( 1 ) THE petitioner before this Court was P. W. 2 in C. C. No. 2341 of 1970 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, First Court, Bangalore. . The respondent before this Court was the complainant in the said case and was examined as P. W. 1. The Police filed a chargesheet against A-1 and a2 charging them with having committed offences under Ss. 406 and 414, indian Penal Code. After the trial, the learned Magistrate acquitted the accused and directed that M. O. 1 to M. O. 3, iewels which were the subject matter of the complaint, be returned to the petitioner P. W. 2, with whom these iewels had been pledged bv A2. This order passed bv the learned Magistrate was challenged in Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2 of 1971 and the First Additional Sessions Judge of Bangalore, set aside the said order and directed the return of M. O. 1 to M. O. 3 to the owner, p. W. 1, the complainant in the said case. This order passed by the learned sessions Judge is challenged in this revision petition. ( 2 ) SRI G. R. Doreswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, P. W. 2, has argued that the Magistrate had found that there was no entrustment, and misappropriation bv the accused and acquitted them. The petitioner in this case is a third partv and he bona fide accepted the pledge of the jewels, M. O. 1 to M. O. 3. The learned Sessions judge committed a mistake in thinking that P. W. 1 did not come with a-2 at the time of the pledge. After being a partv to the pledge, P. W. 1 wants to get back the jewellery without paving the amount. It is open to p. W. 1 to pay the money and redeem the pledge from P. W. 2. It is contended that the petitioner being a pledgee, the court erred in returning m. O. 1 to M. O. 3 to P. W. 1, the complainant when the accused was acquitted in the criminal case. The learned counsel has relied on A. I. R. 1942, nagpur 82, AIR. 1953 SC. 508, and AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 123 in support of the said contentions. The learned counsel has relied on A. I. R. 1942, nagpur 82, AIR. 1953 SC. 508, and AIR. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 123 in support of the said contentions. ( 3 ) SRI C. Lakshminarayana Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of P. W. 1, complainant, has argued that it is admitted that P. W. 1, was the owner of the jewels M. O. 1 to M. O. 3, His initials, 'k. S. B. ' are found on the jewels. The version given by P. W. 2 that P. W. 1 was present at the time of the pledge is false. In examination in chief, P. W. 2 has stated that the accused 2 came and pledged the jewels but in the cross examination he has stated that P. W. 1 had come with A-2 for pledging the jewels. This statement made by P. W. 2 is an after-thought and made only to help himself and save the property. If P. W. 1 had really come with A-2 at the time of pledge, it was open to him (P. W. 2) to take the signature of P. W. 1 on" ex. P-2, pawn ticket taken by P. W. 2 at the time of the pledge. Even in ex. P-3 Mahazar prepared, there is no reference about P. W. 1 being in the company of A-2 at the time of the pledge. The learned counsel has strongly relied on A. I. R. 1956 Madras 264 and 1969 (2) Mysore Law Journal 304 in support of his contentions. It is contended that P. W. 1 was not in the company of A-2 at the time of the pledge and the conduct of P. W. 2 clearly shows that knowing that A-2 was not the owner of the jewels, he has accepted the pledge. The learned counsel argued that there are no grounds to interfere with the order, and the learned Sessions Judge was fully justified in returning the jewels to P. W. 1 the owner. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has contended that the points for determination are whether P. W. 2 came into possession of these jewels lawfully and whether P. W. 1 was ' the owner of M. O. 1 to M. O. 3. He has cited before me A. I. R. 1970 Madras 220 and 1968 (2) Mysore Law Journal Page 511. He has cited before me A. I. R. 1970 Madras 220 and 1968 (2) Mysore Law Journal Page 511. ( 5 ) THERE can be no doubt that jewels M. O. 1 to M. O. 3 belong to pw. 1, the complainant. Ex. P. 2, the Pawn Ticket, discloses that M. O. 2 contains the initials of the complainant, "k. S. B. ". The name of the complainant is K. S. Basavarajappa. The learned Sessions Judge has stated that there is no dispute as to the ownership of the jewels and that pw. 1 is undoubtedly the owner of the jewels in question. It has not been argued before me that the jewels do not belong to PW. 1. A2 hag not claimed that the iewels which he pledged, belong to him. It is therefore clear that PW. 1 is the owner of the jewels MO. 1 to MO. 3. ( 6 ) THERE cannot be any doubt also that A2 pledged these jewels with pw. 2. Ex. P2, Pawn Ticket, clearly discloses that the pledge was by A2. A2 has signed on Ex. P2. As already pointed out A2 at no time claimed that these jewels belonged to him. It is therefore clear that PW. 2 had taken the pledge of these articles from A2 who had no right to the jewels. Before taking the jewels on pledge, PW 2 should have questioned A2 and satisfied himself whether the articles belonged to him. As already stated, the Pawn Ticket Ex P2 shows that the initials of PW. 1, 'ksb', were found on the jewels. When PW 2 found the initials of somebody else on the jewels, he should have satisfied himself that A. 2 had the right to pledge the jewels. PW 2 himself savs that he SAW the initials on the jewels and if he had taken the risk of taking them from A2. he cannot be said to b a bonafide pledgee. It is no doubt true that PW. 2 in cross-examination came with a new version that PW. 1 had also accompanted A2 at the time of the pledge. Obviously it is only an after-thought. If only PW. 1 had accompanied A2 at the time of pledge, one would expect PW. 2, when informed that PW. l is the owner of the iewels. to take the signature of pw. 1 in the pawn ticket. 1 had also accompanted A2 at the time of the pledge. Obviously it is only an after-thought. If only PW. 1 had accompanied A2 at the time of pledge, one would expect PW. 2, when informed that PW. l is the owner of the iewels. to take the signature of pw. 1 in the pawn ticket. The fart that PW. 2 has given two different versions at different times indicate that he is not a bonafide pledgee. ( 7 ) TN a similar case, Thanaaswamy v State ,air. 1966 Mad. 374. it has been pointed out that where the pledger had no title at all to pledge the foods and the property had been obtained by unlawful means, and where the pawnbroker's conduct shows that he did not take any precaution to fortify his position bv necessary enquiries about the antecedents of the pledgor, it would be proper exercise of the discretion on the part of the Criminal court to return the jewels to the owner. In paragraph 4 of the judgment , his Lodship has observed as follows:" It is not the province of the Criminal Court to enter into any elaborate consideration of the relative rights of the pledgor and pledgee under S. 178 and other allied provisions of the Contract Act. In such cases, where it is clear, as in this case, that the pledgor had no title at all to pledge the goods and on the other hand, the property had been obatined by him by unlawful means, and where the pawn-broker's conduct shows that he did not take any precaution to fortify his position by necessary enquiries about the antecedents of the pledgor, where ha got the jewel from and so on, it will be a proper exercise of the discretion on the part of the Criminal Court, in directing the return of the jewel to the person who had been deprived of his possession by the accused by unlawful means. " ( 8 ) IN the above said case, Budhulal v. Sukhman, AIR. 1942 Nag. 82. strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has been considered and distinguished. The facts of the Nagpur case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. " ( 8 ) IN the above said case, Budhulal v. Sukhman, AIR. 1942 Nag. 82. strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has been considered and distinguished. The facts of the Nagpur case are entirely different from the facts of the present case. 'in the said case, the owner's wife, probably the real owner of the jewels, had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels and in the said case the pledgee, before he took the pledge, made enquiries and satisfied himself that the person concerned had authorised the pledger to pledge the jewels in question. As the pledge in that case was bonafide and the pledge had been taken after necessary precautions, the Court held that he was the person entitled to the possession. ( 9 ) I am of the opinion that the decision in Pushkar Singh v. Madhya bharat, AIR. 1953 SC. 508. relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is of no assistance to him. The question their Lordships were considering in the case was the return of a sum of Rs. 463. As it was a case of money, it was not possible to identify it and say to whom the money belonged. The finding in the said case was that no offence of theft had been made out and that the sum of Rs. 463 did not belong to the complaniant. In those circumstances the Court directed the return of the money to the accused as he had been acquitted of the charge of theft. Here, as already pointed out, there cannot be any doubt that the articles in question belong to PW. 1 and A2, who pledged the jewels, had no right whatsoever to MO. 1 to MO. 3. ( 10 ) IN A. S. S. Ahmed v. Police Commissioner, AIR. 1970 Mad. 220. at paragraph 10 of his judgment, his Lordship has observed as follows :". . . . . Normally, in cases where the offence is not made out the property should be delivered to the person from whom it is seized or taken. But, it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In such cases, the actual possession of the property at the time it was seized may be a relevant factor but not conclusive to determine the entitlement of such possession. But, it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In such cases, the actual possession of the property at the time it was seized may be a relevant factor but not conclusive to determine the entitlement of such possession. The words used in S. 523 (1), Crlpc are ' the person entitled to the possession of the property'. These words cannot be equated with the actual posssesion. Nor can they be equated with the expression ' the person from whom the property is seized or taken'. A person may be in unlawful possession at the time it was seized, though he has not committed the offence, and in that circumstance, it cannot be said that he is entitled to possession. It must be a lawful possession. The test therefore, is not the mere possession of property at the time of seizure, but as to who is entitled to lawful possession. The expressipn ' entitled to possession' is the sine quanon for the delivery of property under S. 523, Crlpc. "it is no doubt true that his Lordship was considering the provisions of S. 523, crlpc in the said case. But the question for consideration in that case was also the very words used in S. 517, i. e. , ' person entitled to the possession of the property'. Hence the abovementioned decision is also of assistance in deciding the point that arises in the instant case. ( 11 ) IN Shantakumar v. Mohanla1, (1969) 2 Mys. L. J. 304. in a case of charge of theft, though the accused was acquitted and though the property had been seized from the accused, this Court, in view of the fact that the complainant was the owner of the vehicle, directed the return of the vehicle to the owner. and not to the accused. His Lordship, Justice Ahmed Ali Khan, pointed out in that case, that having regard to the fact that the complainant's ownership of the vehicle was not in dispute, the vehicle should have been returned to the complainant, and not to accused, merely on the ground that the car was produced from accused's possession. His Lordship observed while determining the question as to who is the person entitled to the possession of the property under S. 517 (1) Crlpc. His Lordship observed while determining the question as to who is the person entitled to the possession of the property under S. 517 (1) Crlpc. , it is for the Court to say from the other circumstances as to who is the person entitled to get back possession of property as envisaged in S. 517 Crlpc. Since the ownership and the title of the complainant was not in dispute he was the person entitled to the car. ( 12 ) FROM what has been stated above, the order of the lerned Sessions Judge, directing the return of MD. 1 to MO. 3 to PW. 1,, who was the actual owner of the jewels, cannot be said to be incorrect or illegal. There are no grounds to Interfere with the order passed by the learned sessions Judge and the petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .