ORDER K.C. Puri, J. - This revision petition has been filed by Bashir Ahmad Khan against an order dated 31st July, 1969 passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Faizabad dismissing the appeal preferred by the Petitioner against the judgment and order dated 16th September, 1968 passed by an Extra Magistrate, Faizabad convicting the Petitioner u/s 185 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 55/- for the same. 2. On the report of the sub-overseer of the Nagar Palika, Faizabad the Petitioner was prosecuted for having constructed a house of Khaprail in Sahebganj, Faizabad without leaving a chabutra of 4 feet and without obtaining a building certificate for effecting the said construction. 3. The Petitioner pleaded that no new construction had been made by him and as such he was not required to obtain any sanction for effecting the same. With regard to the Petitioner not having left a chabutra of 4 feet the Petitioner asserted that the very provision under which he was required to leave a chabutra of four feet was beyond the power of the municipality concerned and therefore, even if the Petitioner did not abide by the said provision, he did not commit any offence. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. The first contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the prosecution has failed to establish that the house in question is situated within the "wartman vikasit kshetra" as defined in bye-law No. 1, Clause 46 of the Bye-Laws made under the Municipalities Act. The said bye-law reads as under: "Wartman vikasit kshetra" se arth us kshetra se hai jo municipal seema ke andar ho aur jiska ek bara bhag awas ewam vyapar ke liye vikasit ho chuka ho tatha sadak, jal, sewer aur bijli adi ki samasta suvidhayen uplabdha ho. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, who dismissed the appeal, assessed the evidence led by the prosecution thoroughly and on relying on the statements of the Sub Overseer who had submitted report for the prosecution of the Petitioner found that the construction in question is situated in a locality which comes within the purview of the said definition. I have no reason to disagree with the said finding of fact. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the said definition contemplates that road, water, sewer and electricity etc. I have no reason to disagree with the said finding of fact. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the said definition contemplates that road, water, sewer and electricity etc. should be available in the area in question and it is then and then alone that such an area would fall within the said definition. Stress is laid by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the non-existence of a sewer in the said locality. It is not disputed that roads, water and electricity etc. are available in the locality in which the construction in question exists, but it is urged that sewer is wanting in that locality. No question has been put to the Sub-Overseer to elicit out of him as to whether sewer does or does not exist in the said locality. Even assuming that sewer is non existent in the said locality so far but the other multiple amenities are available in the said locality, the area in question would be deemed to be duly developed and would come within the bye-law in question. The very word "adi" shows that the amenities which have been enumerated in the said bye-law are only illustrative and not exhaustive and if one of the enumerated amenities is nonexistent presently and other multiple amenities are available there and residential buildings as well as commercial buildings are in existence in the area in question, then such an area would come within the ambit of "wartman vikasit kshetra". In these circumstances the said contention fails. 6. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the bye-law No. 16 (Jha) of the bye-laws of the Municipal Board of Faizabad is beyond the power of the said Municipal Board and as such cannot be enforced The said bye-law reads as under: Wartman vikasit kshetra-Uper di gayi talika kewal adhivikasit kshetron men lagu hogi. 6. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the bye-law No. 16 (Jha) of the bye-laws of the Municipal Board of Faizabad is beyond the power of the said Municipal Board and as such cannot be enforced The said bye-law reads as under: Wartman vikasit kshetra-Uper di gayi talika kewal adhivikasit kshetron men lagu hogi. Wartman vikasit kshetron men bhawan yadi kisi bhi chaurai ke marg, sadak ya gali par sthit hai to uske kinaare yadi sampurna agrabhag men kam se kam feet chauri jagah khuli jagah khuli roop men chhori jayegi, yadi bhawan ka pravesh marg sarak ya awas kshetra men vikasit park ya khuli jagah ke samne aur gali ke kinare ho to khule roop men chhori jane wali jagah 5 feet hogi aur is jagah par chahardiwari, chabutra ya bahar ki or khulne wale chhajje, jinki reling 3 feet hogi, se adhik na ho, ko chhorkar kisi prakar ka bhi nirman na hoga. Kintu saath hi yadi nirman ya punarnirman ke samaya makan ke samne wali wartman sarak ki chaurai 12 feet se kam hai to makan ko peechhe hatakar banana hoga taki sadak 12 feet chauri ho jaya aur uske baad yatha apekshit aage ki or jagah chor di jaye. It is provided in the said bye-law that when a building is to be constructed on a road or a lane, then at least 4 feet wide open space shall be left between the building and the road. It is not disputed that an open space as contemplated by the said bye-law has not been left by the Petitioner in between the building in question and the road. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act provides power for making bye-laws for any municipality and List I referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 298 contains the matters with regard to which the municipality concerned is empowered to frame bye-laws. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Section 298 of the U.P. Municipalities Act provides power for making bye-laws for any municipality and List I referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 298 contains the matters with regard to which the municipality concerned is empowered to frame bye-laws. It is further pointed out that in Sub-clause (viii) of Clause (h) of part A of List I it is provided that "any other matter affecting the ventilation or sanitation of the building" and as such the municipality is empowered to make bye-laws in connection with the erection, re-erection or alteration of a building only with regard to a matter or matters which affect the ventilation or sanitation of the building and that the provision concerning the leaving of an open space in between the building and tie road or lane is not a matter of the aforesaid nature. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the word "sanitation" cannot be extended to mean that an open space as observed earlier is to be left because an open space would in no way improve the sanitation of the said building. Sanitation is a very wide word. It is not confined only to the interior of the building. Sanitation contemplates the surroundings of the building as well. Therefore, the provision of having an open space left by the side of the building in between the building and the lane or road may also be necessary for the upkeep of the sanitation of the building concerned. Thus the said sub-clause cannot be said to be beyond the power of the municipal board concerned. It may also be noted here that in Sub-section (1) of Section 298 it is laid down that a board by special resolution...shall make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the municipality consistent with this Act and with any rule for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitant of the municipality and for the furtherance of municipal administration under this Act. This sub-section gives general power for making bye-laws to a municipal board and herein wide powers have been given for making bye-laws for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitant. The word "inhabitant" does not exclude the inhabitants of the building in question. This sub-section gives general power for making bye-laws to a municipal board and herein wide powers have been given for making bye-laws for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitant. The word "inhabitant" does not exclude the inhabitants of the building in question. Bye-law 16 (Jha) referred to above, could very well be framed in exercise of the power provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 298 as well. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that it is only Under Sub-section (2) of Section 298 that the bye-law in question has been framed and therefore, it would be wrong to hold that the said bye-law has been framed in exercise of the power provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 298 as well. In Sub-section (2) of the said section it is specifically provided that "without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by Sub-section (1), the board of a municipality, wherever situated may in the exercise of the said power, make any bye-law described in List I...and the board of a municipality, wholly, or in part, situated in hilly tract may further make, in the exercise of the said power, any bye-law described in List II.... " So the power which is provided in Sub-section (2) is in addition to the power given to a municipal board for making bye-laws Under Sub-section (1) of Section 298. As observed earlier, the power provided in Sub-section (1) is to be exercised by the board for promoting or maintaining the health safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality. Bye-law 16 (Jha) could very well have been framed in exercise of the power contained in Sub-section (1) as well and yet it has been held above that even in exercise of the power contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 298 the said bye-law, i.e. 16 (Jha) could be framed as the word "sanitation" in Sub-clause (viii) of Clause (b) referred to above includes the leaving of an open space in between a building and a road, inasmuch as the sanitary conditions of the building would be benefited by the leaving of an open space in between the building and the road. Thus looking from either angle the bye-law 16 (Jha) has been made in the due exercise of the power vested in the board concerned. 7. Thus looking from either angle the bye-law 16 (Jha) has been made in the due exercise of the power vested in the board concerned. 7. Another contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that no new construction had been made and consequently there was no necessity to obtain sanction of the municipal board for effecting the same. The courts below have concurred that the construction in question was a new construction. That being so, sanction of the board for effecting the same was required and since the Petitioner had not obtained the same, though it is on the record that he had applied for it, consequently he was guilty of making the construction without obtaining requisite sanction. He has consequently been rightly penalized for, firstly, not leaving the requisite open space and secondly, for not obtaining a building certificate for making the construction. 8. It may be mentioned here that the learned Counsel for the Petitioner; inter alia, urged that the Municipal Board, Faizabad itself passed a resolution that their counsel had given them the opinion that bye-law 16 (Iha) was not within the power of the municipal board and therefore, all the cases which were then pending might be compounded. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties does not admit that the Board had any where held that the said bye-law was beyond the power of the municipal board and it is further urged by him that even if such a resolution had been passed the same would 'not take the said bye-law off the statute book and that the counsel for the Petitioner has not pointed out that the Government at any time revoked the said bye-law. Since there is nothing before me to hold that the said bye-law has been taken off the Statute book, the said resolution, even if it be there, only laid down that the cases which were pending might be compounded and 1 am consequently not in a position to hold that the said bye-law has since been withdrawn. It is always open to the Petitioner to approach the municipal board concerned to compound the offence. 9. Pursuant to the above discussion, the petition is dismissed. The stay order is vacated.