JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for khas possession on declaration of title. 2. THE facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal are as follows: -One Rashiklal Ghosh was an occupancy raiyat under his landlord, Sushital Kumar Ghosh. After the death of Rashiklal his two sons, Santosh Kumar Ghoshal and Atal Behari Ghoshal jointly inherited the disputed holding. They defaulted in payment of rent as a result of which their landlord brought a rent suit against them, being Title Suit No. 150 of 1954 of the Second Court of the Munsiff, Sealdah. In execution of the decree obtained in that suit the disputed holding was put up to sale, and it was purchased by the plaintiff on April 21, 1955. The plaintiff obtained delivery of possession through the Court on July 12, 1955. Thereafter on December 14, 1955the plaintiff started a proceeding under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for annulling the in cumbrance, alleging that one Mahadeb Ahir was claiming korfa tenancy in respect of the disputed land under the judgment-debtors, Santos hand Atal. The plaintiff alleged that notice of the said proceeding was duly served upon the said Mahadeb Ahir and his korfa tenancy was duly annulled. The plaintiff instituted the suit out of which thus appeal arises on July 26, 1958 alleging that he had been dispossessed by the defendants in March, 1956. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. The defendants claimed that they were in possession of the said land by virtue of their purchase from Mahadeb Ahir on the 27th of February, 1966. The defendants further alleged that the rent sale was collusive and they also denied the service of notice under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 3. MR. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, has urged, in the first place that the sale in which the plaintiff purchased the disputed land having taken place on the 21st of April, 1955, it was not a rent sale under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The argument is that unless the relationship of the landlord and the tenant subsists during the entire period beginning from the institution of the suit upto the date of sale, the sale cannot be a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act. The argument is that unless the relationship of the landlord and the tenant subsists during the entire period beginning from the institution of the suit upto the date of sale, the sale cannot be a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is contended that the interest of the superior land lord, Sushital Kumar Ghosh, who was an intermediary having vested in the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Acton the 14th of April, 1955, there was no relationship of land lord and tenant between Sushital Kumar Ghosh on the one hand and Santosh and Atal on the other, at the date of the sale which took place on the 21st of April, 1955. Mr. Mukherjee therefore contends that the purchaser in the said sale, namely, the plaintiff had no right to annul the in cumbrance under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The next contention of Mr. Mukherjee is that section5b of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition act is a bar to such a sale. 4. AS these points were not urged before the Courts below, Mr. Nirmal Kumar Ganguly appearing for the respondent prayed for some time to consider this aspect of the matter. The hearing was accordingly adjourned and Mr. Ganguly was granted time as prayed for by him. Let us now examine the contentions put forward by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant. There is no doubt that if the sale held on April 21, 1955 was a rent sale, the plaintiff would have the right to annul the in cumbrance and in that case the defendants who are purchasers from the under tenant Mahadeb Ahir, would acquire no title to the disputed property as their purchase is dated February 27, 1956. If, on the other hand, the sale was not a rent sale then the plaintiff would have no right to annul the korfa tenancy of Mahadebahir. In (1) Krishnapad Chatterjee v. Manada Sundari Ghosh, 36 C. W. N. 518 also reported in I. L. R. 1959 Cal. If, on the other hand, the sale was not a rent sale then the plaintiff would have no right to annul the korfa tenancy of Mahadebahir. In (1) Krishnapad Chatterjee v. Manada Sundari Ghosh, 36 C. W. N. 518 also reported in I. L. R. 1959 Cal. 1202 a Special Bench of this Court held that the right to bring the tenure or holding to sale under section 65 exists only so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, and so a person seeking to have the tenure or holding sold at a rent sale must have the landlord's interest vested in him from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of the sale. If the law as laid down by the Special Bench is applied to the facts of the present case it will be seen that Sushital Kumar Ghosh was not the landlord of Santosh and Atal on the date of the sale, his interest having vested in the meantime in the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. 5. TO get over this difficulty Mr. Ganguly, appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the law laid down by the Special Bench in the decision referred to above is no longer good law, and in any event, it is not applicable to this case. This argument has been advanced by the learned Advocate with reference to section 8 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. The relevant portion of the said section is as follows : "8. All arrears of rent and cesses together with interest thereon and other amounts lawfully recoverable by any intermediary on the date of vesting from any person, in respect of any interest of such intermediary which vests under section 5, and all sums due from such person in respect of any decree for arrears of rent in respect of such interest, whether having the effect of a rent-decree or money-decree and whether obtained before or after the date of vesting and the execution of which is not barred by limitation, shall continue to be recoverable by such intermediary. " Mr. " Mr. Ganguly lays stress upon the words 'rent-decree' appearing in section 8 and contends that because of the use of the said expression it must be taken that the legislature intended to confer a right upon the decree-holder to execute a 'rent-decree' with all its special characteristics under the Bengal Tenancy Act. Mr. Ganguly's argument is that when the legislature has used two distinct expressions, namely, 'rent-decree' and 'money-decree' in section 8, the said expressions must be understood. In support of this submission Mr. Ganguly has relied on the decisions in (2) Bibi Nazma Khatun and another v. R. P. Sinha, Custodian Evacuee Property, Bihar and another, A. I. R. 1954 Pat. 43 and (3) Kusum Lala v. Kampta Prasad A. I. R. 1965 All. 280. This decisions are not very relevant to the present question. There is no doubt that when a particular expression has been used in a statute it should be read as having the same meaning in which that expression is ordinarily understood or in which it has been used in another allied statute unless of course a contrary intention is indicated by the statute itself. It is equally true that when two different expressions have been used in the same section, the expressions should not be understood to have been used in the same sense. But what we are concerned with in this case is not whether the expression 'rent-decree' has been used in the same sense as the expression 'money-decree' but whether different rights have been conferred upon the holder of a 'rent-decree' and the holder of a 'money-decree'. Section 8 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act merely confers a right upon a decree-holder whether the decree is a 'rent-decree' or a 'money-decree' to realise his decreetal dues if it is not barred by limitation. But the section does not prescribe the method of enforcing a decree. It does not also confer any special right upon an intermediary whose interest has vested in the State to execute a 'rent-decree' in the same way in which he might have executed a 'rent-decree' under the Bengal Tenancy Act when he was the landlord. 6. THERE is also another reason why the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Ganguly cannot be accepted. 6. THERE is also another reason why the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Ganguly cannot be accepted. To hold that an intermediary can execute a rent decree as a 'rent-decree' with all its special characterises under the Bengal Tenancy Act would be to render the provisions of section 5b of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act wholly nugatory. Mr. Ganguly's contention, therefore, cannot be accepted. It must therefore be held that the law laid down by the Special Bench in (1) Krishnapada Chatterjee v. Manada Sundari Ghosh, 36 C. W. N. 518 applies with all its force to the facts of the present case. That being the position, the sale held on April 21, 1955, was not a rent sale and therefore the plaintiff had no right to annul the in cumbrance under section 167of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Mr. Ganguly refers to the case of (4) M. L. Dalmiya v. Chinta Haran, 62 C. W. N. 505 in support of his contention that even though the plaintiff was not in khas possession, his right to recover possession from the defendants was not barred by the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. The said decision, in my view, is of no assistance to Mr. Ganguly in this case. In that case it was held that an ejectment suit or an appeal arising out of an ejectment decree would not abate or quandam would not be disentitled to any decree consequent upon the vesting of the rights of the intermediary in the State Government. But in our case the facts are quite different. If the plaintiff had no right to annul the in cumbrance under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act then Mahadeb Ahir would continue to be a korfa tenant under the plaintiff, and after the issue of notification under section 49 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, the plaintiff's interest would also vest in the State Government. The plaintiff, therefore, would have no right to institute a suit for khas possession. Mr. Ganguly further submits that in view of a recital in the agreement for sale executed by Mahadeb Ahir in favour of the defendants (Exh. B) to the effect that the proceeding under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was pending on the date of execution of the said agreement, the defendants are estopped from questioning the proceeding under section 167. B) to the effect that the proceeding under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was pending on the date of execution of the said agreement, the defendants are estopped from questioning the proceeding under section 167. It if difficult to see how the question of estoppel can arise here. There was no representation made by the defendants or their vendor to the plaintiff, nor did the plaintiff act to his detriment in pursuance of any alleged representation. Moreover, there cannot be any estoppel against a statute. It has also been contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the defence taken by the defendants is barred byres judicata because of the proceeding under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This contention of the learned Advocate cannot be accepted for the simple reason that there was no decision in the proceeding under section 167. In fact, there could not be any decision because section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not contemplate any decision on any point by the Court, It merely enables a purchaser at a rent sale to serve a notice and upon due service thereof the in cumbrance is annulled. 7. THE other points urged by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant is that a rent sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act was barred by section 5b of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act on the date on which the sale took place, that is, on April 21, 1955. To meet this point Mr. Ganguly, the learned Advocate for the respondent relied upon the decision in (5) Prahlad Chandra Dey v. Gobinda Chandra Dey, 67 C. W. N. 452. On the basis of the said decision Mr. Ganguly has submitted that the effective date for sale of a raiyati jote cannot be any date earlier than 25th November, 1955 when sections 49 and 52 of Chapter VI of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act were substituted for the old ones and that the effective date in so far as raiyati jotes are concerned should be 10th April, 1956 when notifications under section 49 were issued. The aforesaid Single Bench decision of S. K. Sen, J. was incidentally considered in (6) Ambujakhya Mukherjee v. The State I. L. R. (1966) 1 Cal. 495. The aforesaid Single Bench decision of S. K. Sen, J. was incidentally considered in (6) Ambujakhya Mukherjee v. The State I. L. R. (1966) 1 Cal. 495. In that case P. B. Mukherji, J. took the view following his own decision in (7) Haranath Ghosh v. The State of West Bengal 67 C. W. N. 129 that the modification intended under section 52 of the Act was the contextual adaptation of those chapters of the Act to the case of raiyats and under-raiyat and not amendment of the substantive provisions and effects of these chapters. The contextual adaption is only intended to make those chapters applicable to the case of raiyats and under-raiyats. According to the view taken in the said Division Bench decision in Ambujakhya Mukherjee v. State, therefore, it is not permissible to read 10th April, 1956 or any other date in place of 1st June, 1954 as mentioned in section 5b. It is however not necessary to persue this point further as I have already held that the sale which took place on April 21, 1955 was not a rent-sale. The plaintiff therefore purchased only the right, title and interest of the judgment debtors and he had no right to annul the in cumbrance under section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, with there suit the korfa tenancy claimed by Mahabir Ahir under the judgment debtors continued. 8. THIS appeal is therefore allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Mr. Ganguly prays for leave under clause 15 under the Letters Patent. The leave prayed for is granted.