Judgment :- 1. We are concerned in the second appeal with only the B schedule property, an extent of 10 cents and a half, being one half of a larger property. 2. Plaintiffs 1, 4 and 5 are the appellants; and the 21st defendant is the contesting first respondent. The appellants and the other plaintiffs are the children and grandchildren of a Mathevan; and Mathevan made a settlement of the whole property early in 1119 M.E. in favour of the plaintiffs claiming that the entire property (21 cents) belonged to him. A few months after, Mathevan's sister by name Chinna executed Ex. D10, a possessory mortgage, in favour of the first respondent in Karkadakam 1119 and put the mortgagee in possession of the entire property (21 cents) claiming that she was entitled to the property solely. Subsequently, Chinna filed O.S. No. 4 of 1120 for setting aside the settlement deed executed by Mathevan in favour of the plaintiffs. That litigation ultimately reached this Court; and this Court decided (Ex. P4 being the judgment) that Mathevan and Chinna were entitled to the 21 cents in moieties. Ex. P4 was on 29th November 1957; and thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition and separate possession of a half share in the property, the half share being the B schedule. The first respondent contended that the suit was barred by adverse possession, since it was brought more than 12 years after the was put in possession under Ex. D10. The trial court rejected this contention; but, on appeal, the lower appellate court agreed with the contention and dismissed the suit relying mainly on the decision of Velu Pillai J. of this Court in Konnan Sanku v. Parvathi Amma (1962 KLT. 881). In the second appeal, this decision of the Subordinate Judge is being challenged. And a learned judge of this Court, having felt that the decision in Konnan Sanku's case mentioned above required reconsideration, placed the second appeal before a Division Bench. 3. Velu Pillai J. has relied on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in T. P. R. Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther (AIR. 1942 Mad. 623) and also on the Full Bench decision of the Cochin High Court in Matheis v. Kunhikkavu Varassyar (39 Cochin Law Reports 97). In the Madras decision, Leach C. J.. 3. Velu Pillai J. has relied on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in T. P. R. Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther (AIR. 1942 Mad. 623) and also on the Full Bench decision of the Cochin High Court in Matheis v. Kunhikkavu Varassyar (39 Cochin Law Reports 97). In the Madras decision, Leach C. J.. has laid down the propositions relevant for the case before us: and the propositions are correctly summarised in the head-note of the case, which reads: "Where a person who is in possession under a usufructuary mortgage granted by one of several cosharers remains in possession of the land and cultivates it for years, the requirements of continuity, publicity and extent for adverse possession are fully complied with. Consequently, where some co-owners usufructuarily mortgage specific items of property held by the members of a Mohomedan family and the mortgagee enters into possession of the mortgaged items under his mortgage deed, a suit to recover the share therein by other members of the same family is barred by Art.144 at the end of twelve years of such possession, as the possession of the mortgagee becomes adverse against the other members from the moment of the entry into possession by the mortgagee and not from the date of ouster to their knowledge. The interest which the mortgagee in such a case acquires by prescription is the interest of a usufructuary mortgagee. He does not acquire a full title to the property." And in the Cochin decision it is stated in the head-note "A possession of the mortgagee will not, during the continuance of the mortgage, be adverse to the mortgagor, but possession which is adverse to one person may in law be adverse to another. Where two of the three co-owners execute a usufructuary mortgage of joint property asserting a right in, themselves alone and transfer possession, possession of the mortgagee from that moment becomes adverse to the co-owner or his heir left out of that transaction." Considering both these decisions Velu Pillai J. has stated "Applying this, it must follow that the possession of the first defendant as against the plaintiffs cannot be considered to be that of a mortgagee under them. Ravunny and defendants 4 and 5 by letting a stranger into possession, had asserted a hostile title to their knowledge. This amounted to ouster. Ravunny and defendants 4 and 5 by letting a stranger into possession, had asserted a hostile title to their knowledge. This amounted to ouster. It did not matter whether the co-owners who ousted the others gave a mortgage or were in possession through a lessee. In either case the person in possession is not the mortgagee or the lessee of the co-owners who have been ousted." The principles laid down in the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court have been followed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court also in D. R. Adinarayana Swamy v. Girraju Papamma (AIR. 1963 Andhra Pradesh 121). 4. We do not think there is anything wrong in the principles laid down by Velu Pillai J. in Konnan Sanku's case following the Full Bench decisions of the Madras High Court and the Cochin High Court: what is required is only a proper understanding of the decision and not a reconsideration of the same. When a co-owner asserts in a mortgage document that he is a full or sole owner and puts the mortgagee in possession, the latter's possession is but a continuation of the possession of the former, so that, if 12 years pass thereafter, the other co-owner's right gets barred by adverse possession. The mortgagee has, strictly speaking, two capacities, namely, the capacity of a mortgagee and the representative capacity of his mortgagor. Thus, when he continues in possession, he prescribes, in his own right, to a mortgage right against the other co-owner, who has not joined the mortgage in his favour, in the half of that co-owner; and he also prescribes, as a representative of his mortgagor, against the other co-owner, to the absolute right in the latter's half, since his possession is a continuation of his mortgagor's possession the mortgagor who asserted full or sole title against the other co-owner and put the mortgagee in possession. But this absolute right in the half of the co-owner out of possession, the mortgagee prescribes, not for himself but only for his mortgagor. In a case like the one before us, where the continuity of the representative possession is broken by an appropriate proceeding between the mortgagor-co-owner and the other co-owner out of possession, the mortgagee cannot claim absolute title to the half belonging to the latter. In a case like the one before us, where the continuity of the representative possession is broken by an appropriate proceeding between the mortgagor-co-owner and the other co-owner out of possession, the mortgagee cannot claim absolute title to the half belonging to the latter. The ludicrousness of the position is apparent in this case: the mortgagor-co-owner cannot claim sole title to the property he has no right to the half belonging to the other co-owner (this is admitted too): he has full title only to his half: the mortgagee, who is only a representative of the mortgagor, gets absolute title in the other co-owner's half too, while he gets only the mortgagee's right in his own mortgagor-co-owner's half: of course, since he continued openly in possession (nec vi nec clam nec precario) as a mortgagee of the entire property he prescribes for a mortgage right in the other half of the property too belonging to the other co-owner, though the latter did not join the mortgage. This is the correct legal position: and this is the result of his adverse possession as a mortgagee, not the result of his possession as the representative of his mortgagor: such representative possession has already been broken as a result of the litigation between the two co-owners. 5. Let us examine the position in this case in the light of the principles enunciated hereinbefore. Early in 1119, Mathevan executed the settlement deed claiming that the entire property belonged to him. Towards the end of 1119, Chinna executed the mortgage in favour of the first respondent claiming that she was the sole owner of the entire property and put the mortgagee in possession. If such possession given to the first respondent by Chinna after asserting sole title in herself in the entire property continued for 12 years the statutory period for adverse possession, there cannot be any doubt that the other co-owner, viz., Mathevan, would have lost his title to his half in the property. But in 1120, Chinna filed O. S. No. 4 of 1120 to set aside the settlement deed executed by Mathevan; and that litigation resulted in Ex. P4, the judgment of this Court, which held that Mathevan and Chinna were each entitled to half in the property. But in 1120, Chinna filed O. S. No. 4 of 1120 to set aside the settlement deed executed by Mathevan; and that litigation resulted in Ex. P4, the judgment of this Court, which held that Mathevan and Chinna were each entitled to half in the property. When Mathevan filed a written statement in O.S. No. 4 of 1120 disputing the sole right of Chinna, and ultimately when that question was decided in Ex. P4 in his favour, the continuity of the adverse possession commenced by the assertion of Chinna and her putting the first respondent in possession of the entire property was broken. Thereafter, the possession of the first respondent was not a representative possession of his mortgagor, Chinna: his possession thereafter was only in his own right as the mortgagee: and such possession can avail to him only to prescribe for a mortgage right against the real owner of the other half, Mathevan. (It has to be pointed out, in this connection, that the first respondent was not a party to O.S. No. 4 of 1120.) Thus, the view taken by the Subordinate Judge that the decision of this Court in Konnan Sanku's case was in favour of the first respondent is erroneous. 6. At this stage, a decision of the Supreme Court, which has been brought to our notice by the counsel of the first respondent, may also be referred to. The decision is Wuntakal Yalpi Chenabasavana Gowd v. Rao Bahadur Y. Mahabaleshawarappa (AIR. 1954 SC. 337). What happened in that case was that a father, who, along with his minor son, owned the suit property as a co-owner, executed a lease deed in favour of a third party in 1926 as if the property belonged to his son. And he issued several rent receipts also to the tenant as the guardian of the minor as if the property belonged to the minor. In 1935, the father executed a mortgage in favour of another, wherein he asserted that he was a half owner of the property and that the son was only a co-owner with him. And in that case, the Supreme Court held that, once the possession of a co-sharer became adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer could not interrupt the running of adverse possession. And in that case, the Supreme Court held that, once the possession of a co-sharer became adverse to the other co-sharer as a result of ouster, the mere assertion of his joint title by the dispossessed co-sharer could not interrupt the running of adverse possession. The Supreme Court went on to say that the dispossessed co-sharer must actually and effectively break up the exclusive possession of his co-sharer by re-entry upon the property or by resuming possession in such manner as it was possible to do. The Supreme Court, however, pointed out that it might also check the running of time if the co-sharer who was in exclusive possession acknowledged the title of the other co-sharer or discontinued his exclusive possession. It is also instructive to note the further observation of the Supreme Court, namely, that the fact that one co-sharer, who had allowed himself to be dispossessed by another co-sharer as a result of ouster, exhibited, later on, his animus to treat the property as the joint property of himself and his co-sharer could not arrest the running of adverse possession in favour of the other co-sharer, since a mere mental act on the part of the person dispossessed unaccompanied by any change of possession could not affect the continuity of adverse possession of the deseizor. What happened in that case was, we repeat, that the father acknowledged that the son was the sole owner of the property, thereby defacing himself from ownership, when he executed the lease deed and continued to receive rent as the guardian of the minor son. Adverse possession by the minor son started by such action on the part of the father; and that adverse possession could not be stopped by the mere assertion of the father, at a later stage, that he was a co-sharer with the son. Evidently, this case cannot have any application to the case before us. 7. Though this is a suit for partition, it may only be proper if we allow the appellants, in this suit itself, to redeem the mortgage on payment of half the mortgage money and recover possession of the B schedule. We take this course in view of the fact that the litigation has been there for several years and since there is no point in delaying redemption of the mortgage any more. We take this course in view of the fact that the litigation has been there for several years and since there is no point in delaying redemption of the mortgage any more. And this course will again be justified by the fact, that the property is only paddy land having no improvements thereon effected by the mortgagee and by the fact that there is no purappad payable under the mortgage necessitating a calculation of the redemption amount. 8. Therefore, we allow the second appeal, set aside the decision of the lower appellate court and pass a preliminary redemption decree as provided under 0.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the B schedule. We allow three months' time from the date of receipt of records by the trial court for the appellants (the plaintiffs) to deposit half the mortgage money and apply for a final decree, whereupon the trial court will pass a final decree for the B schedule property. In the circumstances of the case, we direct both parties to suffer their respective costs throughout. Allowed.