G.N. PRASAD, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against the order of the Sessions Judge of Patna dated the 28th August, 1969, rejecting a petition for further enquiry into a complaint which was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Dinapore under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the "Code." The relevant facts are as follows: 2. On the 23rd Ju1y 1968, one Thakuri Rai of village Bahpura, within Bihta 'Police Station, filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Dinapore in respect of offences under sections 430, 467, 468 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code' against seven persons, who are Opposite party No.2 to 8 in this application. After examining the complainant on solemn affirmation, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate referred the complainant to the police for enquiry under section 202 of the Code. The police made an enquiry and then submitted a report to the effect that the allegations contained in the complaint petition were not true and that no prima facie case had been disclosed. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate upon a perusal of the police report dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code by his order dated the 23rd August, 1968. 3. It so happened that earlier, namely on the 12th August, 1968, the complainant Thakuri Rai had died and, therefore, against the dismissal order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, his daughter Munna Devi, also, as wife of the present petitioner Raghunath Prasad and Opposite party No.1 in this Court, moved the learned Sessions. Judge of Patna in Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1968 for a direction to hold further enquiry into the complaint, Notice of the petition filed by Munna Devi (Opposite party No.1) was ordered to be issued upon the persons complained (Opposite party Nos. 2 to 8). But before the service return of the notice was received, the petitioner Raghunath Prasad appeared before the learned sessions Judge and filed a petition on the 28th January 1969 wherein he prayed that his name should be added and/or substituted as a petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1968 to enable him to proceed with the same. The learned Sessions Judge heard the petitioner on the 12th February, 1969, and ultimately on the 17th' February, 1969, he rejected the petitioner's petition observing as follows :- "Munna Devi is the wife of Raghunath Prasad. The learned Sessions Judge heard the petitioner on the 12th February, 1969, and ultimately on the 17th' February, 1969, he rejected the petitioner's petition observing as follows :- "Munna Devi is the wife of Raghunath Prasad. On 28-1-1969 Raghunath Prasad filed a petition for adding or substituting his name as a petitioner saying that the accused persons have entered into a compromise with his wife and got a compromise settlement deed executed on 9-11-68 and he apprehended that she might not prosecute this revision petition and in case she aid it; it would affect the interest of her sons who are her direct heirs. I do not think that Raghunath Prasad can be added as a party in the criminal case nor did he file this revision petition, and in this revision we can not enter into the question as to whether Munna Devi has been gained over by the opposite party or not. His petition is, therefore, rejected. " 4. Against this order of the learned Sessions Judge, the petitioner filed an application in revision in this Court which was summarily dismissed by Mahapatra, J. on the 15th April, 1969. On the 20th May 1969, the service return of the notice in Criminal Revision No. 216 on 963 was received by the learned Sessions Judge showing that notice had been served on all the seven accused persons. One of the accused Shyarn Babu Singh also filed his appearance and the revision petition was posted for hearing on the 16th June, 1969. On the 16th June, 1969, Munna Devi filed a petition before the learned Sessions Judge for leave to withdraw her revision petition. The question of withdrawal was ordered to be put up on the 2nd August, 1969. On the 2nd August, 1969, the present petitioner again filed a petition before the learned Sessions Judge, where in he repeated his prayer that he should be substituted or added as a petitioner in the further inquiry matter, The learned Sessions Judge again heard the petitioner and ultimately passed the impugned order on the 28th August, 1969. 5. On the 2nd August, 1969, the present petitioner again filed a petition before the learned Sessions Judge, where in he repeated his prayer that he should be substituted or added as a petitioner in the further inquiry matter, The learned Sessions Judge again heard the petitioner and ultimately passed the impugned order on the 28th August, 1969. 5. In the impugned order, the learned Sessions Judge has reiterated what he had observed in his earlier order dated the 7th February, and then he has proceeded to say as follows : "His prayer had already been rejected by this Court and he did not prefer any revision before the Hon'ble High Court against that order. That being so, I do not think that Raghunath Prasad can be substituted or added as a petitioner. His prayer is rejected, Since Munna Devi has filed a petition saying that she does not want to proceed with the revision it is rejected for non-prosecution." 6. In the present application under sections 435/436 of the Code, the petitioner has described himself as an "Intervenor petitioner in the Court below" and his prayer is that the complaint petition filed by h is father-in-law Thakuri Rai, which was dismissed under section 203 of the Code, should be ordered to be further enquired into. 7. When the hearing in this Court started, I was surprised how the learned Sessions Judge had observed in the impugned order that the petitioner had not preferred any revision before this Court against his earlier order dated the 17th February, 1969. Accordingly, I looked into the petition which the petitioner had filed before the learned Sessions Judge on the 2nd August, 1969, and I find that therein the petitioner had made no reference at all to the fact that he had moved this Court in revision against the order of the 17th February, 1969, far less that his said revision petition had been dismissed summarily by Mahapatra, J. on the 15th April, 1969, In other words, in his petition dated the 2nd August, 1969, the petitioner had suppressed a material fact, presumably with the ulterior motive of keeping the learned Sessions Judge in the dark on the point that his order of the 17th February, 1969, had been upheld by this Court by reason of the dismissal of the petitioner's revision on the 15th April, 1969. In his petition dated the 2nd August, 1969, therefore, the petitioner sought to reagitate the same matter which had been finally decided in the same proceeding by the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated the 17th February, 1969. 8. However, the question that now arises for consideration is whether the petitioner had any locus standi to intervene in the proceeding for further inquiry in the Court of the Sessions Judge, either by being substituted as a petitioner there in place of Munna Devi or by being added as a petitioner along with her. In the course of the hearing in this Court, I repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the petitioner to let me know under what provision of the Code the petitioner wanted to be substituted or added as a petitioner before the learned Sessions judge. But learned counsel was constrained to admit that he was unable to involve any specific provision of the Code under which the learned Session Judge could have substituted the petitioner in place of the original petitioner Munna Devi or even added him as a petitioner along with her in Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1968. Having looked into the entire Code, I have also failed to discover any provision therein under which the prayer of the petitioner could have been allowed by the learned Sessions Judge. I am inclined to think that Mahapatra, J. also was of the same view when he dismissed the petitioner's revision application on the 15th April, 1969. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas V. The State of Maharashtra and another I wherein upon the death of the complainant who was a woman, her mother was held to be competent to figure as the complainant and to proceed with the complaint. The offences involved in that case were under section 493 and 496, besides section 417 of the Indian Penal Code and the complaint had been filed by the aggrieved woman under section 198 of the Code. Under section 198, a complaint with regard to the offences under sections 493 and 496 could only have been made "by some person aggrieved by such offence", and where the person so aggrieved is a woman, the complaint could be made by some other person on her behalf, with the leave of the Court. Under section 198, a complaint with regard to the offences under sections 493 and 496 could only have been made "by some person aggrieved by such offence", and where the person so aggrieved is a woman, the complaint could be made by some other person on her behalf, with the leave of the Court. It was in this context that their. Lordships referred to section 435 of the Code and held that upon the death of the original complainant, her mother was rightly allowed to carryon the prosecution. After referring to several decisions; their Lordships made the following observation upon which learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied: "None of the cases cited either for the one side or the other directly arose under S. 198 first part in a committal proceeding. The later view is distinctly in favour of allowing the prosecution to continue except in those cases where the Code itself says that on the absence of the complainant the accused must be either acquitted or discharged. The present is not one of those cases and in our judgment the Presidency Magistrate was right in proceeding with the inquiry by allowing the mother to carryon the prosecution, and under S. 495 the mother may continue the prosecution herself or through a pleader". It is manifest that there are several points of distinction between the reported case and the instant case. To start with, the reported case was one where the mother of the original complaint was permitted to carryon a prosecution upon the death of her daughter. In substance, it was a case of substituting a deceased complainant by another who could be considered to be a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198 of the Code. In the case before me, the petitioner seeks to be substituted in place of his wife who is still alive and who in substance has already been allowed to be substituted as the complainant after the death of the original complainant, Thakuri Rai. The petitioner did not ask for being substituted as the complainant in place of Thakuri Rai. He wants to be substituted in place of a living person, namely Munna Devi, who had already been substituted as the complainant in place of Thakuri Rai. I cannot conceive of a case of substitution in place of a living person even in a civil litigation. He wants to be substituted in place of a living person, namely Munna Devi, who had already been substituted as the complainant in place of Thakuri Rai. I cannot conceive of a case of substitution in place of a living person even in a civil litigation. Treating the case of the petitioner as one for addition of party, it is obvious that the reported case can be of no assistance to learned Counsel for the petitioner, for the simple reason that the reported case was not a case of addition of a second complainant in the same prosecution. Secondly, there was no conflict of interest between the original complainant and her mother who was allowed to carryon the prosecution in the reported case. In the instant case, on the other hand, Munna Devi did not see eye to eye with the petitioner. Munna Devi, who must be presumed to be competent to decide how her interest would be best served, was not in favour of carrying on the prosecution which her father had started. Where as the petitioner displayed an entirely conflicting attitude. It is impossible to imagine that the same complaint could have been dismissed as against Munna Devi but allowed to proceed at the instance of the petitioner. Thirdly, in the reported case, the mother was held to be a person aggrieved by the offences under sections 493 and 496 of the India Penal Code, as contemplated by section 198 of the Code. No such consideration arose in the instant case. It is impossible to imagine that the petitioner could be treated as a person aggrieved on behalf of his deceased father• in-law, and that also in a case where the daughter of the deceased did not consider it worthwhile to continue the prosecution. Lastly, the reported case was one in which cognizance had already been taken and commitment proceedings were going on and the original complainant died during the pendency of the commitment proceedings. Whereas in the instant case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had dismissed the complaint summarily and no prosecution was pending at the time when the present petitioner applied for being substituted or added as a complainant. For all these reasons; I am of the opinion that the authority of the reported case can be of no avail to the petitioner. 10. Whereas in the instant case, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had dismissed the complaint summarily and no prosecution was pending at the time when the present petitioner applied for being substituted or added as a complainant. For all these reasons; I am of the opinion that the authority of the reported case can be of no avail to the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel has also relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Jitan Dushadh V. Domoo Sahoo A.I.R. 1916 Pat. 152. In that case the complainant hiving died in the course of a trial his son applied for permission to continue the prosecution, but the trying Magistrate declined to give him the permission and acquitted the accused under section 247 of the Code. There upon District Magistrate of Monghyr made a reference to this Court wherein he stated that the offence complained of was one against the public tranquillity and if he had contemplated the possibility of the case being dismissed on account of the absence of the complainant, he would himself have taken action. Accepting the reference this Court observed as follows: "It is a mere accident that the present case was instituted on the complaint of Jitan. It is a case of considerable importance involving the peace of the district, and under the circumstances we think that we ought to set-aside the order of acquittal. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order is accordingly set aside and he is directed to proceed with the trial of the case." This decision is also distinguishable in two respects. Firstly, it was a case of a pending trial, unlike the present case, in which no trial was pending when the petitioner came upon the scene, rather the complaint had been dismissed summarily on the ground that no prima facie case had been disclosed. Secondly it was the District-Magistrate who had moved this Court for leave to continue the prosecution on the ground that the offence complained of was an offence against the public tranquillity and the peace of the district was involved ill the case. It is well known that the District Magistrate has a special position under law and he is vitally interested in every prosecution affecting the public tranquillity or the peace of his district. It is well known that the District Magistrate has a special position under law and he is vitally interested in every prosecution affecting the public tranquillity or the peace of his district. An intervention by the District Magistrate cannot be viewed at par with an intervention by a private individual like the present petitioner, and that also in a case which has nothing to do with the public tranquillity or the peace of the district. The decision in Jitan Dusadh's case (supra) cannot, therefore, be a justification for permitting the present petitioner to proceed with Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1968 before the Sessions Judge. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon Mahomed Azam Vs. Emperor A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 178. There the question, arose whether death of the complainant, who was the trustee of a mosque, the prosecution in respect of offences under section 143 and 426 of the Indian Penal Code on account of the action of the accused in pulling down the complainant's scaffolding and erecting his own scaffolding for white-washing the mosque, could be continued with a certain prosecution witness as the complainant. Following the Bench decision of this Court in A.I.R. 1916 Patna 152 (supra), a Bench of the Bombay High Court held that in a case of non-cognizable offence instituted upon a complaint, the axiom of actio personalis moritur cum persona, in Civil law confined to torts, does not apply, and the trying Magistrate has discretion in proper cases to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit complainant, if the latter is willing. This decision can be of no assistance to the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge had already allowed Munna Devi to proceed with the case instituted by her father. The petitioner did not apply for being substituted in place of Thakuri Rai, the original complainant. He wanted Munna Devi to be replaced by himself not because she was dead, but because he thought that he should proceed with the complaint. It was difficult to hold that the learned Sessions Judge was b01md to join him as a party in the proceeding for further inquiry. 12. He wanted Munna Devi to be replaced by himself not because she was dead, but because he thought that he should proceed with the complaint. It was difficult to hold that the learned Sessions Judge was b01md to join him as a party in the proceeding for further inquiry. 12. Before concluding his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner put forward the contention that the matter having been brought to the notice of this Court, this Court should exercise its powers under-section 436 of the Code in the interest of Justice, even though the petitioner may not be added as a complainant in the case. In my judgment, such a course cannot legitimately be adopted in a case in which a complaint has been summarily dismissed on the ground that no prima facie case had been disclosed. Different considerations might have arisen had the accused persons been summoned, or the trial had been pending. 13. For the foregoing reason, I hold that there is no merit in this application, which is, accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.