Prakash Narain ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of eviction on the ground of unauthorised Sub-letting passed by the Controller on a petition moved by respondent No. 1 herein under section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 against the appellant and the Vaish Co-operative Urban Bank limited. The allegations of respondent No. 1 herein (hereinafter called the landlord) was that it had let out its premises, sawhney Sadan at P-B, Netaji Subhash Marg, Darya Ganj, Delhi to the Vaish Co-operative Urban Bank Limited (hereinafter called the tenant) on a monthly rent of Rs 150. 00. It was alleged that the said tenant had sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the demised premises to the Vaish Co-operative Adarsh Bank Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) after 9th day of June, 1952 without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. Indeed the specific time when [his was done was stated in the petition to be since March, 1964. Notices dated 4th December, 1964 and 2nd September, 1964 were stated in the petition to have been sent by the land lord to the Assistant Registrar and the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Delhi respectively. By the first notice a warning was given by the land-lord that no sub-letting should be done by the tenant and by the second communication the tenancy was terminated on account of unauthorisedly sub-letting, assigning or parting with the possession of the demised premises. ( 2 ) IT is the common case of the parties that the tenant was and the appellant is a co-operative society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act as extended to Delhi. It is proved on record and both the Controller as well as the Tribunal have founded as a fact that the tenant co-operative society decided and resolved to divide itself into two societies namely Vaish Co-operative Urban Bank Limited and Vaish Co-operative Adarsh Bank Limited in March 1963 in accordance with the provisions of section 15 A of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act. After completion of the necessary conditions for the divisions, the two new co-operative societies were registered on 4th March, 1964. A copy of the certificate of registration of the appellant is exhibit A-3 on the record. After completion of the necessary conditions for the divisions, the two new co-operative societies were registered on 4th March, 1964. A copy of the certificate of registration of the appellant is exhibit A-3 on the record. The demised premises, it is admitted, are in possession of the appellant since 4th March, 1964. The effect of the registration of the two new co-operative societies was that on such registration, the registration of the old society (the tenant in this case) shall be deemed to have been cancelled and the society shall be deemed to be dissolved from the date of such cancellation, as laid down in. sub section 6 of section 15-A of the said Act. The interesting question of law that has arisen is whether in such circumstances she tenants who ceases to exist in the eye of law simuitaneous to the coming into existence of the so called sub-tenant, (the appellant in this case) could have sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the demised premise? in favour of the appellant within theeaning of clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section 1, section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. ( 3 ) BOTH the Controller and the Tribunal were of the opinion that clause (b) of the proviso to section 14 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was attracted on the facts and circumstances of the case. The contention of the appellant that in order to constitute a transfer both the transferor and the transferee must be in existence and inasmuch as in this case the transferor has ceased to exist there was no transfer of demised premises so as to fall within the ambit of the aforesaid clause (b) of the proviso to section 14 (1) was repelled. It was held that even if there was no tenant in existence an order for recovery of possession could be passed against the sub-tenant, namely, the appellant. ( 4 ) IN this Court also Mr. S. N. Chopra, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that in order that there is a sub-letting or an assignment or a transfer of the possession of the demised premises there must be a person who does it to another. ( 4 ) IN this Court also Mr. S. N. Chopra, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that in order that there is a sub-letting or an assignment or a transfer of the possession of the demised premises there must be a person who does it to another. Relying on the effect of sub-section 6 of section 15a of the said Cooperative Societies Act, it was urged that in as much as the appellant in the eye of law came into existence on 4th March, 1964 and simultaneously, on its colling into existence the tenant ceased to exist in the eye of law there could not be any sub-letting, assignment or handing over of the possession effected by the tenant to the appellant. It was contended that prior to 4th March, 1964 the tenant could not hand over possession to the appellant or sub-let or assign the demised premises to it inasmuch as prior to registration the appellant had no existence in the eye of law nor could any one act on its behalf; and once the appellant cane into existence on registration and someone could act on its behalf, the tenant simultaneously ceased to exist and so nobody could act oa its behalf to affectuate sub-letting, assignment or parting with possession. It follows, therefore, according to the learned counsel, that clause (b) of the proviso to section 14 (I) of the Rent Act is not attracted for it postdates a positive act by the tenant inasmuch as the tenant has to, on or after the 9th. day of June, 1952, sub-let, assign or otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any part of the demised premises without obtainining the consent in writing of the landlord. ( 5 ) MR. K. L. Sethi the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, the land-lord, urged that irrespective of whether the tenant has ceased to exist or not an order of possession can be made against the sub-tenant. In support of this contention he has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in South Asia Industries Private Limited Vs. Sarup Singh and others 1966 DLT 149. This is a decision on which the Tribunal had also relied to uphold similar contention made before it. In my view the opinion of the Supreme Court in this decision is not attracted in the facts of this case. Sarup Singh and others 1966 DLT 149. This is a decision on which the Tribunal had also relied to uphold similar contention made before it. In my view the opinion of the Supreme Court in this decision is not attracted in the facts of this case. The Supreme Court was dealing with a case in which the tenant had transferred the lease to the appellant and put the latter into possession. Alleging that this transfer had been made without their consent, the landlords had moved the Controller for an order of possession under clause (b) of the proviso to sub-secticn 1 to section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, impleading the tenant as well as the sub-tenant as respondents. While the application tor eviction was pending M/s Allen Berry and Co. , the tenant, went into the liquidation and was in due course dissolved. Its name was thereupon struck off from the records of the proceedings. It was urged that no order of possession could be made in the absence of the tenant. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that where the tenant assigning the lease becomes extinct, the Court would be fully justified in passing an order for recovery of possession against the assignee alone. The question here is whether assignment or sub-letting at all took place while in the decision cited the tenant became extinct after the assignment of the demised premises. In that case the assignor and the assignee were both in extence at the same point of time when the assignment was made. ( 6 ) MR. Sethi contended that admittedly the landlord s tenant was not in occupation of the demised premises and it was its successor who was in possession of the demised premises. The successor not being the tenant or a sub-tenant put into possession with the written consent of the land-lord, it must be assumed that the tenant had sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the demised premises. It was urged that as the tenant and the appellant were separate legal entities and did not have a common business. so, on the ratio of the decision of B. C. Misra, J. in S. A. O. 210 of 1968 D. /29. 10. 71 1971. It was urged that as the tenant and the appellant were separate legal entities and did not have a common business. so, on the ratio of the decision of B. C. Misra, J. in S. A. O. 210 of 1968 D. /29. 10. 71 1971. RLR (N) 43, it must be held that in as much as the tenant did not retain any legal interest in the tenanted premises and the appellant was doing its exclusive business therein a legal presumption arises that the legal possession has been parted with by the tenant unless the tenant establishss it to the contrary. The facts of the decision relied upon were that the father who was a medical practitioner was a tenant of the premises. In a portion of those premises the sons were carrying on business under the title of Bhadwar Motors and the premises had even been partitioned. The plea of the father that he and his sons constitute a joint Hindu family and so the business conducted by the sons was a joint family business was not accepted on the ratio that the fact that the appellants constitute a joint Hindu family did not mean that their property or business was also joint. It was found as a fact that both the father and the business concern of the sons leapt separate accounts which were not produced to prove that it was joint business and the father was paying income tax separately on his professional income as a medical practitioner. There fore, the ratio of this judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case for basically in this case also the assignor and the assignee were both in existence. ( 7 ) ON a reading of clause (b) of the proviso to section 14 (b) of the Rent Act, it is apparent that it is the tenant s overt act of sub letting, assignment or parting with possession without the consent in writing of the land-lord which gives a cause of action to the land-lord to move an application for an order of possession against the tenant or his assignee or both. The committing of this overt act pre-supposes the existence of the person whose act gives the cause of action. The committing of this overt act pre-supposes the existence of the person whose act gives the cause of action. If the effect of law is that the tenant ceases to exist simultaneously with the coming into existence of the appellant, it follows that the tenant was not in a position nor had a legal capacity to do something which may be called the overt act which in turn gives rise to a cause of action to the land-lord to file an application to recover possession. It may be a legislative lacuna but a reading of clause (b) of the proviso to section 14 (1) of the Rent Act shows that the tenant has to sub-let, assign or part with possession and for that it is necessary that when the sub-letting, assignment or parting with the possession takes place, the tenant should be in existence in the eye of law otherwise it is not possible for a dead person in the eye of law to commit the overt act giving the land-lord a cause of action to file an application for recovery of possession under this provision of law. I, therefore, hold that the tenant has not sub-let, assigned or parted with the possession of the demised premises without the consent of the land-lord in writing. Indeed the tenant having ceased to exist on 4th March, 1964 no consent could be obtained by it. In view of the above finding it is obvious that application under clause (b), of the proviso to section 14 (1) of the Rent Act was misconceived. ( 8 ) MR. Sethi urged that no appeal is appetent by a sub-tenant. I find no force in this contention. An order of dis-possession has been made against the appellant. Section 38 of the Rent Act speaks of appeals to the Tribunal and section 39 which speaks of second appeal to the High Court does not mention either land-lord or the tenant or the subtenant as the person competent to file an appeal. These sections say that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller or that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by the Tribunal respectively. ( 9 ) MR. These sections say that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller or that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by the Tribunal respectively. ( 9 ) MR. Sethi also urged that neither written statements nor the appeals were filed by a competent person in as much as M. Bansal was disqualified to be a member of the co-operative sociely within the meaning of clause 7 (V) of the bye-laws of the appellant. This bye-law speaks of membership of a member of a cooperative society being terminated on being convicted of a criminal offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude. On a reading of the relevant bye-laws, it is obvious that it is prospective. Bansal admittedly was convicted prior to the appellant coming into existence, as would be aparent on a reading of the reported decision J. S. Bansal vs. Delhi Administration A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1577. There is thus no force in this contention. ( 10 ) LASTLY Mr. Sethi contended that the appellant has not validly come into existence in as much as the notices postulated by section 15 A of the said Co-operative Societies Act were not given to the land-lord. This is a matter which cannot be agitated in these proceedings. Apart from this, admittedly the appellant was registered on 4th March, 1964 and unless that registration itself is struck down by competent Court or authority the original certificate of registration, copy of which is exhibit A-3 is conclusive evidence that the society is duly registered as laid down in section 11 of the Bombay Co-operative SocietiesAct. ( 11 ) MR. Sethi also urged that there can be no inheritance of tenancy as the tenancy of the tenant was statutory after service of notice of termination of the contractual tenancy on it. The question of inheritance does not arise here. Apart from this the notice of termination of contractual tenancy, exhibit A-8, is not in my opinion a notice valid for the purpose of terminating the tenancy. In any case there was no evidence on record to show that there was any inheritance of tenancy rights.