JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against a reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Bhadrak and arise's out of a suit brought by him for declaration of his title to and confirmation of his possession over the disputed land measuring 1.331 acres. He also prayed in the alternative for recovery of possession of the property in case he is found dispossessed from the whole of the disputed property or any portion thereof. One Sapani Biswal was admittedly the owner of 5. 84 acres of land covered by khata No. 89 in mouza Chhenakhia situated within the Sub-registry of Chandbali. Sapani had four sons Darsan, Bauri, Sindhu & Ananda. Darsan had three son a Jujesti, Jagabandhu and Kelu. Jagabandhu was the father of Kailas Sindhu's son is Bhaskar. By 7-3-1951, Darsan and Sindhu were dead. On 7-3-1951, the sale deed Ext. 5 was executed in favour of the Plaintiff by Kelu, Kalias, Jujesti, Bauri and Bhaskar Defendant No. 8 Krushna who was then 11 years old also joined in execution of the sale deed. In that document he was described as the son of the deceased Ananda and represented by his uncle guardian Bauri Biswal. The sale deed was in respect of the entire 5. 34 acres of land covered by khata No. 89 of mouzi, Chhenakhia and one decimal of land forming a part of plot No. 20 appertaining to khata No. 1 of mouzi, Anantapur situated within the sub-registry of Soro. The document was registered in the Soro Sub-registration office. The Plaintiff's case is that at the time Ext. 5 was executed, Anand a was untraced and was consequently presumed to be dead and that therefore when the Kabala Ext. 5 was executed, Ananda's son Krushna joined in execution of the Kabala to represent his interest. Ananda subsequently returned to the village and on 29-1-1952, he executed what is described as a Nadabi Patra (Ext. 4) in favour of the Plaintiff relinquishing his one-fourth share in the 5.34 acres of land covered by khata No. 89 of Chhenakhia. Ext. 4 was unregistered. On 12-12-1962, Ananda executed a registered sale deed Ext. A in respect of his one-fourth share in the properties covered by khata No. 89 of mouza Chhenakhia in favour of Defendants 2 to 6. Ext. 4 was unregistered. On 12-12-1962, Ananda executed a registered sale deed Ext. A in respect of his one-fourth share in the properties covered by khata No. 89 of mouza Chhenakhia in favour of Defendants 2 to 6. Defendant No. 6 is the wife of Defendant No. 1 shortly after the execution of the sale deed Ext. A, Ananda died. It is alleged in the plaint that ever since the execution of the sale deed Ext. 5 the Plaintiff has been in possession of the entire properties purchased there under, but that in the year 1963 Defendants 1 to 5 threatened to dispossess him from the disputed land which is a one-fourth share of khata No. 89 referred to above. As the matter was reported to the police they seized the crops standing on the disputed land and kept the same in Zima of Defendant No. 7. It is in these circumstances that the suit giving rise to this appeal was filed by the Plaintiff claiming the reliefs above-mentioned. Besides Defendants 1 to 7, Defendant No. 8 Krushna the alleged son of Ananda and Defendant No. 9 Kati Dei the widow of Ananda have been impleaded as Defendants. 2. The suit was contested only by Defendants 1 to 6. They contended that the one decimal of land situated in mouza. Anantapur which was included in the sale deed Ext. 5 did not belong to the vendors thereof and being folly aware of it this property was included in the sale deed Ext. 5 with the sole object of conferring jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar of Soro to register the document and consequently it is a fraud on the Registration Law and no registration obtained by such means would be valid. Ext. 5, therefore, is invalid. As Ananda had admittedly a one-forth share in the property covered by khata No. 89 in mouza. Chhenakhia and he did not join in execution of the sale deed, that document, even if it is otherwise valid, can not operate to convey the interest of Ananda therein, Krushna who joined in the execution of the sale deed Ext. 5 describing himself as the son of Ananda is not Ananda's son but is the Bon of Bauri. The subsequent deed of relinquishment Ext. 4 which Ananda executed in favour of the Plaintiff being unregistered could not convey Ananda's interest in the property to the Plaintiff. 3. 5 describing himself as the son of Ananda is not Ananda's son but is the Bon of Bauri. The subsequent deed of relinquishment Ext. 4 which Ananda executed in favour of the Plaintiff being unregistered could not convey Ananda's interest in the property to the Plaintiff. 3. The trial Court found that the vendors of Ext. 5 had no title to the one decimal of land in mouzi, Anantapur included in the sale deed. But despite this, he held that there was no fraud on Registration Law because the vendors intended to sell the one decimal of land and the vendee the Plaintiff in good faith believed that his vendors had title to all the properties conveyed under Ext. 5. He did not decide the question as to whether Krushna is the son of Ananda, but held that whether or not Krushna is Ananda's son, the Plaintiff believed in good faith that Krushna was the son of Ananda who was untraced at that time and consequently Ext. 5 was quite valid and the Plaintiff acquired a valid title to the properties conveyed there-under. Regarding Ext. 4, the finding of the learned Munsif is that it is genuine and that no registration thereof was necessary because it was of only in the nature of an acknowledgment and was not means to convey any title. He found that ever since the purchase under Ext. 5 in the year 1951, the Plaintiff has been in possession of all the properties covered by the sale deed and that even if his title is defective for any reason, he has acquired a right to the properties by adverse possession. He assessed the value of the crops kept in the Zima of Defendant No. 7 to be Rs. 300/- He, therefore, passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff declaring his title to the disputed properties and confirming his possession therein. 4. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that one decimal of land situated in mouza Anantapur included in Ext. 5 did not belong to the vendors, that they had no intention to transfer the same, that the Plaintiff never obtained possession of the same and that it was included in the sale deed \with the sole object of conferring jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar of Soro to register the document. 5 did not belong to the vendors, that they had no intention to transfer the same, that the Plaintiff never obtained possession of the same and that it was included in the sale deed \with the sole object of conferring jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar of Soro to register the document. In the circumstances he held that there was fraud on registration and consequently the sale deed Ext. 5 is invalid. He construed Ext. 4 not as a mere acknowledgment but as a document under which title was Bought to be relinquished, and held that for want of registration it is invalid. On the question of possession his finding is that the Plaintiff was not in continuous possession of the disputed property for a period of twelve years preceding the institution of the suit. He also held that Krushna is not the son of Ananda. In the result, he allowed the appeal, Bet aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the Plaintiff. 5. The sale deed Ext. 5 is compulsorily registrable u/s 17 of the Indian Registration Act. Section 28 of that Act requires that every registrable document shall be presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property to which the document relates is situate. It is not disputed that the one decimal of land situate in mouza Anantapur which was included in the sale deed Ext. 5 did not belong to the vendors. It has been found by the learned Subordinate Judge that possession of this one decimal of land was not delivered by the vendors to the Plaintiff, and the latter was never in possession of the same. It is having regard to these facts that the Appellate Court has held that the sola intention of the vendors in including the one decimal of land in the sale deed was to confer jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar of Soro to register the sale deed Ext. 5 and that this amounted to fraud on registration and that consequently rendered the sale deed Ext. 5 invalid. The law on the subject has been enunciated as early as in the year 1914 by the Judicial Committee in Harendra Lal Roy Choudhury v. Sm. Haridasi Debi and Ors. AIR 1914 P.C. 67 . 5 and that this amounted to fraud on registration and that consequently rendered the sale deed Ext. 5 invalid. The law on the subject has been enunciated as early as in the year 1914 by the Judicial Committee in Harendra Lal Roy Choudhury v. Sm. Haridasi Debi and Ors. AIR 1914 P.C. 67 . In that case there had been included in a mortgage deed a certain muffosil land and a plot of land described as No. 25 Gurudas Street in Calcutta where the deed was registered. The Calcutta party was found to be non-existent and the registration held to be invalid. Lord Moulton, J. In delivering the judgment of the Board said at page 71: Their Lordships hold that this parcel is in fact a fictitious entry, and represents no property that the mortgagor possessed or intended to mortgage, or that the mortgagee intended to form part of his security. Such an entry intentionally made use of by the parties for the purpose of obtaining registration in a district where no part of the property actually charged and intended to be charged in fact exist is a fraud on the Registration Law, and no registration obtained by means thereof is valid. It is argued by Mr. Mohanty appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellant that this rule may bold good where property not in existence at all is included in the sale deed to give jurisdiction to the Sub-Registrar of a particular place to register the document but that it has no application to case where the property so included is actually in existence and that, as in the present case the one decimal of land in mouza Anantapur is not a fictitious property but is a property which is in existence, the role enunciated in Harendra Lal Roy Choudhury v. Sm. Haridasi Debi and Ors. AIR 1914 P.C. 67 would not be applicable. The answer to this argument is afforded by the next decision of the Judicial Committee in Mathura Prashad v. Chandra Narayan Choudhury. AIR 1921 P.C. 8 in that case a mortgage deed bad been registered in the Mozuffarpur district on the strength of inclusion of one cowri share of mouza Kolhua situate in that district. It was not suggested in that case that the property was non-existent. AIR 1921 P.C. 8 in that case a mortgage deed bad been registered in the Mozuffarpur district on the strength of inclusion of one cowri share of mouza Kolhua situate in that district. It was not suggested in that case that the property was non-existent. What all was established in that case was that the mortgagor had no interest in it and the parties to the mortgage never intended that it should form part of security. Following the earlier decision of the Board in Harendra Lal Roy Choudhury v. Sm. Haridasi Debi and Ors. AIR 1914 P.C. 67 their Lordships held that there was fraud on registration and that the document was invalid. A similar conclusion was reached by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1934 157 (Privy Council) where the question turned on the inclusion in a sale deed of a one-third share of a garden room covered by tiled roof which was situate in the district where the registration was effected. In that case there was no doubt either as to the existence of the property or the vendor's title to it. But having regard to the facts of that case their Lordships came to the conclusion that it was never intended by either party that the garden room should, for any purpose other than that of registration, be the subject of sale at all. Their Lordships explained that the word factitious used in Harendra Lal Choudhury v. Sm. Haridasi Debi and Ors. AIR 1914 P.C. 67 in the passage quoted above is not confined to non-existing properties. Another decision of the Privy Council to which reference may be made is AIR 1936 91 (Privy Council) where again their Lordships held that if the property sought to be transferred by a deed is situated in one district but a small strip of land situated in another district is included in the deed, without any intention on the part of the parties that it should pass under the deed but solely with a view to obtain registration in the latter district, it amounts to fraud on the law evade the Registration Act, such a way is not valid. 6. 6. The criterion by which the question as to the validity or otherwise of the registration in a case like the present one is to be decided therefore is whether upon the facts established by evidence the property, by the inclusion of which the Sub-Registrar got jurisdiction to register the document, was really intended to pass under the deed. As has already been indicated, the finding in this case is that the one decimal of land in mouza. Anantapur did not belong to the vendors of Ext. 5 and they were never in possession of it. This one decimal of land is a part of plot No. 20 with total area of 1.33 acres and stands recorded in the name of one Samant Sitanath Das Patnaik and others. The Plaintiff never got possession of this land. There is no evidence to show that the Plaintiff possessed any land in mouza. Anantapur so that he would, for any reason, be anxious to have this one decimal of land out of a plot measuring 1.33 acres. It is remarkable that when subsequently the Plaintiff obtained the deed of relinquishment Ext. 4 from Ananda, that document was executed only in respect of 5.31 acres of land situate in mouza. Chhenakhia and this one decimal of land of mouza Anantapur was not included in it. All these circumstances do not leave any doubt in my mind that it was not the intention of the vendors to sell the one decimal of land to the Plaintiff nor was it the intention of the Plaintiff to purchase this land and that the sole object with which this land was included in the sale deed was to confer jurisdiction on the Sub-Registrar of Soro. The learned Subordinate Judge was therefore, perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the sale deed Ext. 5 is invalid and that under the same, the Plaintiff did not acquire any title to the disputed property. 7. Ext. 4 purports to be, and having regard to the recitals contained therein is, in fact, a deed of release. Being unregistered, it is invalid. In fact, the Plaintiff does not rely on this document as one conferring title on him because according of registration, being a device to and the registration obtained in to him it is only a deed of acknowledgment where under Ananda. Being unregistered, it is invalid. In fact, the Plaintiff does not rely on this document as one conferring title on him because according of registration, being a device to and the registration obtained in to him it is only a deed of acknowledgment where under Ananda. is alleged to have acknowledged that his share in the disputed property had passed to the Plaintiff under the sale deed Ext. 5. If the Plaintiff has not acquired any title under Ext. 5, the acknowledgment made in Ext. 4 would not confer any title on him even in respect of the portion of the properties covered by Ext. 4. It is in these circumstances unnecessary to decide the further question whether Krushna who had joined in the execution of the sale deed Ext. 5 is or is not the son of Ananda. 8. The only other point that remains for consideration is the alternative plea of the Plaintiff that he has acquired a title to the disputed property by adverse possession. The trial Court considered this aspect of the case and held that the Plaintiff remained in possession of the disputed land for a period of more than 12 years preceding the institution of the suit to acquire right thereto by adverse possession. This finding was assailed in the Appellate Court and the latter on a consideration of the evidence held that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was in continuous possession of the disputed property for twelve years preceding the institution of the suit. Obviously finding that the decision on adverse possession has gone against the Appellant, Mr. Mohanty appearing for him complained at the time of hearing that as no specific issue regarding acquisition of title by adverse possession has been framed in the suit, the Plaintiff has been prejudiced and that on this ground the suit may be remanded to the trial Court for a fresh decision after framing an issue on this point and giving an opportunity to the parties to let in further evidence. In para 5 of the plaint, the Plaintiff pleaded adverse possession. This was duly denied in the written statement. Both parties let in evidence in support of their respective cases on this point and although no specific issue has been framed, both the Courts below have considered this question and had given their findings. That the present submission of Mr. In para 5 of the plaint, the Plaintiff pleaded adverse possession. This was duly denied in the written statement. Both parties let in evidence in support of their respective cases on this point and although no specific issue has been framed, both the Courts below have considered this question and had given their findings. That the present submission of Mr. Mohanty is an after-thought is evident from the fact that in the grounds of appeal it was not complained that any of the parties has been prejudiced by reason of non-framing of an issue on the question of adverse circumstances, I do not see any sufficient remand nor do I find any sufficient ground Appellate Court's finding on this point. 9. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with possession. In the ground for ordering to interfere with the costs.