( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed under S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order dated 13-9-1972 passed by the Principal Munsiff, Gadag, in HRC. No. 28 of 72 on IA. No. I filed by the respondent under S. 43 (3) of the Act. The respondent in that application has prayed for an interim order directing the petitioners, who are opponents Nos. 1 and 2 in the lower Court, to restore the ameinity, namely the supply of electric power and light. That application was allowed. Hence, the petitioners have challenged that order in this revision petition. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the case of the respondent, he is a tenant running a flour mill under the name and style of 'shri Krishna Trading Co. , gadag' in the premises belonging to the first petitioner having taken the same on a yearly rent of Rs. 650. The second petitioner is a firm which supplies electric power. According to him the first petitioner in collusion with the second petitioner, cut oft the supply of electric power to the respondent's premises suddenly with a view to compel the respondent to vacate the premises belonging to the petitioner. ( 3 ) THE lower Court issued notices to the present petitioners. The first petitioner denied that the respondent was a tenant of the suit premises and alleged that the second petitioner has cut off the supply of electric power according to law and at the request of the first petitioner. The second petitioner in his statement of objections contended that there was no privity of contract between the respondent and the second petitioner and that the supply of electric power was discontinued at the request of the first petitioner who was the registered consumer. ( 4 ) AFTER perusal of the application and affidavit of the respondent and the statements of objections and after hearing the arguments, the lower Court directed the second respondent to continue the supply of electric power on payment of the necessary charges by the respondent leaving open the question of relationship between the respondent and the first petitioner to be decided on merits on the final hearing of the case, ( 5 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioners, by Mr. K. A. Swamy, that the lower Court has failed to decide the question whether the respondent is tenant of the first petitioner or not and that without the Court coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, the Court had no jurisdiction to grant the interim relief to the respondent u s. 43 (3) of the Act. He also contended that it is obligatory on the Court acting under S. 43 (3) to examine the applicant in order to satisfy itself that a prima facie case has been established and that the order of the lower Court is vitiated due to its failure to examine the respondent in the present case. ( 6 ) UNDER S. 43 (3) of the Act the Court has to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out in favour of the applicant on a perusal of the application and affidavits, if any, filed by the tenant "after making such examination of the applicant as it thinks fit". Hence, the examination of the applicant is obligatory though the manner of examination is discretionary. If the object of the legislature was to make the examination of the applicant discretionary, the wording of the Section would have been "after making an examination of the applicant if it thinks fit. We find the words "as it thinks fit" instead of the words "if it thinks fit". Hence, if is obligatory on the Court to examine the applicant before it decides whether a prima facie case has been made out by the tenant. ( 7 ) IN Venkataram v. P. H. Seshagiri Rao (1965 ). 1 Mys. L. J. 560 it was contended that when the tenant questions the status of the landlord, the Munsiff cannot make an order under S. 29 of the Act without first deciding the dispute as to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Upholding the contention it was observed as follows: there is not and cannot be any dispute before me that the Munsiff functioning under the MHR and AC. Act is not an ordinary Civil court of general jurisdiction, but a tribunal of limited jurisdiction the scope of which is. defined by the special Act under which he functions. Upholding the contention it was observed as follows: there is not and cannot be any dispute before me that the Munsiff functioning under the MHR and AC. Act is not an ordinary Civil court of general jurisdiction, but a tribunal of limited jurisdiction the scope of which is. defined by the special Act under which he functions. The principal purpose of that Act is briefly to control the relationship between landlords and tenants in respect of buddings, hotels, and lodging houses. Unless the subject-matter of the proceeding is a dispute relating to a lease of a building, hotel, or a lodging house and unless the parties to the proceeding are landlord and tenant in respect of such building, hotel or lodging house, the tribunals and authorities functioning under the statute would have no jurisdictoin to exercise any of the powers conferred on them by that statute. In other words the existence of such relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of a house hotel, and lodging house is a jurisdictional fact in the absence of which the Munsiff would have no jurisdiction to function under the statute. When the existence of that jurisdictional fact is questioned, unless the statute vests in some other authority the power to decide upon the existence or otherwise of that jurisdictional fact, it is well established that it is the duty of the tribunal itself to decide whether the jurisdictional fact exists, subject no doubt to correcion by. the High Court in the event of its committing an error in deciding that question. " the said decision has been followed in vagdeviamma v. Keshavamurthy (1969) 2 Mys. L. J. 229 and Y. Narayana Pal v. A. C. Appaji (1971) 2 Mys. L. J. 370. ( 8 ) IN Hajarbi v. Babalal Hasimsahab CRP. the High Court in the event of its committing an error in deciding that question. " the said decision has been followed in vagdeviamma v. Keshavamurthy (1969) 2 Mys. L. J. 229 and Y. Narayana Pal v. A. C. Appaji (1971) 2 Mys. L. J. 370. ( 8 ) IN Hajarbi v. Babalal Hasimsahab CRP. 44|69 dt-35-2-71 it has been held that when the respondent in proceedings taken under S. 21 of the Act contends that he is not the tenant and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties the Court has to decide as a jurisdictional fact whether the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant as defined under the Act, that such a power is incidental to the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under S. 21 of the Act and that if the petitioner in the proceedings taken under S. 21 of the Act fails to establish the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant the petition has to be rejected in limine. ( 9 ) IN express Newspapers Put Ltd. v. Workers AIR. 1963 SC. 569. it has been held that if the action taken by the employer is not a lockout but is a closure, bona fide and genuine, the dispute which the workers may raise in respect of such a closure is not an industrial dispute at all; on the other hand if in fact and in substance it is a lockout, but the said action has adopted the disguise of a closure and a dispute is raised in respect of such an action, it would be an industrial dispute which industrial adjudication is competent to deal with and it was observed as follows : it is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial tribunal, at the very commencement the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial Tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. The finding which the Industrial tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whe. ther it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. The finding which the Industrial tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whe. ther it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a closure there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal so far as the main dispute is concerned. If, on the other hand, the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a lockout which has been disguised as a closure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on a jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurrisdictonal fact is found against" the appellant that the industrial Tribunal would have jurisdicton to deal with the merits of the depute. ( 10 ) UNDER S. 43 (3) of the Act, the intention of the legislature is to provide quick relief to the tenant if an essential supply or service is cut off or withheld without sufficient cause by the landlord. But it is to be remembered that the relief contemplated under the said provision is to be granted only to a tenant as defined under the Act. Hence, before granting the interim relief the Court must be satisfied, prima facie not only that the essential supply or service has been cut off without sufficient cause but also that the applicant is a tenant as defined under the Act. In the present case, before passing the order the Court issued notices to the petitioners who were the opponents in the lower Court. The first petitioner contended that the respondent is not a tenant under him. The lower Court was therefore bound to decide the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the respondent and the first petitioner. It is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that such a relationship exists between the respondent and the first petitioner that the Court gets jurisdiction to pass an order under Sec. 43 (3) of the act. It is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that such a relationship exists between the respondent and the first petitioner that the Court gets jurisdiction to pass an order under Sec. 43 (3) of the act. A perusal of the order of the lower Court shows that it was under the impression that it was not necessary to decide the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the first petitioner at this stage and that it could be decided at a later stage, presumably under Clause (4) of S. 43 of the Act. The existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is a jurisdictional fact which the Court was bound to decide before passing an order under s. 43 (3) of the Act. Just as the Court has to be satisfied, prima fade, that when essential supply or service has been cut off or withheld without sufficient eause it is also to be satisfied, prima facia that the applicant is a tenant, before passing an order in favour of the tenant under section 43 (3) of the Act. ( 11 ) IT is contended by Mr. B. G. Sridharan learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, that it is only after holding the enquiry under S. 43 (4) that the Court has to decide the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and it is not necessary for the Court to decide the existence of the said relationship when it is acting under Sec. 43 (3 ). It is his further contention that if the court were to enter into an enquiry with regard to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it would take time and the Court cannot give immediate relief to the tenant as contemplated under S. 43 (3) and that the very object of the legislature would be defeated. But, since the existence of such a relationship is a jurisdictional fact, the Court has to satisfy itself with regard to the existence of such a relationship before it grants relief to the tenant under S. 43 (3) of the Act. ( 12 ) IN Kanaiyalal Chandulal Monim v. Indumati T. potdar AIR. 1058 SC. 444. But, since the existence of such a relationship is a jurisdictional fact, the Court has to satisfy itself with regard to the existence of such a relationship before it grants relief to the tenant under S. 43 (3) of the Act. ( 12 ) IN Kanaiyalal Chandulal Monim v. Indumati T. potdar AIR. 1058 SC. 444. the court considered the scope of sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 24 of the bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act arid observed that these provisions enabled the Court to issue a mandate to the landlord to restore the supply or the service before a specified date, the infringement of which would entail the liability to recurring fines until the mandate had been carried out by the landlord; that these are provisions of an exceptional character, meant to be in force for a specified period during which the legislature thought it advisable and expedient to provide for such extraordinary remedies. It is true that S. 43 (3) of the Act also provides for extraordinary remedies but nontheless the intention of the legislature is that such remedy should be open only to a person who comes within the definition of 'tenant' under the Act. ( 13 ) MR. Sridharan next relied on the decision in Krishtappa v. Sogavaa (7 ). In that case the plaintiff filed a suit for possession of the land alleging that the defendant is his tenant. The question of tenancy had to be decided only by the Tahsildar or Tribunal or Collector or board of Revenue or Government under S. 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, which applied to the land in question, and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue of tenancy. The defendant, in that case asserted that she was the owner of the land. It was held that what is to be looked into to determine the jurisdiction of a Court is the allegation made in the plaint and not what the defendant alleges in support of her claim after filing the suit. Since the plaintiff in that case made a definite allegation that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to trv the plaintiff's suit. Reiving upon this decision it is contended bv Mr. Since the plaintiff in that case made a definite allegation that the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to trv the plaintiff's suit. Reiving upon this decision it is contended bv Mr. Sridharan that the Court had to look into the application and affidavits filed bv the tenant and not the contentions raised on behalf of the opponents u|s. 43 (3) of the Act. In the present case the Court issued notires to the present petitioners, who were opponents before it, before passinff an interim order. As observed above the Court has to be satisfied that, prima facie, the relationship of landlord and tenant exists and that the applicant is a tenant before passing an interim order under S. 43 (3) of the Act irrespective of the fact whether notice has been issued to the opponent or not. The fact that notices were issued to the opponents and the first petitioner contended that the respondent is not a tenant only reinforce the obligation on the Court to decide whether, prima facie, the respondent was a tenant or not. ( 14 ) SINCE the lower Court has failed to determine whether, prima facie, the respondent is a tenant the order of the lower Court is unsustainable and is therefore set aside. The lower Court will consider the application, IA. No. 1, afresh and decide the same according to law keeping in view the observations made above. ( 15 ) A copy of the order shall be despatched to the lower Court immediately. ( 16 ) IN the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .