Judgment :- 1. The respondent filed an application for evicting the petitioner from a building under S.11(4) (iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. And the petitioner was directed to pay the arrears of rent and the rent accruing due pending the proceeding as contemplated by S.2(1) (1) of the Act. The petitioner failed to deposit the arrears; and consequently, as contemplated by sub-section (3) of S 12, the Rent Control Court passed an order "directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building", 2. This order was sought to be executed by the respondent, when objection was taken by the petitioner that the order was not executable. The Objection has been overruled by both the lower courts, and hence the civil revision petition. A learned judge of this Court considered the question to be of importance so as to be considered by a Division Bench and referred the matter to a Division Bench. 3. The first contention urged by the counsel of the petitioner is that, in S. '4 of the Act, an order passed under S.12 is not mentioned as an order executable, the orders passed under S.11 or S.13 or S.19 or S.33 alone having been included there. (We have excluded the appellate and revisional orders) On a proper construction of the provisions of S.11 and S.12 (3), it has to be said that an order passed under S.12 (3) is really an order passed under S.11. Therefore, the absence of mention of S.12 in S.14 is of no consequence such mention is unnecessary. But the counsel has pointed out that in S.14, when it was amended by Act 7 of 1966, S.12 was also mentioned; and has argued that. when that was deleted under Act 8 of 1968, the intention of the legislature must have been that such an order, an order under S.12, should remain unexecutable. This could never have been the intention of the legislature which made a provision authorising (rather compelling) the Rent Control Court to pass an order in eviction: the intention of the legislature could never have been that such an order should not be executed, having provided for such an order; then, why was such an order provided for? This could never have been the intention of the legislature which made a provision authorising (rather compelling) the Rent Control Court to pass an order in eviction: the intention of the legislature could never have been that such an order should not be executed, having provided for such an order; then, why was such an order provided for? The position appears to be that the legislature, when it passed Act 8 of 1968, realised the mistake committed in Act 7 of 1966, which included S.12 also in S.14, that the inclusion of S.12 in S.14 was otiose, since an order passed under S.12 was really an order passed under S.11. (This will become clearer in another part of this judgment, where we discuss the purpose of a repealing Act the purpose is to remove inconsistencies also.) We may also reiterate that S.11 is mentioned in S.14, so that an order passed under S.11 is executable. 4. The next contention is that the effect of Act 8 of 1968 was to make such an order unexecutable. We may, at this stage, point out a few facts leading to the passing of Act 8 of 1968. Originally, President's Act 2 of 1965 was passed; and subsequently, President's Act 7 of 1966 was passed amending the provisions of the earlier Act. Still later came Act 8 of 1968 passed by the legislature; and by this Act, some of the provisions of Act 2 to 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 were repealed. The contention now urged is that, by such repeal, the execut-ability of an order like the one before us was also taken away. 5. In this connection, we have to consider the effect of a repealing Act. In Jethanand Betab v. The State of Delhi (AIR. 1960 SC 89), Subba Rao J. approvingly quoted the 'neat' expression of Chakravartti C. J of the Calcutta High Court in Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press (AIR. 1954 Cal. 484). The passage from the judgment of Chakravartti C. J. runs "Such Acts have no legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume-Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are also removed by repealing and amending Acts. The only objects of such Acts which in England are called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care" In our opinion, the purpose of an amending Act is to plant the necessary amendments in the parent or the main Act, and once such planting has been effected, the planting Act (the amending Act), having served its purpose, need not any more remain there to tend the plant, as it were: the plant has taken root in the main Act, and thereafter, the amending Act has only to be repealed: and if an amending Act is so repealed by a repealing Act, the repeal does not affect the plant, the amendment already planted in the main Act. Subba Rao J., in following the above observation of Chakravartti C. J., has said that the main object of the repealing Act (called in England a Statute Law Revision Act) is only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of the ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind is only to expurgate the amend ing Act which had served its purpose. Of course, the repealing Act takes care to remove inconsistencies, if there are any. (See the dropping of the reference to S.12 from S.14 by Act 8 of 1968.) Therefore, the repeal of an amending Act does not affect the amendments which have already been brought into the main Act. 6. Then we revert to the effect of Act 8 of 1968. The counsel of the petitioner has pointed out that S.10 of Act 7 of 1966 was not repealed, so that the intention of the legislature in dropping the other sections should not have the effect pointed out by us supra. We do not think that this contention is quite happy. What was done by Act 8 of 1968 was, first, to make Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 an Act of the legislature to convert it from an Act of the President into an Act of the legislature. We do not think that this contention is quite happy. What was done by Act 8 of 1968 was, first, to make Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 an Act of the legislature to convert it from an Act of the President into an Act of the legislature. Thereafter, the amending provisions, which had served their purpose, e.g., S.2 to 9, were dropped. S.10 in Act 7 of 1966 was not an amending provision: it was not a provision planted in the main Act: it was a new provision added in Act 71966, so that, if that provision had to be retained as a provision enacted by the legislature, it had necessarily to be retained. And that was what was done by Act 8 of 1968. Therefore, the contention of the counsel of the petitioner on this ground has also no force. 7. The counsel of the petitioner has drawn our attention to some observations in some decisions of the Supreme Court, which, the counsel has claimed, have the effect of laying down that a decree like the one which is sought to be executed in the case before us is a nullity. The first decision is Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass ((1969) I.S.C.W.R. 51), where the Supreme Court was considering S.13 of the Delhi &Ajmer Rent Control Act. S.13 (1) provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises should be passed by any court in favour of the landlord against any tenant. Then followed a proviso which provided that nothing in the sub-section should apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the court was satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed. (The proviso contained several grounds.) Evidently, under this sub-section, the court gets jurisdiction to pass an order in eviction only if it is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso exists. What happened in that case was that'an award, to which the landlord himself was not a party, was passed, under the Arbitration Act, allowing eviction of the tenant from the premises; and that, on the basis of the award, a decree was also passed. And it was that decree that was sought to be executed. What happened in that case was that'an award, to which the landlord himself was not a party, was passed, under the Arbitration Act, allowing eviction of the tenant from the premises; and that, on the basis of the award, a decree was also passed. And it was that decree that was sought to be executed. It is clear that, under S.13(1) of the Act, such a decree could not have been passed, because the jurisdiction of the court to pass a decree in eviction was only on its being satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed: without considering the grounds, the court could not have passed a decree in eviction. And this was what was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case. The next decision is Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. Shri. K. L. Bansal ((1969) I.S.C.W.R. 56). This was also a case under the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act. In that case, the decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree; and the Supreme Court pointed out that the same reasoning given by it in the earlier decision applied to this case as well, namely, that, without considering the grounds mentioned in the proviso, eo decree for eviction could have been passed. Lastly, the decision in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal (1970 (3) SCC 181) has also been brought to our notice, which again, we may point out, considered S.13 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act. In that case also, the decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree; and therefore.the reasoning given in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court applied to that case as well. 8. Now, let ire consider the scheme of our Act in the light of these three decisions of the Supreme Court. Under S.11 of our Act, the Rent Control Court is given power to pass orders in eviction on certain grounds; and when a petition for eviction is filed and a proceeding for eviction is pending, S.12(1) provides that the tenant should pay the admitted arrears of rent already accrued and the arrears accruing pending the proceeding, and if he fails to do so, he is precluded from contesting the proceeding. And sub-s. (3) of S.12 obliges the court (the word used is 'shall') to "stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building". The contention of the counsel of the petitioner is that, even if the tenant fails to deposit the arrears as contemplated by S.12(1), the Rent Control Court should consider whether the ground alleged in the petition for eviction as contemplated by S.11 existed before it passes an order in eviction. The language of S.13(1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act is materially different from S.12(3) of our Act. The counsel has also drawn our attention, in this connection, to the decision in Smt. Krishnabai Babulal Mishra v. Smt. Laxmibai (AIR. 1970 Madh. Prad. 280), where the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act has been considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The difference in language of the relevant provision in our Act will presently be brought into relief, when we just refer to the language of the relevant section in the Madhya Pradesh Act S.13 of the Madhya Pradesh Act provides that, when the tenant fails to deposit the arrears, "the court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit." (The underlining is ours). It is clear that, under the Madhya Pradesh Act, the court is bound to proceed with the hearing of the suit, though the court has the power to strike out the defence of the tenant, which means that, in proceeding with the suit, the court must look into the grounds on which eviction is sought. In our Act, the language is very different, e. g., that, on the tenant's failure to deposit the arrears, the court shall "stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building": there is no question of the proceeding going further, as is the case under the Madhya Pradesh Act, whereunder the suit has to be tried, or under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, whereunder the grounds under the proviso have to be considered. The scheme of our Act is quite clear that, pending the proceeding for eviction, the tenant is bound to deposit the admitted arrears already accrued and the arrears accruing during the pendency of the proceeding. The scheme of our Act is quite clear that, pending the proceeding for eviction, the tenant is bound to deposit the admitted arrears already accrued and the arrears accruing during the pendency of the proceeding. And if he fails to do so, the proceeding comes to an end; and the landlord should be given an order putting him in possession of the building. Therefore, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court cannot also help the petitioner. We dismiss the civil revision petition with costs.