Judgment Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. This appeal by the plaintiff arises out of a suit for eviction of the defendant-respondents 1 and 2 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the respondents') from premises bearing plot no. 1-156 in Sakchi Market in the city of Jamshedpur, on the ground that they had defaulted, in payment of rent for more than two months. Admittedly, the father of the appellant had let out the premises to the defendants and he died in 1962 before the institution of the suit leaving behind the plaintiff, a son, and defendant-respondent no. 3, a daughter, as heirs and legal representatives. It is also not in dispute that after the death of his father the appellant alone was realising rent of the premises from the respondents and they were paying it to him without any objection that he not being the only heir of his father could not realise the entire rent. In the plaint, the appellant stated that he had given necessary notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act to the respondents and terminated the tenancy. He also claimed that he alone was in possession as landlord of the suit premises realising the entire rent and thus entitled to evict the respondents. 2. The main defence of the respondents were two fold, firstly, that there was no default in payment of rent and secondly, that as the notice was only by the plaintiff and not his sister, it being a notice only by a colessor, was not valid in law and could not determine the tenancy. Defendant no. 3 did not challenge the claim of the appellant that he alone was in possession of the suit premises and realising the entire rent. 3. The trial court held that the respondents had defaulted in payment of rent for more than two months and, therefore, liable to be evicted from the suit premises. It further held that, in view of the definition of landlord in section 2 (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act-hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' the appellant was the landlord and notice given by him alone was valid and the tenancy stood determined. 4. Defendant no. 1 appealed to the lower appellate court. It further held that, in view of the definition of landlord in section 2 (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act-hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' the appellant was the landlord and notice given by him alone was valid and the tenancy stood determined. 4. Defendant no. 1 appealed to the lower appellate court. He did not challenge the finding of the trial court that there was default in payment of rent for a period of more than two months. The only ground pressed on his behalf was that the notice by the appellant (before this Court) alone was invalid. The lower appellate court has reversed the finding of the trial court on that point and held that notice being by one of the colessors only was invalid. It has accordingly dismissed the suit. 5. Mr. S.K. Jha appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that the notice was not valid and the tenancy could not be determined by it was not correct in law. On the other hand, Mr. J.C. Sinha appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that in India a lease cannot be determined by a notice by only one of the lessors. To determine a lease it is necessary that the notice must be by or on behalf of all the lessors. He concedes that the rule of English law is that in the case of joint lessors notice by one colessor is sufficient to determine the tenancy of all, but submits that the lex loci of this country is different and according to that law, which has been adopted by the decisions of this country, even for the purposes of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of property Act, one of the several joint owners whether joint tenants or tenants in common cannot determine the tenancy and notice to quit must be given by all. According to Mr. S.K. Jha, the said lex loci is only as to agricultural tenancy and has been incorporated in various Tenancy Act of this country. According to Mr. S.K. Jha, the said lex loci is only as to agricultural tenancy and has been incorporated in various Tenancy Act of this country. In this connection he has drawn our attention to section 188 of the Bihar Tenancy Act which lays down that where two or more persons are joint landlords anything which the landlord under this Act required or authorised to do must be done either by both or all those persons acting together or by an agent authorised to act on behalf of all of them. He has submitted that has the lex loci been the same as to non-agricultural tenancy, a provision similar to section 188 of the Bihar Tenancy Act would have also been incorporated in the Transfer of Property Act, and in absence of such a provision in the Transfer of Property Act, it should be held that notice by one colessor is sufficient to determine the tenancy as to all. In support of this contention, Mr. Jha has placed reliance on two decisions. Firstly, he has referred us to a decision of the Supreme Court in Kanji Manji v. •The Trustees of the Port of Bombay. In this case, with reference to sections 106 and 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was held by the Supreme Court that in case of joint tenancy notice to determine lease to one of the joint tenants was sufficient. The expressions used in section 106 are 'lessor and lessee' and Mr. Jha submits that if notice to one of the co-lessees is sufficient in law for purposes of that section, notice by one of the co-lessors also must be held to be sufficient. In other words, according to him, the Supreme Court for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act has approved of the rule of English law, which is also the law of this country for non-agricultural tenancy, as to sufficiency of notice. 6. Mr. Jha has next relied on the decision in Ebrahim Pir Mahomed v. Cursetji Sorabji De Vitre. That was a case in which one of the parties was parsi and it was urged on behalf of the defendant that notice being given on behalf of one of the owners only was bad in law. 6. Mr. Jha has next relied on the decision in Ebrahim Pir Mahomed v. Cursetji Sorabji De Vitre. That was a case in which one of the parties was parsi and it was urged on behalf of the defendant that notice being given on behalf of one of the owners only was bad in law. Dealing with this argument, the learned Single Judge observed as follows: "Then it is argued for defendant that the notice is bad as being given on behalf of one of the owners only, and similarly that the suit cannot be maintained by him alone, the question raised in the first issue. Cases among Hindus have been cited in support of this argument; and, as remarked by Mr. Justice West in his notes to West and Buhler, Vol. II (3rd Ed.), p. 607, the Indian decisions have usually treated the relation created by contract with several joint landlords as continuing until there exists a new and complete volition to change it. But I think I ought to apply to the present case the rules of the English law. A similar contention received much attention in the thrice-argued case of Doe, Lessee of Whayman, v, Chaplin, on which the Advocate-General relies, and again in Doe Dem, Aslin v. Sumersett, where Lord Tenterden in delivering the Judgment of the Court said that, without any adoption by other joint tenants, 'a notice to quit by one of the joint tenants put an end to the tenancy as to both'... The right of the plaintiff, who is a tenant-in-common, appears to me stronger than that of a joint-tenant, as the former has a several estate." Even in cases relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents holding that notice by one of the colessors is not valid in law, the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court has been noticed and not dissented from. Mr. Jha has submitted that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be differently interpreted for Parsis and Hindus and if in case where one of the parties is a Parsi and notice by one of the colessors is valid, it must be held to be valid in cases where other communities of this country are parties. According to Mr. J.C. Sinha, this case has been wrongly decided. According to Mr. J.C. Sinha, this case has been wrongly decided. The rule which is applicable to Hindus as observed by learned Judge should have been applied to that case as well. 7. Mr. J.C. Sinha has placed before us a large number of decisions of various High Courts of this country. Mr. Jha in his argument has also dealt with them separately and distinguished majority of them on the ground that they relate to agricultural tenancy. In view of special provisions of the Tenancy laws, decisions relating to agricultural tenancy are not of any real assistance. I, therefore, do not propose to deal with such of the decisions which relate to agricultural tenancy except the case of Sri Raja Simhadri Appa Rao v. Prattipati Ramayya and others on which Mr. J.C. Sinha has placed great reliance. 8. The decisions on which Mr. Sinha has relied very strongly is the case of Gopal Ram Mahuri v. Dhakeswar Pershad Narain Singh. It was a case which was not governed by tenancy laws but by Transfer of Property Act and a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held- “We think the rule to be deduced from these cases is, as laid down in Ebrahim pir Mohamed v. Cursetji Sorabji De Vitre, that though in England any joint tenant may put an end to his demise, as far as it oprates on his own share, whether his companions join him in putting an end to the whole lease or not, yet according to the Indian decisions the relation created by contract with several joint landlords continues, un-till there exists a new and complete volition to change it... .. .. .. But where the relation of joint landlord continues, it would seem the tenancy of the lessees cannot be put an end to, except by all the lessors acting together.” It is to be noticed that their Lordships did not observe that decision in Ebrahim Pir Mohamed's case referred, to above, by the Bombay High Court was bad. .. .. .. But where the relation of joint landlord continues, it would seem the tenancy of the lessees cannot be put an end to, except by all the lessors acting together.” It is to be noticed that their Lordships did not observe that decision in Ebrahim Pir Mohamed's case referred, to above, by the Bombay High Court was bad. They further felt that their decision was going to result in hardship to the plaintiffs and observed as follows: "It would seem to be a hardship that the plaintiffs, who represents 15 annas share of the lessor's interest, should in consequence of the collusion of their one ann a co-sharers with the principal defendant, be unable to obtain khas possession against the latter, but such would seem to be the effect of the Indian decisions and we must follow them." The decisions to which they referred were of agricultural tenancy and could be easily distinguished on that ground. 9. In Sri Raja Simhadri Appa Rao V. Prattipati Ramayya and others, Sankaran Nair, J. stated the difference between the English and Indian Law as follows :- "The difference between the English and the Indian cases appears to be that where there is a relation created by contract with several joint landlords, according to the English cases, that relation subsists, only so long as all of them with it to continue, while according to the Indian cases, it subsists until all of them agree to put an end to it; and it is not competent to any one of them to determine a contract which is entire, unless there are any special circumstances in the case, like collusion between a tenant and one of the lessors, etc." He further observed... "To allow a co-owner to recover an undivided share would, in many cases, be a hardship to a tenant who might not be willing to continue in possession of a portion of the property or as a tenant in common with such co-owner. On the other hand to allow him to recover the entire property would be unjust to the others who may not wish the tenant to be turned out of their shares. In this state of authorities and for the above reasons I hesitate to follow the English law. On the other hand to allow him to recover the entire property would be unjust to the others who may not wish the tenant to be turned out of their shares. In this state of authorities and for the above reasons I hesitate to follow the English law. But I consider it unnecessary to decide that question as I am of opinion that the cases cited above have no application to this case." Even though, as observed earlier, the case was of an agricultural tenancy, the suit of a co-owner for ejectment was decreed by the High Court. Subrahmania Ayyar, Officiating Chief Justice, with whom Sankaran Nair, J. ultimately agreed, held that the colessors in that case were tenants-in-common and the plaintiff, one of them, was entitled to eject defendant nos. 1 and 2 to the extent of his interest on proper notice to quit. 10. 'In Hindu Law by Mulla, Thirteenth (1966) edition, in Article 31 it is stated that according to the Mitakshara School two or more persons inheriting jointly take as tenant-sin-common except the four classes of heirs specifically mentioned in that Article, who take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. One of the four classes of heirs who take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship is "two or more daughters succeeding as heirs to their father except, in the Bombay State where they take an absolute estate in severalty". It appears, therefore, that the test is that where co-heirs succeed with rights of survivorship, they are joint tenants where they do not succeed with rights of survivorship they are tenants-in-common. According to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act when a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act, provided that if he had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule (daughter is one of such relatives) or a male relative, specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1 to this section says that for the purposes of the section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. To my mind, it is obvious from the provisions of this section of the Hindu Succession Act that daughters and sons of a male Hindu having at the time of his death an interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property, on his death do not succeed to his property as joint tenants, but as tenants-in-common. Hence, according to the Madras decision, on which Mr. Sinha has placed great reliance, notice by the appellant was valid in law and, could determine the tenancy. 11. The passage from A Digest of the Hindu Law of Inheritance, Partition, and Adoption with introductions and notes by West and Buhler, Third (1884) Edition, at pages 607-8 of book II on which the various decisions relied on by Mr. Sinha appear to have been based is : "One only or two of united coparceners cannot enhance rent against the will of another or oust a tenant of the family or recover his own estimated fractional share of the joint property from a stranger." According to Hindu Law by Mulla, 13th (1966) Edition, Articles 60 and 343, the effect of a reunion is to remit the reunited members to their former status as members of joint Hindu family and in Mitakshara school share of a reunited member survives to the other members of the reunited family like the share of a member of a normal joint family. Thus, that passage too can apply to only cases of joint tenants and not sons and daughters of a male Hindu who dies after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, who are tenants-in-common. 12. In Abdul Hamid v. Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Mudholkar, J. sitting singly held that a tenant could not be ejected at the instance of only one of the landlords where the tenancy had been created by several landlords and that all the joint landlords must give notice to the tenants before terminating his tenancy. 12. In Abdul Hamid v. Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Mudholkar, J. sitting singly held that a tenant could not be ejected at the instance of only one of the landlords where the tenancy had been created by several landlords and that all the joint landlords must give notice to the tenants before terminating his tenancy. He relied on the decisions in (i) Balaji Bhikaji v. Copal which was a case of enhancement of rent and not of eviction though some observations were also made about eviction, (ii) Ghulam Muhiuddin Hossein v. Khairan, which was a case of agricultural tenancy, and (iii) Copal Ram Mohuri V. Dhakeswar Pershad Narain Singh already referred to above. 13. A Bench decision of Assam High Court in Arun Chandra Dowerah v. Panchu Modok and others and a decision of a learned Single Judge of Orissa High Court in Smt. Chhoti Dei v. Gangadhar Misra and another do support the contention of learned counsel for the respondents; they being based on the principle that notice to quit by a colessor is not valid. They do not give any special reason for the decision except that they assume that the principle aforesaid is well recognised. 14. The purpose behind enactment of the Transfer of property Act was not to consolidate the local laws on the subject. It is obvious from the fact that preamble to the Act does not contain the expression 'consolidate.' That also introduced in India by it rules of English law. It is obvious from the fact that 'English mortgage' was recognised by the Act as one of the forms of mortgages in the country. Therefore, if it would have been necessary to decide the question, even without reference to the definition of the 'landlord' in the Act, I would have held that in cases of non-agricultural tenancy, notice by one of the colessors specially when they are tenants-in-common is valid and may determine the tenancy. In my opinion, however, so far this case is concerned, it is not necessary to decide that question so broadly. For the reasons, which I shall state hereafter I think that a person who is a landlord within the definition of the term in the Act, can evict the tenant alone and a notice to determine the tenancy by him alone is also valid. 15. For the reasons, which I shall state hereafter I think that a person who is a landlord within the definition of the term in the Act, can evict the tenant alone and a notice to determine the tenancy by him alone is also valid. 15. Section 2 (d) of the Act defines 'landlord' as follows ; "'Landlord' includes the person who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of or for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled, to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant." According to the definition, a person who is receiving rent for the time being, whether he is entitled to receive it or not, is a landlord for the purposes of the Act. The appellant, who admittedly was receiving rent of the suit premises for the time being, is thus a landlord within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. Section 11 lays down the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted. He cannot be evicted on grounds other than those mentioned in that section. Two of the grounds are default in payment of two month's rent and the personal necessity of the landlord. In S.M. Usman v. Hakim Sayed Ahmad Warsi and others the facts were as follows. A house originally belonged to one Sheodayal Narayan and he inducted as a tenant in the year 1939. Sheodayal had several creditors who had obtained decrees against him. In execution of their decrees, three sets of creditors purchased his interest in the house separately. Two persons who constituted one set instituted a suit for declaration of their right and recovery of possession from successor-in-interest (by purchase inter vivos) from one purchaser; the other purchaser was also made a party to the suit. The litigation was fought up to this Court and it' was held that two purchasers who had instituted• the suit had 8 annas interest in the house and a decree for recovery of possession was also passed in their favour against successor-in-interest of one of the purchasers. The litigation was fought up to this Court and it' was held that two purchasers who had instituted• the suit had 8 annas interest in the house and a decree for recovery of possession was also passed in their favour against successor-in-interest of one of the purchasers. That successor-in-interest of one of the purchasers had, during the pendency of the suit, applied to the House Controller for eviction of S. Ultimately he succeeded and an order for eviction of S. was passed by the Controller. Then S. instituted a suit for declaration that the order of eviction passed by the House Controller was without jurisdiction and void and not binding on him and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the said order. The trial court decreed the suit. The lower appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit. Then there was an appeal to this Court. One of the grounds urged before this Court was that the persons who had obtained order from the House Controller for eviction being a co-sharer landlord could not make an application for eviction. It was held that as that co-sharer landlord was a person who for the time being was receiving or was entitled to receive the rent of the building, he was perfectly entitled to make an application for eviction. This decision which has been relied on by Mr. Jha is a clear authority for the proposition that a co-sharer landlord who is a landlord within the meaning of the definition of the term in the Act could alone maintain an action for eviction. In my opinion, the power to sue in ejectment should ordinarily be taken to include power to take up such action as may be necessary as preliminaries to the institution of such a suit. As the appellant alone could sue for ejectment, he alone could also determine the tenancy by giving a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 16. The view taken by me in the preceding paragraph that power to sue in ejectment should ordinarily be taken to include power to take up such action as may be necessary as preliminaries to the institution of such a suit is supported by a Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in Badardoja and others v. Ajizuddin Sirkar and others on which Mr. Jha has placed reliance. Jha has placed reliance. Virtually, I have reiterated the very language used by their Lordships. 17. In Mir Tapurah Hossain v. Gopi Narain and others Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J. (Caspersz, J. concurring) observed as fellows:- "It may indeed happen that a suit by one of several co-owners can be successfully maintained against a tenant; this is the case when the tenant has dealt with such co-owner as sole landlord and by so dealing is estopped from denying the title of the person who has let him into possession; but except in such a case all the co-owners must join as plaintiffs in the suit." Though in that case a co-owner receiving rent was not treated as the landlord for purposes of instituting a suit, the above quoted observation was made. Relying on this decision Mr. Jha has contended that apart from the definition of 'landlord' in the Act, as the respondents were paying rent to the appellant and had attorned to him, the appellant could evict them, and as a preliminary to the eviction, determine the tenancy by serving a notice to quit as provided under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He has also submitted that the fact that defendant no. 3, the other co-landlord, is not challenging the appellant's right to evict the respondents should also be taken into consideration and it should beheld that he alone could determine the tenancy for the purposes of eviction. I, for the reasons already discussed, hold that the appellant, who was receiving rent and thus landlord within the meaning of definition of the term in the Act, could alone give a notice to determine the tenancy as a preliminary for eviction and the notice is valid in law. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and those of the trial court restored. Appeal allowed.