legal proceeding in regard to an offence committed under the 1922 Act may be instituted even after its repeal, and punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow, unless a different intention appears in the repealing statute. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow, unless a different intention appears in the repealing statute. Their Lordships said : "In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests and intention to destroy them." This is the authority for the proposition that where a repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the contrary intention has to be judged with reference to the provisions of the new Act, that is to say, the O.L.R. Act. As already shown above, the intention was not to destroy the rights of the tenants under the O.T.R. Act, but to preserve them and to crystallise them into stabler rights. In the case of Gujarat Electricity Board v. Shantilal, R. Desai AIR 1969 S.C. 239 , the Bombay Electricity Board issued a notice under section 7 of the Electricity Act, 1919, prior to its amendment in 1959, read with section 71 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for compulsorily purchasing a concern. Section 7 of the Electricity Act was amended and section 71 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, was repealed. No provision had been made to preserve the rights already acquired under the repealed provision. It was contended that by reason of the amendment of section 7 and repeal of section 71, no provision was made to preserve the rights already acquired under those provisions. Hence the appellant was not entitled to purchase the concern. It was held that in absence of any law expressly, or by necessary implication, providing for taking away the rights accrued earlier, section 6 of the General Clauses Act could be invoked and the repeal, unless a different intention appeared, shall not affect the rights, privileges or liabilities acquired or incurred under the enactment so repealed. The case of State v. Dhanraj Mills Ltd. AIR 1960 Bom. 453 , has much similarity to the present case. The case of State v. Dhanraj Mills Ltd. AIR 1960 Bom. 453 , has much similarity to the present case. In that case there was a contravention of clause 21(3)(c) of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, read with Government Notification No. SRO-609, dated 27th April, 1951, which amounted to commission of an offence punishable under sections 7 and 8 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, (24 of 1946), which ceased to be in operation from 26th January 1956. It was contended that no prosecution could, after that date, commence for infringement of orders issued in exercise of the authority of that Act. Section 1 (3) of the Essential Supplies (temporary powers) Act, 1916, which was amended by Act 65/52, expressly provided that the Act shall cease to have effect on the 26th of January, 1955, except as respect things done, or omitted to be done before that date, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if it had then been repealed by a Central Act. It was held that evidently, the Legislature had contemplated that in respect of things done or omitted to be done, section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply and it was not disputed that if section 6 applied, the prosecution of the accused could be commenced and continued not-with-standing the repeal of the Essential Supplies (Temporary) Powers Act, 1946. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid decisions that whenever any legal proceeding under a repealed Act is to be commented or continued for the purpose of enforcing any accrued right or incurred liability or to impose penalty for offences committed under the repealed Act, the forums, provided in such repealed Act for entertaining such proceedings or conducting any investigation in regard to those matters remained, as otherwise the proceedings can neither commence or continue. Wherever section 6 of the General Clauses Act has been construed, nowhere has a contention been advanced that even though section 6 of the General Clauses Act applied, the forum provided under the repealed Act did not survive for those proceedings as there was no specific legislation for such survival in section 6. 11. Wherever section 6 of the General Clauses Act has been construed, nowhere has a contention been advanced that even though section 6 of the General Clauses Act applied, the forum provided under the repealed Act did not survive for those proceedings as there was no specific legislation for such survival in section 6. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, it does not appear to us that any illegality has been committed by the various authorities under the Act exercising their respective jurisdictions under the provisions of that Act, as if that Act has not been repealed, and as such, the impugned order of the Additional District Magistrate, dated 1-12-1969, and that of the Additional Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar, dated 9-9-1969 be quashed. 12. The application for a writ of certiorari therefore fails and is dismissed ; but in the circumstances, there would be no order for costs. B.K. Patra, J. - I agree. Final Result : Dismissed