MALIMATH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in this batch of 29 cases are excise contractors, who had secured exclusive privilege of retail vending of toddy, arrack and special Lquor in deferent areas or shops in the old Mysore area of the new State of Mysore. Though in these writ petitions several reliefs have been asked, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, during the course of arguments, restricted their prayer to the refund of education cess paid during the years 1951-52 to 1965-G6 on shop rentals and tree tax in respect oi toddy and on duty of excise m respect of arrack and special liquor, on the ground that the education cess was paid by them under a mistake of law. As common questions arise for determination in all these cases, they were heard together and we are disposing them of by this common order. ( 2 ) IT is not necessary to advert to the history of the levy of education cess on the aforesaid items under the Mysore Elementary Education Act, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the Education Act) and the Mysore compulsory Primary Education Act, 1961, as the same has been referred to in great detail in the decision of this Court between d. Cawasji and Co. v. State of Mysore , (1968) 2 Mys. L. J. 78. which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in state of Mysore v. P. Cawasji and Co , AIR. 1971 SC. 152, in view of the aforesaid decision of this Court, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the collection of education cess by the respondents from the petitioners for the relevant years was clearly illegal and without the authority of law. At one stage, the learned Advocate general appearing for the respondents, took the stand that though the levy of education cess has been declared to be without the authority of law in the aforesaid decision, the Legislature having subsequently validated the levy and collection thereof, the petitioners cannot claim refund on the basis of the earlier decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. After the decision of this Court in D. Cawasji and Co's cose (1) and during the pendency of the appeal by the State before the Supreme Court, the Mysore education Cess (Validation of Levy) Act, 1969 was passed with the object of validating the levy of education cess on items of excise revenue under the Education Act. But, when the learned Counsel for the petitioners brought to our notice another judgment of this Court between h. S. Basappa v. State of Mysore , WP. 1418/69 dt. 6-10-1971 the learned Advocate General fairly conceded that the validation Act does not come to the rescue of the State. This court has, in the csse of Basappa (3), considered the effect of the Validation act and held that though the Act intended to validate the levy, the same has not the effect of validating the levy inasmuch as the grounds of illegality or invalidity of the levy pointed out by this Court in the decision D. Cawasji and Co. 's case (1) have not, in fact, been removed. ( 3 ) WHILE conceding that in the light of the aforesaid decisions of this court and the Supreme Court he cannot justify the levy and collection of education cess, the learnod Advocate General submitted that we should decline to exercise our jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the pround of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. The prayer for refund of education cess paid by the petitioner is in respect of the periods from 1951-52 to 1965-66. the High Court of Bombay seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the sales Tax Officer from recovering the amount fom them, on the ground that S. 21 (4) was ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and that the order of forefeiture was violative of Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 365 of the constitution. On November 28, 1958, the writ petition was dismissed hy a learned single Judge, on the ground that the petitioners, having defrauded other persons, were not entitled to any relief. The appeal filed against the said order by the petitioner was dismissed on the 13th of July, 1959. Before the appeal was dismissed, the Collector of Bombay attached the petitioners' properties. The appeal filed against the said order by the petitioner was dismissed on the 13th of July, 1959. Before the appeal was dismissed, the Collector of Bombay attached the petitioners' properties. Between 3rd August, 1959 and 8th August, 1960, the petitioners paid the amount to the Collector of Bombay In another case before the Supreme Court, the decision of which is reported in AIR 1968 sc. 445 decided on 29-9-1967 the Supreme Court struck down S. 21a (4) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. 1946 as unconstitutional and violative of art. 19 (1) (f ). It is after the Supreme Court rendered that decision that the petitioners filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court, on the 9th February, 1968 claiming refund of the amount paid by them, under S. 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The petitioners alleged that they paid the amount to the Collector under coercion and or by mistake of law and that they discovered the mistake on the 29th September, 1967 when the Supreme Court rendered its decision in another case reported in AIR. 1968 SC, 445. The contention of the petitioners was, for the grounds on which the Supreme Court struck down s. 12a of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946, S. 21 (4) of the Bombay Sales tax Act, 1953 is also liable to be struck down. It is in these circumstances that the Supreme Court had to consider the question as to whether the claim of the petitioners would be barred by limitation, if it were the subject matter of a suit in February, 1968 and if so, whether the petitioners were entitled to any relief under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The writ petition was heard by a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court and was dismissed in accordance with the opinion of the majority. Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, justice Bachawat and Justice Mitter have delivered separate judgments dismissing the writ petition, whereas Justice Sikri (as he then was) and Justice Hegde have delivered separate dissenting judgments. ( 4 ) WE shall now advert to the opinions expressed by the learned Judges who constituted the majority. Chief Justice Hidayatullah has, in para 12 observed as follows:" The petitioner moved the High Court for relief on the ground that the recovery from him was unconstitutional. ( 4 ) WE shall now advert to the opinions expressed by the learned Judges who constituted the majority. Chief Justice Hidayatullah has, in para 12 observed as follows:" The petitioner moved the High Court for relief on the ground that the recovery from him was unconstitutional. He set out a number of grounds but did not set out the ground on which ultimately in another case recovery was struck down by this Court. That ground was that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The question is: can the petitioner in this case take advantage, after a lapse of a number of years, of the decision of this Court? He moved the High Court but did not come up in appeal to this Court. His contention is that the ground on which his petition was dismissed was different and the ground on which the statute was struck down was not within his knowledge and therefore he did not know of it and pursue it in this Court. To that i answer that law will presume that he knew the exact ground of unconstitutionally. Everybody is presumed to know the law. It was his duty to have brought the matter before this Court for consideration. In any event, having set the machinery of law in motion he cannot abandon it to resume it after a number of years, because another person more adventurous than him in his turn got the statute declared unconstitutional, and got a favourable decision. If I were to hold otherwise, then the decision of the High Court in any case once adju- decated upon and acquiesced in may be questioned in a fresh litigation revived only with the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when he abandoned his own litigation. I agree with the opinion of my brethren Bachawat and Mitter, JJ. , that there is no question here of a mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke analogy of the Article in the Limitation Act. . . " ( 5 ) JUSTICE Bachawat has, in para 33 of the judgment, observed as follows:" In my opinion, the petitioners were not labouring undef any mistake of law when they made the pavments. As early as March 1958 they filed a writ petition for restraining the levy under the order dt. . . " ( 5 ) JUSTICE Bachawat has, in para 33 of the judgment, observed as follows:" In my opinion, the petitioners were not labouring undef any mistake of law when they made the pavments. As early as March 1958 they filed a writ petition for restraining the levy under the order dt. March 17, 1958, claiming that the order was invalid and that Section 21 (4) of the Bombav Sales Tax Act, 1953 was ultra vires and unconstitutional. They might not have then known the precise ground upon which the Court subsequently struck down a similar provision of law, but they had discovered presumably under legal advice that they were not legally bound to make any payment. After the writ-petition was dismissed their properties wore attached' and they made the pavments under coercion in 1959 and 1960. The payments were not made under a mistake of law or as pointed out in Shiba Prasad Singh's case (AIR 1949 PC 297) under a mistake in thinking that the money was due. They cannot claim any relief on the ground of mistake. "justice Mitter has, in para 49 of the judgment, observed as follows:" Before the Bombay High Court the petitioners questioned the legality of the order of forfeiture and prayed for quashing it on the ground of the threatened invasion of their fundamental rights. On these facts it is idle to suggest that the petitioners ever entertained any belief or thought that the money was legally due from them. The way they asserted their position under the law precluded any inference that they were ever influenced by a mistake of law or that they ever failed to appreciate the correct position under the law Even after the decision of the Bombay High Court they did not willingly pay up the amounts forfeited but only made disbursements after an attachment had been levied on the business including the tenancy of the premises and its goodwill. They protested against the order of forfeiture not only out of Court but in Court and only paid after the issue of a legal process. They protested against the order of forfeiture not only out of Court but in Court and only paid after the issue of a legal process. " ( 6 ) IT is clear from the opinion expressed by the learned Judges constituting the majority that on the facts of the case, they came to the conclusion that the payment of the amount by the petitioners was not under a mistake of law, even though it is only in a decision rendered later by the Supreme Court that an analogous provision was for the first time declared as void. Though the opinion expressed by the Hon'ble Judges constituting the minority supports the contention of Sri Kolha, we are bound by the opinion expressed by the majority. The principle deducible from the majority opinion of the Supremo Court is that the question as to whether the payment of tax was made under a mistake of law and if so, what is the date on which the mistake was discovered depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and not necessarily on the declaration by a competent Court of law that the levy and collection of tax was without the authority of law. We, therefore, reject the contention of Sri Kolha. ( 7 ) THE amount of education cess, the refund of which the petitioners have sought in these writ petitions was paid by them during the years 1951-52 to 1965-66. The writ petitions have been filed several years after payment, ranging from about 3 years to 16 years. Parties who seek relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution, must approach this Court expeditiously. If the ordinary remedy by way of suit is barred by limitation by the time the party approaches this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it would be proper exercise of discretion to decline to interfere in such cases. Even in cases where the ordinary remedy by way of suit is not barred by limitation, it will be proper exercise of discretes under Art. 226 of the Constitution to decline to interfere in cases where the persons approach this Court after several years of delay, in the absence of special and adequate grounds. Even in cases where the ordinary remedy by way of suit is not barred by limitation, it will be proper exercise of discretes under Art. 226 of the Constitution to decline to interfere in cases where the persons approach this Court after several years of delay, in the absence of special and adequate grounds. ( 8 ) THE learned Advocate General is right in pointing out that this Court in the decision reported in D. Cawasji's case (1), after declaring that the levy of education cess is without the authority of law, directed the "state to refund the education cess paid by the petitioners only within a period of 3 years from the date of filing of the writ petitions, leaving it open to the petitioners to seek remedy by way of suit or other processes -in respect of the education cess amount paid by them prior to 3 years of the filing of the writ petitions. The said decision, as already noticed, has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, When in the previous cases, the parties under similar circumstances were relegated to the ordinary remedy by way of suit in regard to refund claimed for a period beyond 3 years of the filing of the writ petitions, we do not find any good grounds to interfere in these cases filed subsequently. ( 9 ) THERE are serious questions of limitation to be tried in regard to payments made beyond a period of 3 years prior to the filing of the writ petitions. In all writ petitions, except writ petition No. 2672 of 1968, refund of education cess paid beyond a period of 3 years prior to the filing of the writ petitions, have been claimed. Writ Petition No. 2672 of 1968 relates to recovery of education cess paid during the year 1965-66 and was filed on the 25th of July, 1968. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we dismiss all the writ petitions except WP. No. 2672 of 1968, leaving it open to the petitioners to seek their remedy by way of suit or other proceedings in accordance with law, if they so desire. We allow writ petition No. 2672 of 1968 and declare that the petitioner is entitled to refund of the education cess collected from it between 1st July, 1965 and 30th June, 1966 on shop rentals, and tree tax as duty of excise. We allow writ petition No. 2672 of 1968 and declare that the petitioner is entitled to refund of the education cess collected from it between 1st July, 1965 and 30th June, 1966 on shop rentals, and tree tax as duty of excise. The petitioner shall file with respondent 2 a detailed statement of education cess collected from it during the aforesaid period, to the refund of which it is entitled, within a period of one month from today. Respondents shall, within three months from the date of receipt of the statement from the petitioner, determine and pay to the petitioner the amount collected as education cess, to the refund of which it is entitled. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .