Judgment :- 1. The question posed in this revision, which, on reference by a learned single judge, has been placed before us, is whether the plaintiffs, who seek partition of the plaint schedule property, a portion of which is in the possession of trespassers (defendants 9 to 13), are required, as directed by the lower court, to pay ad valorem court fee for ejectment on the value of the entire property in the hands of the trespassers, or it would be sufficient if they pay ad valorem court fee on the value of their shares of the portion of the property trespassed upon. The plaintiffs have already paid fixed court fee for partition under S.37 (2) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, and the present controversy confines to the correct ad valorem court fee that is payable with respect to the portion of the property remaining in the hands of the trespassers. 2. A partition suit simpliciter presupposes unity of title in the plaintiff and the defendants; and the claim is for separation of the plaintiff's share from the joint possession of the tarwad or of all the co-owners, as the case may be, for enjoyment to the exclusion of the other sharers. In all such cases, the court fee payable, undoubtedly, is as provided in S.37 (2) of the Court Fees Act. A suit for partition and separate possession of a share of the joint family property or of property owned jointly or in common by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession of such property is of another category; and the court fee payable in such a case is in accordance with the provisions contained in S.37(1) of the Act. The case on hand is of yet another category, inasmuch as a portion of the plaint schedule property is in the possession of neither the plaintiffs nor the other members of the joint family (defendants 1 to 7), but in the hands of strangers. 3. It cannot be denied, and it is not disputed also before us, that there cannot be a partition of a property unless it is brought into the hotch-pot of the joint family or of the co-owners, as the case may be. 3. It cannot be denied, and it is not disputed also before us, that there cannot be a partition of a property unless it is brought into the hotch-pot of the joint family or of the co-owners, as the case may be. It is, therefore, necessary in this case to eject the trespassers from the portion of the property which is alleged to have gone out of the possession of the joint family before partition could be effected. Placing reliance on the wording "fee shall be computed on the market value of the plaintiff's share" in sub-section" (1) of S.37 of the Act, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is that the plaintiffs need pay court fee for ejectment only on the value of their shares in the portion of the property in the bands of the trespassers. The counsel has also attempted to draw an analogy from the provision for cancellation of decree and documents contained in sub-section (4) of S.37, which reads as follows: "Where in a suit falling under sub-section (1) or sub section (2) the plaintiff or the defendant seeks cancellation of decree or other document of the nature specified in S.40, separate fee shall be payable on the relief of cancellation in the manner specified in that section " As far as the words "plaintiff's share" appearing in sub-section (1) of S.37 are concerned, we have to bear in mind that the position is quite different from the present case. As we have already indicated, sub-section (1) of S.37 is made applicable to a case where the plaintiff is excluded from possession by the other members of the joint family or other co-owners, and, therefore, it cannot be applied to a case where the property sought to be partitioned is in the hands of trespassers. Sub-section (4) dealing with the cancellation of decrees and documents visualises a different situation. No question of recovering actual possession, which is a pre-requisite for partitioning the property already gone out into the possession of trespassers, arises in such cases. In effect, it requires only a declaration that such a decree or such a document, to the extent to which it relates to the plaintiff, is cancelled. Therefore, the analogy drawn from subsection (4) also cannot be of much assistance in deciding the issue before us. 4. In effect, it requires only a declaration that such a decree or such a document, to the extent to which it relates to the plaintiff, is cancelled. Therefore, the analogy drawn from subsection (4) also cannot be of much assistance in deciding the issue before us. 4. The counsel for the revision petitioners has drawn our attention to -the decisions In Re. Nanda Lal Mukherjee (AIR. 1932 Calcutta 227), Apparahan v. Rappai Kutty (1949 TCLR. 225 F.B.), Pattabhirama v. Subbaraman (AIR. 1952 T.C. 509 F.B.) and Nabeesa Saivu v. Samadhana Ammal & Others (1960 KLJ-1247) in an attempt to substantiate the contention that the plaintiffs need pay ad valorem court fee only on the value of their shares in the property in the hands of the trespassers. It has been held in those decisions that, where partition of the property which is not in the joint possession of the sharers is claimed, plaintiffs have to pay ad valorem court fee on the value of their shares in the property. In all those cases, as we understand it, the controversy was whether or not ad valorem court fee was payable for ejectment over and above the court fee payable for partition. The question whether ad valorem court fee payable for ejectment was on the value of the shares of the plaintiffs in the property or whether it was on the property in its entirety was never posed or considered in those cases. 5. The present suit really is a combination of two suits, namely, one for partition and the other for ejectment. The courts, while not insisting the plaintiffs to bring two suits, will not, however, allow them to evade payment of court fee for the reason that the reliefs sought are being agitated in one and the same suit. There cannot be a partition of the property in the hands of the trespassers unless it is reduced to possession of the joint family. For this, ad valorem court fee as in any other suit for ejectment has to be paid. To apply the provisions of S.37 (1) of the Act to the present case, would defeat the provisions relating to muitifariousness contained in S.6 of the Act. That the plaintiffs have been allowed to seek two distinct reliefs in one and the same suit should not result in deprival of the court fee that is due to the State. To apply the provisions of S.37 (1) of the Act to the present case, would defeat the provisions relating to muitifariousness contained in S.6 of the Act. That the plaintiffs have been allowed to seek two distinct reliefs in one and the same suit should not result in deprival of the court fee that is due to the State. The submission of learned counsel that the plaintiffs would be put to undue hardship in such a case cannot have any bearing on the question of court fee that is leviable. The simple question is as to what would happen to the property in the hands of the trespassers in case it is not sought to be partitioned in the present suit. A separata suit for ejectment paying the requisite court fee will be necessary. It is only thereafter the question of partition could arise; and naturally for partition also court fee will have to be paid. 6. The counsel also points out that, under sub-section (3) of S.37, a defendant claiming partition and separate possession of his share of the property is required to pay on his written statement fee computed at half the market value of his share or at half the rate specified in sub-section (2) according as such the defendant has been excluded from possession or is in joint possession. This, as we find, is a requirement independent of the claim for share in the property in the bands of the trespassers and cannot relieve the plaintiff of his liability to pay ad valorem court fee to bring the property into the hotch-pot of the joint family from the bands of the trespassers. 7. The argument that the plaintiffs would be unduly burdened with liability to pay court fee does not appear to be correct. Being a suit for partition, if the plaintiffs succeed in establishing that the joint family has subsisting title to the property in the hands of the trespassers, the costs incurred by them in securing the ejectment would also ordinarily come out of the estate thereby apportioning the burden evenly on all the sharers Therefore, the fact That the plaintiffs are required to spend initially for payment of ad valorern court fee for ejectment on the entire value of the property also cannot be a ground for taking a different view. In the result, the revision is dismissed and the order passed by the Court below is upheld. There will, however, be no order as to costs.