( 1 ) THE common question for decision in these writ petitions is whether the period of limitation for the claim against the petitioner is two years. or six years. It is common ground that the period of limitation is prescribed by sub-rule (2) of Rule 31 of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Rules, 1960, shortly called the Rules. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts are these: The Bellary Town Co-operative stores, Ltd. (which we will call as the Society), respondent 1, was registered under the madras Co-operative Societies Act (VI of 1932), and deemed to have been registered under the provisions of the Mysore Co-operative societies Act, 1959 hereinafter called the Act. The petitioners were all its directors during the relevant period. The petitioner in WP. 4141 1968 was its President and the petiti6ner in WP. 4269/68 was the Secretary. In the. meeting held on 14-7-1960, the Directors resolved to obtain acceptance from all the members and non-members to whom credit sales were made to a tune of Rs. 59,426-41 and further resolved to make good the loss in case the said amount was not realised before December, 1960. The petitioners were signatories to the said resolution. The amount was neither realised from the debtors nor reimbursed by the petitioners. They continued to hold their offices till the Society was put under an Administrator on 14-3-1964. Thereafter, the Administrator field a dispute on 2-7-1964 before the Registrar under S. 70 of the Act, claiming an amount of Rs/59,426-41. The claim was based on the undertaking given by the petitioners as per their resolution dt. 14-7-1960. The Registrar referred the dispute for disposal to an arbitrator who by his award dt. 13-8-1967, decreed the claim of the Society against the petitioners jointly and severally. The appeals preferred by the petitioners against the award were dismissed by the Mysore Co-operative appellate Tribunal. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioners, a number of contentions were raised both before the Arbitrator and also before the Tribunal. But, in these petitions, the question of limitation was the main point urged for our Consideration. It turns on the scope and meaning to be given to Rule 31 (2) of the rules. The said rule, so far as it is relevant, provides:"31. Procedure of reference and Arbitration. . . . . . (Omitted ). But, in these petitions, the question of limitation was the main point urged for our Consideration. It turns on the scope and meaning to be given to Rule 31 (2) of the rules. The said rule, so far as it is relevant, provides:"31. Procedure of reference and Arbitration. . . . . . (Omitted ). (2) The period of limitation for referring a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society to the Registrar under sub-sec. (3) of S. 70 of the Act, shall be six years from the date of the cause of action; provided that a dispute between (i) the society, or its committee, and (ii) any past committee, any past officers, past agent, or past employees, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society shall where the dispute relates to any act or omission on the part of the Society or- its committee, or any past committee, any past officer, past agent or past employee, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the Society, be referred to the Registrar within two years from the date on which the act or omission, with reference to which the dispute arose, took place. " (The rest is omitted), it was urged for the petitioners that their case falls under the above proviso, providing for a limitation of two years and not under sub-rule (2), providing for a period of six years. They based their contentions on the following factors. They had undertaken to reimburse the loss on credit. sales, by their resolution dated 14-7-1960. The undertaking was to reduce the balance by fifty per cent by September and to clear up the same before december, 1960. They did not 'act' upon this undertaking, or, they committed a breach of the said undertaking. Their 'omission' to make good the less gave rise to a cause of action for the Society to raise a dispute against them, on 31-12-1960, and, the dispute ought to have been referred to the Registrar within two years therefrom. The dispute which was filed on 2-7-1964, it is contended, is barred by time. ( 4 ) BEFORE we go to the correctness of these contentions, let us see what the Tribunal has stated. The dispute which was filed on 2-7-1964, it is contended, is barred by time. ( 4 ) BEFORE we go to the correctness of these contentions, let us see what the Tribunal has stated. The Tribunal was of the opinion, that the claim of the Society was not based on any act or omission on the part of the petitioners but on the breach of their undertaking to make good the loss sustained by the Society and such an undertaking falls outside the ambit of the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 31. It also held that the period of limitation in respect of the said dispute, regard being had to the facts of the case, should not be counted from the date of the breach of the undertaking, but from the date of the knowledge of the Administrator about the mistake or fraud committed by the petitioners. It called into aid the provisions of S. 17 of the Limitation Act and held that the limitation should commence to run from 1964, when the Administrator first discovered the said mistake and that the dispute filed on 2-7-1964 was therefore in time. ( 5 ) IN our view, the latter reasoning of the Tribunal is quite wrong. The Arbitrator is not a Court. The provisions of the Limitation Act are, therefore, not attracted to the proceedings before him, unless they are specifically made applicable. S. 119 of the Act provides for the application of ss. 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, to the filing of an appeal or application for revision under the Act. No provision of the Limitation Act is attracted for referring a dispute to the Registrar. That is governed by rule 31 (2) of the Rules. Sub-rule (2) provides a period of six years from the date of the cause of action, and, the first proviso to the said sub-rule limits that period to two years in respect of the dispute falling under the said proviso. That period of two years has to be counted from the date on which the 'act or omission' with reference to which the dispute arose, took place. That period of two years has to be counted from the date on which the 'act or omission' with reference to which the dispute arose, took place. The answer to the question before us, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to the words 'act or omission' occurring in the said first proviso, whether the said words include every act or omission giving rise to a dispute falling under sub-rule (2), or whether they are confined to a particular type of act committed by the class of persons or the committee of the society enumerated under the said proviso. Though the said words have not been defined under the Act, they have a definite meaning in the legal terminology. Under the definition contained in S. 3 (2) of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899 , an 'act' might include an illegal omission when it is used with reference to an offence or a civil wrong. We may now briefly refer to a few cases in which the scope of the said words came up for consideration. Let us first see the decision of this Court. In Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit bank, Ltd. v. Laxmibai 1959 Mys. L,j. 523. , S 70 of the Bombay Co-operative societies Act, came up for interpretation. The said section which is in parlmateria with S. 125 of the Act, reads as follows : " No suit shall be instituted against a Society or any of its officers in respect of any act touching the business of the sodety until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Registrar, or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (the underlining (italic) is ours ). Therein, the question arose whether the non-payment of rent by the Society which constituted a cause of action on the basis of which a suit was filed, was an act touching the business of the Society and if so, whether a notice under S. 70 was necessary. Das Gupta, CJ. , after referring to a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in District Board, Allahabad v. Lola Behari Lal AIR. Das Gupta, CJ. , after referring to a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in District Board, Allahabad v. Lola Behari Lal AIR. 1936 All 18, and the decision of the Privy Council in Revati mohan Das v. Jatindhra Mohan Ghosh AIR. 1934 PC. 96, held that the omission to pay rent by the tenant society cannot be said to be an illegal omission and a liability for the breach of a contract cannot be said to be a liability with reference to an offence or a civil wrong. In other words, it was held that the expression "any act touching the business of the sociey" is not every act but has reference only to a civil wrong. The same was the view expressed by Sulaiman, CJ. , in Behari Lal's case (2 ). The learned Chief Justice while interpreting S. 192 of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922, held that the word 'act' in S. 192 of the said Act includes only cases of an illegal omission within the meaning of S. 4 of the u. P. General Clauses Act. The pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Revati mohan Das's case (3) though with reference to S. 80 of CPC. throws considerable light on the interpretation which we should put on the first proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 31 of the Rules. In that case. the former manager who was assumed to be a public officer. had exemted a mortgage deed creating a charge on certain property of his ward but had not undertaken any personal liability to pay the mortgage money. When a suit was brought by the next manager on the deed a plea was taken that the suit was defective inasmuch as notice under S 80. CPC. had not been given. S. 80, CPC, so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads:" 80. Notice. When a suit was brought by the next manager on the deed a plea was taken that the suit was defective inasmuch as notice under S 80. CPC. had not been given. S. 80, CPC, so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads:" 80. Notice. No suit shall be instituted aeainst the Government (including the State of Jammu and Kashmir or against a Public Officer in revert of anv act nproperting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity until the expiration of two months next after notice, in writing has been delivered to, their Lordshins pointed out that non-payment of the mortgage money cannot be said to be an "art purporting to be done" by the manager "in his official capacity" Tbey relied upon the genrel Definition of the word 'act' contained in S. 3 of 1he General Clauses Act, 1897, and observed: " an 'act' might include an illegal omission, but there clearly was no illegal omission in the present case. "the corresponding section of the Mysore General Clauses Act is S. 3 (2) which we have already noticed. 6 It appears to us that the rule-making authority has taken note of the difference in respect of a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society falling under sub-rule (21 of R "31, and a dispute relating to "any act or omission" on the part of the Society or its committee or anv past committee, anv past officer, past agent or past employees heirs, or legal representatives of anv deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society, falling under the first proviso to sub-rule (2 ). There appears to be no reason why the words "act or omission" should include all cases of mere omission to nerform a private contract or discharging of any liability even though such act or omission does not amount to be an illegal omission within the meaning of S. 3 (2) of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899. ( 6 ) WE are clearly of the opinion that the words "act or omission" occurring in the said proviso have reference only lo a civil wrong where a claim is based on tort for wrongful act. ( 6 ) WE are clearly of the opinion that the words "act or omission" occurring in the said proviso have reference only lo a civil wrong where a claim is based on tort for wrongful act. ( 7 ) IN that view, the dispute in the present case, based on a breach of the undertaking given by the petitioners, is governed by the rule of six years as provided by sub-rule (2) of Rule 31 and the one filed on 2-7-1964 must be held to be in time. ( 8 ) IN the result, the award of the Arbitrator as confirmed by the tribunal, is kept undisturbed while dismissing these petitions without an order as to costs. --- *** --- .