Gauri Shanker Tyagi v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1972 DIGILAW 266 (ALL)

ORDER K.N. Singh, J. - Gauri Shanker Tyagi filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution claiming relief for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing an order of the State Government dated 10th November, 1970, retiring him compulsorily from service. 2. The petitioner joined the U. P. Fire Service in the year 1945 as Fire Station Officer. In 1952, the petitioner was awarded associate membership of the Technological Institute of Great Britain on completion of one year's study course. After selection by the U. P. Public Service Commission in 1952, he was appointed as Chief Fire Officer, on 9-7-1953, he was confirmed and made permanent on the post of Chief Fire Officer. The petitioner was posted at different important stations in the State including Allahabad, Lucknow, Kanpur and Varanasi. In 1968, the petitioner was allowed to cross his final Efficiency Bar at the stage of Rupees 750/- with effect from 9th September, 1967, while he was posted at Kanpur. The petitioner was a candidate for a newly created post of State Fire Officer selection to which was to be held through the Public Service Commission. Interview for the same was scheduled to take place on 30th November, 1970, but before that date the State Government passed the impugned order on 10th November, 1970, retiring the petitioner from service in exercise of the power vested in it by Note appended to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations, dispensing with the petitioner's service with immediate effect. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the said order on a number of grounds. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the provisions of Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations did not apply to the petitioner as the petitioner's service conditions were regulated by the U. P. Fire Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1945 and not by the Civil Service Regulations. Since there was no provision for compulsory retirement in the U. P. Fire Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service), Rules, which, according to the learned counsel, were special rules regulating conditions of service of the petitioners, he could not be retired from service prematurely under Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. Since there was no provision for compulsory retirement in the U. P. Fire Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service), Rules, which, according to the learned counsel, were special rules regulating conditions of service of the petitioners, he could not be retired from service prematurely under Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. It is true that the petitioner was recruited to Government service under the provisions of the U. P. Fire Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1945, but those Rules are not exhaustive. Those rules do not contain any provision for gratuity, pension or age of superannuation. The rules generally make provision for recruitment and lay down general conditions of service. Fundamental Rule 56 prescribes the age of superannuation which applies to all Government servants holding civil employment under the State. Similarly, the rules framed by the Governor regulating the terms and conditions for grant of gratuity and pension and for the termination of service apply to all Government servants except those who are specially excluded. The Governor is free to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service which may include the terms and conditions for the grant of pension, retirement, and for premature termination of services. Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations was framed by the Governor of the then United Provinces under Section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been asserted that Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations applies to the petitioner and his pension was regulated by the provisions contained in the Civil Service Regulations. It has further been asserted on behalf of the State in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was holding the post of Chief Fire Officer on the date his services were terminated and the U. P. Fire Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules did not apply to him as the appointment and conditions of service of Chief Fire Officers were not regulated by the said rules. The petitioner has not been able to place any material before me to refute the assertions made on behalf of the State. In any event, the petitioner was holding a pensionable post. His pension was regulated by the provisions contained in the Civil Service Regulations. Article 465, deals with retiring pension. The petitioner has not been able to place any material before me to refute the assertions made on behalf of the State. In any event, the petitioner was holding a pensionable post. His pension was regulated by the provisions contained in the Civil Service Regulations. Article 465, deals with retiring pension. Article 465, as amended and applicable to Government servants of Uttar Pradesh runs as follows : "465 (1) A retiring pension is granted to Government servant who is permitted to retire after completing qualifying service for 25 years or on attaining the age of 50 years. (2) A retiring pension is also granted to a Government servant who is required by Government to retire after completing 25 years or more of qualifying service. Note : - The Government retains the absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has completed 25 years of qualifying service without giving any reasons and no claim to special compensation on this account shall be entertained. This right shall only be exercised by the Government in the Administrative Department where it is in the public interest to dispense with the service of a Government servant." The petitioner's services have been dispensed with in exercise of power contained in Note I. In his petition the petitioner has asserted that Article 465-A does not apply to him as the post of Chief Fire Officer is not one mentioned in Article 349-A of the Civil Service Regulations. The petitioner's contention is without any substance. Article 465-A is worded in similar manner in which Art. 465 stands but Article 465-A is applicable only to certain class of officers mentioned in Article 349-A. It is true that the service of Chief Officer is not one mentioned in Art. 349-A. Therefore, Article 465-A was not applicable to the petitioner but that does not help the petitioner because the order in question has been passed in exercise of the powers under Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations which apply to all the Civil servants of the State of Uttar Pradesh who hold pensionable posts. The petitioner has failed to place before me any Government order or notification excluding the application of Article 465 to Chief Fire Officers. There is thus no force in the petitioner's contention. 4. The petitioner has failed to place before me any Government order or notification excluding the application of Article 465 to Chief Fire Officers. There is thus no force in the petitioner's contention. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the power conferred upon the State Government under Note I to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations was arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as no guiding principles were laid down for regulating the exercise of the power of termination of service. The power was left to the arbitrary will of the authority concerned without there being any criterion laid down for the exercise of the same. I do not find any merit in the argument. Note I to Article 465 itself lays down that the right to terminate services of a Government servant shall be exercised only in a case where the competent authority was of the opinion that it was in the public interest to dispense with the service of a Government servant. Public interest in the context of public service requires efficiency in administration. Public interest therefore itself provides ample guidance to the competent authority to exercise power of termination of service. The conferment of power to retire a Government servant in public interest has been held reasonable in a number of cases on the ground that public interest itself provided sufficient guiding principles to the authority concerned, and the contention that conferment of power to retire a Government servant in public interest was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution has consistently been rejected. (See Shyamlal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 369 ; T.G. Shivacharna Singh v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 280 . Baburam Verma v. State of U. P., 1971 All LJ 653 ; (1971 Lab IC 1162); I.N. Saxena v. State of M. P., AIR 1967 SC 1264 ; Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (1971 Lab IC 8) and Hardwari Lal v. Divisional Engineer, 1972 All LJ 145). 5. It was then urged that Art. 465 of the Civil Service Regulations as well as Fundamental Rule 56 both deal with compulsory retirement of Government servants but no criteria or guiding principles were laid down as to under what circumstances the power under either of them should be exercised. 5. It was then urged that Art. 465 of the Civil Service Regulations as well as Fundamental Rule 56 both deal with compulsory retirement of Government servants but no criteria or guiding principles were laid down as to under what circumstances the power under either of them should be exercised. The matter is left to the sweet will of the authority concerned. No doubt the provisions of Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations and the U. P. Fundamental Rules both deal with compulsory retirement of Government servants, but the circumstances under which action is taken under the two provisions are quite different. In both the cases the Government is required to form opinion that termination of service of the Government servant was necessary in the public interest but under Art. 465 of the Civil Service Regulations action is permissible when an officer has completed 25 years of service or has attained the age of 50 years while under the U. P. Fundamental Rule 56 action can be taken when an officer attains the age of 55 years. No action under Fundamental Rule 56 can be taken against a Government servant who has not attained the age of 55 years while under Regulation 465 attaining of age of 55 years is immaterial. Action can be taken if either of the two requirements are fulfilled namely if the Government servant has completed 25 years of qualifying service or has attained the age of 50 years. The two rules operate in different circumstances and there is no scope for choosing action under the Civil Service Regulations or Fundamental Rule 56. The petitioner's argument, therefore, that the two provisions cover the same field without there being any guiding principle is devoid of any force. A similar argument raised before a Division Bench of our Court was repelled in State of U.P. v. Dr. B.S. Saxena, (1971 All LJ 911) ; (1971 Lab IC 1456). The petitioner's contention in this regard must be rejected. 6. Before I proceed further, it would be pertinent to state that the petitioner had admittedly not attained the age of 55 years on the date when the impugned order was passed. He had completed only 48 years of age but he had completed 25 years of qualifying service. The State Government could not therefore take any action against the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56. He had completed only 48 years of age but he had completed 25 years of qualifying service. The State Government could not therefore take any action against the petitioner under Fundamental Rule 56. If the State Government was satisfied that it was in the public interest to dispense with the services of the petitioner the only course left open to the Government was to exercise its powers under Note I to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations. It is thus clear that in the petitioner's case two courses were not open to the Government hence the question of arbitrary exercise of power by having recourse to Art. 465 or to fundamental Rule 56 did not arise. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the petitioner was not given any opportunity prior to the issue of the impugned order. Hence the principles of natural justice were violated which rendered the impugned order void. Reliance was placed on State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ). It is not disputed that the petitioner was not given any opportunity before his services were terminated. The question is whether under the rules the petitioner was entitled to any opportunity or in the absence of any provision in the rules for giving opportunity, the rules of natural justice prevailed, necessitating the giving of opportunity before the impugned order retiring the petitioner from service was issued. The rules of natural justice are not static, they vary from statute to statute and rules to rules. The application of the principles of natural justice has to be ascertained from the scheme of the Act and the Rules and in the context in which power is conferred on an authority to dispense with the services of a Government servant and the nature of the right that may be affected by the order. The order of termination of service in exercise of powers under Article 465, Note I of the Civil Service Regulations or premature retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 is normally not an order of punishment and the Government servant is not entitled to any opportunity. 8. In AIR 1967 SC 1269 an order of compulsory retirement was passed on the basis of certain disputed date of birth of Dr. Miss. Binapani Dei. 8. In AIR 1967 SC 1269 an order of compulsory retirement was passed on the basis of certain disputed date of birth of Dr. Miss. Binapani Dei. Her age was corrected on the report of an enquiry officer but before the correction was made she was not given any opportunity to contest the report of the enquiry officer. The Supreme Court in those circumstances held that the order of compulsory retirement was vitiated as no opportunity was given to Miss Binapani Dei. In that case the order of compulsory retirement deprived Dr. Miss. Binapani Dei of her right to continue in service till the age of superannuation, hence the principles of natural justice were applied. However, in a case of termination of service in exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56 or under Art. 465 of the Civil Service Regulations different considerations arise. The provisions contained in these rules embody one of the facets of the pleasure doctrine contained in Art. 310 of the Constitution. None of the legal rights of a Government servant is affected by compulsory retirement. In ( AIR 1971 SC 40 = (1971 Lab IC 8 (SC) ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court distinguished the case of Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 and held that the principles of natural justice were not applicable to a case where a Government servant was compulsorily retired in pursuance of Fundamental Rule 56 (J). The principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J. N. Sinha's case, AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (1971 Lab IC 8 (SC) fully apply to the petitioner's case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any opportunity and the impugned order is not void. 9. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that his record of service was excellent, there was nothing on record before the State Government to justify the termination of his services and the impugned order was passed arbitrarily in an unreasonable manner. While considering this argument, it is necessary to observe that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the judgment or the satisfaction of the State Government while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. While considering this argument, it is necessary to observe that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the judgment or the satisfaction of the State Government while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the State Government on an overall assessment of the petitioner's record of service was bona fide satisfied that the petitioner's continuance in service was not in public interest, this Court cannot interfere with that opinion on the insufficiency of material or on the ground that a different view was possible on the material present before the State Government. The powers conferred on the appropriate authority to dispense with the services of a Government servant in exercise of powers under Note I to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulations are similar to those of Fundamental R. 56 (j). As already discussed, the power to dispense with the services in both the cases is to be exercised in public interest. While considering the extent of Court's power to review the opinion of the authorities concerned in compulsorily retiring a Government servant under Fundamental Rule 56 (j) the Supreme Court in the case of J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (1971 Lab IC 8 (SC) ) observed as follows "Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56 (j), it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in the public interest to courts. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision." The above observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court make it clear that if the authority bona fide forms opinion to dispense with the services of a Government servant, the correctness of that opinion cannot be chat lenged. However, it has no doubt been made clear that the aggrieved Government servant can contend before the Court that the opinion , so formed was mala fide, based on collateral' grounds. In this view of the matter the petitioner's contention that his service record was excellent and that the material on record did not justify the formation of opinion that the petitioner's services should be dispensed with or that the petitioner's termination was not in public interest cannot be investigated. The opinion formed by the State Government cannot be questioned on this ground. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that the opinion so formed was mala fide one and the decision to retire the petitioner was taken arbitrarily. In this context the learned counsel has relied upon the allegations of mala fide made against A. K. Mustafy, Home Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, who has been arrayed as a respondent to the petition, and allegations have also been made against Jia Ram, the then Inspector General of Police, who is, also arrayed as one of the respondents. It is well settled that if an order of the Government is passed mala fide it must be struck down even though the Government may have acted within its jurisdiction. Mala fides vitiate the order of the Government. It is, however, easy to make allegations of mala fide but difficult to prove them. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof and in order to succeed on the ground of mala fide the petitioner has to establish the allegations made by him against the respondents. 11. As regards the plea of mala fide against Sri A. K. Mustafy, the Home Secretary, the necessary facts are stated in paragraphs 38, 38-A and 39 of the petition. Briefly, the petitioner has alleged that Sri S. K. Bose, Chief Fire Officer posted at Luck-now, had developed personal contacts with Home Secretary, Sri A. K. Mustafy and he had been instrumental in prejudicing him against the petitioner due to personal rivalry for the post of State Fire Officer. When the post of State Fire Officer was going to be advertised, Sri S. K. Bose, according to the petitioner, managed to get the essential qualifications for the said post so prescribed as to fit him alone, and to exclude the petitioner and other senior officers. When the post of State Fire Officer was going to be advertised, Sri S. K. Bose, according to the petitioner, managed to get the essential qualifications for the said post so prescribed as to fit him alone, and to exclude the petitioner and other senior officers. Sri Bose influenced the Home Secretary in getting the petitioner's representation against the award of adverse entries for 1967-68 rejected and getting the petitioner compulsorily retired in order to eliminate the petitioner from selection for the post of State Fire Officer. Sri Mustafy, according to the petitioner was a member of the three man committee which had been formed by the Government to review the service record of the officers of the Police Department for purposes of taking action for compulsory retirement of such officers whose service record was not satisfactory. Since Sri Mustafy was favourably inclined towards Sri Bose and had the main say in the decision of the Committee, he influenced the committee in judging the issue of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. 12. Sri Mustafy has filed counter affidavit and denied the allegations made against him. He has asserted that he was not biased against the petitioner. The qualifications for the post of State Fire Officer were prescribed by the State Govt. in consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the order for the petitioner's retirement was passed by the then Chief Minister who was at that time holding the portfolio of Home also. The decision to retire the petitioner was taken on the objective report of the Committee and not on account of any bias as alleged by the petitioner. A supplementary counter-affidavit was filed by Sri Mustafy on 27th March, 1972. In his supplementary affidavit Sri Mustafy denied that he was personally prejudiced against the petitioner or that he was personally interested in S. K. Bose. He further asserted that the proposal for prescribing the qualification of the State Fire Officer was not put up at his instance. In fact the Inspector General of Police had suggested qualifications for that post. Those proposals were accepted by the State Government and forwarded to the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission thereafter advertised the post. Allegations made by the petitioner have thus been effectively denied by Sri Mustafy. 13. S. K. Bose was a subordinate officer. In fact the Inspector General of Police had suggested qualifications for that post. Those proposals were accepted by the State Government and forwarded to the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission thereafter advertised the post. Allegations made by the petitioner have thus been effectively denied by Sri Mustafy. 13. S. K. Bose was a subordinate officer. There appears to be no reason why Mustafy should have gone out of his way to help S. K. Bose by getting certain qualifications prescribed nor I find any reason to believe the petitioner's version that Sri Mustafy was biased against the petitioner as a result of which he influenced the members of the screening committee for compulsorily retiring him. In the absence of any documentary evidence on record I am not inclined to accept the petitioner's contention or to discard the sworn testimony of the Home Secretary. Disputed questions of fact cannot be investigated or decided in writ jurisdiction. The petitioner had made an application for summoning Sri Mustafy for his cross-examination. Arguments were heard at length by brother B. N. Lokur, J. and thereafter he rejected the application by his order dated 17th December, 1971. A similar request was made before me at the time of the hearing of the writ petition. I however, did not consider it necessary to record any reasons for rejecting the petitioner's request as I agreed with the reasons recorded by brother Lokur, J. The petitioner has failed to place any material before me to show that the statements, contained in the affidavits of Mustafy were incorrect. I do not find any vague or evasive reply in his statement. There is nothing on record to doubt the veracity of the Home Secretary. The petitioner has failed to make out any case for departure from the normal rule of deciding the writ petition. On the basis of affidavits I did not consider it necessary to summon Mustafy for cross-examination. The petitioner has failed to make out any case of mala fides against Sri Mustafy, the Home Secretary. 14. The petitioner made allegations against Sri Jia Ram, the then Inspector General of Police, of U. P. These allegations are contained in paragraphs 16, 24 and 25 of the petition. According to the petitioner, Jia Ram was prejudiced against the petitioner when he gave him adverse remarks for the year 1967-68. 14. The petitioner made allegations against Sri Jia Ram, the then Inspector General of Police, of U. P. These allegations are contained in paragraphs 16, 24 and 25 of the petition. According to the petitioner, Jia Ram was prejudiced against the petitioner when he gave him adverse remarks for the year 1967-68. The petitioner made a representation against the remark which was forwarded to the State Government. That annoyed Jia Ram because the petitioner in his representation had pointed out certain irregularities and serious lapses against Jia Ram in not following the normal procedure in giving annual remarks. The petitioner further asserted that while he was posted at Varanasi, Jia Ram paid a visit to that town in October, 1969. The petitioner had an interview with him and during the course of interview, Jia Ram made enquiries about the local fire service affairs and thereafter asked the petitioner if he was going on with the same type of life as he was leading at Kanpur. The petitioner submitted that there was nothing wrong with the petitioner's way of life, thereupon, the Inspector General of Police, according to the petitioner, felt more annoyed and told, the petitioner whether he was not ashamed of the incident that took place at Kanpur. The petitioner tried to explain the circumstances in which the unfortunate incident occurred at Kanpur, when one of his very dear friends committed suicide. Sri Jia Ram cut short the interview saying if the petitioner also wanted to commit suicide or be hanged. The petitioner alleged that Jia Ram awarded adverse remarks against the petitioner for the years 1967-68 and 1968-69 on account of his prejudice against the petitioner without there being any justification for the same. These adverse entries were taken into account for retiring the petitioner from service. Over and above all, Jia Ram was himself a member of the Screening Committee which recommended the petitioner's compulsory retirement. The biased recommendation was accepted by the Chief Minister, and the impugned order was issued. These are the petitioner's allegations. 15. Sri Jia Ram who is at present posted as Director General (Vigilance), Government of India, Ministry of Railways, New Delhi, filed an affidavit controverting allegations made by the petitioner. The biased recommendation was accepted by the Chief Minister, and the impugned order was issued. These are the petitioner's allegations. 15. Sri Jia Ram who is at present posted as Director General (Vigilance), Government of India, Ministry of Railways, New Delhi, filed an affidavit controverting allegations made by the petitioner. He asserted that the petitioner's allegations that he was biased or prejudiced against the petitioner because he had filed a representation against the annual remarks given by him in the year 1967-68 was incorrect. The petitioner had a right to file appeal or representation against the adverse remarks and he did not entertain any prejudice against him on that account. As regards the petitioner's interview with him at Varanasi, he has stated that he did pay visit to Varnasi in 1969 for inspection. In that connection he interviewed gazetted officers of the district and the petitioner also must have appeared before him for interview. He, however, denied the allegation that he showed temper or annoyance. He has asserted that he must have asked the petitioner some questions concerning the Fire Service Organization, and it might be that during the course of the interview some questions regarding private life of the petitioner cropped up. He, however, denied the allegation of feeling annoyance and losing temper. He also denied that he closed the interview by saying that whether the petitioner wanted to commit suicide or be hanged. He denied the allegation that the annual remarks for the year 1968-69 were given by him on account of prejudice or with a view to victimise the petitioner. The annual remarks were given by him on the basis of his information and assessment of the petitioner's work and conduct. It is thus clear that the allegations of mala fide made by the petitioner have been controverted by the sworn testimony of Jia Ram. The petitioner has not placed any evidence before me to doubt the veracity of the statement of Sri Jia Rain. On the material on record it is not possible to discredit the statement of Jia Ram. The petitioner's prayer for summoning Jia Ram for cross-examination was also rejected by brother B. N. Lokur, J. by his order dated 14-12-1971. 16. So far as the awarding of adverse remarks against the petitioner was concerned, Sri Jia Ram was the head of the Police Department as Inspector General. The petitioner's prayer for summoning Jia Ram for cross-examination was also rejected by brother B. N. Lokur, J. by his order dated 14-12-1971. 16. So far as the awarding of adverse remarks against the petitioner was concerned, Sri Jia Ram was the head of the Police Department as Inspector General. It was his duty to maintain the service record and character roll of his subordinate officers and in that connection Sri Jia Ram was under a duty to record his own assessment of the petitioner's work and conduct. The petitioner had an opportunity of making representation against those remarks to the State Government. That representation was rejected by the Government. The awarding of adverse remarks by a superior officer or the head of department cannot by itself be a proof to justify allegations of prejudice or mala fide. More so in the present case the petitioner himself admitted that there was an incident at his house at Kanpur wherein one of his friends committed suicide after exchange of some words with one Mrs. Dayal. I do not consider it necessary to go into the details of that incident or to assess the merits of the two versions one given by the petitioner and the other given by the respondents, but this much is clear that the said incident was in itself an indication to show that the petitioner was not maintaining the conduct which a Government servant is required to do. The immediate officers namely the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police of the range where the petitioner was posted had also recommended and awarded adverse remarks. In the circumstances it is difficult to infer prejudice or mala fide against Sri Jia Ram merely because he awarded adverse remarks against the petitioner. 17. As regards the exchange of words during the petitioner's interview with Sri Jia Ram at Varanasi, there is oath against oath before me. Admittedly no one was present at the said interview. The petitioner has not produced any other evidence before me in support of his allegations. In the circumstances, I do not find any justification to discard the sworn testimony of Sri Jia Ram and to accept the version given by the petitioner who is a highly interested person. I therefore hold that the petitioner has failed to make out any case of prejudice or mala fide against Sri Jia Ram. 18. In the circumstances, I do not find any justification to discard the sworn testimony of Sri Jia Ram and to accept the version given by the petitioner who is a highly interested person. I therefore hold that the petitioner has failed to make out any case of prejudice or mala fide against Sri Jia Ram. 18. On the material on record it is clear that the petitioner's work and conduct were assessed by a Screening Committee appointed by the Government for the purpose of considering the question of compulsory retirement of Government servants in the Police Department. Sri Mustafy has asserted that the committee considered the service record of officers including the petitioner and thereupon made its own assessment and submitted its report to the Chief Minister, who was the final authority, who passed the order against the petitioner retiring him from service. Since the allegation of mala fide against Mustafy and Jia Ram have failed the recommendations made by the Screening Committee cannot be said to be tainted. In the circumstances, I hold that the impugned order was not passed mala fide and therefore it cannot be held void. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner then strenuously urged that the impugned order was passed arbitrarily on extraneous considerations without there being any material on record and the formation of opinion to retire the petitioner in public interest was not made bona fide. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State as well as in the affidavit of A. K. Mustafy it has been asserted that the decision to retire the petitioner from service under regulation 465 of the Civil Service Regulations was taken on an overall assessment of the petitioner's work and conduct. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Durga Bahadur Srivastava, Superintendent of Home (Police B) Department, Lucknow, certain adverse entries awarded against the petitioner in his character roll have been reproduced. It was however urged on behalf of the petitioner that since the petitioner was allowed to cross Efficiency Bar with effect from 9-9-1967, vide Government Order dated 10th June, 1968, any adverse entry existing in the petitioner's record of service prior to 10th June, 1968, could not be taken into account at the time of considering the question of petitioner's compulsory retirement from service because those adverse entries stood wiped off on account of the Government having allowed the petitioner to cross the efficiency bar. Sri K. C. Agarwal, the learned Chief Standing Counsel, however urged that the State Government was justified in considering the service record of the petitioner for the entire period of his service because the petitioner had to cross Efficiency Bar in the normal routine while the question of termination of the petitioner's services was a serious matter, hence the entire service record of the petitioner throughout his service career was considered. He further urged that even if adverse remarks existing in the petitioner's character roll prior to 9th September, 1967, were to be ignored there was sufficient material before the State Government to sustain the opinion of the State Government. In that connection he has referred to the adverse remarks made against the petitioner by his superior officers including the Inspector General of Police for the years 1967-68 and 1968-69. These remarks are set out below : "1967-68. I am sorry to note that his reputation in his private and social life was unbecoming that of a gazetted officer. (I. G. Police). 1968-69 Who, however, at the end of his stay here involved himself with some private individuals too closely leading to an unfortunate incident of suicide right at his house by one of his friends. This brought considerable odium to him. Could not win the loyalty of his subordinates uniformly which reflected on his mismanagement. (Sir Supdt. of Police, Kanpur). 1968-69. I endorse the views of the S. S. P. about this officer. Enquiries into the incident reflecting on his association with some persons is pending with C.I.D. (D. I. G. Kanpur). 1968-69 His personal conduct, however, at Kanpur, was not found worthy of a Gazetted Officer. In an accident at his house, at Kanpur on 7-8-1968, one of his friends is reported to have committed suicide by shooting himself with a revolver. Subsequent enquiries showed that Sri Tyagi was indiscreet in associating himself with friends given to gay social life involving wine and women, leading to this unfortunate incident (Inspector General of Police)." 20. The petitioner made an application for summoning of his character roll and personal file from the State Government. Sri A. K. Mustafy filed an application claiming privilege. This Court by its order dated 6th December, 1971, rejected the claim of privilege and directed the Standing Counsel to produce the entire character roll of the petitioner for scrutiny and inspection. The petitioner made an application for summoning of his character roll and personal file from the State Government. Sri A. K. Mustafy filed an application claiming privilege. This Court by its order dated 6th December, 1971, rejected the claim of privilege and directed the Standing Counsel to produce the entire character roll of the petitioner for scrutiny and inspection. The petitioner's request with regard to production of file maintained in the Police Department and Secretariat was however, rejected. Brother Lokur, J. directed the Standing Counsel to produce three documents which contained correspondence between the officers. The documents directed by brother Lokur, J., were produced and the petitioner was allowed to inspect the same. On inspection the petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit annexing thereto extracts from his character roll to show that his overall work was good and there was nothing against him which could justify premature termination of his services. 21. On a perusal of the petitioner's character roll it is clear that the petitioner earned a number of adverse entries against him which related to the years 1945, 1946, 1947, 1952-53, 1953-54, 1954-55, 1961-62, 1967-68 and 1968-69. The annual remarks in the years 1967-68 and 1968-69 were given after the petitioner had been allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar. If all these adverse remarks made against the petitioner for the aforesaid years are taken into account in judging the question of retention of the petitioner in service, it is difficult to hold that the opinion formed by the State Government that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired from Government was not bona fide. I cannot sit in appeal over the opinion formed by the State Government. The State Government was the best judge to consider as to whether the petitioner's work and conduct were such that it could be in public interest to retire him from service. In the present case the opinion formed by the State Government was a reasonable one and the materials on record before me do not lend any support to the petitioner's contention that the opinion formed by the State Government was not bona fide. In the present case the opinion formed by the State Government was a reasonable one and the materials on record before me do not lend any support to the petitioner's contention that the opinion formed by the State Government was not bona fide. Once it is held that the opinion was a bona fide and a reasonable one based on relevant material before it, the decision of the State Government to retire the petitioner from service in public interest cannot be assailed and it would not be open to this Court to reassess the material to form a different opinion. The petitioner's contention, therefore that there was no material on record to justify the impugned order and that the opinion formed by the State Government was not bona fide must be rejected. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that the adverse remarks made against the petitioner prior to 1967, should not have been considered at the time of considering the question of petitioner's termination of service. A Government servant is allowed to cross Efficiency Bar only when the Government or the appropriate authority is satisfied that the Government servant concerned was efficient and there was nothing against the conduct or integrity. When that is done by the Government, any earlier lapse on the part of the Government Officer stands wiped off. If the Government was satisfied that the petitioner's work and conduct were not satisfactory, the Government would not have allowed the petitioner to cross the Efficiency Bar. The fact that the petitioner was allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar by its order dated 10-11-1968 shows that the earlier entries prior to that date were condoned by the Government and the petitioner was considered fit enough to cross the Efficiency Bar and earn his increments. Reliance was placed on the case of State of Punjab v. Diwan Chunni Lal, (1970) 1 SCC 479 ; ( AIR 1970 SC 2086 ). In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that crossing of Efficiency Bar must be regarded as giving a Government servant a clean bill upto that date because if the authorities took any serious view of the adverse remarks contained in the confidential report they could not have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the Efficiency Bar. The petitioner seeks support to his contention by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of the report (p. 484) which is in the following words : "In our view the reports earlier than 1942 should not have been considered at all inasmuch as he was allowed to cross the Efficiency Bar in that year. It is unthinkable that if the authorities took any serious view of the charge of dishonesty and inefficiency contained in the confidential reports of 1941 and 1942 they could have overlooked the same and recommended the case of the officer as one fit for crossing the Efficiency Bar in 1944. It will be noted that there was no specific complaint in either of the two years and at best there was only room for suspicion regarding his behaviour." 23. Prima facie the above observations support the petitioner's contention that any adverse remarks made against the petitioner prior to September, 1967 could not be taken into account as the Government had given him a clean bill upto that date. The question, however, as to whether the State Government could legally take into account any adverse entry made against a Government servant prior to the period when the Government servant was allowed to cross Efficiency Bar while considering the question of compulsory retirement of a Government servant under Art. 465 of the Civil Service Regulations came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Dr. B.S. Saxena, (1971 All LJ 911) ; (1971 Lab IC 1456 (All)). In that case also reliance was placed on behalf of the affected Government servant on the observations made by their Lordships in the case of 1970 (1) SCC 479 = ( AIR 1970 SC 2086 ). The Division Bench, however, observed that in the case of Diwan Chunai Lal their Lordships of the Supreme Court had made the above observation while dealing with a case where the officer was allowed to cross Efficiency Bar and the adverse entries made in the earlier years were used to frame charges against him. The Division Bench further held that even if the earlier entries were to be ignored the subsequent entries could justify compulsory retirement of a Government servant. The Division Bench further held that even if the earlier entries were to be ignored the subsequent entries could justify compulsory retirement of a Government servant. It is true that on first sight the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Diwan Chunni Lal, 1970 (1) SCC 479 ; ( AIR 1970 SC 2086 ) appear to lend support to the petitioner's contention, but if the matter is examined closely it would be clear that the aforesaid observations cannot be pressed into service in the case of compulsory retirement. 24. The facts of Chunni Lal's case were that, Diwan Chunni Lal, a Sub-Inspector of Police, was called upon to answer a number of charges against him setting forth extracts from his character roll showing inefficiency and lack of probity while in service from 1944 to 1948 and to submit his answer to the prima facie charge of inefficiency. The extracts of the confidential reports made it clear that Diwan Chunni Lal was being accused of laziness and ineffectiveness and having a doubtful reputation about his honesty. Diwan Chunni Lal pleaded that since he was allowed to cross efficiency bar in 1944, any adverse entries in his character roll prior to that date could not be taken into account in holding the charges proved against him. In that connection it was urged that the crossing of efficiency bar must be regarded as giving the petitioner in that case a clean bill upto the date when he was allowed to cross the efficiency bar. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the above observations. The facts narrated above make it clear that Diwan Chunni Lal was departmentally proceeded on the charge of laziness, ineffectiveness and doubtful reputation and all those charges were based not on any specific instance but on the annual adverse remarks made against the petitioner in his confidential character roll, those adverse remarks were relied upon by the State Government to prove the charges against the petitioner. There is, however, vast difference in the nature of power exercised by the State Government in dismissing a Government servant on the proof of charges against him and in compulsorily retiring a Government servant. In the former case the Government servant is punished on the charges of misconduct while in the latter case there is no such element of punishment. There is, however, vast difference in the nature of power exercised by the State Government in dismissing a Government servant on the proof of charges against him and in compulsorily retiring a Government servant. In the former case the Government servant is punished on the charges of misconduct while in the latter case there is no such element of punishment. The State Government exercises its powers of termination of service conferred upon it by the rules which is a facet of pleasure doctrine. The State Government has to make overall assessment of the entire service of a Government servant and in that connection it would be pertinent to take into account the service record of a Government servant of his entire service. I am therefore of the opinion that even if a Government servant is allowed to cross efficiency bar any adverse remark made earlier to that period can be taken into account by the State Government in considering the suitability of the officer concerned for purposes of retaining him in Government service. The retention of a Government servant whose work and conduct have not been good has to be decided by the State Government considering his record of service. Apart from that I am bound by the Division Bench decision in the case of (1971 All LJ 911) = (1971 Lab IC 1456 (All)). The petitioner's contention that the opinion of the State Government was arbitrary and not bona fide or that any irrelevant material was taken into account in forming the opinion cannot be accepted. I have already held that the State Government acted bona fide in forming the opinion that it was in public interest to terminate the petitioner's service prematurely. 25. Before I conclude it is necessary to refer to the adverse remarks awarded against the petitioner for the years 1967-68 and 1968-69. These entries in my opinion were in themselves sufficient for the formation of opinion that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was in public interest. Similar view was taken by the Division Bench in 1971 All LJ 911 = (1971 Lab IC 1456 (A11)). 26. Since all the points raised by the petitioner have failed, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.