JUDGMENT B.D. Singh, J. This application under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein after referred to as 'the Code') is directed against the final order dated the 11th October, 1969, passed by Shri D.P. Sinha, Magistrate, First Class, under section 146 (IB) of the Code. In the proceeding, the petitioner was the second party where as the opposite party was the first party. The disputed land measures 19 kathas 17 dhurs, described as under: Plot No. 2309 - 4 kathas 11 dhurs Plot No. 3203 - 4, kathas 11 dhurs Plot No. 3542 -10 kathas 15 dhurs. The land is situated in village Sundarpur, Police Station Barharia in the district of Saran. 2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this application, it is necessary to State briefly the facts of the case. On the 15th November, 1960, a proceeding under section 144 of the Code was initiated which was converted into one under section 145 of the Code on the 10th January, 1961. On the 26th of April, 1962, Shri S.N. Jha, Magistrate, First Class, passed a final order under section 145 of the Code declaring possession of the petitioner over the disputed land. Aggrieved by the said order, the opposite party filed criminal Revision No. 48 of 1962 in the court of the Additional Sessions Judge who was pleased to refer the same to the High Court under Criminal Reference No. 66 of 1963. On the 8th November, 1963, the said reference was heard by Kamala Sahai, J., who held: "I find that the' learned magistrate has considered the affidavits but, as pointed out by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, he has not properly considered the documentary evidence. A finding relating to possession can only be arrived at on a consideration of evidence of both kinds oral and documentary. If one kind of evidence is ignored, the finding is bound to be vitiated. For the reason given above, I accept the 1 reference and set aside the learned Magistrate's order. The case is remanded to him for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above after giving an opportunity to both parties to be heard." On remand, the matter was placed before Shri Omkar Nath, Magistrate, on the 9th December, 1963: but, he however, did not pass the final order. The case is remanded to him for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above after giving an opportunity to both parties to be heard." On remand, the matter was placed before Shri Omkar Nath, Magistrate, on the 9th December, 1963: but, he however, did not pass the final order. Thereafter, it was placed before different Magistrates but no final order was passed as most of them were transferred. Ultimately, on the 29th July, 1968, the matter was placed before Shri D.P. Sinha, who was pleased to refer the same to the Civil Court under section 146 of the Code. The relevant portion of his order reads: Six affidavits have been filed by the F.P. whereas seven affidavits have been filed by the S.P. Both parties have also filed some documents and rent receipts in support of their claims. So in order to decide the factum of possession I have perused documentary evidence and have examined affidavits filed by either side but in spite of efforts I have not been able to decide the factum of possession. Accordingly, the proceeding is converted into U/S 146 Cr. P.C. The land in question will remain attached. Let the entire record be sent to the Civil Court having competent jurisdiction to determine the point of possession. Let the parties appear there at on 29.8.68." On the 30th August, 1969 Mr. M.P. Gupta First Munsif, Siwan, passed an order under section 146 of the Code. The operative portion of his order reads thus: "On a careful consideration of the papers and affidavits filed on behalf of the parties. I have no hesitation to hold that it is the members of the first party who have been in possession over the eastern halves of R.S. Plot Nos. 2309 & 3203 and whole of the R.S. Plot No. 3542." 3. Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has challenged the impugned order as well as the order passed by the learned Munsif and has raised the following points for consideration by this Court: (i) The learned Munsif has erred in holding possession of the opposite party on the entire disputed land under plot No. 3542 although the opposite party claimed in the show cause as well as in the written statement only half of it. In the affidavits also, the opposite party had claimed only half of it. In the affidavits also, the opposite party had claimed only half of it. (ii) The learned Munsif has erred in making declaration of the eastern side of plot No. 3203 to be in possession of the opposite party although there is no material on the record to show that the opposite party was in possession over the land in plot No. 2303 from the eastern side. (iii) The learned Munsif has erred in not considering the two zarpeshgi deeds of the years 1923 and 1946 filed by the petitioner. (iv) The learned Mtinsif failed to notice that in the final order dated the 26th April, 1962. Shri S.N. Jha had held the rent receipts filed by 'the opposite party' to be suspicious. The learned Munsif, according to Mr. Saran, ought not to have relied on those very receipts without giving cogent reasons. (v) The order dated the 29th July, 1968, by which Shri D.P. Sinha had made the reference to the civil Courts under section 146 of the Code was itself not vaild. (vi) The learned Munsif erred in relying on the opposite party's affidavits of (a) Ramkishun Kohar son of Lakhan Kohar, (b) Sita Ram son of Kamlesh war Ram, (c) Bansi Kohar son of Phulena Kohar, and (d) Bhagirathi Ahir son of Nakched Ahir, which were inadmissible, not being in legal form. 4. It will be convenient to deal with point no. (v) first Mr. Saran drew my attention to the order dated the 29th July, 1968, under which reference was made to the Civil Courts under section 146 of the Code. The relevant portion thereof has been quoted earlier. Learned Counsel submitted that it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to make genuine efforts to find out as to who was in actual possession of the disputed land under section 145 of the Code. Without making such efforts he was not expected to shift his responsibility to the Civil Courts. The relevant portion thereof has been quoted earlier. Learned Counsel submitted that it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to make genuine efforts to find out as to who was in actual possession of the disputed land under section 145 of the Code. Without making such efforts he was not expected to shift his responsibility to the Civil Courts. In order to substantiate his contention he relied on a decision of this Court in the State of Bihar v. Hari Mishra AIR 1965 Pat 411 where Anant Singh and G.N. Prasad, J.J., while dealing with the provision contained in section 146 (1) observed that it was not competent for a Magistrate to refer a case under the said provision to a civil Court without drawing up statement of the facts of the case and without expressing his opinion that he was unable 'to decide the question of possession and in those circumstances any decision that might be given by the civil Courts on even taking fresh evidence before it would be surely without jurisdiction. On the basis of the above observation Mr. Saran urged that in the instant case the Magistrate has not drawn up statement of the facts of the case, and the relevant portion of the order shows that he had not made genuine efforts to find out possession. In the same proceeding Mr. S.N. Jha had, pointed out earlier, passed final order under section 145 of the Code declaring possession of the petitioner over the disputed land. It is curious that there was sufficient material on the record for Mr. S.N. Jha to make up his mind where as Mr. D.P. Sinha, who 'passed the impugned order, did not find adequate materials on the record to decide about possession one way or the other and, had to refer it to the Civil Courts under section 146 of the Code. 5. In my opinion, this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be entertained at this stage. It is well established that when a petitioner submits to the Jurisdiction of a court, he cannot be allowed to raise such objection after Judgment is passed adverse to him. In the present case also if the petitioner had any grievance against the order dated the 29th July, 1968, he ought to have come to this Court for quashing there of. In the present case also if the petitioner had any grievance against the order dated the 29th July, 1968, he ought to have come to this Court for quashing there of. He having not done so submitted to the jurisdiction of the Munsif, who was proceeding with the case under section 146, and waited till the order was passed adverse to him Therefore, in my opinion, there is no merit in this point. 6. Now I purpose to deal with point No. (vi) Mr. Saran drew my attention to the verification portion of the affidavits sworn by Sita Ram, Bansi Kohar and Bhagirathi Ahir. The verification portion of the affidavit of Sit a Ram is to the following effect :- "I Sita Ram do hereby solemnly affirm that the above statements is true to the best of my knowledge and belief." The verification portion of the affidavits of Bansi Kohar and Bhagirathi Ahir is practically similar, except their names. It is to the following effect : "I do hereby declare that the contents of this affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge & belief." Learned counsel urged that the above defects in the verification were vital and as such the affidavits should not have' been accepted. In this connection he referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dipendra Nath Sarkar V. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1962 Patna 101) where it was observed that if a deponent of an affidavit did not clearly state how much of the statement was a statement of the knowledge of the deponent and how much of it was a statement of his belief, there was violation of Order 19 Rule 3 of the code of civil Procedure and such affidavits could not be accepted. In my view, this submission of the learned counsel is not tenable. Their Lordships in the above case were dealing with the provision contained under Order 19 Rule 3 of the code of Civil Procedure and were not dealing with the affidavits, which are sworn in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. In my view, this submission of the learned counsel is not tenable. Their Lordships in the above case were dealing with the provision contained under Order 19 Rule 3 of the code of Civil Procedure and were not dealing with the affidavits, which are sworn in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. Even assuming that the same principle would govern the affidavits in such proceeding also, it is well established that before rejecting them on the ground of defect in the verification, opportunity should be given to the parties to remove those defects and if they are not removed within the prescribed time, only then such affidavits can be rejected by a court. Besides, in the present case no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on that account. It will be petitioner note here that in the affidavits which were sworn on behalf of the petitioner verification portion also suffers from similar defects. Therefore in my Judgment, there is nothing wrong in the affidavits of Sita Ram, Bansi Kohar and Bhagirathi Ahir. They have been rightly accepted. 7. Learned counsel then drew my attention to the verification portion of the affidavit of Ramkishun Kohar. In this case affidavit is by Ramkishun, who has put his thumb impression, but in the verification portion the name of Ganesh Kohar is mentioned. From the perusal of the original affidavit it appears that previously it was prepared for Ganesh Kohar. At the top of the affidavit the name 'Ganesh' appears to have been scored through and instead 'Ramkishun' is found written by hand, but in the verification portion the name 'Ganesh Kohar' which is typed, has not been penned through. In the certificate portion, however, 'Ganesh' appears, to have been penned through and 'Ramkishun' has been written. Learned Counsel submitted that the learned Munsif ought not to have accepted at least this affidavit. He urged that the learned Munsif did not apply his mind on the serious defect of this affidavit. In my view, this submission of the learned counsel is well founded but that will not be a ground for reversing the order of the learned Munsif. He urged that the learned Munsif did not apply his mind on the serious defect of this affidavit. In my view, this submission of the learned counsel is well founded but that will not be a ground for reversing the order of the learned Munsif. Reference may be made to the provision contained in section 167 of the Evidence Act, which reads as: "The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be a ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the. Court before which such objection is raised that, independent of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision." In view of the above provision I find that even if the affidavit of Ramkishun Kohar be left out of consideration; the remaining five affidavits were sufficient for the learned Munsif to base his decision. 8. It will be convenient now to deal with the remaining points nos. (i) to (iv) together. Learned Counsel while elaborating point no. (i) drew my attention to paragraph 15 of the show cause filed on behalf of the 1st Party opposite party, which is to this effect: "That from the facts disclosed above it is clear that the 1st party are in peaceful possession of the half portion of all the disputed lands and the 2nd party are." Similar statement has been made on behalf opposite party in all the affidavits, which were sworn on his behalf, except that of Bhagirathi Ahir, who stated in paragraph 3 as: "That the disputed plot no. 3542 is in khas possession of 1st Party Bhola Kohar for the last 15 months and prior to that the same was in possession of Rekha Ahir and Dharmdaeo Ahir zerpeshgidar on behalf of 1st party and the father of 2nd Party both of whom had half share each." In my view, this submission of the learned counsel is also not of any material consequence as at least in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of Bhagirathi there was material for the Munsif to hold regarding exclusive possession of the opposite party over the disputed land in plot no. 3542. In support of point no. 3542. In support of point no. (ii) learned counsel submitted that there was no material before the learned Munsif to declare that the opposite party was in possession of half of the land in plot no. 3203 from the eastern side. In my view, this submission is also not acceptable. Even in the order dated the 26th April, 1962, passed by Mr. S.N. Jha, who had decided in favour of the petitioner, I find that Mr. Jha, while discussing the case of the first party had mentioned that the first party had given out in his written statement that he was in possession of the eastern half of the disputed plots. A reference to the order sheet dated the 6th February, 1961, makes it quite clear that a written-statement was also filed on behalf of the first party. The said written statement is not traceable at present on the record of the case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Munsif, when he passed the order under• section 146 of the Code, had no material before him to declare the opposite party to be in possession of the half of the land in plot No. 3203 from the eastern side. 9. As regards point No. (iii) learned counsel submitted that in spite of the direction given by Sahai, J. in Criminal Reference No. 66 of 1963, referred to above, learned Munsif has not considered the two zerpeshgi deeds filed on behalf of the petitioner. In my view, this contention of the learned counsel is not tenable. In paragraph 11 of the order the learned Munsif has not only referred to the two zerpeshgi deeds, but has considered them and has given reasons for not relying on them. Even if two views may be possible on the appreciation of the evidentiary value of those zerpeshgi deeds, this Court would not interfere on that account in its revisional jurisdiction. 10. Learned counsel then submitted regarding point no. (iv). In this connection he referred to the order dated the 26th April, 1962, passed by Mr. Jha in order to show that in his order he had observed that the rent receipts filed by the opposite party were suspicious. In my opinion, his observation in the said order was not binding upon the learned Munsif. (iv). In this connection he referred to the order dated the 26th April, 1962, passed by Mr. Jha in order to show that in his order he had observed that the rent receipts filed by the opposite party were suspicious. In my opinion, his observation in the said order was not binding upon the learned Munsif. He had ample jurisdiction to take a different view regarding those rent receipts Learned counsel then referred to paragraph 9 of the order of the learned Munsif to show that in the earlier portion thereof he himself observed that the production of the rent receipts from the custody of the first party, however, could not be regarded as conclusive proof of his claim of possession but in the latter portion the learned Munsif, inconsistent to his own observation, held that the zerpeshgi deed dated the 27th May, 1941, filed by the first party and the numerous rent receipts from his custody lent support to his claim of possession. In my opinion; the two observations of the learned Munsif can easily be reconciled. It may be noticed that in the earlier portion he had observed that the rent receipts by themselves could not be regarded as conclusive proof of possession whereas in the latter portion he considered these rent receipts along with the zerpeshgi deed dated the 27th May, 1941, and, therefore, he held that taken those documents together they lent support to the claim of possession of the first party. I do not find any justification for interfering with the order of the learned Munsif on that score either. Reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dewani Chaudhary V. Chaturi Manjhi where provisions contained in sections 145, 146 sub-section (I-B) and (I-D), 435 and 439 of the Code came up for consideration, and it was observed that this Court can interfere with the order of the Munsif passed under section 146 and the order of the Magistrate passed under section 146 Sub-Section (I-B) only in cases involving flagrant violation of the legal principles or principles of natural Justice. The scope for interference is very limited. 11. After careful consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel from different aspects I do not find any merit in the application, which is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of Muusif as well as that of the Magistrate are upheld. Application dismissed.