NARAYANA PAI, CJ, J. ( 1 ) ORIGINAL Suit No. 55 of 1964 on the file of the Civil Judge, Chickmagalur, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the respondent Ramakammal against the Appellants, viz, her broter Manjappa Iyer , his son gopal, his daughter Meenakshi and his wife Sharadamma. In the suit she prayed lor a decree lor partition and delivery to her of a hair share in the properties described in Schedule 'a' annexed to the plaint which consists ol a house in Chickmagalur town and a Coffee Estate known as yeinoorkhan Coffee Estate, situated in Pandaravalli village of Chlickmaglur taluk, and for recovery of possession of the entire property described in Schedule 'b' to the plaint, which is 90 acres of land out of survey No. 173 of the same village Pandaravalli and adjacent to the Coffee Estate mentioned above. ( 2 ) THE suit was decreed, so far as the Plaint 'a' Schedule property is concerned, lor partition thereof into two equal shares and denvery of one share to the plaintiff, together with incidental directions as to the effecting of partition, enquiry into mesne profits, etc. The suit regarding the plaint 'b' Schedule property was dismissed. The defendants appeal against the decree lor partition of the plaint 'a' Schedule property. The plaintiff has cross-objected against tne dismissal of her suit in regard to the plaint 'b' Schedule property. Hence, the entire subject-matter of the suit is now for consideration by us. ( 3 ) THE parties are closely related to each other, the plaintiff being the younger sister of the 1st defendant. Their maternal grand-father huchangi Seetharamaiah had two daughters, Gundamma the mother of the 1st defendant and the plaintiff and Seshamma. His wife Subbamma pre-deceased him when both these daughters were very young children. Hence, Subbamma's widowed sister Achamma, who had no children of her own same and lived with the family to look after. Gurdamma and seshamma. Gundamma's marriage with one Shivaswami Iyer appears to have been performed shortly before the death of Seetharamaiah, which occurred in the year 1891. Shivaswami Iyer, it is stated, was expected to come and take up residence in his father-in-law's house and look after the estate but he did not do so immediately after the marriage nor for nearly three years after the death of Seetharamaiah. Shivaswami Iyer, it is stated, was expected to come and take up residence in his father-in-law's house and look after the estate but he did not do so immediately after the marriage nor for nearly three years after the death of Seetharamaiah. He is said to have come down to the estate only in the year 1894. The 1st defendant was born in the year 1896. Shivaswami Iyer died in the year 1897. The plaintiff Janakammal is his posthumous daughter. Gundamma died in the year 1928, achamma in the year 1945 and Seshsmma in the year 1959. Seshamma has not left any sons, Gundamma, as already stated, has left one son the 1st defendant, and one daughter the plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff and the 1st defendant were living together and were on cordial terms till about the year 1959-60. Thereafter, some differences arose between them resulting in the filing of a suit in forma pauperis in june 1961. The pauper application was actually registered as a suit in 1964 ( 5 ) THE Yeinoorkhan Coffee Estate, which is item No. 2 in the plaint 'a' Schedule, was admittedly purchased and developed by Seetharamaiah. The house in Chickmagalur town, which is the first item in the said Schedule, was also originally constructed by him but subsequently improved or extended after his death. The 90 acres of land described in the plaint 'b' Schedule were purchased under Ext. P6 on 5th July 1911. The sale deed stands in the name of Gundamma. ( 6 ) BRIEFLY stated, the case of the plaintiff is that Seetharamaiah had left a will dt. 20th March 1889, bequeathing all his property absolutely to his two daughters, Gundamma the plaintiff's mother and Seshamma, each being entitled to a half share therein. Regarding the plaint 'b' Schedule property, her case is that the same was purchased by her under Ext. PS with her own money, being part of the income of the Coffee Estate included in the plaint 'a' Schedule. ( 7 ) THE original will has not been produced. According to the averments contained in the plaint, the original will is with the 1st defendant. In his written statement, the 1st defendant stated that it is totally false to allege that Seetharamaiah left a will bequeathing all his property to his two daughters on 20th March 1889 or on any other date. According to the averments contained in the plaint, the original will is with the 1st defendant. In his written statement, the 1st defendant stated that it is totally false to allege that Seetharamaiah left a will bequeathing all his property to his two daughters on 20th March 1889 or on any other date. Obviously in answer to the plaint averment that the original will is with him, the 1st defendant made the following averments in paragraph 15 of his written statement :" (a) The 1st defendant is in possession of a copy of the will stated to have been given to the said Achamma by the Testator. This copy recites that the original was kept in a sealed cover to be deposited with the District Registrar. First defendant's enquiries did not so far disclose any such deposit. What has become of the original will is a matter of mystery. (b) The 1st defendant considers the copy of the will with him as a genuine one and has stated so in his reply to the plaintiff's notice. She in her turn has been advised to state that the 1st defendant is putting forth a spurious copy to defraud her. (c) If there is no original will, the plaintiff's suit has to fail on this goround alone, (d) The plaintiff has to prove not only that there was a will but that such a will bequeathed the suit 'a' Schedule properties to Gundamma and Seshamma. "in her reply or rejoinder, with reference to the copy mentioned by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff stated as follows:" The plaintiff denies that the copy of the will which the 1st defendant has and referred to in the statement (which has not been produced to the Court but the inspection of which has been given) is a true or genuine copy of the will and that it was given to Achamma by the testator. The copy is not a correct or true copy of the will but appears to be a spurious one. So far as the plaintiff's enquiry shows, the will has not been deposited with the Dist Registrar or the Sub-Registrar. The plaintiff believes that the original will must be with the 1st defendant and he is keeping it back as it would go against him. So far as the plaintiff's enquiry shows, the will has not been deposited with the Dist Registrar or the Sub-Registrar. The plaintiff believes that the original will must be with the 1st defendant and he is keeping it back as it would go against him. If the original will is not forthcoming, of course, other evidence will be adduced to prove the contents thereof and an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the 1st defendant for its non-production. The defendants are bound to produce all documents in their possession and power relating to the suit at the earliest opportunity. No permission of anybody is required. The plaintiff never offered to give him permission of the same. Many of the averments in the statement are lacking in restraint. The averments in para 15 (a) to (c) of the same para of the statement contrary to that of the plaint are denied. " ( 8 ) ON the basis of the pleadings as summarised above, the case put forward by Mr. M. K. Nambiar, on behalf of the defendants-appellants, is as follows: The plaintiff's claim depends exclusively on her case that there was a will executed by Seetharamaiah on 20th March 1889, under which he bequeathed all his property to his two daughters absolutely in equal shares. Before she could substantiate the said claim, she should prove both due execution of the will by the testator Seetharamaiah as well as the contents thereof which are the source of the plaintiff's title. The original will has not been produced. There is no proof of the execution of the will. This failure on the part of the plaintiff is in itself sulffcient to non-suit her. Even as to the contents of the will, because the original will is not available, the contents will have to be proved by secondary evidence which, according to S. 63 of the Evidence Act, means and includes-" (1) certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained; (2) copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) copies made from or compared with the original; (4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5) oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. "in this case, the argument continues, Clauses (1) to (4) of Sec. 63 are obviously not applicable and as to Clause (5), the oral accounts referred to therein can only be oral evidence actually given by witnesses before Court. That is so, according to Mr. Nambiar, because the five clauses of Section 63 are exhaustive. For this proposition, he relies upon Girdhar Prasad v. Ambika Prasad, ILR. 7 Bom. 139. in which, with reference to S. 63 of the Evidence Act, it is stated in para 16 of tne judgment that the expression 'means and includes' makes it quite clear that the five clauses of S. 63 referring to secondary evidence are exhaustive. He also relies upon Kunyalal v. Pyaralal, AIR. 1930 PC. 45, in whcih it was held that a written statement of the contents 01 a copy oi a document, the original of which the person malting the statement has not seen, cannot be accepted as an equivalent of that which S. 63 of the Evidence Act renders admissible, viz, an oral account of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it, and on Surenrdra Nath v. Kamakhya Narain, AIR. 1969 Pat. 218, in which it was held that a Survey and Settlement Report, which was based on a jamabandi, the original of which was not produced and which itself was not exhibited in evidence, cannot be treated as secondary evidence of the contents of the Jamabandi statement under clause (5) of Sec. 63 or under any other section of the Evidence Act. ( 9 ) BEADING passages from ' Jarman on Wills' at pages 171 and 172 of the 8th Edn and the judgment of the Court of Appeal in England in sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, (1876) 1 Probote Divn. 154, and of the House of Lords in Woodward v. Goulstone, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 469, he pointed out that oral testimony as to contents of a lost or destroyed will should be very cogent and convincing. ( 10 ) IT was also the case of Mr. Nambiar that the reference to a will dt. Leonards, (1876) 1 Probote Divn. 154, and of the House of Lords in Woodward v. Goulstone, (1886) 11 App. Cas. 469, he pointed out that oral testimony as to contents of a lost or destroyed will should be very cogent and convincing. ( 10 ) IT was also the case of Mr. Nambiar that the reference to a will dt. 20th March 1889 in the written statement of the 1st defendant should not be read as an admission or even a suggestion that the said will is the same as, and not different from, the will propounded by the plaintiff, and that therefore the fact that the date happens to be the same should not be relied upon to make any such inference. To avoid repetition, we may mention here itself that the unsigned copy of the will produced by the 1st defendant and marked as Ext. D90 is not admissible in evidence at all, nor can it be looked into for any purpose, but that the fact that the date of the will depended upon by the 1st defendant is also 20th March 1889 is available in other admissible documents like Exhibit D82. ( 11 ) MR. V. Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that, so far as the execution of the will is concerned, proof thereof is unnecessary in this case for the reason that the will referred to by the plaintiff and the will referred to by the 1st defendant are one and the same and that, so far as proof of the contents to the extent necessary for the plaintiff's case is concerned, the plaintiff need not rely upon S. 63 of the Evidence Act at all but on clause (b) of S. 65 and written admissions which are relevant and admissible within the scope of the said clause, as well as the conduct of the principal parties concerned in relation to the property in suit. ( 12 ) THE first part of the argument as to the identity of the will is, in our opinion, of considerable importance for the disposal of this case, it is necessary therefore to deal with the said argument, in the first Instance, although to some extent it may be necessary to anticipate some of the details of the second part of the argument. ( 13 ) IN the first place, as already stated, the date of the will depended upon by the plaintiff is 20th March, 1889. The 1st defendant also depends upon a will of Seetharamaiah of the same date and traces his title to it contending that under the said will Seetharamaiah's wife's sister Achamma alone was given all the properties with absolute right, that she released all her rights in the property in favour of Shivaswami Iyer under a release deed dated 2nd August 1894 marked as Ex. D-82 and that he acquired title as an heir to his father Shivaswami Iyer. ( 14 ) THE release deed expressly refers to Achamma having taken possession of the property of Seetharamaiah in accordance with a will written by him on 20th March, 1889, corresponding to Phalguna Bahula tadige of Sarvadhari Samvatsara. In a subsequent document Ex. P-4 dated 31st August 1905, executed by Gundamma and Seshamma, there is a statement that they got the propertv under a will of their father Seetharamaiah executed on 20th March 1889, and another statement that although it is so written therein as to convev the meaning that the property is given to Achamma, it was stated thus for some other reason. ( 15 ) IT should be noticed that the controversies or differences between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant arose only in or about 1959, whereas the release deed Ex. D-82 was writ'en within about 3 years of the death of the testator Seetharamaiah and Ex. P-4 was executed about 55 years before any controversy arose between the parties. It is safe therefore, in our opinion, to relv upon these documents as furnishing a firm basis for an inference as to the identity or otherwise of the will propounded by the plaintiff and the will depended upon by the 1st defendant. ( 16 ) THE 1st defendant traces his title to a will of Seetharamaiah dated 20th March 1889 through the release deed Ex. D-82 executed by achamma, which recites that she got into possession pursuant to the said will. The plaintiff claims title also to a will of Seetharamaiah of the same date through her mother Gundamma, and the said Gundamma as well as her sister Seshamma have traced their absolute the to a will of Seetharamaiah of the same date in Ex. D-82 executed by achamma, which recites that she got into possession pursuant to the said will. The plaintiff claims title also to a will of Seetharamaiah of the same date through her mother Gundamma, and the said Gundamma as well as her sister Seshamma have traced their absolute the to a will of Seetharamaiah of the same date in Ex. P-4, in which they have described the will as one which contains language capable of an interpretation that the property is given to Achamma. ( 17 ) SCARCELY anything more is necessary to come to the conclusion that, according to the true basis of the case of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendants, the will of Seetharamaiah, which is the ultimate source of the title claimed by them respectively is one and the same, viz. , a will executed by him on 20th March 1889 corresponding to Phalguna Bahula tadige of Sarvadhari Samvatsara. ( 18 ) WE therefore hold that both the plaintiff and the defendants admit that Huchangi Seetharamaiah executed a will on 20th March 1889 which is the source of title claimed by the parties. This admission, implicit in the circumstances of the case, therefore dispenses with the proof of execution. ( 19 ) COMING now to the second part of the argument of the Counsel relating to the proof of contents, the question is whether the plaintiff is confined to S. 63 of the Evidence Act alone. Mr. Nambiyar's argument is that, according to S 6t of Ihe Evidence Act, the contents of a document mav be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence and that S. 62 defines 'primary evidence' to mean the document itself produced for inspection of the Court and S. 63 gives an exhaustive list of what mav be regarded as 'secondary evidence'. But then, Chapter V of the Evidence act dealing with documentary evidence does not stop there. The very next Section 64 states :"documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereafter mentioned". But then, Chapter V of the Evidence act dealing with documentary evidence does not stop there. The very next Section 64 states :"documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereafter mentioned". The next Section 65 states : " Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases :" among such cases, the case stated in Clause (b) is : "when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest". At the end of the section, the particular type or category of evidence admissible is pnumprated. In case (b) it is stated "written admission in admissible". The effect is that where a person against whom a document is sought to be proved or his representative in interest has admitted in writing the existence, condition or contents of the original document, such written admission is admissible. In Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, AIR. 1954 SC. 139, the existence and contents of an Ekrarnama of the year 1879 were of materiality. One of the appellants, Sibnarayan Singh, in his letter dated 19th July 1943, had admitted the existence and also the contents of the ekrarnama. Dealing with that, the Supreme Court states : "further and strictly speaking, the appellant Shri Sibnarayan Singh mahapatra having in his own letter dated 19th July 1943 referred to above admitted the existence and contents of the Ekrarnama, secondary evidence is, strictly speaking, admissible under S. 65 (b) of the indian Evidence Act. " ( 20 ) IN fact, if we read the entire 65th Section, it appears to be complementary to S. 63 because, after setting out various special cases in clauses (a) to (g), the section says at the end :"in cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission ia admissible. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g) evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is, skilled in the examination of such documents". In case (b), the written admission ia admissible. In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible. In case (g) evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is, skilled in the examination of such documents". ( 21 ) IT appears to us therefore that written admissions of the predecessors of the parties, who must be regarded as their representatives in interest for purposes of Section 65 (b), are admissible. What value a Court should attach to them will depend upon the circumstances and other evidence in the case. ( 22 ) ANOTHER aspect of the matter, which is of Importance and of assistance, is the value which one may attach to the conduct of persons like Achamma, Gundamma, Shivaswami Iyer, In ascertaining the strength or otherwise of the resoective claims of the parties before us. In Madho das v. Mukind Ram, AIR. 1955 SC. 481, the questions for consideration related to an old family settlement of the vear 1875. While discussing the value of previous statements of old deceased family members and the conduct suggested by the same this is what the Supreme Court stated at page 488 of the Report:"the conduct of the various members of the family is relevant to show that their actings, viewed as a whole, suggest the existence of the family arrangement on which the defendants rely. At this distance of time gaps in evidence that would otherwise be available have to be filled in from inferences that would normally have little but corroborative value. But circumstanced as we are, inferences from the conduct of the family is all that can reasonably be expected in proof of an arrangement, said to have been made in 1875. The statements that Har devi and Maha Devi made as witnesses are therefore as relevant as recitals made by them in deeds and statements made by them in pleadings. They do not In themselves prove the fact in issue, namely the family arrangement, because, in the absence of S 32 (3), they are rot admissible for that purpose, but as their conduct is relevant these statements are admissible as evidence of that conduct". ( 23 ) WE are confronted in this case with a situation which is more or less similar Further. ( 23 ) WE are confronted in this case with a situation which is more or less similar Further. is should he borne in mind that the contents of the with of Seetharamaiah which are relevant for deciding the case do not relate to questions whether and if so, what other legacies or directions were made or given by him. but only to the question whether he gave his properties absolutely to his two daughters Gundamma and Seshamma or absoltely to his sister-in-law Achamma. Strictly speaking, therefore, the question is really one of title, and having regard to the fact that many years have pasped since the death of Seetharamaiah. the safer guide is the conduct influenced by the will of the partipr who dealt with this property immediately or shcrtlv after his death. particularly Achamma who admittedly got into possession immediately after his death, and later of gundamma and Seshamma. ( 24 ) WE shall proceed to examine the documents and the conduct of the parties disclosed by them. The earliest of the documents are three labour agreemets -Ext. P8 dt. 15-11-1893. Ext P9 dt 3-2-1894 and Ext. P10 d. 3-3-1894. All these are registered instruments and relate to the coffee estate included in plaint A Schedule These have been executed by third parties in favour of achamma. In these documents Achamma is described as the guardian of the minor daughters of Seetharamaiah The Kannada word used is 'poshakaru'. The importance of these documents is that Achamma has been described not as the owner of the estate but as guardian of the minor children of the deceased owner Seetharamaiah The argument on behalf of the plaintiff is that the documents indicate that Achamma herself treated the property as belonging not to her but to Gundamma and Seshamma. Mr. Nambiar's contention is that no value can be attached to these documents because, the statements contained therein are not of Aehamma. ,but of the executants of the document; but Mr. V Krishna Murthy's answer is that the importance of the documents is not so much in the nature of a statement of Achamma as indicative of her conduct because the documents have been executed in her favour and she must therefore, naturally be regarded as having taken the benefit of the same. V Krishna Murthy's answer is that the importance of the documents is not so much in the nature of a statement of Achamma as indicative of her conduct because the documents have been executed in her favour and she must therefore, naturally be regarded as having taken the benefit of the same. In any event, it is in ovr opinion, a matter of considerable importance that she permitted herself fo be described that way so soon after the death oi seetharamaiah and at a point of time when there was no controversy of the type now brought up for adjudication before us. ( 25 ) THE next set of documents which are of considerable important are Ext D82 dt 2nd August 1894, a registered release deed executed bv Achamma in favour of Shivaswamy Iyer and Ext. P7 of the same date, a registered agreement executed by Shivaswamvy Iyer in favour of Achamma in connection with the first named document. Both the documents are in Kannada and their full translations are given in para 27 of the trial Court's judgment. ( 26 ) THE release deed Ext. D82 opens with the recital that in accordnce with the directions of Seetharamaiah contained in the will dt. 20th march 1889, Achamma has taken possession of all his properties and actimg as the gurdian of and in protection of the interests of his daughters gundamma and Seshsmma, she hands over the properties into the possession of Shivaswamy Iyer to be managed by him because he has by the agreement Ext. 7 executed the same day, agreed to do so. Finally, she says that she has relinquished by way of release in favour of Shivaswamy iyer all her rights and interests over the said properties. ( 27 ) IN the agreement Ext. F7 Shivaswamy Iyer says that he has agreed to carry on the management as desired by Achamma of the properties of Seetharamaiah his father-in-law which were at that time under achamma's management or authority in terms of Seetharamaiah's will. It has also been suggested in the course of the argument that the Kannada sentence may also convey the meaning that the handing over of the management to Shivaswamy Iyer was also in accordance with the directions contained in the will. These is another statement of importance in Ext. It has also been suggested in the course of the argument that the Kannada sentence may also convey the meaning that the handing over of the management to Shivaswamy Iyer was also in accordance with the directions contained in the will. These is another statement of importance in Ext. P7 to the effect that Seshamma should be got married to one Doraiswami and that as directed by Achamma, he will pay to Seshamma, upon her attaining majority, a sum of Rs. 5,000 as determined or settled by Achamma whereupon he will become the full owner of Yelnurkan Coffee estate. The document concludes with the statement that Shivaswamy iyer with not without obtaining the consent of Achamma alienate the properties by sate, gift etc. ( 28 ) NOW the first thing that clearly flows from these documents is that both Achamma and Shivaswamy Iyer were fully aware of the existence and the contents of he will of Seetharamaiah and were purporting to act in accordance with the terms of directions contained in the said will. It follows therefore, that their conduct in relation to the property is influenced by their knowledge of the contents of the will and by their desire or intention to aet in accordance with the will. If so, the recitals in the documents to the effect that Achamma was looking after -the properties as a guardian of Gundamma and Seshamma and in protection of their interest and that her position was that of a manager and that what was transferred by her to Shivaswamy Iyer was also management would indicate that the terms of the will also were that Achamma or Shivaswamy Iyer should only function as manager of the property and protect the interests of Gundamma and Seshamma. Prima facie therefore, this negatives the theory of any absolute interest created in favour of Achamma. Hence, the transfer of all rights and interests in the property under the release deed Ext. D82 could mean no more than the transfer of the right of management. ( 29 ) EVEN so it may be suggested that the right which Gundamma and seshamma had need not necessarily be absolute right but the limned interest of a female heir under the Hindu Law. The suggestion of course, cannot be rejected oat of hand but there are two circumstances way it may not be correct to make such a suggestion. The suggestion of course, cannot be rejected oat of hand but there are two circumstances way it may not be correct to make such a suggestion. firstly, it all that Seetharamaiah intended to center upon his daughters in respect of his property was a limited interest of a female heir under the Hindu Law, he need not have executed a will at all because, under the. rules, of succession of the hindu Law the daughters would automatically acquire such an interest. It may be said even then, that there was a need to appoint someone as a guardian or care-taker or manager to look after the property during the minority of the daughters. But then, there is another more clinching circumstance. As already stated, there is in Shivaswamy Iyer's agreement ext. P7 a statement that upon payment, of Rs. 5,000 as settled by Achamma to Seshamma upon her attaining majority, Shivaswamy Iyer could acquire absolute right to the property. This would mean prima facie that Shivaswamy iyer can acquire by purchase from Seshamma an absolute interest, the only intervention of Achamma in that regard being in the matter of settling the price at Rs. 5,000. If so it means that Seshamma had an interest in the property and that the Said interest was an absolute interest because, if at was only a limited interest or an interest limited to her life time, she was not competent to transfer to Shivaswamy Iyer an absolute interest which would survive her death. Although the sentence in Ext. P7 would suggest that upon payment of Rs. 5,000 to Seshamma, Shivaswamy iyer would acquire absolute interest in respect of the entire estate, such a reading or meaning of the sentence would conflict with the general tenor of the document as well as of the connected document Ext. D82 that, not only Seshamma but also Gundamma had an interest because Ext. D82 says that Achamma was functioning as a guardian or a well-wisher in protection of the interests of both Gundamma and Seshamma. It follows therefore, that Gundamma's interest was also an absolute interest and that the sentence was so written because, Gundamma being the wife of Shivaswamy iyer, upon acquisition ot Seshamma's interest by payment ot rs. D82 says that Achamma was functioning as a guardian or a well-wisher in protection of the interests of both Gundamma and Seshamma. It follows therefore, that Gundamma's interest was also an absolute interest and that the sentence was so written because, Gundamma being the wife of Shivaswamy iyer, upon acquisition ot Seshamma's interest by payment ot rs. 5,000 the entire estate would be the property of Shivaswamy Iyer and gundamma who, alter all as husband and wife, would be expected to enjoy and actually be enjoying the property together. ( 30 ) THE said sentence indicating the necessity to purchase the interest of Seshamma would also negative the suggestion that Achamma had an absolute interest and transferred the same to Shivaswamy Iyer under ex. D-82. That is why it has been strongly urged on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that Ex. D-82 does not contain any clause of conveyance Of absolute interest in the property. ( 31 ) THE next important document is Ex. P-4 dated 31st August 1905 executed by Gundamma and Seshamma in favour of one Seshamal, a money-lender and attested by Achamma. It appears from Ex. D-23 an extract from fee Register of civil suits of the Subordinate Judge's Court at Chickmagalur that Achamma and Gundamma had executed a promissory-note in favour of the father of Seshamal for Rs. 937 on 1st June 1901 acting as guardians of the first defendant Manjunatha who was then a miner and Seshamal had filed OS. 638/1904-05 against Manjunatha, Achamma, gundamma and Seshamma for the recovery of the amount due under the promisory note from Achamma and Gundamma personally and from the property of Manjunatha. The suit was settled by compromise and Ex. P-4 appears to have been executed as a part of that compromise. Under the said document Gundamma and Seshamma mortgaged the coffee estate to Seshamal. In the document Gundamma and Seshamma state that the coffee estate mortgaged thereunder was got by them under the will dated 20th March 1889 of their father, that nobody except themselves has any sort of right or interest therein, that though the writing in the will is capable of being understood as giving the property to their aunt achamma, it was so written for other reasons. It is written further that neither Achamma nor Shivaswamy Iyer nor Gundamma's son Manjunatha has any right or interest in the property and that they have got the deed attested by Achamma in token of her consent that she had no sort of right or interest in the property. It is ultimately stated that should Seshamal think that Manjunatha Iyer has some interest or right in the property, he may take that the deed as executed by Gundamma both for herself and also as guardian of her minor son Manjunatha. ( 32 ) WHEREAS Mr. Krishna Murthy for the plaintiff places strong reliance on the document as indicating an absolute title residing in Gundaamma and Seshamma, Mr. Nambiar lor the defendant contends that the recitals in the document are mutually contradictory and incapable of yielding any firm inference. He says that while Gundamma and Seshamma claim that they got the property absolutely under their father's will they admit that the will reads as if the property has been given to Achamma and further state that if Seshamal should think that Manjunatha Iyer has any interest therein, he may take it that Gundamma is acting as his guardian also. Actually he states that we should treat the document as one got written by the creditor Seshamal to protect his interests and that he has got all sorts of recitals made therein. ( 33 ) IF the only intention was the protection of the interests of the creditor it would have been sufficient for him to get staled therein either that the property belonged to Gundamma and Seshamma or that it belonged to Manjunatha and Gundamma was acting as his guardian. It was unnecessary to make any reference either to Seshamma or to Achamma. Obviously, the circumstances and situation were such that everyone of these persons-Achamma, Gundamma, Seshamma and Manjunatha iyer-could have probably said they have acquired some sort of an interest in the property. It appears therefore, that not only was it necessary to protect the interests of Seshamal but also to clarify the position as to title as between Gundamma, Seshamma , Achamma and Manjunatha Iyer. ( 34 ) NOW, so far as Achamma is concerned, her statement or conduct one way or the other may be regarded as immaterial on the date of Ex. ( 34 ) NOW, so far as Achamma is concerned, her statement or conduct one way or the other may be regarded as immaterial on the date of Ex. P-4 because whatever interests she might have had, may be said to have been totally transferred by her to Shivaswamy Iyer under Ex. D-82 and Seshamma and Gundamma having attained majority, even her guardianship had already come to an end. ( 35 ) BUT the statements of Gundamma and Seshamma claiming title in themselves are of some value. Further, whereas an assertion by Seshamma may be described as a self-serving statement, Gundamma's cannot be so regarded because Seshamma did not have any sons as already stated. but Gundamma had one and if the position was that Gundamma and Seshamma had only a life interest or enjoyed the property as mere intestate heirs, the next absolute owner would be Gundamma's son and by conceding seshamma's right Gundamma is actually giving up for herself and her son the interest extending to one-half of the property. ( 36 ) WHAT is more, the document is one of the year 1905 when all the persons concerned were living amicably and no one is shown to have been interested in injuring the right of another or profiting oneself at the expense of another. ( 37 ) THERE is therefore, considerable force In the argument of Mr. Krishna Murty that the cumulative effect of the documents considered above is strongly in favour of the view that Gundamma and Seshamma had or acquired an absolute interest in the property in equal shares and that the source thereof is the will dated 20th March 1889 of Seetharmaiah. ( 38 ) THERE are however same documents sounding the other way also on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Nambiar on behalf of the defendant. But before proceeding to deal with them, we might mention that so late as on 16th March 1933, when defendant 1 sought to mortgage the property to the Bank of Mysore under Ex. D-81, he obtained on the same date a transfer of Seshamma's interest by means of a release deed Ex. D-87 executed by her in his favour. But before proceeding to deal with them, we might mention that so late as on 16th March 1933, when defendant 1 sought to mortgage the property to the Bank of Mysore under Ex. D-81, he obtained on the same date a transfer of Seshamma's interest by means of a release deed Ex. D-87 executed by her in his favour. To the extent it goes, this circumstance would indicate that defendant-1 himself was aware of the fact that Seshsmma had an interest in the property which, in the light of the documents already discussed is the interest referred to in Ex. P-7 executed by his father Shivaswamy Iyer to which we have already made a detailed reference. ( 39 ) THE other documents relied upon by Mr. Nambiar are, Ex. D-37 a revenue receipt where Gundamma is shown to have paid land revenue as guardian of the first defendant Mamjunatha in the year 1911. It is seen lowever that the khate of the property was registered in the name of manjunatha Iyer, defendant-1. We do not know the circumstances in which the khate came to be so made out in the name of Manjunatha Iyer nor it there any evidence in that regard. Ex. D-69, extract from Khetwar of Pandravalli village refers to an order made by the Deputy Surveyor for transfer in the year 1899-1900 in the name of Manjunatha Iyer as anubhavadar; but that order is not available in evidence. When the inferences as to title available from documents to which the persons concerned were parties point to the contrary, we do not think that the entries in the revenue records can be given so much importance as to totally nullify those inferences. Same is the position regarding payment of kandayam by shivaswamy Iyer as indicated by Ex. D-63. ( 40 ) A purchase by Shivaswamy Iyer under Ex. D-84 dated 16-10-1895, a grant of water rights by him under Ext. D91 of 16-10-1895 and a mortgage by him of the house in Chickmagalur under Ext. D83 dated 18th March, 1897 are of little value to the defendant's case in view of our opinion as to the effect of Ex. D82 and Ex. P-7 and also because of the subsequent execution of Ex. P-4. D91 of 16-10-1895 and a mortgage by him of the house in Chickmagalur under Ext. D83 dated 18th March, 1897 are of little value to the defendant's case in view of our opinion as to the effect of Ex. D82 and Ex. P-7 and also because of the subsequent execution of Ex. P-4. Similar is the position regarding the issue of municipal licenses in the name of the defendant for repairs, reconstruction or extension of the house in Chickmagalur ( 41 ) AS stated by us very early in this judgment, the parties were on very amicable terms till just about two years before the institution of the suit. They were also living together and enjoying the property and both the plaintiff and defendent-1 were participating in the management of the property. Having regard to the close relationship between the parties and the good relations that exis. ed between them for such a long time, it is not possible to draw any inference of a conduct on the part of the defendant adverse to or destructive of the rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is asking only for her half share in the property. bo far as the other half belonging to Seshamma is concerned, defendant 1 has already taken a transfer thereof from her under Ex. D-87. ( 42 ) FOR all the above reasons we are of opinion that the inference of absolute interest acquired by Gundamma and Seshamma under the will of Seetharamaiah strongly suggested by Exs. P-8, P-9, P-10, D-82, P-7 and p-4 is not rendered doutful much less unavailable by reason of the other documents depended upon by the defendant. We therefore confirm the findings of the trial Court in regard to plaint 'a' schedule property. ( 43 ) SO far as the 'b' schedule property is concerned, the sale deed ext. P6 dt. 5th July 1911 no doubt, stands in the name of Gundamma. But very shortly thereafter, on 27th July 1911, two purchases were made of contiguous lands under Exts. D24 and D25 which were in the name of the defendant Manjunatha, represented by his mother Gundamma as his guardian. Ext. P6 was in respect of a land of an extent of 90 acres, Ext. D24 was in respect of 30 acres and D25, 91 acres, making a total of 211 acres. Ext. D24 and D25 which were in the name of the defendant Manjunatha, represented by his mother Gundamma as his guardian. Ext. P6 was in respect of a land of an extent of 90 acres, Ext. D24 was in respect of 30 acres and D25, 91 acres, making a total of 211 acres. Ext. D25 which is admittedly a purchase in the name of Manjunatha in which Gundamma figured as his guardian contains statements indicating that the entire 211 acres belonged to Manjunatha by virtue of the three purchases. What is more, when Manjunatha sold all these 211 acres under ext. D93 dt. 13th Octr 1915 to one Venkataramaniah the said deed was attested by Gundamma. Manjunatha subsequently repurchased it from venkataramaniah under Ext. D94 dt 21st June 1916. Ext. D18 the khetwar extract shows that the khate of the land of the extent of 211 acres 30 guntas purchased under the above three documents was transferred in the name of defendant Manjunatha, the natural son of the purchaser Gundamma as per her request granted by the Kadoor Deputy Commissioner. ( 44 ) THE opinion of the trial Judge therefore, that the 'b' schedule property covered by Ext. P6 was also purchased for first defendant himself and not for the benefit of Gundamma does not appear to be erroneous. ( 45 ) THE result is that both the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections fail and are hereby dismissed. In this Court, the parties will bear their own costs both in the appeal and in the cross-objections. ( 46 ) IT is pointed out that in para 66 of the judgment, the trial Judge has referred both to Rule 12 as well as to Rule 18 of Order XX, CPC while dealing with the necessity of directing an enquiry into profits. These is no doubt however, nor is it disputed before us that in the case of co-sharers like the plaintiff and the first defendant in this case, the question is not of computation of mesne profits but of rendering an account of profits by the person in possession. The appropriate Rule is therefore rule 18 (1) referring specifically to partition of lands under the provisions of S. 54 of the Code and sub-rule (2) to other immovable property. The appropriate Rule is therefore rule 18 (1) referring specifically to partition of lands under the provisions of S. 54 of the Code and sub-rule (2) to other immovable property. To clarify the position therefore, we make a direction that the further enquiries regarding profits or accounts as the case may be, shall be under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) as the case may be, of Rule 18 of Order XX CPC. --- *** --- .