JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, C.J. 1. The fifth respondent in the writ petition is the appellant, the petitioner being the first respondent. The first respondent was a trained teacher in Hindi, and was appointed in a short vacancy for about three months in 1970 in a private High School. The High School had an Upper Primary section also attached to it. For the year 1970-71, the District Educational Officer sanctioned one permanent post of High School Assistant in Hindi, one permanent post of Junior Hindi Teacher and one temporary post of Junior Hindi Teacher in the staff fixation order. Daring 1970-71, the person holding the permanent post of Junior Hindi Teacher by name Unnikrishna Panicker went out for training, so that that place became vacant. The first respondent, who was a trained band, was appointed to that place, eventhough training qualification was not necessary for the post of Junior Hindi Teacher. 2. Unnikrishna Panicker returned after training, when the first respondent had to give place to him, since she was appointed only in the place left by him. In the staff fixation order for 1971-72, the District Educational Officer sanctioned two places of High School Assistant and one place of Junior Hindi Teacher. The matter was taken up in revision suo motu by the Regional Deputy Director, who modified the order of the District Educational Officer and allowed one place of High School Assistant and two places of Junior Hindi Teachers. This meant that the first respondent bad to leave the school, because the appellant, who was senior to the first respondent, was eligible for the post of Junior Hindi Teacher. And against this order, the first respondent filed the writ petition which has given rise to the appeal. A learned Judge allowed the writ petition mainly on the question as to when R.6F in Chap.23 of the Kerala Education Rules came into force. According to the learned Judge, the rule came into force only when the rule was published in the Official Gazette and not when the rule was made. And for coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge relied on the decision of Chinnappa Reddy J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. Narayana Reddy v. The State of A. P. (1969) I Andhra W.R. 77. 3. And for coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge relied on the decision of Chinnappa Reddy J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. Narayana Reddy v. The State of A. P. (1969) I Andhra W.R. 77. 3. R.6 in Chap.23 of the Kerala Education Rules was deleted by notification dated 13th September 1971 published in the Gazette on 12th October 1971; and R.6C to 6M of the same Chapter were made on 3rd July 1971 but published in the Official Gazette only on 3rd August 1971. According to R.12 in Chap.23, staff fixation orders have to be passed by 15th July every year. And therefore, we have to consider which of the rules, viz., R.6 or R.6F, was in force on that date. It is pointed out at this stage by both sides that there is practically no difference between R.6 and R.6F but for the proviso to the latter, which runs "Provided further that in sanctioning posts as per sub-r.(i) to (iii), qualified teachers working against sanctioned posts shall not be affected." If this proviso was in force when the staff fixation was effected on 15th July 1971, the appellant should get the benefit of the proviso: on the other hand, if this proviso was not in force -- in other words, if R.6F was not in force on that date, then the contention of the first respondent should prevail. This will depend upon the question as to when R.6F came into force -- whether on 3rd July 1971 when it was made or only on 3rd August 1971 when it was published in the Gazette. 4. Since the Single Judge, whose judgment is impugned in the appeal, has followed the decision of Chinnappa Reddy, J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, we shall straightaway proceed to consider that decision. In that case, the notification the learned Judge was considering was one on which the promotion of certain officers was effected. 4. Since the Single Judge, whose judgment is impugned in the appeal, has followed the decision of Chinnappa Reddy, J. of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, we shall straightaway proceed to consider that decision. In that case, the notification the learned Judge was considering was one on which the promotion of certain officers was effected. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Harla v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1951 SC 467 where Vivian Bose, J., with whom Mahajan, J. has agreed, has observed that, in the absence of any special law or custom, it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not, even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have acquired any knowledge. The learned Judge has observed further that natural justice required that, before a law became operative, it must be promulgated or published it must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men might know what it was, or, at the very least, there must have been some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge could be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. Vivian Bose, J. has gone still further and observed that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public had no access and to which even their accredited representatives had no access and of which they could normally know nothing would affect their lives, liberty and property was shocking to the judicial conscience. The learned Judge has concluded by stating that promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort was essential. 5. The short facts of this case may also be noted. During the minority of the Maharaj of Jaipur, a Council of Ministers appointed by the Crown Representative was authorised to make laws for the State. On 11th December 1923, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution purporting to enact the Jaipur Opium Act. The Act was "never promulgated or published in the gazette or made known to the public by other means" (in the language of Chinnappa Reddy, J.). And the question was whether "the mere passing of the resolution was sufficient to make it law"; and it was held that it was not. 6. The Act was "never promulgated or published in the gazette or made known to the public by other means" (in the language of Chinnappa Reddy, J.). And the question was whether "the mere passing of the resolution was sufficient to make it law"; and it was held that it was not. 6. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has also referred to the later decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George AIR 1965 SC 722 . In that case the majority judgment was pronounced by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., Subba Rao, J., taking a contrary view. The notification considered in that decision was a notification issued by the Reserve Bank prohibiting import of gold into India. The notification was issued on 8th November 1962, but was published in the Gazette on 24th November only. Thereafter, the respondent before the Supreme Court came to India by air with prohibited gold on his person; and he was proceeded against for contravening the notification. The High Court held that he was not liable, since he bad no knowledge of the notification when he brought gold into India. The State of Maharashtra filed an appeal against that decision; and it was in that appeal that the decision referred to above was given. Before the Supreme Court, two questions were argued, viz , whether mens rea was an essential ingredient of the offence charged under the relevant provision of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the prosecution had established that the respondent knowingly contravened the law in relation to the carriage of the contraband article; and whether the notification, being merely subordinate or delegated legislation, "would be deemed to be in force" not from the date of its issue or publication in the Gazette, but only when it was brought to the notice of persons who would be affected by it. 7. We are not concerned with the first question in this case; and we are concerned only with the second question. In considering this question, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. has referred, inter alia, to the decision of Bailhache, J. in Johnson v. Sargant and Sons (1918) 1 KB 101. Bailhache, J. has held, in a short judgment, that a subordinate legislation conies into operation only on its date of publication and not on the day when it is made. In considering this question, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. has referred, inter alia, to the decision of Bailhache, J. in Johnson v. Sargant and Sons (1918) 1 KB 101. Bailhache, J. has held, in a short judgment, that a subordinate legislation conies into operation only on its date of publication and not on the day when it is made. The reason given for this conclusion by Bailhache, J. is that, in the case of statutes, there is publicity, since the matter is discussed in the Parliament, while, in the case of subordinate legislation, such publicity is lacking. After considering this reasoning, Avyanear, J., has referred to the criticism levelled against this dictum by Prof C. K. Alien in his work Law and Orders, wherein the learned author has stated: "On the face of if, it would seem reasonable that legislation of any kind should not be binding until it has somehow been 'made known' to the public; but that is not the rule of law, and if it were, the automatic cogency of a statute which has received the royal assent would be seriously and most inconveniently impaired. In a solitary case, however, before the passing of the Act of 1946, Johnson v. Sargant, Bailhache. J. held that an order did not take effect until it 'became known'. The reasoning was that statutes at least received the publicity of Parliamentary debate, and that therefore they were, or should be, 'known', but that this was not true of delegated legislation, which did not necessarily receive any publicity in Parliament or in any other way. This was a bold example of Judge-made law. There was no precedent for it, and indeed a decision, Jones v. Robson, which, though not on all fours, militated strongly against the Judge's conclusion, was not cited; nor did the judge attempt to define bow and when delegated legislation 'became known'. Both arguments and judgment are very brief. This was a bold example of Judge-made law. There was no precedent for it, and indeed a decision, Jones v. Robson, which, though not on all fours, militated strongly against the Judge's conclusion, was not cited; nor did the judge attempt to define bow and when delegated legislation 'became known'. Both arguments and judgment are very brief. The decision has always been regarded as very doubtful, but it never came under review by a higher court." (In Jones v. Robson [(1901) I QB 673] it was held that, where there was a provision for giving notice before prohibiting the use of any explosive, which was or was likely to become dangerous, in the opinion of a Secretary of State, the provision as to giving notice was only directory and was not a condition precedent to the coming into operation of the order of the Secretary of State.) After quoting this passage, Ayyangar, J. has gone on to observe. "We see great force in the learned author's comment on the reasoning in Sargant's case. Taking the present case, the question would immediately arise: is it to be made known in India or throughout the world, for the argument on behalf of the respondent was that when the respondent left Geneva on November 27 he was not aware of the change in the content of the exemption granted by the Reserve Bank. In a sense the knowledge of the existence or content of a law by an individual would not always be relevant, save on the question of the sentence to be imposed for its violation. It is obvious that for an Indian law to operate and be effective in the territory where it operates viz., the territory of India, it is not necessary that it should either be published or be made known outside the country. Even if, therefore, the view enunciated by Bailhache, J. is taken to be correct, it would be apparent that the test to find out effective publication would be publication in India, not outside India so as to bring it to the notice of everyone who intends to pass through India. Even if, therefore, the view enunciated by Bailhache, J. is taken to be correct, it would be apparent that the test to find out effective publication would be publication in India, not outside India so as to bring it to the notice of everyone who intends to pass through India. It was "published" and made known in India by publication in the Gazette on the 24th November and the ignorance of it by the respondent who is a foreigner is, in our opinion, wholly irrelevant." (Note the portion underlined by us.) Thus, what has been indicated above is that the criticism of Alien has great force and that the correctness of the reasoning of Bailhache, J. in Sargant's case (1918) 1 KB 101 is doubtful, since it is a solitary decision which has not been tested in a higher court. And Ayyangar, J has said that, even if the view of Bailhache, J. is correct, even then, there was publication in the case before the Supreme Court. 8. In this connection, we may advert to some other learned authors as well; for instance, S. A. de Smith, in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Second Edition, page 130, observes under the heading 'Delegated Legislation'. "The Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, and regulations made thereunder, provide that after a statutory instrument has been made it shall be sent to the Queen's Printer, numbered and (save in so far as part of an instrument may be exempted by a certificate given by the responsible authority) printed and sold. Where any statutory instrument is required to be laid before Parliament after being made, a copy must be laid before both houses and (subject to a special procedure to be followed when it is essential for the instrument to come into operation before being laid) shall be so laid before the instrument comes, into operation. Every statutory instrument must bear on its face the date on which it comes into operation. Normally the date fixed for an instrument to come into operation is some days after the date of laying. Does failure to comply with the rules governing printing and issue, or laying, render the instrument a nullity? Every statutory instrument must bear on its face the date on which it comes into operation. Normally the date fixed for an instrument to come into operation is some days after the date of laying. Does failure to comply with the rules governing printing and issue, or laying, render the instrument a nullity? The predominant view is that an instrument becomes legally operative from the moment that it is 'made' (i.e., made by Her Majesty in Council, or signed by the appropriate Minister or his duly authorised officer), unless a later date for the operation of the instrument has been specified. The proposition that the instrument, having become legally operative when made, will be subsequently invalidated by non-observance of the procedural rules is not readily attractive; it is therefore generally thought that those rules are directory only. The view that the rules governing printing and issue are no more than directory is clearly correct. If breach of these rules deprived the instrument of legal effect, it would have been unnecessary for the Statutory Instruments Act expressly to provide that it shall be a defence to criminal proceedings for contravening an instrument to prove that the instrument has not been issued at the date of the contravention unless the prosecution proves that reasonable steps have previously been taken to bring its purport to the notice of the public or persons likely to be affected or the person charged. This defence presupposes that the instrument is valid before it is issued." And Halsbury's Laws of England. Third Edition, Vol. 36, page 485, Para.733 says: "Ignorantia juris non excusat. Whilst there are, so far as statutory obligations are concerned, no exceptions to the principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse a failure to observe it, the principle is relaxed in relation to obligations imposed by statutory instruments printed and sold by the Queen's Printer. Third Edition, Vol. 36, page 485, Para.733 says: "Ignorantia juris non excusat. Whilst there are, so far as statutory obligations are concerned, no exceptions to the principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse a failure to observe it, the principle is relaxed in relation to obligations imposed by statutory instruments printed and sold by the Queen's Printer. In any proceedings for an offence committed by contravening any such instrument, it is a defence to prove that the instrument had not been issued by Her Majesty's Stationery Office at the date of the alleged contravention unless it is proved that at that date reasonable steps had been taken for the purpose of bringing the purport of the instrument to the notice of the public, or of persons likely to be affected by it, or of the person charged." This paragraph makes it clear that, but for the Statutory Instruments Act, the defence mentioned in the paragraph will not be available. It will also be instructive to note, in this connection, the observation of Ayyangar, J. in Mayer Hans George's case AIR. 1965 SC. 722 that it would be better to have a legislation in India like the Statutory Instruments Act of 1946 of the United Kingdom: but for such a legislation, it is clear from the reasoning of Ayyangar J., that subordinate legislation will take effect from the date on which it is made and the absence of publication will not invalidate it. 9. At this stage, we wish to observe that we confine our attention to a case like the one before us, viz., where the notification concerned is one the contravention of which is not an offence. (The position was the same in the case before Chinnappa Reddy, J.) This distinction is apparent in the discussion' of Ayyangar, J. in the Supreme Court decision as well as in decisions like Lim Chin Aik v. Reginam (1963) I All ER 223 PC (We do not discuss Lim Chin Aik's case.) In a case where the contravention of the notification is an offence, two maxims of law appear to conflict: one of the maxims is actus non facit roun nisi mens sit rea and the other maxim is ignoranda juris non excusat. The first maxim lays down that in all offences mens rea or the guilty mind is an essential ingredient. The first maxim lays down that in all offences mens rea or the guilty mind is an essential ingredient. That will depend upon the knowledge that the act concerned is an offence, which will again depend upon the publication of the subordinate legislation. And that ingredient can be displaced or ousted only by appropriate terms in the law or by the nature of the subject matter of the law. In other words, until such displacement or ouster is established by the language of the law or the nature of its subject matter, mens rea or guilty mind is an essential ingredient of the offence. The other maxim lays down that ignorance of law is no excuse: every citizen is presumed to know the law of his country. This apparent conflict, we reiterate, can arise only in a case where the contravention of the notification concerned is a criminal offence. In a case like the one before us (the position, we repeat, was the same before Chinnappa Reddy, J. too), where the contravention of the notification or the subordinate legislation does not create a criminal offence, the principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient of an offence does not arise. The result is that, in such a case, the other maxim, viz., ignorantia juris non excusat, must have its full play. The result again is that, in a case like this, the mere making of the subordinate legislation is sufficient to give validity to it: publication is not necessary for bringing it into force or giving it validity. Of course, if the subordinate legislation itself or the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made lays down that the subordinate legislation will take effect only from a notified date, certainly the subordinate legislation can have effect only from such notified date. (A legislation like the Statutory Instruments Act of the United Kingdom, we reiterate, is necessary, if a different result is required.) If no such date is prescribed, then the principle pointed out by Allen and the other learned authors and also approved by Ayyangar, J. in Mayer Hans George's case AIR 1965 SC 722 must prevail, viz., the rule that the subordinate legislation comes into force on the date on which it is made. We may also point out that the facts in Harla's case AIR 1951 SC 467 were different: the Jaipur Opium Act could not have been said to have been made: there was only a resolution by the Council of Ministers. And we may also add that this case does not appear to have been considered in Mayer Hans George's case AIR 1965 SC 722 . 10. At this stage, one observation of the Single Judge has to be noted. The learned Judge has referred to the preamble of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959, wherein it is stated that the Rules framed under S.36 of the Kerala Education Act "shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of these Rules". From this the learned Judge has concluded that the Rules made under S.36 will be effective only if published in the Gazette. We wish to point out that the effect of this provision in the preamble is not this: the effect of the preamble is that, if provision is made for the rules or particular roles in the rules to come into force on a particular date or dates, then the Rules or the particular rules will come into force only on that date or those dates. We do not think that this provision means that the Rules will come into force only on a notified date, and if no date is notified, the Rules will not come into force at all. 11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the decision of the Single Judge requires variation in view of the fact that the proviso to R.6F of Chap.23 of the Kerala Education Rules came into force on 3rd July 1971 when it was made and not on 3rd August 1971 when it was published in the Gazette. 12. The appeal is consequently allowed, the order of the Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. And we pass no order regarding costs.