JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal against a confirming judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Aska upholding the decision of the Munsif, Aska decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for redemption. On 12-6-1939, the Plaintiff No. 1 who is admittedly the owner of the disputed properties measuring 21.83 acres executed a simple mortgage (Ext. 1) in respect of the same in favour of Defendant No. 1 for Rs. 100/-. The loan amount was to bear interest at twenty-five percent per annum and the Plaintiff No. 1 had agreed to redeem the same by the Dol Purnima on the following year. But he could not redeem the mortgage. The Plaintiff's case is that in 1950 the Defendant No. 1 told Plaintiff No. 1 that a sum of Rs. 700/- was due to him under the mortgage and demanded the same. As the Plaintiff could not pay the dues, he delivered possession of the lands to Defendant No. 1 asking him to treat the transaction as a usufructuary mortgage and to remain in possession of the land till the full mortgage amount was discharged. It is his case that by remaining in possession of the lands, the Defendant No. 1 has realised by way of usufruct more than the amount due to him under the mortgage. As in spite of repeated demands by the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 1 did not deliver possession of the lands to him, he filed the suit for redemption and recovery of possession of the lands and for determination of mesne profits due to him from the Defendants. Defendant No. 2 is the son of Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 3 is alleged to have purchased a portion of the disputed properties from Defendant No. 2 Plaintiffs 2 to 5 are the sons of the mortgagor Plaintiff No. 1. 2. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement admitted the execution of the simple mortgage bond in his favour by the Plaintiff No. 1. He stated that in 1941, the first Plaintiff paid up the mortgage dues to him and redeemed the properties. Subsequently, the mortgage lands were put to auction sale for arrear dues to the Zamindar and the latter purchased the same. In 1950 the Zamindar settled the lands with Defendant No. 1. He stated that in 1941, the first Plaintiff paid up the mortgage dues to him and redeemed the properties. Subsequently, the mortgage lands were put to auction sale for arrear dues to the Zamindar and the latter purchased the same. In 1950 the Zamindar settled the lands with Defendant No. 1. He disputed the genuiness and validity of the alleged sale of a portion of the disputed lands by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 3. 3. Defendant No. 2 did not contest the suit. Defendant No. 3 in his written statement admitted about the execution of the mortgage bond Ext. 1 by Plaintiff No. 1 in favour of Defendant No. 1. According to him, however, as Plaintiff No. 1 could not discharge the loan, he surrendered the disputed lands to Defendant No. 1 in 1942 who thereafter became the full owner of the properties. There was a subsequent partition between Defendant No. 1 and his son Defendant No. 2 in which the disputed properties fell to the share of Defendant No. 2, who in 1963 sold the same to Defendant No. 3 under a registered deed of sale for a consideration of Rs. 5000/- and since then he (Defendant No. 3) is in possession of the lands in his own right. In the circumstance stated by him, be pleaded that the Plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 4. The title Court disbelieved the case of Defendant No. 1 that the Plaintiff No. 1 redeemed the mortgaged properties in 1941, that subsequently they were put to auction sale for arrears of rent and purchased by the ex-Proprietor of Khallikote and that the latter thereafter settled the lands with Defendant No. 1. He also disbelieved the case of Defendant No. 3 that the Plaintiff surrendered the lands in 1942 to Defendant No. 1 and that in a subsequent partition between Defendant No. 1 and his son Defendant t No. 2 the disputed properties fell to the share of the latter. He also disbelieved the alleged subsequent sale of the properties by Defendant No. 2 to Defendant No. 3 as no sale deed was produced in proof of the transaction. He believed the Plaintiffs' case that in the year 1950, the Plaintiff No. 1 delivered possession of the lands to Defendant No. 1 under usufructuary mortgage which however was an oral transaction not evidenced by any document. He believed the Plaintiffs' case that in the year 1950, the Plaintiff No. 1 delivered possession of the lands to Defendant No. 1 under usufructuary mortgage which however was an oral transaction not evidenced by any document. In view of this finding, he held that Defendant No. 1 if at all had perfected his right to the suit properties only as a usufructuary mortgagee. None-the-less, following the principle enunciated in Purusottam Das and Another Vs. S.M. Desouza and Another, he held that the Plaintiff No. 1 would not be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act and would not also be entitled to claim any mesne profits. In the result he passed a preliminary decree directing payment of Rs. 200/- towards the principal amount advanced and interest by Plaintiff No. 1 to Defendant No. 1 within three months from the date of the decree on payment of which Defendant No. 1 was directed to deliver back possession of the suit properties to the Plaintiff No. 1. 5. Defendant No. 3 alone appealed against the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld the findings recorded by the learned Munsif and came to the conclusion that the mortgage which was effected in 1939 still subsists and that the Plaintiff No. 1 is entitled to redeem the mortgage on terms fixed by the trial Court. He, therefore, dismissed the appeal. Hence this appeal by Defendant No. 3. 6. Two substantial points of law are urged in support of the appeal, namely, (1) that the Plaintiffs' case being that Plaintiff No. 1 executed a simple mortgage bond in respect of the disputed properties on 12-6-1939, it was not open to them to plead a possessory mortgage since the year 1950 because it amounted to variation of the terms contained in the simple mortgage bond Ext. 1 and thereby offended Section 92 of the Evidence Act; and (2) the possessory mortgage of the year 1950 required for its validity a registered document, and in the absence of the same, the transaction is void and consequently Defendant No. 1 having remained in possession of the properties since 1950 acquired an absolute title thereto by adverse possession and that the finding that his possession is still as a mortgagee is not correct. 7. 7. The first contention raises the question whether the oral agreement of 1950 alleged and proved on behalf of the Plaintiffs is an agreement contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the original mortgage. It appears to me that this subsequent oral agreement instead of contradicting varying, adding to or sub stracting from the terms of the original mortgage merely seeks to lay down the means by which the original contract was to be implemented, or the means of satisfaction of the mortgage debt. To that extent it not merely does not contradict, vary add to or subtract from the original mortgage but really seeks to full the terms of the mortgage, and consequently, it is not hit by the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act but is fully covered by Proviso (2) thereof. The subsequent oral agreement does not, as the Courts below seem to have assumed, convert the original mortgage which was a simple mortgage into a manufactory mortgage. What all Plaintiff No. 1 did was when in 1950 Defendant No. 1 demanded the dues under Ext. 1, he put the mortgagee in possession of the properties so that from the usufruct thereof he could pay himself off the debt due from Plaintiff No. 1. This view receives support from an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kamal Sahai v. Babu Nandan Mian and Anr. 11 Cal L.J. 39 and a Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Narain Mishra Vs. Mahanth Mishra and Others, . 8. The second argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant also appears to me to be untenable. The character of adverse possession depends upon the animus possidendi of the person under which the possession has been taken and continued though the mortgage as such may be invalid, the possession itself having been taken on the footing of its being a mortgage, such possession is not derogation of the absolute title of the owner, but is at least permissive. The concurrent finding of the Courts below in this case is that when in 1950 Plaintiff No. 1 gave possession of the disputed properties to Defendant No. 1 it was understood by both the parties that the latter would remain in possession thereof and pay himself off out of the usufruct of the lands in discharge of the original simple mortgage deed. Having taken possession under such circumstances Defendant No. 1 can not prescribe an absolute title in the properties. His possession in the circumstances must be deemed to be only permissive. Reference in this connection may be made to the two Bench decisions of this Court in Purusottam Das and Another Vs. S.M. Desouza and Another, and Sheobalak Misra and Others Vs. Suraj Prasad and Others, ; in the latter case, Panigrahi, J. stated thus: A person may transfer his property for securing a loan either orally, or by an unregistered document both of which are inoperative to create the relationship of mortgager and mortgagee. But the possession of the transferee under such a transaction becomes adverse from the moment he enters into possession and he acquires by such adverse possession the title for which he prescribed when he entered into possession. Thus a person who enteres into possession as a mortgagee under an invalid document acquires by prescription the title of a mortgagee after twelve years, for the possession from the commencement is under an adverse title. I was contended that the principle laid down in Purusottam Das and Another Vs. S.M. Desouza and Another, was in respect of a case where the mortgagee entered into possession under a document executed but unregistered and, therefore, an invalid document, whereas in the case before us the transaction of 1950 was an oral transaction. But this does not appear to me to make any distinction in principle because the case dealt with in Sheobalak Misra and Others Vs. Suraj Prasad and Others, in which the passage above-quoted occurs related to a mortgage transaction which took place orally. 9. Both the contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant fail. I would accordingly uphold the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with costs payable to the contesting Respondents.