Judgment S.Anwar Ahmad, J. 1. This appeal by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (defendants first party) arises out of a suit for declaration that 4 kathas 18| dhurs of land appertaining to plots Nos. 767, 768. 771 & 790/1489 of Khata No. 88. in village Chak Jahangir Roza were the self-acquired properties of the plaintiffs and that the sale deed (Exhibit A) dated the 27th July, 1951, executed by the defendants second party (respondents Nos. 5. 6 and 7) was sham and without consideration and no title passed thereunder to the appellants. The further prayer of the plaintiffs was for recovery of possession, in case they were dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. 2. According to the case of the appellants the land in suit belonged to one Palat Das who died leaving behind two sons, Budhu Das (the original plaintiff) and Kamal Das. Budhu and Kamal separated from each other and partitioned the joint family property between them, each getting one-half share, i. e., 4 kathas 18J dhurs of land. Kamal Das died in the year 1951 leaving behind his widow Mt. Pathli (respondent No. 5) and two minor sons Harihar Das and Dhanichand Das (respondents Nos. 6 and 7). After the death of Kamal Das. his widow Mt. Pathli. for self and as guardian of her two minor sons aforesaid, sold the said 4 kathas 18 1/2 dhurs of land along with the trees standing thereon to the defendants first party for a sum of Rs. 300.00 by sale deed dated the 27th July. 1951. The case of Budhu Das. the original plaintiff, was that the property in suit was his self-acquired property which he had acquired after separation from his brother Kamal Das. 3. There were a number of litigations concerning the suit property which it is not necessary to refer. It may, however, be stated that the Courts below decreed the suit of the plaintiffs in its entirety. Learned Counsel for the appellants does not challenge the findings arrived at by the two Courts below on the basis of which the suit has been decreed except the finding as to whether the suit had abated as a whole. The suit was filed on the 7th October, 1961. The defendants first party-appellants filed their written statement on the 14th May, 1962. Budhu Das the original plaintiff, died on the 14th August 1965. The suit was filed on the 7th October, 1961. The defendants first party-appellants filed their written statement on the 14th May, 1962. Budhu Das the original plaintiff, died on the 14th August 1965. A petition was filed on behalf of his two sons Nani-pat Das and Narsingh Das (respondents Nos. 1 & 2) on the 11th September, 1965, stating that they and their two minor sons (respondents Nos. 3 and 4) were the only heirs of the original plaintiff Budhu Das and should be substituted in his place. The substitution was done accordingly. A supplementary written statement on behalf of defendant No. 2 (appellant No. 2) was filed on the 22nd January. 1966, in which it was specifically stated that the case of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that Budhu Das died leaving behind only two sons and two grandsons was palpably false. The real truth was that he left behind four daughters also, viz, Mt. Paria. Mt. Bhusia, Mt. Reshma and Mt. Asharfi. The learned Munsif recast the issues on the 22nd January, 1966. Issue No. 8 ran as follows: "Whether the suit abates due to the non-substitution of the daughters of Budhu Das after his death in the category of plaintiffs along with his sons ?" The position taken up by the two sons of Budhu Das (respondents Nos. 1 and 2) for self and on behalf of their sons (respondents Nos. 3 and 41 was that all the four daughters of Budhu Das. viz.. their four sisters, had died during the lifetime of their father and, therefore, they could not be substituted along with their brothers, the respondents. 4. The learned Munsif. on the admission of plaintiff No. 2 Narsingh Das (P. W. 7) as well as on the evidence of Methur Sah (P. W. 1) came to the conclusion that the original plaintiff Budhu Das also left behind four daughters as his heirs and all of them were alive at the time of his death. This finding of fact has been affirmed by the Court of appeal below. Both the Courts below have also held that in spite of the fact that the four daughters of Budhu Das had not been substituted in his place along with their brothers, the suit would not abate either in whole or in part. 5. This finding of fact has been affirmed by the Court of appeal below. Both the Courts below have also held that in spite of the fact that the four daughters of Budhu Das had not been substituted in his place along with their brothers, the suit would not abate either in whole or in part. 5. As already stated, learned counsel for the appellants does not challenge the other findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. The only point urged by him is that on the facts found in the case the suit must be held to have abated as a whole and, in this view of the matter, the decree passed by the Courts below should be set aside. 6. Admittedly. Budhu Das died on the 14th of August. 1965, when the Hindu Succession Act fAct XXX of 1956V had already come into force. As laid down in Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the four daughters of Budhu Das were Class I heirs along with their brothers, viz., respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Admittedly, they were not brought into the category of the plaintiffs; on the contrary, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 their brothers, definitely took up the stand that all their sisters had died during the lifetime of their father Budhu Das. The learned Munsif wrongly relied upon the case of Jaggernath Singh V/s. Narayan Sarogi, ( AIR 1965 Pat 300 ) and held that as the two sons of Budhu Das had been brought on record the suit could not abate. The facts of the above reported case are quite different from the facts of the present case. In that case an application was made for bringing on record the minor sons of the deceased plaintiff under the guardianship of their mother. The substitution was allowed. No objection was raised by the defendant at any stage earlier that the widow of the deceased plaintiff was not substituted, but when the appeal before the lower appellate Court was ripe for hearing an application was filed by the defendant that the suit had abated as the widow of the deceased plaintiff had not been substituted in his place. No objection was raised by the defendant at any stage earlier that the widow of the deceased plaintiff was not substituted, but when the appeal before the lower appellate Court was ripe for hearing an application was filed by the defendant that the suit had abated as the widow of the deceased plaintiff had not been substituted in his place. The Court of appeal below held that no objection having been raised on this score within the period of limitation in spite of the defendants ap- pearance and decree having been passed, the point could not be allowed to be agitated at the appellate stage. A. B. N. Sinha, J. approved the stand taken by the Court of appeal below and held that the defendant was estopped from contending that the substituted heir did not fully represent the estate of the decresed plaintiff and that on account of the non-substitution of his widow the suit had abated. 7. So far as the present case is concerned, the appellants well within the period of limitation by means of a supplementary written statement clearly asserted that Budhu Das had left behind four daughters also but they had not been brought on record as his heirs. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in all fairness, ought to have accepted the position and prayed for bringing on record the four daughters also along with themselves. But this they did not chose to do; on the contrary, they fought the case on the score that all the. four daughters of Budhu Das had died during his lifetime and also adduced evidence to that effect. The Courts below have held that the four daughters of Budhu Das are alive. The application filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for their substitution along with their sons alone cannot be regarded as a bona fide application. The word "bona fide" has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary (fourth edition) as follows : "In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely, without deceit or fraud. Truly; actually; without simulation or pretense. Innocently; in the attitude of trust and confidence; without notice of fraud, etc. Real, actual, genuine, and not feigned". Even if initially respondents Nos. The word "bona fide" has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary (fourth edition) as follows : "In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely, without deceit or fraud. Truly; actually; without simulation or pretense. Innocently; in the attitude of trust and confidence; without notice of fraud, etc. Real, actual, genuine, and not feigned". Even if initially respondents Nos. 1 and 2 did not apply to have their sisters brought on record without any lack of bona fides, but when they refused to do so in spite of the objection of the appellants and falsely stated before the Court that their sisters were dead and also led evidence to that effect, it cannot be said that the application filed by them was a bona fide application for substitution. A Bench of this Court in Barme-shwar Nath Prasad Singh V/s. Babu Kuer Rai, ( AIR 1964 Pat 116 ), on a consideration of almost all the relevant decisions on the point laid down the law on the subject, so far it applies to the present case, in the following words : "xxxxx (iii) Where the deceased leaves several heirs and a bona fide application for substitution of only some of them has been made, there is full representation of the deceased and there is no abatement; the other heirs may subsequently be added as parties even beyond the period of limitation. (iv) Where the deceased leaves behind several heirs, but a mala fide application is made for substitution of some of them only, such an application does not prevent abatement". As already stated, the application for substitution filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a bona fide application. 8 Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision in Dolai Maliko v. Krushna Chandra Patnaik, ( AIR 1967 SC 49 ) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered a number of cases in which some of the heirs of the- deceased had not been brought on record. In that case one of the appellants had died and his heirs had to be brought on record. In that case one of the appellants had died and his heirs had to be brought on record. Their Lordships proceeded to lav down the law in the following words : "In such a case there is no question of any diligent or bona fide enquiry for the deceased appellants heirs must be known to the heirs who applied for being brought on the record. Even so we are of opinion that unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumstances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding, there is no reason why the heirs who have applied for being brought on record should not be held to represent the entire estate including the interests of the heirs not brought on the record. This is not to say that where heirs of an appellant are to be brought on record all of them should not be brought on record and any of them should be deliberately left out. But if by oversight or on account of some doubt as to who are the heirs, any heir of a deceased appellant is left out that in itself would be no reason for holding that the entire estate of the deceased is not represented unless circumstances like fraud or collusion to which we have referred above exist". In the present case, on the facts found by the Courts below and in view of the circumstances to which reference has already been made respondents Nos. 1 and 2 deliberately left out their sisters from being brought on the record. It must, therefore he held that the respondents who had been substituted could not represent the entire estate of the deceased sole plaintiff Budhu Das and the suit in its entirety abated for want of substitution of the four daughters of the deceased. 9 Mr. Prem Lall for the respondents contended that, on the findings of the Courts below, the appellants were more or less in the position of trespassers, because in the earlier suit the right claimed by them had been negatived. In support of his submission, Mr. 9 Mr. Prem Lall for the respondents contended that, on the findings of the Courts below, the appellants were more or less in the position of trespassers, because in the earlier suit the right claimed by them had been negatived. In support of his submission, Mr. Prem Lall relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Niranjan Das V/s. Loknath Mandal, (AIR 1970 Pat I) wherein it was held that a co-owner could bring a suit for possession of property against trespassers without impleading the other co-owners. It is so. but the suit out of which this appeal arises was a suit in which the deceased plaintiff as well as the contesting defendants claimed title in themselves. On the facts stated in the plaint, it could not be said to be a suit as between a person who had title and as against a trespasser who had no title whatsoever. For the reasons stated above, the Full Bench decision is of no avail to the respondents. 10. In the result, it has to be held that the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff Budhu Das abated in its entirety as his daughters were not brought on record. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside and the suit is dismissed as having abated as a whole. There will, however, be no order for costs.