JUDGMENT T. C. Raghavan, J. 1. A batch of writ petitions was heard by Govindan Nair, J.; and the learned Judge dismissed the writ petitions. Against the dismissal of one of the, writ petitions, the writ appeal has been filed by the petitioner in the writ petition. Another batch of writ petitions came before Isaac, J., before whom the decision of Govindan Nair, J. was cited. Isaac, J. disagreed with that decision and placed the writ petitions before a Division Bench. The writ appeal, the writ petitions referred and a few other similar writ petitions come up before us for disposal. The order of reference by Isaac, J. is reported as Vadakkekara Karshaka Samajam v. State of Kerala 1971 (II) L.L.J. 252 (We think that this decision cannot strictly be cited as a precedent though it is reported, because nothing has been decided in those writ petitions, the learned Judge having just expressed his opinion without deciding any case.) 2. The Government of Kerala published a notification under section 3 (1), (b) and 5 (1) (b) of the Minimum Wages Act. The notification was dated 9th February, but was published in the Gazette dated 27th February, 1968. The relevant portion of the notification read: "Notice is hereby given that the proposal will be taken up for consideration on or before 15th April 1968 and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above date will be considered by the Government.' All representations shall be addressed to the Secretary, Health and Labour Department, Secretariat, Trivandrum. " Thereafter, the Government considered the representations received by them, consulted the Advisory Board constituted under section 7 and then published another notification as contemplated by section 5 (2) of the Act revising the minimum rates of wages for agricultural labour. In the cases before us, the second notification mentioned above is being questioned on the ground that the first notification did not conform with the relevant section under which it was issued. Section 5 (1) reads : " Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages. In the cases before us, the second notification mentioned above is being questioned on the ground that the first notification did not conform with the relevant section under which it was issued. Section 5 (1) reads : " Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages. (1) In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed, the appropriate Government shall either” (a) appoint as many committees and sub-committees, as it considers necessary to hold inquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision, as the case may be, or (b) by notification in the Official Gazette, publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date, not less than two months from the date of the notification, on which the proposals will be taken into consideration. " 3. Then comes sub-section (2) of the section, which provides that, after considering the advice of the committee or committees appointed under clause (a) mentioned above or all representations received by the Government before the date specified in the notification under clause (b), the Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix or revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment. This sub-section also provides that the minimum rates, unless the notification otherwise provides, shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of issue of the notification: the proviso to the sub-section provides that, where the Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in clause (b), the Government shall consult the Advisory Board. And section 7 makes provision for the constitution of the Advisory Board. 4. The main contention urged before us is that the notification extracted above does not comply with section 5(1) (b) of the Act. As already stated, the notification was dated 9th February 1968, but was published in the Gazette only on 27th February. The notification fixed the date on which, the proposal would be taken for consideration as "on or before 15th April 1968"; and the notification provided that "any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above date will be considered by the Government". The notification fixed the date on which, the proposal would be taken for consideration as "on or before 15th April 1968"; and the notification provided that "any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above date will be considered by the Government". Govindan Nair, J. appears to think that, "if the Govern­ment felt after considering the report of the committee that there should be further material and published a notification under section 5(1)(b) of the Act, called for representations and consulted the Advisory Board as well before making up their mind, this Court would not be justified in setting aside the fixation of minimum wages". According to the learned Judge, the Government took action under section 5(1)(a), but issued a further notification under section 5(1)(b) of the Act too: in the words of Govindan Nair, J., "the notification under section 5(1)(b) in these cases is unnecessary, the committee under section 5(1)(a) having been constituted and their report being made available to the State Government". The learned Judge has also considered the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1964 Bombay 51 which had occasion to consider the decision of this Court in Vasudevan v. State of Kerala ) A.I.R. 1960 Kerala 67 Kotval, J. (as he then was) of the Bombay High Court has extracted a passage from the decision of our Court and has observed that that observation "seems to have been inadvertently made". In the opinion of Govindan Nair, J. too, that passage in the judgment of our Court was obiter and was not material for the decision of Vasudevan's case. 5. The notification impugned in these cases was issued by the Government under section 5(1)(b) of the Act. In the counter-affidavit filed by the State, this fact is made clear; and the State has no case that the action taken by them was under section 5(1)(a). They have also no case that they took action under section 5(1) (a) and that the impugned notification under section 5(1)(b) was an additional or unnecessary notification as stated by Govindan Nair, J. The second notification issued by the Government under section 5(2) of the Act fixing the minimum rates of wages states in unequivocal language that the only action taken by the Government was under section 5(1)(b). What emerges from the counter-affidavit of the State is that the notification was under section 5(1) (b), that the proposal was to revise the minimum rates of wages fixed earlier and that no other action was taken under section 5(1)(a). The Government Pleader has also said so. 6. A little confusion appears to have crept into the judgment under appeal regarding the procedure followed by the Government: and therefore, we venture to indicate the procedure clearly laid down in section 5 of the Act. The section lays down the procedure for fixing minimum rates of wages for the first time and also for revising the minimum rates as contemplated by section 3(1)(b). Two methods are laid down: appointing committees and sub-committees to hold inquiries and advise; and publishing proposals by notification in the Official Gazette for the information of persons likely to be affected specifying a date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration. Then, after considering the advice of the committees or after rconsidering all representations received, as the case may be, the Government has to fix or revise the minimum rates of wages by notification in the Official Gazette: and these newly fixed or revised minimum rates shall come into force, unless the notification otherwise provides, on the expiry of three months from date of issue of the notification. By the proviso it is further enacted that, if the Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the method of publishing proposals in the Official Gazette and considering representations received, then the Government shall consult the Advisory Board: in other words, this mandatory provision in the proviso does not apply to the fixation of minimum rates of wages for the first time (applies - only to revision of minimum rates) and it does not even apply to revision of minimum rates of wages by appointing committees and sub-committees for holding inquiries and considering their advice. "And the Advisory Board is constituted "for the-purpose of co-ordinating the work of committees and sub-committees" mentioned above and for "advising the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages". "And the Advisory Board is constituted "for the-purpose of co-ordinating the work of committees and sub-committees" mentioned above and for "advising the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages". In the light of this and in the light of the averments in the counter-affidavit of the State already referred to, it is clear that the committee never held inquiries in these cases nor advised the Government regarding the revision of the minimum rates of wages already fixed by the Government earlier. 7. Now we come to the main question, viz., whether the conditions mentioned in section 5(1)(b) are mandatory or only directory as claimed by the Government Pleader. On this question a few decisions have been brought to our notice. The first decision is the decision of our own Court in Vasudevan v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 1960 Kerala 67 The notification, in that case stated that the proposal would be "taken into consideration after two months from the date of publication of this notification and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal "before the expiry of the above period will be considered by the Government"; A Division Bench of this Court held that this notification was bad, since it did not specify a date on which the proposal would be taken into consideration and also since the notification confined or restricted the right to make representations to a date anterior to such specified date. In considering the question as to whether a particular direction or condition in a statute was mandatory or directory, the Division Bench referred to authorities like Crawford, Sutherland, etc, and held that the direction in section 5(1)(b) was mandatory. According to the Division Bench, where the authority given in a statute was in the nature of a command and the condition or direction was laid down by virtue of that authority, then it must be construed as mandatory or peremptory or imperative: it mast be strictly complied with. 8. According to the Division Bench, where the authority given in a statute was in the nature of a command and the condition or direction was laid down by virtue of that authority, then it must be construed as mandatory or peremptory or imperative: it mast be strictly complied with. 8. There are other decisions faking the same view, for instance, Narottamdas Harjiwandas v. P.B. Gowarikar A.I.R. 1961 M.P. 182 and Bijoy Krishna Paul v. State of Assam 1970 (1) L.L. J. 584 In the first of these decisions, authorities like Maxwell and Crawford have been referred to and Vasudevan's case has also been referred to and followed; and in the second decision, it has been held (without referring to any authority) that the procedure prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act has to be strictly complied with. The decision which appears to take a contrary view (we use the expression 'appears to take' deliberately) is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramkrishna Ramnath v. The State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1964 Bombay 51. The relevant portion of the notification considered in that case was in these terms. "and notice is hereby given that the said draft will betaken into consideration by the Government of Bombay on or after the 1st day of March, 1958." 9. The Bombay High Court held that the notification was in sufficient compliance with section 5(1)(b): Kotval, J, said that the notification certainly specified a date, but it added that the Government would consider the representations further after that date: in the opinion of the learned Judge, the whole idea behind specifying a date was that the persons likely to be affected by the draft proposals should be in a position to make representations against the draft proposals and know till what date they had to make them so that the Government was precluded from taking a decision upon the proposals until the expiry of the date specified: Kotval, J. also pointed out that there was nothing in the statute which required that the Government should consider the representations on the specified date itself it would be impossible too for the Government to do so. It is in view of this that we have stated that the Bombay decision only 'appears to take a contrary view': in fact, it does not lay down any thing contrary. 10. It is in view of this that we have stated that the Bombay decision only 'appears to take a contrary view': in fact, it does not lay down any thing contrary. 10. But, in considering Vasudevan's case, Kotval, J. has extracted a passage therefrom and has observed that it shears to be an obiter remark and it "seems to have been inadvertently made ". (Govindan Nair, J. also thinks that this observation was obiter.) May be. But we wish to make one thing clear. Under section 5(1) (b), the Government shall publish by notification in the Official Gazette their proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby: the notification shall specify a date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration: the said specified date shall not be less than two months from the date of the notification. And under section 5 (2), the Government is bound to consider all representations received by them before the date specified in the notification under clause (b) of section 5 (1): that is, the Government has no right to say that only such of the representations received before a particular date will be considered, if that date is not the date specified on which the representations are to be taken into consideration: in other words, the Government has to consider all representations received by them before the date specified for considering the proposals. It is this aspect that was made clear by the passage extracted by Kotval, J. of the Bombay High Court from Vasudevan's case of our Court. 11. In addition to the aforesaid decisions, a few other decisions have also been brought to our notice, for instance, the decision of this Court in D.M.S. Rao v. The State of Kerala A.I.R. 1963 Kerala 115 by Vaidialingam, J. K. T. Appannah v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 157 and Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association, Nagpur v. The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1068.The Government Pleader has contended that, the Minimum Wages Act being a piece of legislation intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen, the provisions of the Act should be construed in a beneficent fashion. There is no dispute regarding this proposition. There is no dispute regarding this proposition. But, this proposition, we venture to state, should be understood in its proper perspective: and the( perspective is stressed by Gajendragadkar, J. in the passage extracted below .(from Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Association's case A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1068 "It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social justice to workmen employed in the scheduled employments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions the court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction. If the relevant words are capable of two constructions preference may be given to that construction which helps to sustain the validity of the impugned notification; but it is obvious that an occasion for showing preference for one construction rather than the other can legitimately arise only when two constructions are reasonably possible, not otherwise." (Underlining is ours.) 12. It is not as if that under the Minimum Wages Act all the rights are for the labourers and the employers have no right at all. Section 5 (1) (b) has a purpose; and that purpose should not be lost sight of by the beneficent construction. Section 5 (1) (b) provides for publication of the proposals by notification in the Official Gazette for the information of the persons likely to be affected, which will include not only the labourers but also the employers. The section says further that the notification should specify a date on which the proposals will be taken into consideration: this has also a purpose, which should not be lost sight of in construing this section. The section also provides that the specified date should not be less than two months from the date of the notification, which again, it is apparent, has a purpose, which also should not be lost sight of. Again, section 5 (2) indicates that the Government has to consider all the representations received by it before the date specified in the notification (not merely the representations of the labourers) this again should not be ignored. Therefore, in the guise of beneficent construction, the other aspect, viz, the right the employers have under the Act, should not be lost sight of. Therefore, in the guise of beneficent construction, the other aspect, viz, the right the employers have under the Act, should not be lost sight of. Moreover, the question of beneficent construction can arise only when the provision is capable of two constructions, one beneficial to the labourers and the other not beneficial to them, and not otherwise. In paragraph 15 of the reports in Appannah case, the Mysore High Court has dissented from the view expressed by our Court in Vasudevan's case and by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Narottamdas Harjiwandas' case that section 5 (1) (b) is imperative. And the decision of Vaidialingam, J. in D.M.S. Rao's case, though it contains a long discussion, does not, in our opinion, help us much in the cases before us. 13. Incidentally, some discussion has taken place at the bar as to whether the employers as well as the labourers are entitled to be heard on the date on which the proposals are taken into consideration by the Government. Of course, there is nothing in the Act which says in so many words that the parties affected should be heard: what the Act says is only that all the representations received should be considered. But the Mysore decision in Appannah's case seems to proceed on the basis that the persons affected should be heard (vide paragraph 18 of the reports); and Isaac, J. in the reference order has also stated that the purpose of specifying the date for considering the proposals implies that the affected persons are entitled to be heard. Though we need not express a final opinion on this question since it is not necessary for the disposal of these cases, we wish to point out, having regard to the language of section 5 (1) (b), that the affected parties appear to have a right to be heard: for instance, the date to be specified in the notification is the date "on which the proposals will be taken into consideration " and not merely the date up to which alone representations need be sent: fixing a time limit and then specifying a date indicate this. Of course, the Government may consider the proposals on that date or on that date and other adjourned dates or even adjourn consideration of the proposals to another date altogether. Even here, the adjournment will have to be to a specified date. 14. Of course, the Government may consider the proposals on that date or on that date and other adjourned dates or even adjourn consideration of the proposals to another date altogether. Even here, the adjournment will have to be to a specified date. 14. Another argument was also adduced before both the learned Judges; and both the learned Judges have repelled the argument. The argument was that the minimum rates of wages proposed in the notification were some figures and minimum rates actually fixed by the Government were higher and such fixation of wages higher than the wages proposed in the notification was illegal. This argument cannot stand any scrutiny in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore A.IR. 1970 S.C. 2042. We may, however, state that this argument has not been repeated before us. 15. We would also refer to another argument of the Government Pleader: the Government Pleader has contended that the period of two months should be from the date of the notification and not from the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. This contention is evidently erroneous. In these cases, the notification was dated 9th February 1968, but was published only on 27th February: a period of 18 days intervened. If the contention of the Government Pleader is accepted, it may even lead to the extreme case of the notification having been published two months after the date shown in the notification. The whole purpose of fixing a time-limit will then be lost. 16. The notification in these cases says that the proposals "will be taken up for consideration on or before 15th April 1968". Of course, a date is specified in the notification; but if the proposals were taken up for consideration even the next day or on an unspecified day before the specified day, the action of the Government would have been justified! Can it be said that such a notification complies with section 5 (1) (b)? One who runs will answer the question only in the negative. A notification saying that the proposals will be taken up for consideration (as in the Bombay case), say on 15th April 1968, or after is different from the present notification stating that the proposals will be taken up for consideration on or before 15th April 1968. One who runs will answer the question only in the negative. A notification saying that the proposals will be taken up for consideration (as in the Bombay case), say on 15th April 1968, or after is different from the present notification stating that the proposals will be taken up for consideration on or before 15th April 1968. It is surprising that the Government did not see this difference. Moreover, the notification was published in the Gazette "for the information of the persons likely to be affected " only on 27th February 1968: then where is the time of "not less than two months" contemplated by section 5(1) (b)? Well, in these circumstances, the attempt of the Government to justify the notification is patently untenable. In the light of the above discussion, we allow the writ appeal and allow the writ petition therein. We also allow all the other writ petitions. And we quash the notification published in the Official Gazette by the Government under section 5 (2) of the Act, since the notification under section 5 (1) (b) did not conform with the requirements of law. However, we pass no orders regarding costs.