JUDGMENT Untwalia, C.J. Shri Guhi Ram Das, a dismissed workman of Sijua Colliery, situated at Bhelatand in the district of Dhanbad, owned by the Tata Iron and Steel Company, Limited, is the sole petitioner in this writ application. The management of the Colliery is the fourth respondent and its Manager is the fifth. The petitioner has obtained a rule against the respondents to show cause why a writ of mandamus be not issued against the Government of India, respondent no.1, and the Secretary, Labour and Employment, Government of India, respondent no. 2, directing them to refer the industrial dispute raised by the petitioner to an appropriate Court or tribunal. Cause has been shown on behalf of the management, respondent no. 4, by filing a counter-affidavit as also at the time of the hearing of the writ application. 2. For the disposal of this writ application the facts can be pressed into a narrow compass. A chargesheet was issued and served on the petitioner by respondent no. 5 on 14.5.69, a copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ application. The petitioner's case is that without holding any proper enquiry a dismissal order was passed against him on 20.6.69 (Annexure2). He filed a review petition by way of appeal before the authorities of the management and a copy of the review petition is Annexure 3, but that was not allowed. Thereafter he filed a petition dated 5.2.70 (Annexure 4) before a Conciliation Officer who in the present case was the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dhanbad respondent No. 3, The management filed its reply on 20.3.70 a copy of which was annexed as Annexure 5 to the writ application. A rejoinder dated 7.4.70 (Annexure 6) as also a supplementary rejoinder by the Union dated 13.4.70 (Annexure 7) were filed before the Conciliation Officer. The failure report dated 18.5.70 is Annexure 8. The Government of India refused to make the reference under section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). The reasons communicated to the petitioner in accordance with section 12 (5) of the Act are contained in the Government of India's letter dated 21. 7.70 (Annexure 9), which letter is as follows. The Government of India refused to make the reference under section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). The reasons communicated to the petitioner in accordance with section 12 (5) of the Act are contained in the Government of India's letter dated 21. 7.70 (Annexure 9), which letter is as follows. “In continuation of this Ministry's letter No. 2/77/69 LR II, dated the 3rd June, 1970 on the above subject, I am directed to say that the Government of India do not consider the dispute fit for reference to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication because the management does not appear to have acted mala fide." The petitioner's case further is that thereafter he filed a representation dated 4. 8. 70 (Annexure 10) before the Government of India, but the Government of India reitertaed its decision not to refer the dispute and communicated the same to the petitioner in their letter dated 13/15.10.70 (Annexure 11). The petitioner's attack on the order of the Government of India in refusing to make reference is based upon the following grounds, as urged at the time of the hearing of this writ application-(l) that after the introduction of section 2A in the Act Government of India had no discretion in the matter it was bound to refer the dispute as regards dismissal of the petitioner to the appropriate authority for adjudication, (ii) that even if the Government had discretion in the matter it exceeded its right or jurisdiction in refusing to make a reference on the ground it has been done, because it had no power to decide the dispute itself and then refuse to make reference, and (iii) that in any view of the matter out of the two main question which were necessary to be decided in relation to the dispute raised by the petitioner, refusal to make reference is based upon only one reason; the other reason was not considered by the Government at all. 3. The facts stated on behalf of the petitioner have been controverter in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the management and the points urged on his behalf have been combated at the time of hearing, 4. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the merits of the facts which led to the dismissal of the petitioner by the management. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the merits of the facts which led to the dismissal of the petitioner by the management. Suffice it to say that in the petition (Annexure 4) filed by the petitioner before the Conciliation Officer he had taken the stand-"A date of enquiry was fixed by the management. The petitioner participated in the enquiry but was neither allowed to produce any defence witness nor cross-examine the prosecution witness as he was in a disturbed mind for his wife's illness who expired subsequently," Then, in the last but one paragraph a ground was taken that the action of the management is malafide because it has been taken as a measure of victimisation. A rejoinder to this petition was filed on behalf of the management. The copy (Annexure 5) annexed with the writ application is not a complete copy. Relevant portions of it are not to be found there. The complete copy is to be found in Annexure B appended to the counter affidavit. In regard to the enquiry the stand of the management was- "The allegation of the workman that at the domestic enquiry he was not allowed to cross-examine the management witnesses or produce his defence witness is a blatant lie. His other allegation that he had made request for adjournment at the time of enquiry is also baseless. We understand that these allegations have been introduced with some ulterior motive best known to him. At no time earlier to his dismissal he made any allegation against the enquiry proceedings or the enquiry officer. On the other hand we find that the enquiry was held on three days and on the concluding day he made categorical statement before the enquiry officer that he had no defence witness to produce. The allegation of the workman at this stage that the enquiry officer did not explain him the proceedings and asked him to put signature on some papers is not only incorrect but mischievous. The enquiry proceedings will show, whether the workman was explained the proceedings. The allegation of the workman at this stage that the enquiry officer did not explain him the proceedings and asked him to put signature on some papers is not only incorrect but mischievous. The enquiry proceedings will show, whether the workman was explained the proceedings. The cross-examination of the management witnesses by the chargesheeted workman will also show that the workman was perfectly in balance state of mind and his belated plea that he was in disturbed mind due to his wife's sickness is all an afterthought." The allegation that the action of the management was taken as a, measure of victimisation was also denied. In the rejoinder and supplementary rejoinder the facts were reiterated by the petitioner or on his behalf. In the failure report (Annexure 8) it is stated in paragraph 3. "The management's case is contained in their letter dated 20/30. 3. 70 and 10/13/4. 70 (copies enclosed) nothing further was added by representative of the management." The first letter referred to in this paragraph is the rejoinder of the management dated 20/30. 3. 70 (Annexure B) filed before the Conciliation Officer. All these papers were before the Government when decision was taken that they did not consider the dispute fit for reference to an Industrial-Tribunal for adjudication. It is no doubt true that the only reason given in Annexure 9 is that the management did not appear to have acted mala fide. But, in my opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the reason given in Annexure 9 does include both the points raised by or on behalf of the petitioner. The action of management could not be bonafide if there was no proper inquiry or if the inquiry was held by violating the principles of natural justice. In my opinion, therefore, Annexure 9 by itself would show that the Government did not consider the dispute raised by the petitioner as fit for adjudication. Prima facie they had a right to examine the merits of the dispute. They, of course, could not enter. In my opinion, therefore, Annexure 9 by itself would show that the Government did not consider the dispute raised by the petitioner as fit for adjudication. Prima facie they had a right to examine the merits of the dispute. They, of course, could not enter. into disputed questions of fact for adjudicating upon them, but surely, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The State of Bombay AIR 1964 SC 1667 they had a right to examine them to find out whether it was a fit case which required trial or adjudication and, therefore, whether it was a fit case for reference or not. 5. But the matter does not stop there. In the review petition filed by the petitioner in paragraphs 3 and 4 he clearly took the stand again that the action of the management was mala fide and that it was taken in contravention of the principles of natural justice because he did not get adequate and proper opportunity to' cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the management or to examine his own witnesses. On a consideration of this long review petition filed by the petitioner it was reiterated by the Government of India in Annexure 11 that they do not find any justification to revise the decision already communicated to the petitioner in their letter dated 21. 7. 70. As I have said above, on reading Annexure 9 in the context of the facts of this case, there is no difficulty in taking the view that in the opinion of the Government of India there was no prima facie case for adjudication either on the point of inquiry or on the point of the alleged mala fides. But even if it be assumed in favour of the petitioner that Annexure 9 per se was not sufficient to indicate that, the facts as disclosed from Annexures 10 and 11 will leave no room for doubt as to what was meant by the wordings used in Annexure 9. I have come to the conclusion that the Government of India did not exceed their jurisdiction in refusing to make a reference in this case. 6. I have come to the conclusion that the Government of India did not exceed their jurisdiction in refusing to make a reference in this case. 6. I think it is not necessary to refer to any other decision on the point except the Supreme Court case referred to above, in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists v. The State of Bombay AIR 1964 SC 1617 . The impugned order refusing to make reference was quoted in paragraph 3 of the judgment. The first ground given was that the termination of services of the workman concerned appeared' to be an act of retrenchment on the part of the management for which they were willing to pay compensation and the second ground was that the action of the management was not malafide. The argument on behalf of the Workmen Union before the Supreme Court was that section 12(5) imposed an obligation on respondent no. I to record reasons for refusing to make a reference; and the reasons given by respondent No. 1 in the present case indicate that respondent No. 1 acted beyond its jurisdiction in proceeding to consider the merits of the dispute while deciding whether the reference should be made or not. " This argument was repelled in paragraph 6 in these words" This question has been considered by this Court in the case of the State of Bombay v. K. P. Krishnan, (1961) 1 SCR 227 : ( AIR 1960 SC 1223 ). The decision in that case clearly shows that when the appropriate Government considers the question as to whether any industrial dispute should be referred for adjudication or not, it may consider, prima facie the merits of the dispute and take into account other relevant considerations which would help it to decide whether making a reference would be expedient or not. It is true that if the dispute in question raises' questions of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under S.10 (l) read with S.12 (5), or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be said to be foreign to the enquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under S. 10 (I), and so, the argument that the appropriate Government exceeded its jurisdiction iI1 expressing its prima facie view on the nature of the termination of service of appellants 2 and 3, cannot be accepted." It would thus be seen that on prima facie examination of the facts if the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that the claim made is patently frivolous or that the facts were glaringly against the workman concerned and that they do not require any trial or adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal or Court, then it is open to the Government to say that the case is not a fit one for reference. In view of what has been said in paragraph 8 at page 1622 by Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists it is plain that it is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over the views expressed by the Government of India in the impugned order (Annexure 9 and 11) and to say that there was a prima facie case for reference for adjudication. Of course, if the reasons given would have been perverse or obviously wrong, then this Court could treat that reason as non est. Of course, if the reasons given would have been perverse or obviously wrong, then this Court could treat that reason as non est. But on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is difficult to say that the stand of the petitioner was correct, or that he had any prima facie case for trial. The facts appear to be glaringly against the petitioner and on the basis of those facts if a view was taken by the Government of India that the petitioner's case was not a fit one for reference this Court is unable to issue a writ of mandamus to command the Government of India to make a reference. 7. I have so far 'dealt with points 2 and 3 together. Now I proceed to discuss the first point urged on behalf of the petitioner. In my opinion, there is absolutely no substance in this point. Before the introduction of section 2A an individual dispute regarding the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and termination of the service of an individual workman- unless and until it was taken up by a number of workmen or their union, could not be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act in regard to which any reference could be made. Section 2A, as against the express definition of 'industrial dispute' in section 2 (k) introduces a legal fiction and makes such a dispute. That is, in my opinion, the only difference brought about by the introduction of section 2A. It in no way affects the ambit or scope of the power of the appropriate Government under section 10 (1) or section. 12 (5) of the Act. Whether such a dispute is raised by the Union or by an individual workman concerned, the power of the appropriate Government in exercise of the discretion either to make a reference or not to make it is all the same there. It has got to be exercised in accordance with the well-settled principles of law decided by the Supreme Court. It is difficult to accept the argument that now because an individual dispute is also an industrial dispute, therefore it has cast an obligation on the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication and the appropriate Government has no discretion in the matter. It is difficult to accept the argument that now because an individual dispute is also an industrial dispute, therefore it has cast an obligation on the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication and the appropriate Government has no discretion in the matter. This argument has been advanced on the basis of the decision of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Jute and Jute Goods Buffer-Stock Association v. The Secon Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal. 1972 1972 Labour & Industrial cases 503, in that case it has been laid down that because some of the relevant 'considerations which can justify the exercise of the discretion for making or refusing to make a reference under section 10 of the Act could be absent when the dispute is an individual dispute in accordance with section 2A of the Act, therefore section 2A is void and illegal. It offends against the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the first instance, I do not subscribe to the view expressed by the learned Judge or the Calcutta High Court and I say so respectfully. I, however, need not detain myself for elaborating my points in support of my inability to subscribe to this view. For the purpose of the point as urged before us, it is sufficient to say that neither side argued in this case that section 2A is void and if it is not so, then I see no justification for taking the view that the requirements of considerations which are germane for refusing to make a reference will be different if the dispute is raised by the Union and when it is raised by an individual workman. The point, in my opinion, is unsound and must be rejected. 8. For the reasons stated above, this writ application fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no, costs. Application dismissed.