JUDGMENT T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. 1. The second appeal raises a nice question of law. 2. Defendants 2, 4 to 6 and 8 to 14 in O. S. 132 of 1963 on the file of the Munsiff's Court of Nadapuram are the appellants. The suit is filed in the following circumstances. 3. The plaint property belongs in jenm to the Puthravakasom tavazhi of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant, the plaintiff being the karnavan of the tavazhi since 15th of October, 1949. The prior Karanavan of the tavazhi Chathu Vaidyar had demised the plaint property and two other items belonging to the tavazhi on kanam on 26-8-1930 to Pokkinan. The 7th defendant who is a junior member of the tavazhi had filed O. S. 39 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tellicherry to set aside the kanam and to recover possession of the properties therein against defendants 1 to 6 who were impleaded as defendants 2 and 4 to 8 and the kanamdar. The occupation of the building in the plaint property by these defendants was admitted in O. S. 39 of 1951. Defendants 1 to 6 contended that they had been in possession of the plaint property even prior to the kanam and they are not liable to be dispossessed even if the kanam is set aside. The plaintiff in O. S. 39 of 1951, that is the 7th defendant submitted that he would work out his claims against defendants 1 to 6 in a separate suit and in view of this submission the suit was decreed leaving open the rights of defendants 1 to 6 in the plaint property. In execution of the said decree the kanamdar was dispossessed on 14-9-1953. 4. Thereafter, the 7th defendant filed O. S. 36 of 1954 in the Munsiff's Court, Nadapuram against defendants 1 to 6 for recovery of possession of the plaint property. Chathu Vaidyar was impleaded as the 7th defendant in that suit. The Trial Court dismissed the suit by Ex. B1 judgment. The 7th defendant in the suit giving rise to the second appeal filed A. S. 325 of 1957 on the file of the Sub court, Badagara impleading defendants 1 to 6 and Chathu Vaidyar as respondents. The sub court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and decreed O. S. 36 of 1954. The decision of the Sub Court is Ex. B2. The sub court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and decreed O. S. 36 of 1954. The decision of the Sub Court is Ex. B2. Defendants 1 to 6 filed S. A. No. 1051 of 1957 against Ex. B2. But in that second appeal the plaintiff in O. S. 36 of 1954 that is the present 7th defendant was alone impleaded and Chathu Vaidyar was not made a party. This court by Ex. B3 Judgment set aside Ex. B2 and restored Ex. B1. 5. In pursuance to Ex. B2, the 7th defendant recovered possession of the plaint property from defendants 1 to 6. After Ex. B3 reversing" Ex. B2 defendants 1 to 6 took steps to recover possession of the plaint property from the 7th defendant by way of restitution. It was at that stage the present suit was instituted for the issue of permanent injunction to restrain defendants 1 to 6 from taking restitution proceedings based on Ex. B3 on the ground that it is not binding on the plaintiff's tavazhy. The suit was concurrently decreed by the courts below and the second appeal challenges the correctness of those decisions. 6. The above facts are admitted. It is also admitted that the plaint property has been allotted to the 7th defendant for maintenance from the tavazhy and that he has got the right to be in possession of the property. 7. The plaintiff has been granted a decree on the ground that Ex. B3 is not binding on the tavazhi of the plaintiff and the 7th defendant because of the non impleading of Chathu Vaidyar in S.A. 1051 of 1957. Before dealing with this question, it is necessary to note one further fact. 8. The 7th defendant had in O. S. 36 of 1954 obtained sanction under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., to institute the suit on behalf of all the members of the tavazhi. The courts below took the view that Chathu Vaidyar was a necessary party to Ex. B3 and because of his non impleading it will not bind the tavazhi of which the plaintiff is the karnavan. According to the lower courts the fact that the 7th defendant had obtained permission under O.1, R.8, C.P.C. in O.S. 36 of 1954 cannot effect the question. 9. B3 and because of his non impleading it will not bind the tavazhi of which the plaintiff is the karnavan. According to the lower courts the fact that the 7th defendant had obtained permission under O.1, R.8, C.P.C. in O.S. 36 of 1954 cannot effect the question. 9. P. R. Sundara Aiyar in his book on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law observed at page 152: "In order to conserve the tarwad property it had been established by judicial decisions that an anandravan "is entitled to institute a suit to obtain a declaration that any alienation made or any charge created by the Karanavan is not binding on the tarwad. To hold otherwise, would indeed be practically to nullify his right in the tarwad property as he is not entitled to sue for partition. The question is fully discussed in Moidin Kutty v. Krishnan (1887) ILR Madras 322. In such a suit although it may be instituted only by a single anandravan, it is advisable that all the members of the tarwad should be made parties, as otherwise the judgment will not be binding on those who are not parties, and it would be open to them, in case the alienation is held to be binding on the tarwad, to institute fresh suits to establish that the alienation was improper." The right of a junior member to redeem and recover possession of tarwad property outstanding on mortgage is different from his right to impeach an alienation of tarwad property. In the former case his right is restricted in the sense that he can redeem tarwad property only when the interest of the tarwad as a whole demand such redemption and that he is obliged to file the suit because of the failure of the karnavan to redeem. There is no comparison between the two rights to be exercised by a junior member. It is no doubt true that when at the instance of a junior member an alienation is set aside, the karanavan of the tarwad is entitled to be put in possession of the property as right to possession and management of the tarwad properties is always vested in the karanavan and the junior member has no such right. This is only possible when the karanavan expresses his willingness to take possession of the tarwad properties. This is only possible when the karanavan expresses his willingness to take possession of the tarwad properties. But a difficulty may arise in cases where a karanavan is not a party to the suit. There is no absolute prohibition against a decree being granted to a junior member for recovery of possession of the alienated property. He is then bound to keep possession of the property on behalf of the tarwad and subject to its being made available for the karanavan. It may so happen that if a karanavan happens to be a defendant in a suit instituted by a junior member to set aside an alienation and a decree for possession is granted to him he may fail to take the necessary steps to recover possession of the property by colluding with the alienees. Nothing, therefore, prevents the court from straightaway passing a decree in favour of a junior member or in authorising the junior member to recover possession of the property if there is default to recover possession by the karanavan within a time to be specified by the court. The basic principle in Marumakkathayam Law is that when an alienation is effected or a decree is passed against a tarwad and the junior members are unwilling to stand by it they are entitled to an opportunity to conserve the interests of the tarwad by setting aside the alienation or the decree. This right is inherent in every member of the tarwad. But at the same time the alienee or the decree holder should be protected from repeated actions from every member of the tarwad in the sense that it is the duty of the court to see that the alienee or the decree holder should not be allowed to be harassed by repeated litigations from the members of the tarwad. But at the same time the alienee or the decree holder should be protected from repeated actions from every member of the tarwad in the sense that it is the duty of the court to see that the alienee or the decree holder should not be allowed to be harassed by repeated litigations from the members of the tarwad. It is, therefore, the duty of the junior member to institute the suit on behalf of the tarwad in such a way that the tarwad also is properly represented therein and this is achieved by impleading all the members of the tarwad or by impleading the karanavan alone to represent himself and all the members of the tarwad in which case the decision in the action instituted by the junior member will be binding on the other members of the tarwad who will be prevented from instituting a suit against the decree holder or the alienee for the same relief. The right to impeach an alienation of tarwad property or decree obtained against a tarwad was conceded to a junior member even though he had no statutory right to compel a partition of the tarwad properties. Now that the several, statutes have recognised a compulsory partition a junior member has a right under law to conserve the interests of the tarwad and its properties. It is not necessary for me to discuss whether this right of a junior member is his personal right or whether it is a right which is bound to be exercised on behalf of the tarwad. It is enough that in whatever capacity he exercises the right it must be exercised in such a way that the alienee or the decree holder as the case may be may not be harassed further by actions coming from other members of the tarwad. I do not think that it can be laid down as a proposition of law that a junior member for the purpose of exercising a right to impeach an alienation of the tarwad property should always implead the karanavan also as a defendant to the suit. The karanavan is not a necessary party, though he may be a proper party. The right which the junior member is exercising is not only on his own behalf but for the benefit of the tarwad as such. The karanavan is not a necessary party, though he may be a proper party. The right which the junior member is exercising is not only on his own behalf but for the benefit of the tarwad as such. The right to institute a suit to set aside an alienation or a decree is a personal right in the sense that it can be exercised by any individual member of the tarwad even without the consent of the karanavan or the other members of the tarwad. If a junior member has no such right then the institution of a suit after obtaining permission under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., will not help him. But in cases where a junior member has got a right to institute a suit to protect the interests of a tarwad when permission to him has been granted under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., his suit should be deemed to have been instituted as representing all the members of the tarwad including the karanavan. 10. Ex. B2 grants recovery of possession of the property only to the 7th defendant and not to Chathu Vaidyar. There is also nothing therein to show that the 7th defendant was allowed recovery of possession on behalf of his tavazhi. Chathu Vaidyar did not choose to file an appeal against Ex. B1 dismissing the suit. It was only the 7th defendant who had filed the appeal against Ex. B1. In view of the terms of Ex. B2, it is very doubtful whether Chathu Vaidyar could have executed the same and recovered possession of the property even if there was default on the part of the 7th defendant. 11. It was not contended neither it is possible to contend that to have Ex. B2 set aside it was enough to have impleaded Chathu Vaidyar alone as the respondent. It appears to me that when Chathu Vaidyar as a defendant did not contest the right of the 7th defendant to institute the suit on behalf of his tavazhy it has to be held that for the purpose of those proceedings Chathu Vaidyar held out the 7th defendant as a person competent to file the litigation on behalf of the tarwad. 12. 12. In the case before me the position is stronger because of the sanction accorded to the 7th defendant under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., to continue the suit as a representative one on behalf of all the members of the tavazhi. Since Ex. B2 decree stands only in favour of the 7th defendant I do not think that the non impleading of Chathu Vaidyar as an additional respondent is such a vital defect as to render Ex. B3 not binding on the tavazhy. 13. It is well settled law that once sanction is given to the plaintiff under O.1, R.8, C.P.C., for the purpose of a suit it is available till the end of the proceedings. 14. There is no plea in this case that Ex. B3 is the result of any collusion or fraud practised on the tarwad by the 7th defendant and the appellants in Ex. B3. 15. I, therefore, hold that Ex. B3 is binding on the tavazhi of the plaintiff and the decisions of the courts below cannot be sustained. I set aside the same and allow the second appeal, dismissing the plaintiff's suit. I make no order as to costs.