JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Defendants are the Petitioners. They have suffered a decree for recovery of money in the hands of the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur. 2. The Plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 720/- from the Defendants on the allegation that the Defendant No. 1 had borrowed 18 putties of paddy on 25-3-1963 from the Plaintiff upon execution of a bond agreeing to repay the same by 5-5-1964 with interest at the rate of 25 percent per annum. The Defendants failed to make the payment. Therefore, the Suit was instituted. 3. The execution of the loan bond was admitted. The advancement of the paddy loan was also accepted, but it was pleaded that on 30-4-1963 there had been a repayment of 16 putties of paddy. It was also contended that the Suit was barred by limitation on the footing that while the loan was of 25-3-1963 the suit was instituted on 4-3-1967. beyond three years from the date of the bond. 4. The learned Trial Judge decreed the suit for a total amount of Re. 493/- with proportionate costs. He found the transaction to be genuine. He negatived the plea of repayment, yet keeping in view the rate of paddy he calculated the Plaintiff's due& in the aforesaid manner. 5. Against the decree of the trial Court the Plaintiff appealed claiming higher rate as also interest pendentilite and future. A Cross-objection was filed by the Defendants challenging the decree of the trial Court. The learned Subordinate Judge has given a decree for the entire amount and has not accepted the defence contention raised in the memorandum of cross-objection. This Civil Revision is directed against the Appellate decree. 6. Two questions have been mainly raised by Mr. Murty. According to him, the claim was barred by limitation. He next contents that, the rate of paddy as calculated in the lower Appellate Court is wholly inappropriate in view of the fact that a prescribed rate has been determined by Government and the Court should have adopted that rate only. Though he also challenged the decree regarding interest pendentelite and future he ultimately did not press it seriously. 7. The loan trepanation is dated 25.3-1963, The suit has been filed on 4-3-1967. There is no dispute at the Bar that the period of limitation prescribed for such a suit is three years. Though he also challenged the decree regarding interest pendentelite and future he ultimately did not press it seriously. 7. The loan trepanation is dated 25.3-1963, The suit has been filed on 4-3-1967. There is no dispute at the Bar that the period of limitation prescribed for such a suit is three years. The question, however, is as to when the period of limitation would commence and what would be the relevant Article of the Limitation Act to apply. Mr. Murty for the Petitioners challenges, the reasonings given in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court to apply Article 28 of the Limitation Act. He contends that 'bond' has a definition in the Limitation Act and the document in question is not a bond. 'Bond' has been defined in Section 2(d) as follows: 'bond' includes any instrument whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be. In the Stamp Act Section 2(5) gives the following definition for that word: 'Bond' includes. (a) any instrument where by a person obliges himself to pay money to another, on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is performed, or is not performed, as the case may be; (b) any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer, where by a person obliges himself to pay money to another; and (c) any instrument so attested, whereby a person obliges himself to deliver grain or other agricultural produce to another; To paddy loan of the kind in question the definition in Section 2(5)(c) of the Indian Stamp Act would certainly have application. But the question is when in a subsequent legislation (Limitation Act of 1908) the definition of the word 'bond' is differently given than the one appearing in the Indian stamp Act (2 of 1899) it must be assumed that the legislature while dealing with the law of limitation omitted intentionally Clauses (b) and (c) appearing in Sub-section (5) of Section 2 of the Stamp Act. There is considerable force in the contention of Mr. There is considerable force in the contention of Mr. Murty that the view adopted in the Lahore High Court in AIR 1925 415 (Lahore) did not pointedly refer to the two definitions and accepted a paddy loan to be a bond for the purposes of the corresponding Article 66 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Some of the commentators are of the view that the Lahore decision has not kept the proper position of law in view. But even if I accept the stand of Mr. Murty on the aforesaid basis I do not think there is any case for limitation. Mr. Murty's contention seems to be that Article 19 would apply to the facts of this case. The suit was for recovery of money lent to the Defendants. The residuary Article 55 is attracted only when there is no provision in any of the other Articles. Mr. Murty contends that Article 19 applies and, therefore, there is no scope for the residuary Article to be applied. 8. In view-of the finding that the translation is genuine I must hold that the learned Appellate Judge has also found that repayment was contemplated by 5-3-1964. Article 19 does not cover such a case. In fact when money lent becomes payable upon demand Article applies. On the other hand, Article 55 deals with compensation for breach of any contract. The stipulation to pay by a particular date when not performed leads to a breach and that Article, therefore, applies. Such a view is supported by good authority. Five learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Hussain Ali Khan v. Hafiz Ali Khan ILR 3 All 600 examined a matter which throws good light. Stuart, C.J. In that case said: Whether, however, the document be regarded as a promissory note or an agreement for money lent, it clearly is a contract, and in my opinion, one within the meaning of Article 116 of the same schedule and being registered, the period of limitation that applies to it is six years from the date when the loan was made. The other learned Judges concurred with that view. Three learned Judges of the Calcutta. High Court in Sreenath Roy v. Peary Mohan AIR 1917 Cal. The other learned Judges concurred with that view. Three learned Judges of the Calcutta. High Court in Sreenath Roy v. Peary Mohan AIR 1917 Cal. 154 also said to the same effect when they held that Article 115 is not limited to the case of damages for breach of contract but is applicable to a case of liability under a simple debt due. A Fun Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mohomed Ghastia v. Siraj-ud-din AIR 1922 Lah. 198 has held that a suit to recover a specified sum of money on a contract is a suit for compensation with in the meaning of Article 115 of the Limitation Act. A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mohammad Hussain Vs. Firm Andani Co., applied Article 115 of the old Limitation Act to a case for recovery of a definite sum of money. Similar was the view expressed by a learned single Judge of the Hyderabad High Court in Phoolchand v. Shesh Gir AIR 1956 Hyd. 12. The learned single Judge brought out the distinction between "compensation" and damages and held that a suit for recovery of a definite sum of money is covered by Article 115 of the Limitation Act of 1908. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Rameshwa Mandal v. Ram Chand Roy ILR Cal. 1033 had also come to the same conclusion. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Dhapai Vs. Dalla and Others, dealing with Article 115 of the old Limitation Act said that "compensation" has the same meaning as it has u/s 73 of the Contract Act and it denotes a sum of money payable to a person on account of the loss or damage caused to him by the breach of contract. There can be no dispute, therefore, that the suit in question would be covered by Article 55 of the Limitation Act and since it has been brought within three years from the date stipulated for performance the suit is within limitation. The Courts below were right in their conclusion that the suit Will within time though their reasoning was not correct. The contention of Mr. Murty, therefore, fails. 9. The next contention of his is that the price of paddy as determined in the lower Appellate Court is excessive. The Courts below were right in their conclusion that the suit Will within time though their reasoning was not correct. The contention of Mr. Murty, therefore, fails. 9. The next contention of his is that the price of paddy as determined in the lower Appellate Court is excessive. There is clear evidence that the paddy was selling in the market at the particular rate at which the decree has been passed. It may be that Government have fixed a prescribed rate. But in view of the clear evidence about the prevailing market rate the basis adopted by the lower Appellate Court cannot be said to be unreasonable. 10. Mr. Murty had also a point to make regarding payability of interest. While not seriously pressing the decree of the lower Appellate Court for pendentelite and future interest Mr. Murty contended that since it was not a suit for recovery of the paddy but was a suit for realisation of the money the rate of interest would not have been 25 percent. The Money Lenders Act allows interest at the higher rate of 25 percent only in case of paddy loan. But if the Plaintiff chooses to convert his loan in kind to a loan in terms of money he must not be entitled to more than 12 percent interest. I do not think I should entertain such a contention. The loan in this case was essentially of paddy. The Defendants had put forward a false plea of discharge of the major portion of the liability. That has been negatived. 11. I would accordingly dismiss this revision as being devoid of any merit. The Plaintiff shall have his costs throughout.