ORDER P.N. Bakshi, J. - This is a reference made by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge of Kumaun. It arises out of proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. Plot No. 63/4 is situate in village Nayagaon Chandan Singh, Pargana Bhaber Kota, Tahsil Kaldhungi, Police Station Ramnagar. The Station Officer Ramnagar reported that there was an apprehension of breach of peace in respect of this plot. On 14-9-1970 a preliminary order was passed by the Magistrate calling upon the parties to file their written statements and documents in support thereof. On 13-1-1971 the SDM Bhabar passed an order directing Maheshwari Datt to be put in possession of the plots in question and he restrained Sri Tara Singh from interfering with his possession unless evicted therefrom in due course of law. Tara Singh filed a revision before the First Additional Sessions Judge of Kumaun, who has made a reference for quashing the order of Sri R.S. Dohre, SDM, Bhabar. 2. I have heard counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. I am inclined to accept this reference. The undisputed facts are that village Nayagaon Chandan Singh Pargana Bhabar Kota is situate in Police Station Ram Nagar. The contention of the revisionist is that Police Station Ram Nagar falls under the jurisdiction of SDM, Kashipur. On the other hand, the opposite party contended that the SDM, Bhabar was authorised to exercise jurisdiction over Police Station Ram Nagar. Reference has been made to an order dated 2-4-1971 passed by Sri B.K. Goswami, Deputy Commissioner Naini Tal regarding distribution of work amongst the officers of the district of Naini Tal. It appears from the aforesaid order that Sri R.S. Dohre the present SDM, Bhabar was designated as SDM-cum-SDO, Bhabar consisting of Haldwani Tahsil and Peshkari Kaladhungi. The submission is that in view of the order of the Deputy Commissioner Sri R.S. Dohre was entitled to take cognizance of the present proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. This argument, in my opinion, is untenable for two reasons. In the first place, the order authorising Sri R.S. Dohre, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhabar to exercise jurisdiction over the area in question was dated 2-4-1971, while the impugned order passed by Sri R.S. Dohre was dated 13-1-1971. This argument, in my opinion, is untenable for two reasons. In the first place, the order authorising Sri R.S. Dohre, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhabar to exercise jurisdiction over the area in question was dated 2-4-1971, while the impugned order passed by Sri R.S. Dohre was dated 13-1-1971. It is thus obvious that on the date when he passed the impugned order he had no jurisdiction over the area which is covered by the present proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may also be mentioned in this connection that u/s 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the State Government has been given the power to divide districts into sub-divisions. Such power cannot be exercised by the District Magistrate. Section 8 Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: The State Government may divide any district outside the Presidency Towns into sub-divisions or make any portion of any such district a sub-division and may alter the limits of any sub-division. It is obvious from a reading of the above section that the power to divide a district into sub-divisions or to alter the limits of the sub-division has only been vested in the State Government. If it was desired that Sri R.S. Dohre should be authorised to exercise jurisdiction over a sub-division or a part thereof whose territory did not originally fall under his sub-division, it was for the State Government to pass such an order. The Deputy Commissioner Naini Tal was not in law authorised to widen or enhance the jurisdiction of the SDM. 3. Counsel for the revisionist has urged that as the disputed plot did not lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the SDM the order passed by him is void and must be quashed. He has placed reliance upon Section 145(1) read with Section 530(j) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has also cited a Single Judge decision of this Court reported in Kapil Deo Singh v. State 1966 AWR 548. Counsel for the opposite party has contended that the impugned order should not be set aside merely on the ground that the present proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure in the course of which the impugned order was passed took place in a wrong sub-division or local area. He has relied upon Section 531 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 537 Code of Criminal Procedure. He has relied upon Section 531 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 537 Code of Criminal Procedure. He submits that unless the revisionist can show that the error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice no interference is called for. He has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal 1961 AWR 665 SC. I shall now deal with this aspect of the matter. 4. The relevant portion of Section 145(1) reads as follows: Whenever a DM, SDM or Magistrate of first class is satisfied through a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exist concerning any land or water or to boundaries thereof, within the heal limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court....and to put in written statement....as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.... The emphasis in the section is Laid on the words "within the local limits of his jurisdiction" i.e. even though a dispute may arise which was likely to cause a breach of peace, the Magistrate will not be empowered to take cognizance of it unless the area or territory where the dispute has occasioned lies within that local area over which he had jurisdiction. If any other interpretation is given to that section it would lead to disastrous results. It may even lead to conflict of exercise of jurisdiction simultaneously by different Magistrate, which could not be the intention of the law. In my opinion, only that Magistrate is authorised to take cognizance of the proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure within whose local limits of jurisdiction the area in dispute falls. Section 529 Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates those irregularities committed by a Magistrate which do not vitiate proceedings. Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, lays down a catalogue of irregularities which vitiate proceedings. The relevant portion of Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure may be quoted within advantage: If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things: (j) makes an order Under Chapter XII his proceedings shall be void. 5. The relevant portion of Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure may be quoted within advantage: If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things: (j) makes an order Under Chapter XII his proceedings shall be void. 5. It is thus clear that the legislature had in his contemplation a situation where a Magistrate not empowered by law would act in excess of his jurisdiction. But it drew a distinction with regard to the various acts done by the Magistrate which he was not empowered to do. Some of such acts or irregularities which did not go to the root of jurisdiction were Lald down in Section 529 Code of Criminal Procedure and it was mentioned there is that if such acts were done erroneously in good faith the proceedings would not be set aside merely on the ground of the Magistrate not being empowered to do so. But there were other irregularities which were of a far more serious character which have been mentioned in Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure. With respect to these if the Magistrate passed any order which he was not empowered by law the proceedings shall be totally void. As quoted above if the SDM makes an order Under Chapter XII which deals with disputes as to immovable property u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure etc. such order would be void ab initio. It is a nullity. No subsequent conferment of jurisdiction can revive a void order. 6. In this connection we may also consider the meaning of the expression "empowered by law" as used in Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure. Counsel for the opposite party contends that the powers referred to in Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure have to be construed in the light of the IIIrd Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Schedule III defines the powers of the Magistrates, whether they be of 1st class, IInd class or IIIrd class. The contention is that if a Magistrate of a particular class exercises those powers which he is not authorised to do, having regard to the limitations provided in Schedule III in that case alone he should be deemed to have exercised powers in excess of its authority and it was in such cases that his order should be declared null and void. Reference has been made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Raj Mohan Roy Chaudhry v. Prasunna Chandra Chatterji, 5 CWN 686 . In that case it was held that the fact that the subject matter of the dispute was not within the local limits of the SDM who tried the case, would not oust his jurisdiction or render him incompetent to try the case provided that he was vested with a power of a proper class and the order made by him would not on that account be bad. It was further held therein that Section 530(j) refers to a case where the Magistrate is not competent by virtue of the position he holds or the powers vested in him to try a case of the character referred to in Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. With all respect, I am unable to agree with the view expressed in the Calcutta case. The word "empowered in law" in Section 530 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be given such a narrow provisions of Code. As already mentioned Section 145(1) Code of Criminal Procedure authorises the Magistrate to take action only within the local limits of his territorial jurisdiction. The limitation provided in Section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be ignored. In my view, therefore, the expression "empowered by law" refers to the powers of the Court as defined in Schedule III of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is restricted in its application to the territory over which a Magistrate is authorised to exercise that power. I am supported in my view by the observations of Uniyal, J. in Kapil Deo Singh v. State 1966 AWR 548. Learned Counsel for the opposite party placed reliance upon Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal 1961 AWR 665 SC and on its basis be argued that Section 531 Code of Criminal Procedure would apply to this case and the impugned order of the Magistrate should not be set aside unless it is shown that the error has in fact occasioned failure of justice. On facts that case is clearly distinguishable. On facts that case is clearly distinguishable. Without going into a detailed examination of the said case it may be mentioned that in the case before the Supreme Court, the subordinate court which tried the case had jurisdiction only to try certain offences committed by the accused, while there were other offences committed in the course of the same transaction which were beyond the jurisdiction of that court. In those circumstances after considering Sections 235/239 Code of Criminal Procedure their Lordships were of opinion that "the court having jurisdiction to try the offence of conspiracy has also jurisdiction to try an offence constituted by the overt acts which are committed in pursuance of the conspiracy beyond its jurisdiction." I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the submissions made on behalf of the counsel for the opposite party. In my opinion Sri S.N. Dohre, SDM Bhabar had no jurisdiction at all on the date he passed the impugned order to take cognizance of the proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. He has clearly usurped jurisdiction not vested in him by law. The impugned order passed by him is void. 7. I, therefore, accept this reference and quash the impugned order passed by Sri S.N. Dohre, SDM, Bhabar dated 13-1-1971.