M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal raises an important question as to the nature of the power exercised by the Chief Officer of a Borough Municipality while exercising powers under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 (Bombay Act No. XVIII of 1925) (which will hereinafter be referred to as 44the Act ). ( 2 ) THE appellant is Surat Borough Municipality as it was then constituted and the respondent is a citizen of Surat who owned an open land within the municipal limits on which he made some constructions without the requisite permission of the Chief Officer. Two complaints were filed against the respondent for such unauthorized constructions which in one case was of a stable and in the other of two rooms. He was convicted under sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Act in both these cases. The building Superintendent of the Municipality then issued two notices Ex. 51 and 52 for demolition of the unauthorized constructions and two other notices Ex. 53 and 54 intimating that the Municipality would demolish the offending constructions as the respondent had not complied with the requisitions made in the notices. The respondent being aggrieved had filed Regular Civil Suit No. 813 of 1960 in the Court of the learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge Surat in which he contended that the notices were illegal in so far as they were issued in violation of the principle of natural justice meaning that the respondent was not heard and was not given an opportunity to meet the case before the issuance of such notices. It was contended that the Building Superintendent had no powers to issue such notices. The learned trial Judge negatived the second contention and upheld the first one. In defendants Regular Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1964 the learned Assistant Judge Surat has by his decision dated May 5 1966 upheld the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that no opportunity was given to the plaintiff before issuance of the four notices. The learned Judge has thereby confirmed the decree of the trial Court which had declared that the four notices in question were illegal and against principles of natural justice. It is against this decision that this second appeal is directed. ( 3 ) NOW sub-sec. (7) of sec. The learned Judge has thereby confirmed the decree of the trial Court which had declared that the four notices in question were illegal and against principles of natural justice. It is against this decision that this second appeal is directed. ( 3 ) NOW sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 which occurs in Chapter X of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 falls under the second head dealing with powers to regulate buildings etc. Sec. 119 deals with setting back of projecting buildings. Sub-sec. (2) thereof deals with acquisition of land which is within the regular line of a street and open or occupied only by platforms etc. Sub-sec. (3) provides for compensation payable by the Municipality to the owner of any land added to a street under sub-sec. (1) or acquired under sub-sec. (2 ). Sec. 120 deals with setting forward of a building to regular line of street. Sec. 121 prescribes the nature of the construction to be made qua the external roofs and walls of buildings and also provides for the power of the Chief Officer to require removal of roof and wall if inflammable and provides for the penalty for noncompliance etc. Sec. 122 prescribes the level of the buildings. Sec. 123 which is material for the present purpose in sub-sec. (1) requires the permission of the Chief Officer for new construction alteration addition or reconstruction etc. to be made. Sub-sec. (2) gives powers to the Chief Officer to pass orders granting permission with or without appropriate conditions. Sub-sec. (3) gives power to the Chief Officer to revoke the permission or give fresh permission before any work has commenced. Sub-sec. (4) gives powers to the Chief Officer to suspend the work or require further particulars. Sub-sec. (5) gives right to the applicant to proceed with the work in certain cases. Sub-sec. (6) deals with the limit of time of commencement of the work. Sub-sec. (7) provides for a penal action in the shape of a prosecution against a person making construction alteration addition or reconstruction without giving the notice required by sub-sec. (1) or without furnishing any plan information or particular required by or under that section or except as provided in sub-sec. (5) without awaiting or in any manner contrary to such legal orders of the Chief Officer as may be issued under the section or contrary to the provisions of sub-secs. (1) or without furnishing any plan information or particular required by or under that section or except as provided in sub-sec. (5) without awaiting or in any manner contrary to such legal orders of the Chief Officer as may be issued under the section or contrary to the provisions of sub-secs. (5) or (6) or in any other respect contrary to the provisions of the Act or of any bye-law in force thereunder. Sub-sec. (73) in the first para provides that such offender shall be punished with fine which may extend to Rs. 1 0 and in the case of a continuing contravention of any of the aforesaid provisions to an additional fine which may extend to ten rupees for each day during which such contravention continues after conviction for the first such contravention. It provides 16 second part that Chief Officer may:- (A) direct that the construction alteration addition or reconstruction be stopped and (B) upon a conviction being obtained under sub clause (7) by written notice require such construction alteration addition or reconstruction to be altered or demolished in accordance with the provisions of such notice. ( 4 ) IT is with clause (b) of sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Act that I am concerned in the present appeal. ( 5 ) AS aforesaid the Municipality had by the first two notices called upon the respondent to remove the offending constructions and by the latter two notices intimated to the respondent that the Municipality will enter upon the premises and demolish the offending constructions as the respondent had failed to obey the directions. ( 6 ) NOW power to requires person to alter or demolish the offending construction has been given to the Chief Officer under clause (b) of subsec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Act. The power can be exercised only upon a conviction of the person under first part of sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Act being obtained. Even then the power to be exercised in the matter is a discretionary power and the consequences ensuing from the exercise of such power are serious. It is not necessary that in every case the offending construction be ordered to be altered or demolished It may be that in a given case the Chief Officer might find that the construction etc. It is not necessary that in every case the offending construction be ordered to be altered or demolished It may be that in a given case the Chief Officer might find that the construction etc. although made without the necessary permission may be allowed to stand and a post-facto permission may be granted and the construction may thus be regularized or legalized. The exercise of the powers under clause (b) requires the Chief Officer to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The Chief Officer has to discharge his functions in a fair and just manner. Having regard to the frame work of the law conferring this power and the consequences ensuing from the exercise of the powers in my opinion the power is expected to be exercised only after giving a show cause notice to the person who is alleged to have contravened the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 123 of the Act for making construction alteration etc. without the requisite permission for which a conviction has been obtained against him and after hearing him. ( 7 ) IT was contended by Mr. R. M. Vin learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent that the exercise of the powers under clause (b) is an administrative power and not a quasi-judicial power and therefore it was not necessary for the Chief Officer to have issued a show cause notice to the respondent before calling upon him to remove the offending construction. Now as observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in X. R. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 150:- The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred the person or persons on whom it is conferred the framework of the law conferring that power the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power. Following these observations of the Supreme Court in my opinion in order to ensure a just and fair exercise of the powers under clause (b) of sub-sec. (7) of sec. 123 of the Act it is necessary to issue a show cause notice to the person concerned in order that he may have an opportunity of meeting the case and rendering an explanation. It may be that in a given case the facts and circumstances may not justify an action under clause (b) and the Chief Officer may not exercise the power and may vacate the notice or he may regularize or legalise the offending construction or alteration. The very nature of the power which is to be exercised and the consequences which flow from the exercise of the power require that such an opportunity should be given The power to be exercised in such cases is in my opinion a quasi-judicial power. The lower Court was therefore right in taking the view that principles of natural justice were violated in so far as the respondent was not given an opportunity to show cause before ordering him to remove the offending construction. ( 8 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Mr. R. M. Vin asks for certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal. ( 8 ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Mr. R. M. Vin asks for certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal. In my opinion this is not a fit case to grant such a certificate which is accordingly not granted. .