Judgment :- 1. O. S No. 494 of 1971 is a suit instituted for eviction of the defendants therein from a room in a building called "Rajasadan" in Quilon. The 1st Defendant in the suit was residing in Room No. 9 and the plaint allegation was that be allowed the 2nd Defendant to reside without the permission of the plaintiff Additional issues 4, 5 and 7 were tried as preliminary issues. These issues are: "4. Whether the suit is maintainable? 5. Whether the court is competent to grant the prayer prayed for? 7. Whether the plaintiff has waived quit notice". Additional issues 4 and 5 were raised on the basis of the contention that the room from which eviction was sought was "a room in a hotel" and therefore did not fall within the main part of the definition of the term "building' in S.2(1) of we Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 2 of 1965. which expressly excludes "a room in a hotel or boarding house" from the definition of the term'building'. The court below found that the room in question was not a room in a hotel as there was no supply of food. It was conceded that it was not a room in a boarding house. It was therefore of the view that the room in question was not exempted from the definition of the term 'building in the Act. Nevertheless it came to the conclusion that although the Rent Control Act was applicable, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit was not barred On additional issue No. 7 it found that there had not been any waiver by acceptance of rent, subsequent to the issuance of the notice by the plaintiff Against the finding that the Rent Control Act is applicable to the room in question, the plaintiff has preferred CRP. No. 1193 of 1972. Against the finding that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that there has been no waiver on the part of the plaintiff (the subject-matter of issue No. 7) the 1st Defendant has preferred CRP. No. 1144 of 1972. 2. The first question for determination is whether the subject-matter of the suit is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act. S.2(1) of the Act reads: "2. No. 1144 of 1972. 2. The first question for determination is whether the subject-matter of the suit is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act. S.2(1) of the Act reads: "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, (1) "building" means any building or but or part of a building or hut, let or to b-1st separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes (a) the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any. appurtenant to such building, hut, or part of such building or hut. and let or to be let along with such building or hut; (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or but or part of a building or hut; (c) any fittings or machinery belonging to the landlord. affixed to or installed in such building, or part of such building and intended to be used by the tenant for or in connection with the purposes for which such building or part of such building is to be let, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house;". It is conceded that the building in question is not a boarding house. But what is contended for the plaintiff is that the building is a'hotel' and that the room, from which eviction was sought is a room in a hotel. Despite the contention raised by Counsel for the Defendants, that the plea is not expressly covered by the pleadings in the case, I am satisfied that the replication filed by the plaintiff expressly raises the contention that the room in question is a room in a hotel. The question therefore is: What is a hotel? and is the room in question a room'in a hotel? In Associate Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor (AIR. 1959 SC. 1262) the eviction was sought from a room in the Imperial Hotel, New Delhi, used for the purpose of conducting a barber shop. Justice S. K. Das. agreed with the judgment of Justice Subba Rao that the document on the basis of which the room was held was a lease and not a licence. 1959 SC. 1262) the eviction was sought from a room in the Imperial Hotel, New Delhi, used for the purpose of conducting a barber shop. Justice S. K. Das. agreed with the judgment of Justice Subba Rao that the document on the basis of which the room was held was a lease and not a licence. The next question that was agitated was the true scope and effect of S.2(b) of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 19 of 1947 which also contained an exemption from the definition of the term'premises' more or less on the same terms as S.2(1) of our Act. The exemption in the Delhi Act was that the expression 'premises' does not include a room in a Dharmasala, hotel or lodging house. Das J. agreed with Sarkar J. that the room in question was a room in a hotel. Subba Rao J. held that the room was not used as part of the hotel for hotel business, and therefore cannot be regarded as a room in a hotel. Das J. observed: "The question before us is What is the meaning of the expression "a room in a hotel"? Does it merely mean a room which in a physical sense is within a building or part of a building used as a hotel; or does it mean something more, that is, the room itself is not only within a hotel in a physical sense but is let out to serve what are known as hotel purposes,? and proceeded to state that the word 'hotel' was not defined in the Rent Control Act, although a definition is to be found in the cognate Act called the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The learned judge then proceeded: "It is sufficient to state that in its ordinary connotation the word 'hotel' means a house for entertaining strangers or travellers; a place where lodging is furnished to transient guests as well as one where both lodging and food or other amenities are furnished. It is worthy of note that in S.2(b) of the Rent Control Act three different words are used 'hotel', 'dharamshala' or 'lodging house'. Obviously; the three words do not mean the same establishment. It is worthy of note that in S.2(b) of the Rent Control Act three different words are used 'hotel', 'dharamshala' or 'lodging house'. Obviously; the three words do not mean the same establishment. In the cognate Act, the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House-Rates Control Act, 1947, however, the definition clause gives the same meaning to the words 'hotel' and lodging house'. In my view, S.2(b) of the Rent Control Act by using two different words distinguishes a hotel from a lodging house in some respects and indicates that the former is an establishment where not merely lodging but some other amenities are provided. It was, however, never questioned that the Imperial Hotel, New Delhi, is a hotel within the meaning of that word as it is commonly understood, or even as it is defined in the cognate Act. Subba Rao J. observed: "The word "hotel" is not defined in the Act. A hotel in common parlance means a place where a proprietor makes it his business to furnish food or lodging or both to travellers or other persons. A building cannot be run as a hotel unless services necessary for the comfortable stay of lodgers and boarders are maintained. Services so maintained vary with the standard of the hotel and the class of persons to which it caters; but the amenities must have relation to the hotel business. Provisions for beating or lighting-supply of hot water, sanitary arrangements, sleeping facilities and such others are some of the amenities a hotel offers to its constituents. But every amenity however remote and unconnected with the business of a hotel cannot be described as service in a hotel." The learned judge found that as the room in question was not let out as part of a hotel for hotel purposes, it cannot be regarded as 'room in a hotel' (within the meaning of S.2 of the Act). Both Das J., and Subba Rao J. seem to have had in mind the definition of the term 'hotel' as given in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon. The definition of the term "hotel" as given in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon is as follows: " A hotel is a place where the proprietor makes it his business to furnish food or lodging, or both to travellers or other persons." 4. Counsel for the plaintiff also invited my attention to the decision in Madan Lal v. Dr. The definition of the term "hotel" as given in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon is as follows: " A hotel is a place where the proprietor makes it his business to furnish food or lodging, or both to travellers or other persons." 4. Counsel for the plaintiff also invited my attention to the decision in Madan Lal v. Dr. Brahm Sarup (1951-53 Punj L R 75) where, after referring to the definition of the term 'hotel' in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon, and to the provisions of the Punjab and the West Bengal Rent Control Legislations, a learned judge of the Punjab High Court held that'hotel' is a place where food or lodging or both is, or are, made available to travellers or for other persons My attention was called to several dictionaries and law lexicons. Some of them contain indications that both food and lodging should be served before a building can be regarded as 'hotel'. Others state that provision for either food or lodging is sufficient to constitute a hotel. Having regard to the fact that the two learned judges of the. Supreme Court (Das and Subba Rao JJ.) preferred to adopt the definition of 'hotel' as given in Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon, I am of the opinion that the room in question is a room in a hotel and therefore exempt from the definition of the term 'building' in S.2(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, I therefore allow civil revision petition No. 1193 of 1972. 5. The contention raised in C. R. P. No. 1144 of 1972 is that the civil N court has no jurisdiction. In the light of my finding that the room in question is not a'building' as defined in the Rent Control Act, this aspect of the matter does not really arise; but even if it does, there is sufficient authority in this Court to hold that the Rent Control Act does not bar a civil court from entertaining a suit for eviction but only bars the eviction from the building itself. (See for instance Kajaria Co. (P) Ltd. v. Vimala Bai (1967 KLT. 575). The finding of the court below that the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred is therefore correct and does not call for any interference. (See for instance Kajaria Co. (P) Ltd. v. Vimala Bai (1967 KLT. 575). The finding of the court below that the civil court's jurisdiction is not barred is therefore correct and does not call for any interference. The finding as recorded by the court below that there has been no waiver of the quit notice by the plaintiff does not appear to call for any interference in revision, and nothing was said to warrant interference. 6. In the result, I dismiss C. R. P. No. 1144 of 1972. There will be no order as to costs in either of these civil revision petitions.