Judgment :- 1. This is a petition under S.561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed for quashing the proceedings in C. C. No. 336 of 1971 on the file of the District Magistrate's Court, Quilon, initiated a the instance of the Income Tax Officer under S.27/ of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the new Act. 2. The facts leading to the prosecution relevant for consideration in this case are as follows: The petitioner is a partner in Union Engineering Company. Quilon, a firm registered under the new Act. On 18 31962 one of the partners, the father of the other partners died and a new partnership came into being on 18 91962. For the assessment year 196162, corresponding to the accounting year ending with 315 1960, the petitioner herein submitted a return on 29 51962 showing an income of Rs. 23,947/-. The Income Tax Officer called for the accounts of the firm for scrutiny. On,examination he detected some suppression. He found that the accounts disclosed only utilisation of two tonnes of tin plates while on 14 51960 there was a release of 24.5 tonnes of tin plates from the key loan at the Bank. The balance of 22.5 tonnes plates was not accounted for in the closing stock and therefore he issued notice to the assessee calling for an explanation. The assessee gave an explanation which was not acceptable to the Income Tax Officer. The Income Tax Officer finalised the assessments on the basis of a revised return submitted by the firm for the year 1961-62. Ultimately, the taxable income was computed at Rs. 50.205/- which approximated to the taxable income returned by the assessee as per the revised return. The Income Tax Officer initiated penalty proceedings against the petitioner and a penalty of Rs. 20,000/- was imposed, which on appeal was reduced to Rs. 13,000/-. The petitioner filed an application under S.66(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as the old Act, for stating a case to this Court, which was however dismissed. Thereafter, the assessee filed OP. No. 3188 of 1969 under S.66(2) of the old Act. This Court directed the Tribunal to state a case. While this original petition was pending, the Income Tax authorities took proceedings under S.277 of the new Act by filing a complaint before the District Magistrate's Court, Quilon. Thereafter, the assessee filed OP. No. 3188 of 1969 under S.66(2) of the old Act. This Court directed the Tribunal to state a case. While this original petition was pending, the Income Tax authorities took proceedings under S.277 of the new Act by filing a complaint before the District Magistrate's Court, Quilon. The gist of the charge against him was that he delivered on 29 51962 to the Income Tax Officer, Quilon, a profit and loss account and a balance sheet showing the value of closing stock at Rs. 9,450/-and a total income at Rs. 23,947/-which was false and which he knew to be false or did not believe it to be true and has therefore committed an offence punishable under S.277 of the new Act. On receipt of notice of this complaint, the petitioner filed OP. No. 6468 of 1971 to quash that notice. The O.P. was dismissed in limine by this Court. A writ appeal filed against that decision also met with the same fate but the Division Bench directed that the petitioner will be at liberty to move this Court with an application under S.561-A Cr.P.C. Hence this petition. 3. Various contentions were raised before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner. I am here concerned only with the question whether there is any legal bar for the prosecution before the District Magistrate's Court either under the new Act or under the old Act. 4. The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere under S.561-A Cr. PC. is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in R P, Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR. 1960 SC. 866. I am extracting below the relevant portion from that judgment: "The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised are: (1) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category " Therefore, what is necessary in this case is to examine whether this prosecution comes within one or the other categories enumerated in the above decision. 5. The main contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me is the one based on the protection given to an assessee from prosecution contained in S.28 (4) of the old Act, which reads as follows: "No prosecution for an offence against this Act shall be instituted in respect of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed under this section. The question therefore which falls for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to this protection and whether his case comes within S.28(4) of the old Act. The return in this case was submitted only on 29-5-1962, that is, after the coming into force of the new Act on 141962. Provision is made in the new Act for the procedure to be adopted in assessment proceedings for the period before coming into force of the new Act depending upon the date of submission of the return. S.297 (1) of the new Act repeals the old Act. S.297 (2) contains the saving clause. Under clause (a) of S.297 (2) it is provided that where a return of income had been filed before the commencement of the new Act, proceedings for the assessment of that person might be taken and continued under the old Act and clause (b) provides that where a return of income is filed after the commencement of the new Act for the assessment year ending 31st day of March, 1962 or any earlier year, the assessment of the person shall be in accordance with the procedure specified in the new Act. Provision is also made in the new Act for taking penalty proceedings against an assessee and a distinction has been made basing on the date on which the assessment was completed. S.297 (2) (f) and (g) are the relevant provisions relating to penalty. For a better appreciation of the point involved in this case, I am extracting below those two clauses: "(f) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in respect of any assessment completed before the first day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed; classified into two groups: the first group is of those whose assessments have been completed before 1-4-1962 and it is provided that in such cases penalty will be imposed under the old Act. The second group of assessees is of those whose assessment is completed on or after 1st day of April 1962 and in their cases the imposition of penalty has to be under the new Act. Ia this case, the return itself was submitted only on 29-5-1962 and therefore it is cl. (g) of S.297 (2) that is attracted for the imposition of penalty on the petitioner. S 28 (4) of the old Act gives relief to an assessee from prosecution only if penalty is imposed under the old Act because the expression used in S.28(4) is "a penalty has been imposed under this section," It is clear that in view of S.297 (2) (g), the penalty proceedings can be taken only under the new Act and therefore S.28(4) of the old Act cannot be invoked by the petitioner. The new Act does not contain any provision corresponding to S.28(4) of the old Act and therefore when the penalty is imposed under the relevant provisions of the new Act there is no bar for a prosecution on the same facts. As observed in Jain Bros. v. Union of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 778), one of the departures in the new Act from the eld Act is that while no prosecution could be launched in respect of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed under the old Act, under the new Act a penalty can be imposed and a prosecution launched on the same facts. 6. 1970 SC. 778), one of the departures in the new Act from the eld Act is that while no prosecution could be launched in respect of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed under the old Act, under the new Act a penalty can be imposed and a prosecution launched on the same facts. 6. An ingenious argument was put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution is bad in as much as S.277 of the new Act cannot be attracted in his case. The basis of the argument is that the statement made by him in a verification, which is the subject-matter of the prosecution, was not under the new Act or any rule made thereunder but under the old Act. This contention does not take into account the various acts mentioned in S.277 of the new Act, which reads as follows: " If a person makes a statement in any verification under this Act or under any rule made thereunder, or delivers an account or statement, which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years." The offence is therefore not only in making a statement but also in delivering an account or statement which is false. The account and statement made in this case by the petitioner are false, according to the prosecution. Whether an offence has been committed or not has to be decided by the trial Magistrate. It cannot be said that the prosecution is barred under any of the provisions of either the old Act or the new Act. There is, therefore, no merit in this petition. In the result, the criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed.