VENKATASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a defendant's appeal. It is directed against the judgment and decree made by the Addl. Civil Judge, Bangalore Dist, Bangalore, in R. A. No, 58 of 1966, which reversed the judgment and decree made by the Addl. Second. Munsiff, Bangalore, in O. S. No. 408 of 1964. This is a defendant's appeal. It is directed against the judgment and to sell several items of. immoveable properties-alleged to have been entered into by the appellant-first- defendant- with the first respondent-plaintiff, on. 24-4-1957. 3 he consideration stipulated under tha agreement instated to be Rs. 8,000 out of which a sum of Rs. 6,000 is alleged to have: been paid on the date of agreement of sale and the balance of Rs, 2,000 having been agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the deed. It would appear that at or about the time this agreement was entered into there was a litigation going on between the appellant herein on the one side and one ghannappa and her father-in-law on the other. The suit in question, was in respect of the title and possession of the present suit schedule properties and it was O. S. No. 156 of 1957 on the file of the Second Munsiff, bangalore. It is also the case of the first respondent that he took possession of the properties from Channappa, the judgment-debtor in that suit, diretly by way of part-performance of the suit agreement to sell. There are some other small details to which it is unnecessary to refer for my present purpose. ( 2 ) THE defence of the appellant, niter alia, is one of denial of execution of the agreement in question. The trial Court after an exhaustive consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that this defence was true and dismissed the suit. In appeal, the learned Civil Judge, reversed the said judgment and decree and decreed the suit for specific performance. Hence this appeal by the first defendant. On behalf of the appellant, the principal contention urged is that the judgment in appeal has been clearly vitiated in that there has been no judicial approach to the evidence in the case and the judgment of the trial court. Hence this appeal by the first defendant. On behalf of the appellant, the principal contention urged is that the judgment in appeal has been clearly vitiated in that there has been no judicial approach to the evidence in the case and the judgment of the trial court. In elaboration, it is urged by Sri T. Lakshminarasimha Iyengar, the learned Counsel, that the evidence has been rather mechanically dealt with without reference to the material points and discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses for the plaintiff. Further, the reasoning of the trial Court has been almost totally ignored and this clearly is an erroneous approach to the case in appeal. Indeed, he invited attention to certain- portions of the judgment in appeal and also of the trial Court as typical of the mechanical and rather unjudicial approach to the evidence. ( 3 ) I have been taken through the judgment ip. appeal and I have also gone through the judgment of the trial Court. It seems to me that the learned Civil Judge has not found fault with the reasoning of the trial court in regard to the findings on the various issues in the case. It is also seen from the judgment of the trial Court, the learned Munsiff has adverted to the demeanour of the witnesses. As for example in regard to PW-2, the scribe of the agreement this is what he says:". . . This would go to show that PW. 2 is a person-who is prepared to swear to anything to prove his case. No reliance can be placed an. the evidence of PW. 2, who is said to be the shanbhogue of mayasandra village. From the beginning I am not at all satisfied the way he deposed in this suit. At one stage he wants to remember the contents of Ext. P1 from his memory and depose, at another stage he looked into Ext. P1 and deposed contrary to what he has already deposed. If reliance is to be placed on the evidence of PW. 2, then I don't think nobody is safe. . " ( 4 ) THESE observations of the trial Judge do not appear to have been noticed at all in the first appeal. When one remembers that PW2. P1 and deposed contrary to what he has already deposed. If reliance is to be placed on the evidence of PW. 2, then I don't think nobody is safe. . " ( 4 ) THESE observations of the trial Judge do not appear to have been noticed at all in the first appeal. When one remembers that PW2. is one of the important witnesses in the case, it seems to me, it was the duty of the appellate Judge to have dealt with it accepting or rejecting it as a first appellate Court ought to do in the circumstances. ( 5 ) MY attention has also been invited to passages in the judgment as typical of the erroneous approach to the case. They are to be found in paras 8 to 12 of the judgment. It seems to me that the discussion therein is clearly open to the criticism levelled against it by the learned Counsel for the appellant. But it is, however, unnecessary to dwell on this matter further as in my opinion the appeal has to succeed on the other ground relative to the non-consideration by the appellate Court of the elaborate reasons given by a trial Court. That this would be so, is seen by the observations of the Supreme Court in T, D. Gopalan v. Commr. of Hindu religious and Charitabte Endowments, Madras, 1971 2 SCWR 65 the observations occur at para 9 of the said judgment and are as follows;" The uniform practice in the matter of appreciation of evidence has been that if the trial Court has given cogent and detailed reasons for not accepting the testimony of a witness, the appellate Court in all fairness to it ought to deal with those reasons before proceeding to form a contrary opinion about accepting the testimony which has been rejected by the trial Court. " ( 6 ) THE above enunciation would be clearly attracted to the facts of the case on hand. The trial Court had dismissed the suit after giving elaborate reasons in support of its findings on issues. It has also had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and noting or remembering their demeanour in the witness box. In the judgment in appeal, there is not any reference to the reasoning of the trial Court on any of the issues. The trial Court had dismissed the suit after giving elaborate reasons in support of its findings on issues. It has also had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and noting or remembering their demeanour in the witness box. In the judgment in appeal, there is not any reference to the reasoning of the trial Court on any of the issues. Indeed, in my judgment, the learned Civil Judge has merely arrived at his own conclusions of facts on the evidence on record, mostly keeping in mind the arguments, as it seemed to him, of the learned Counsel. It is not as though, in the view of the learned Civil Judge, the judgment of the trial Court was either perfunctory or suffered from a non-consideration of the material evidence on record. In this state of affairs, it is reasonable to conclude that the judgment in appeal suffered from want of a judicial approach, amounting to an error of procedure. I am, therefore, of the view that it cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) IN this context, I consider it relevant to refer to certain observation of the Supreme Court in Sarju Pershad Rnmdeo Sahu v. Jwadeshwar pratnp Narain Sigh, AIR. 1951 SC. 120. The Court, in what it has referred to as a 'rule of practice' in regard to appreciation of evidence by an appellate Court, has observed thus :" Where the question for consideration for the appellate Court is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competenant to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competenant to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule isand ft is nothing more than a rule of practicethat when there ia conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibilitv of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness, which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. The appellate Court is wrong in thinking that it would detract from the value to be attached to a trial Judge's finding of fact if the judge does not expressly base his conclusion upon the impressions he gathers from the demeanour of witnesses. The duty of the appellate Court in such cases is to see whether the exidence taken as a whole Can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial Court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court, outweighs such finding. " ( 8 ) IN the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The matter will now stand remitted to the lower appellate Court for a fresh disposal of ra. No. 58 of 1966 in accorrdance with law. Since the matter is fairly old. the learned Civil Judge will give some priorlity to this appeal and dispose of it as expeditiousy ag possible. ( 9 ) IN the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. --- *** --- .