JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, Ag. C.J. 1. This revision is by the Plaintiff from the Appellate order of the District Judge, Cuttack, setting aside the order of temporary injunction passed by the trial Court. 2. The Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of right, title and Interest in respect of the suit-land, for recovery of possession of the same, and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her possession. This order of injunction was sought against Defendants 1 to 4. The case of the Plaintiff may be briefly stated: The suit-land consists of two plots viz., plot No. 1147, and 717, appertaining to Khata Nos. 239 and 276 respectively in Mouza Korua. Admittedly these plots belonged to one Mohani Sahu father of Defendant-5. Upon the death of said Mohani Sahu, Defendants inherited the suit property and sold the same to the Plaintiff on 12-3-1968 for a consideration of Rs. 2900/- within 3 months of her purchase the Plaintiff Instituted a criminal case against Defendants 1 to 4 u/s 427, Indian Penal Code, alleging that on 24-6-1968 they damaged the paddy seedlings on the suit-land. The Defendants were acquitted in that case. Thereafter, these Defendants, 1 to 4, out and carried away the paddy alleged to have been grown by the Plaintiff on the suit-land on 7-1-1970 under a claim of bhag tenancy right. This gave rise to the cause of action for instituting the present suit. She also filed a petition for issue of injunction against these Defendants 1 to 4 restraining them from causing obstruction to the Plaintiff in cultivating the suit-land and from dispossessing her therefrom. 3. The main plea of the Defendants is that they are the bhag-tenants in respect of the suit land since the time of the Plaintiff?s vendor, and are in continuous possession thereof even after the Plaintiff?s purchase. They are also paying the water-rent for the land. It will be seen that the Defendants do not contest the title of the Plaintiff, but claim merely a bhag-tenancy right in other words, they claim actual physical possession of the land in suit. 4. They are also paying the water-rent for the land. It will be seen that the Defendants do not contest the title of the Plaintiff, but claim merely a bhag-tenancy right in other words, they claim actual physical possession of the land in suit. 4. The principal considerations in the matter of grant of injunctions is that the Court must be satisfied that the plain, tiff has made out a fair prima facie case and that irreparable injury will accrue to him if no injunction is granted and that there is no other remedy open to him by which he could protect himself from the consequence of the apprehended injury and that the apprehended injury must be a material one i.e. one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages. Grant of injunction is discretionary but the discretion must be, exercised by the Court judicially and not arbitrarily. It is therefore to be seen if the lower Appellate Court has exercised his discretion Judicially in the aforesaid legal perspective. If he has done so his order cannot be interfere with. 5. Both parties filed documents in support of their respective contentions. The Plaintiff filed her sale-deed, three rent-receipts granted to her by the Tahasildar after her purchase, and a notice issued by the water-rate department to the originally recorded tenant Mohani Sahu, and two unstamped receipts dated 27-3-1966 and 3-4-1967, purported to have been granted by Defendant-5 to the husband of the Plaintiff showing payment of bhag-paddy by the latter to the former. The case of the Plaintiff in this regard is that before her purchase she, through her husband was in cultivating possession of the suit-land on bhag under Defendant-5. On behalf of the Defendants some documents were filed. They are two water-rate parchas of the years 1958-59 and 196263 issued in their favour in respect of the suit plot 717, a notice issued by the water-rate department to Defendant-1 directing him to pay water-rent in respect of the suit-property from the year 1963-64, and a certified copy of the judgment of acquittal passed in their favour in the aforesaid criminal litigation. 6. The trial Court granted the injunction being satisfied that the Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of title and possession and that the balance of convenience ws in favour of granting the temporary injunction sought for. 7. 6. The trial Court granted the injunction being satisfied that the Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of title and possession and that the balance of convenience ws in favour of granting the temporary injunction sought for. 7. The lower Appellate Court has come to different conclusions on the very same materials placed before him by both the parties. On a careful consideration of the various documents produced by the Plaintiff, coupled with relevant circumstances indicated in para 7 of his order, he has come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of her actual physical possession of the disputed land after her purchase. On the contrary, he believed, tenatatively, that the Defendants have succeeded in establishing prima facie case of their cultivating possession of the suit plot. He was further of opinion that even assuming that the Plaintiff had an Indefeasiable title, yet she would not be entitled to a temporary injunction, because she would not suffer any irreparable or material injury which could not be compensated in damages. In the circumstances, he was of the opinion that the balance of convenience was not in favour of granting any injunction. It appears that the lower Appellate Court considered the question of grant of temporary injunction, judicially and in correct legal setting. His appraisement of the respective cases of the parties in the light of the various documents filed by them and other circumstances, to determine if the Plaintiff has made out a case for grant of injunction, is judicious and far from arbitrary. 8. I will indicate some broad features which would go to corroborate the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the lower Appellate Court. The Plaintiff purchase the suit-land on 12-3-1968, and on the strength of that purchase she was entitled to carry out agricultural operation during the first agricultural year following her purchase, viz, 1968-1969 commencing from 13th April, 1968. It is admitted that no sooner she entered upon the land she was obstructed by the Defendants compelling her to file the criminal case. It is also admitted that the crops grown during that agricultural year were removed by the Defendants. This indicates that the Plaintiff never acquired peaceful possession of the suit-land at any time since her purchase. It is admitted that no sooner she entered upon the land she was obstructed by the Defendants compelling her to file the criminal case. It is also admitted that the crops grown during that agricultural year were removed by the Defendants. This indicates that the Plaintiff never acquired peaceful possession of the suit-land at any time since her purchase. The Plaintiff alleged that before her purchase she through her husband was cultivating the land as a bhag-tenant, and yet in support of that story no water-rent receipt was filed. Further, Defendant-5 has not come forward to support this case of the Plaintiff. No affidavit has been filed by the Plaintiff?s husband in this case corroborating the story of the Plaintiff as regards her case of possession prior to her purchase. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, justified in refusing to attach any importance to the bhag-chas receipts purporting to have been granted by Defendant-5. In the aforesaid circumstances and in view of the admission of the Plaintiff that the Defendants asserted possession from the commencement of the agricultural year 1968-1969, and ultimately out and carried away the paddy crops grown on the suit land during that year probabilised the defence story of possession and cultivation. This receives some corroboration from the documents filed by the Defendants showing that at least one of those Defendants was considered liable to pay water-rate to the water-rate department. Though this inference is not to be construed as a conclusive finding of this Court as to the possession of the suit-land by the Defendants during that year, yet it creates considerable doubt as to the Plaintiff?s claim as to actual physical possession of the suit land. Thus, if maintenance of status quo is one of the considerations in determining whether to issue injunction or not, then in view of the aforesaid conclusion to issue an injunction will upset the status quo. 9. The learned District Judge, as an Appellate Court, was entitled to come to his own conclusion after consideration of the materials on record. Since he has come to his own conclusions in the correct legal perspective, which mayor may not be correct, and since he has exercised his discretion judicially and not arbitrarily, I fail to see how the question of illegal exercise of jurisdiction or exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity is involved in his order. 10. Since he has come to his own conclusions in the correct legal perspective, which mayor may not be correct, and since he has exercised his discretion judicially and not arbitrarily, I fail to see how the question of illegal exercise of jurisdiction or exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity is involved in his order. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this revision petition which is accordingly dismissed. Costs one Gold Mohur. Petition dismissed.